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Abstract 
Following telecommunications industry deregulation in United Kingdom and 
the introduction of competition in the United States of America‟s long distance 
telecommunications services in the 1980s, telecommunications industries in other 
developed and developing countries have been deregulated. Contributing to the 
deregulation are the influences of globalization, technological advancement, fiscal 
policy restraint, lending institutions‟ requirements, regulatory costs curtailment and 
the desire for improved performance. However, the benefits of deregulation remain 
uncertain. The motivation for this research is to investigate the efficiency and 
productivity performance of telecommunications industries in deregulated 
environments. Comparatively analyzing the experiences of Canada and Nigeria, this 
research addresses two broad questions. First, how did deregulatory policies 
influence competitiveness in the industries in the two countres? This was addressed 
by: (i) investigating the forces that drove deregulation, (ii) exploring the similarities 
and differences in the deregulatory milieu in the two countries, and (iii) evaluating 
competitiveness in the industry. Second, how did the industries perform in the 
deregulated environments? The outcomes shed lights on the efficiency, productivity 
and the influence of environmental factors on efficiency performance. It also imbues 
the applicability of structure-conduct-performance model in the understanding of 
deregulatory outcomes.  
The approach adopted entailed empirical analysis of the two countries in the 
context of 17 other telecommunications industries from High Income Countries and 
Middle Income Countries over a 13-year period (2001–13). The study used non-
parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist Productivity Index 
to assess the efficiency and productivity changes and a random effect (RE) panel 
Tobit model was used to evaluate the effect of environmental factors on efficiency 
performance. Furthermore, responses from industry participants were obtained to 
complement the DEA findings. The DEA results suggest that operating in 
deregulated environment improves efficiency and productivity performance; a 
finding validated by the views of the industry participants involved in the study. The 
two countries, though inefficient, showed improved technical efficiency. The 
productivity analysis revealed both countries experienced productivity growth but it 
has slowed. Also, the Mann-Whitney test showed that the two countries have 
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comparable productivity change. The Canadian telecommunications industry 
experienced technological progress and efficiency improvement, but the productivity 
change was mainly due to efficiency improvement attained through managerial 
effectiveness. On the other hand, the Nigerian telecommunications industry 
experienced technological retardation but efficiency progression. Its productivity 
change was due to efficiency improvements attained through enhanced operational 
scale.  
The investigation of the influence of environmental factors on efficiency 
reveals that the number of years in deregulation has an insignificant negative 
influence on technical and scale efficiency. However, as a quadratic term, the effect 
is positive but remained insignificant. Revenue per subscription positively influences 
technical and scale efficiencies and is statistically significant. This indicates that 
higher prices may result in better technical efficiency and operational scale. Industry 
concentration level was found to have a positive but not statistically significant effect 
on technical and scale efficiencies and a negative but also statistically insignificant 
effect on pure technical efficiency. This signifies that telecommunications industry 
concentration is not consequential to performance. Capital expenditure to revenue 
ratio has no significant influence on technical efficiency but a statistically significant 
negative influence on scale efficiency. This signifies that scale efficiency could be 
attained by optimizing capital expenditure through full capacity utilization and by 
avoiding infrastructure duplication. Labour productivity influences technical 
efficiency but has an unimportant negative effect on scale efficiency. This implies 
that technical efficiency could be enhanced through labour productivity 
improvements. Also, change in real gross domestic product per capita has a negative 
and insignificant effect on technical and scale efficiencies. However, as a quadratic 
term, it has significant positive influence on scale efficiency, suggesting that 
countries with higher economic growth and wealth would display better scale 
efficiency performance. Inflation has significant positive influence on technical and 
scale efficiency performance. The level of development has insignificant relationship 
with technical and scale efficiency scores, implying that it is not an essential 
determinant of performance. The interaction of labour productivity and capital 
intensity undermines technical efficiency, signifying that efficiency improvement 
through labour productivity and increased use of capital is not sufficient to neutralize 
efficiency loss from increased capital intensity. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background 
In broad terms, the telecommunications industry is an industry that allows for 
the transfer of data and/or information between parties through a variety of channels 
(e.g., radio, television, cable, satellite communication, Internet and telephone) using 
wired or wireless means (Gupta, 2008). The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (2011) confines the description to communications through 
telephony (i.e., wireless and wired) and the Internet. A more restricted view limits 
the description to telephony using wireless and wired means (Gu & Lafrance, 2012; 
CRTC, 2013). In this research, telecommunications is construed as the use of wired 
or wireless means to transfer information over a distance. Firms providing these 
services are viewed as telecommunications firms, and the industry as the 
telecommunications industry. 
Traditionally, the telecommunications industry in most countries relied on a 
regulated monopoly due to the presumption of cost disadvantages associated with 
having more than one firm in the industry. Aside from the economic argument, the 
justification for government involvement in the industry via state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) centred on promoting socio-economic interests and ensuring national security 
(Kerf & Geradin, 1999; OECD, 2002a). However, over the last three decades, the 
sway of economic and policy reforms, the integration of the global economy, rapid 
technological advancement and the poor performance of the industry have 
contributed to the shift away from the monopoly model. Conspicuously, a monopoly 
is touted as impeding performance and creating and sustaining an incumbent‟s 
„market power‟ by according it the ability to maintain prices above what it would 
have been in a competitive environment (Uukkivi, Ots, & Koppel, 2012, p. 225). 
Seeking better performance, governments in various countries have introduced 
deregulatory policies to initiate competition and instill market discipline that 
conditions firms in the industry to make rational decisions. 
The industry has changed significantly over the past three decades. Following 
the deregulation in the UK and the US in the 1980s, major industrialized nations and 
many developing countries have deregulated their telecommunications industries. 
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Primarily, efficiency and productivity are performance indicators that provide insight 
on the effectiveness of firms in allocating and transforming inputs into outputs. 
Studies show performance improvements in deregulated environments but the 
findings have not been consistent across all of the studies and the countries 
investigated. This research seeks to provide additional evidence on the effects of 
operating in deregulated environment through a comparative analysis of the 
performances of the Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications industries. Canada‟s 
Telecommunications Act, 1993 aimed to enhance the performance and 
competitiveness of the industry by allowing it to rely on market forces and by 
eliminating entry barriers. The industry plays an important role in the Canadian 
economy with the 10 largest providers responsible for 95% of the revenue in the 
industry (CRTC, 2014). In 2013 the industry employed 111, 338 people and 
accounted for 2% of Canada‟s gross domestic product (GDP) (Statistics Canada, 
2016). Another salient outcome of the industry in Canada is that it is saturated due to 
subscriptions growth decline and stagnant teledensity despite investment in the 
sector. Similar to Canada, the Nigerian telecommunications industry was deregulated 
to increase competition and to ensure the sector‟s performance met customers‟ needs. 
However, unlike Canada, the industry witnessed significant price decline and a 
phenomenal increase in subscriptions. Its teledensity of 91 in 2013 suggests more 
potential for growth. In addition, the industry attracted foreign direct investment and 
accounted for 7.8% of Nigeria‟s GDP in the last five years (NCC, 2016a). 
Remarkably, the telecommunications industries in Canada and Nigeria 
continue to attract the attention of service providers seeking to enter the industry. 
However, the industry in the two countries has not fully garnered the attention of 
academics. Literature on the performance of the industry in the two countries is 
limited because existing literature focuses mostly on the industry‟s contribution to 
economic growth and development. This research shifts attention to the efficiency 
and productivity performance of the industry in the two countries. The disciplinary 
approach adopted is the field of economics. This provides a robust understanding of 
the phenomenon and enables the research to discuss the two countries‟ cases in the 
context of 17 others selected from the World Bank‟s categorization of middle income 
countries (MICs) (i.e., lower-middle income countries and upper-middle income 
countries), high income countries (HICs) and Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Although not similarly affluent or 
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at equivalent level of development, the two countries are of interest because they 
made similar policy decisions that culminated in the deregulation of their 
telecommunications industry. In addition, the industry is integral to each country‟s 
economy and serves as a beacon of deregulation. A comparison with other countries 
is necessary to allow for inferences to be made about potential differences in the 
outcome of deregulation in the two countries and to diminish potential differences in 
the economic conditions and development levels in the two countries. The 10 HICs 
are Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), Germany 
(DEU), Japan (JPN), New Zealand (NZL), South Korea (SKR), United Kingdom 
(UK) and United States of America (USA). The nine MICs are Brazil (BRA), China 
(CHN), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Kenya (KEN), Mexico (MEX), Nigeria 
(NGA), South Africa (SA) and Turkey (TUR). Thus the research analyzed panel data 
from 19 countries over a 13-year period (2001–13) for a total of 247 observations. 
The decision to investigate the telecommunications industry was based on the 
industry‟s constant transformations that continue to make new empirical knowledge 
important and the recognition that whereas the motives for the industry‟s 
deregulation are similar across countries, the outcomes have been divergent. In view 
of this, this research provides additional empirical evidence and contributes to the 
debate on telecommunications industry deregulation and its impact on the 
competitiveness and performance of the industry. 
 
1.2 Motivation for this research 
The initial motivation for this research stemmed from debate about 
deregulation and the telecommunications industry‟s structural transformation since 
the adoption of deregulatory mechanisms in Canada and Nigeria. Most of the 
literature on telecommunications industry deregulation focuses on US and European 
Union countries, making it difficult to apply the findings to Canada and Nigeria. 
Documenting the experiences of Canada and Nigeria fills a gap in the existing 
literature which and serves as the impetus for engaging in this research. The 
comparison of the two countries is based on the observation that even though they 
differ in characteristics, the motive for deregulation is the same. Thus, it is important 
to evaluate the efficiency and productivity performance of the two countries. Also, 
Nigeria imitated developed countries such as Canada and has sought improvement in 
performance by altering the structure of the industry. The comparison provides 
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interesting understanding of the deregulatory approach in each country and the 
outcome. Additionally, the industry in both countries is dominated by a handful of 
large firms, making it suitable to compare them. Furthermore, focusing on the two 
countries provides avenue for obtaining insightful information on the outcome of 
deregulation which is relevant to regulatory and policy discuss centred on 
ascertaining differences in performance and what they could learn from each other. 
In addition, the Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications industries continue to 
attract quasi-regulatory policies that subject them to outside influences with respect 
to connectivity, subscribers‟ registration and network coverage. Given this evolving 
operating environment, this research embodies knowledge that contributes to the 
understanding of performance and the influence of environmental factors on it. Also, 
it may generate findings with potential effects on telecommunications industry 
policies by providing theoretical and empirical evidence that may be used to guide 
policy formulation by government agencies (i.e., the regulators and/or policy makers) 
responsible for setting rules that guide the industry. Policy makers could reference 
this research as empirical evidence to gauge their expectations of the industry and to 
formulate new policies aimed at improving the industry‟s performance. 
 
1.3 Purpose and objective of the research 
The main purpose of this research was directed at meeting the need for 
information on the efficiency and productivity of the telecommunications industry in 
deregulated environments. The pursuit of this information prompted the exploration 
of trends across multiple countries but with a focus on Canada and Nigeria. This was 
carried out using partial indicators of performance to investigate the efficiency and 
productivity. Next, the efficiency and productivity analyses were carried out using 
aggregate measures to generate benchmark frontier that served as reference when 
assessing the efficiency and productivity of the industry in the two countries. 
Additionally, the influence of environmental factors on efficiency was examined 
coupled with an evaluation of the evolution of the industry‟s efficiency and 
productivity from 2001 to 2013. Also, participants from the industry completed 
survey questionnaires and provided useful feedback that gave insightful details of 
trends in performance and on how the industry is shaped by the deregulated 
environment. 
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1.4 Research questions 
Two general research questions were addressed in this study. Research on 
telecommunications industry deregulation note that deregulation provides the 
platform for increased competition (Hausman & Taylor, 2012). In view of this, the 
first research question seeks to understand the appropriateness of deregulation in 
conceptualizing competition in the Canadian and Nigerian contexts and how the 
structure of the industry in the two countries evolved from the monopoly model. 
RQ1: How have deregulatory policies influenced the competitiveness in the 
telecommunications industry in Canada and Nigeria? 
RQ1.1: What forces drove and are driving the deregulated 
telecommunications industry in Canadian and Nigerian 
context? 
RQ1.2: What are the similarities and differences in Canada’s and 
Nigeria’s deregulatory milieu? 
RQ1.3: What impact does operating in a deregulated environment 
have on the industry’s competitiveness? 
The second question examines how telecommunications industry 
deregulation influences performance. This question is premised on the view that 
deregulation has a positive effect on the efficiency and productivity of the industry. 
RQ2: How has the performance of the industry been in the deregulated 
environment? 
RQ2.1: What are the performances (i.e., efficiency and productivity) of 
the industry in the two countries and how do they compare? 
RQ2.2: What influence do environmental conditions have on the 
efficiency and productivity performance of the industry? 
RQ2.3: Ascertain the applicability of structure-conduct-performance 
model to deregulatory outcomes in the two countries. 
 
1.5 Overview of methodology 
Several activities were undertaken in order to answer these research 
questions. First, an understanding of changes in the industry was gained through a 
review of prior empirical studies. Second, a two-stage analysis of efficiency and 
productivity was conducted. Stage one engaged non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and relied on DEA-based Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) 
 6 
productivity improvement management software. It adopted the input-oriented 
approach for the analysis of 13 years of panel data involving 19 countries to discern 
any efficiency and productivity changes. The main data sources were the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), World Bank, and OECD 
communications outlook. Additional data were obtained from each country‟s 
national statistics agency, regulatory agencies and empirical studies with a focus 
similar to this research. For an in-depth analysis, the DEA relied on three inputs 
(Capital Expenditures, Subscriptions and Employment) and two outputs (Revenue 
and Teledensity) with the analysis carried out under constant returns to scale (CRS) 
and variable returns to scale (VRS) as described in the methodology and data section 
in Chapter 5 with the results of the analysis presented and discussed in Chapter 6. 
In addition, Mann-Whitney test was conducted to reveal if there is statistical 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the efficiency and 
productivity performance of the industry in the two countries of focus. Stage two 
involved the use of censored Tobit model to regress the efficiency scores against 
environmental variables (e.g., number of years in deregulation [NYRS], 
subscriptions to employment ratio [SubEmp], change in real GDP per capita 
[CRGDPPC], revenue to subscriptions ratio [RevSub], industry concentration [HHI], 
capex to revenue ratio [CapexRev], consumer price index [CPI], and level of 
development [LDev]) to guage their influences on efficiency. Finally, industry 
participants were contacted to complete the questionnaire designed for this research. 
Their responses provided detailed information that enriched the understanding of the 
phenomenon being studied. 
 
1.6 Summary of findings 
Industry participants in both countries indicated that deregulation has altered 
the structure, conduct and performance of the industry. The removal of barriers has 
changed the structure of the industry and has led to an increase in competition. The 
impact of the structural change on conduct varies between the two counries. It has a 
high influence on product pricing and product/service differentiation in Canada 
whereas it influences advertising, promotion and product pricing to a great degree in 
Nigeria. There is a widely held view among industry participants that performance 
improved in the deregulated environment. However, it was noted that the industry in 
Canada was mature, signifying limited growth opportunities while the industry in 
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Nigeria is emerging, suggesting potential for growth. Additionally, the rationale for 
deregulating the industry was found to align with literature exposition on motivations 
for deregulating the industry. The basis for deregulating the industry includes 
universal provision, service quality improvement, promoting competition, economic 
development, investment promotion and reasonable prices. Nonetheless, the issues 
facing the industry differ between the two countries. Changing technology, 
infrastructure funding and scale economies were issues in Canada whereas 
inadequate financing, policy inconsistency relating to tariffs and spectrum allocation, 
inadequate infrastructure and firms‟ disregard for rules meant to level the playing 
field were issues afflicting the industry in Nigeria. 
Although the research found that the telecommunications industry in the two 
countries was inefficient, both showed improvements with Canada displaying better 
efficiency. The inefficiency in both countries was due to inappropriate scale and 
managerial ineffectiveness in allocating inputs. The industry in the two countries 
would attain better efficiency by decreasing inputs and by adjusting operational 
scale. The findings relating to the productivity of the industry showed the two 
countries experienced comparable levels of productivity increase but the path 
through which it was attained differed. Canada achieved productivity increase 
through technological progress and efficiency improvement. The technological 
progress came from innovation and the adoption of new technologies while 
efficiency came from improved managerial capabilities. The industry in Nigeria 
attained productivity through efficiency improvement only. However, unlike Canada, 
the efficiency improvement was achieved through enhanced operational scale. Since 
efficiency improvement contributed to productivity growth in both countries, it 
appears productivity could easily be augmented through efficiency improvement. 
The findings relating to the exogenous environmental factors‟ influence on 
performance were exhilarating. First, industry concentration declined in the two 
countries, suggesting that the deregulated environment caused structural change and 
led to increased competitive intensity in the industry. However, the level of 
concentration indicates an oligopoly structure and suggests a handful of firms 
dominate the industry in each country, but this does not appear to have a significant 
role in determining performance. Second, the average revenue per subscriber 
(ARPS), which is an indicator of prices that customers pay, is higher in Canada than 
in Nigeria. Interestingly, one of the views for deregulating the industry was that 
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increased competition would cause prices to decline. However, the findings show 
ARPS increased slightly in Canada but declined significantly in Nigeria which 
indicates that competition has benefitted customers in Nigeria. Because RevSub was 
found to have a positive and significant influence on performance, 
telecommunications industry with a higher ARPS will perform better, hence the 
superior performance of the Canadian telecommunications industry. Third, labour 
productivity was measured by SubEmp and the findings showed that it increased in 
both countries but is higher in Canada. In addition, this research found that labour 
productivity has a significant effect on technical efficiency performance. Thus, when 
evaluating performance, a telecommunications industry with high labour productivity 
will display better technical efficiency performance. However, it may not operate at a 
better operational scale than telecommunications industry with low labour 
productivity. Fourth, capital intensity which is represented by CapexRev is similar in 
both countries in the last year of the study. However, the pattern indicates that while 
it is relatively stable in Canada, it declined in Nigeria. This measure has a 
statistically significant negative influence on scale efficiency, implying that 
increasing the Capex per dollar of revenue diminishes performance and that 
enhanced performance depends on the degree of capacity utilization. Fifth, RGDPPC 
increased in both countries but Canada‟s display of higher RGDPPC may infer a 
higher disposable income and the affordability of telecommunications services. 
However, CRGDPPC was found to have a negative and insignificant influence on 
technical and scale efficiency, indicating that the telecommunications industry in 
countries with lower economic growth would display technical and scale efficiency 
performance that are similar to telecommunications industries in countries with 
higher economic growth. Inflation denoted by consumer price index has positive and 
significant effect on technical and scale efficiency, suggesting inflation drives 
performance enhancement. The level of development has an insignificant 
relationship with technical and scale efficiency, implying that the level of 
development in a country has unimportant influence on technical and scale efficiency 
of the industry. 
 
1.7 Significance of the research 
Studies on telecommunications industry deregulation and its impact on 
performance exist but with a focus on countries other than Canada and Nigeria. 
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Because no current study exists on the efficiency and productivity performance of 
the industry in the two countries, this research fills a knowledge gap in literature and 
provides empirical evidence that adds to the understanding of the industry‟s 
performance. In addition, this research contributes to the knowledge of 
telecommunications industry performance in deregulated environments in three other 
ways. First, measuring efficiency and productivity performance of the industry over 
time and delineating the source of change yields information on trends in the 
performance of the industry and the source of cross-country differences in 
performance. In so doing, it provides telecommunications industry managers and 
regulators with information that could facilitate improvement of the industry. 
Second, the uniqueness of this research lies in the application of the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) model in examining the deregulation of 
telecommunications industry; it contributes to the SCP model narrative by seeking to 
confirm or disprove it through an exposition of the industry‟s structural change and 
influence on conduct and performance. Third, policies in favour of deregulation are 
embarked on with a view to promoting efficiency and increasing competition. 
However, deregulation does not always yield the presumed benefits that policy 
makers aspire to (Jurac, Vladimir, & Leos, 2004). This research contributes to the 
understanding of the relationship between deregulation and performance and 
increases stakeholders‟ knowledge regarding the evolving landscape prior to 
instituting policy actions that may impede existing deregulation or result in further 
deregulation of the industry. Therefore, government agencies (i.e., the regulators 
and/or policy makers) could use this research as empirical evidence when gauging 
their expectations of the industry and when formulating policies to move the industry 
in the direction of sustainable competition. 
 
1.8 Structure of the research 
The eight chapters in this research report all plausible concepts, phenomena 
and findings relating to the research (Figure 1.1). Chapter 1 introduces the research 
and deregulation milieu. It presents the research background, the motivation for 
engaging in the research, the purpose and objective of the research, the key research 
questions, an overview of the methodology, a summary of the findings, and the 
significance of the research by identifying the gaps filled and why the problem 
merited investigation. In addition, the chapter provides information on the structure 
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of the research. Chapter 2 focuses on the evolution of the telecommunications 
industry in Canada and Nigeria. It describes and presents a snapshot of events that 
contributed to the industry‟s evolution in the two countries. In addition, the chapter 
provides an assessment of the industry and discusses the objectives of deregulation 
and the deregulatory issues experienced in the two countries of focus. Chapter 3 
details the theoretical review and framework of this research. It conceptualizes 
regulation and deregulation. Predominantly, this chapter describes regulation, the 
rationale for regulating monopoly, forms of regulation and regulatory mechanisms 
(i.e., rate of return regulation, price cap regulation and earnings sharing regulation). 
In addition, the chapter conceptualizes deregulation and alternative expressions such 
as liberalization, privatization and commercialization as used in telecommunications 
research. The chapter discusses market structure vis-a-vis market structure 
continuum and deliberates on the theoretical underpinnings of market structure 
through a discussion of the Austrian school of thought, the Chicago school of 
thought, the post-Chicago school of thought, the contestable market phenomenon, the 
new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) theory, the SCP model and game 
theory. Furthermore, it presents the SCP model as the theoretical framework on 
which this research is based. Chapter 4 reviews the literature on deregulation and on 
telecommunications industry efficiency and productivity analyisis. It presents a 
review of studies on the impacts of deregulation on performance. It also presents the 
outcomes of empirical studies on telecommunications industry efficiency and 
productivity analysis. Chapter 5 covers the methodology and the data. It details the 
concept and measurement of efficiency and productivity, pinpoints various DEA 
models and discusses the use of MPI in decomposing and isolating the source of 
productivity change. In addition, the chapter discusses the Tobit model as a 
supplement to DEA-based efficiency analysis. Furthermore, this chapter elaborates 
on the empirical approach adopted, the model specifications, and the input and 
output selection. Additionally, the chapter discusses the data collection methodology, 
data issues, assumptions, and data treatment and ethical considerations in the conduct 
of the research to enhance its reliability and validity. Chapter 6 presents the results of 
the performance analysis in the form of partial factor analysis and total factor 
analysis of the efficiency and productivity of the industry. It identifies trends and 
patterns that relate to the research objectives and answers the research questions. The 
findings from using input-oriented DEA-based efficiency and an MPI analysis of 13 
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years of panel data involving 19 countries are presented in the chapter. Also, the 
chapter highlights changes and trends in efficiency and productivity as well the 
sources of the changes. In addition, the chapter considers the results of the second 
stage regression analysis and the Mann-Whitney test used to ascertain the statistical 
significance of identified efficiency and productivity differences between the two 
countries. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the sensitivity analysis performed on 
the DEA efficiency scores and also presents the result of the robustness check carried 
out on the censored Tobit model. Chapter 7 discusses the results of the survey 
questionnaires completed by industry participants. The chapter provides a discrete 
discussion of the analysed data, details the implications, and compares the findings 
with contemporary research that have examined telecommunications industry 
deregulation. Chapter 8 provides concluding details of the research and discusses the 
implications and meaning of the research results and their usefulness and 
contribution to the literature. The chapter discusses the research in a manner that 
presents the interpretation of the result as objective and worthy of further empirical 
inquiries.  
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Sources: Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the research. 
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Chapter 2 
Background on the Evolution of the Telecommunications Industry 
in Canada and Nigeria 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The evolution of the telecommunications industry in Canada and Nigeria is 
articulated in this chapter. The first section of this chapter (Section 2.2) highlights the 
distinctiveness of the Canadian telecommunications industry deregulation and 
enunciated the two phases in its evolution. In addition, it gives a brief overview of 
the objective for deregulating the industry, and provides an assessment of the 
industry and deregulatory issues. The second section (Section 2.3) describes the 
stream of events that culminated in the deregulation of the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry. Specifically, it decribes the pre-liberalization, 
liberalization and post-liberalization eras, provides a basis for understanding the 
objectives for deregulating the industry, and presents an assessment of the industry 
and issues pertaining to the industry‟s deregulation. 
 
2.2 Canadian telecommunications industy deregulation 
2.2.1 Evolution of the Canadian telecommunications industry deregulation 
Canada‟s telecommunications industry evolved from provincially held 
monopoly to one that is market driven. Events in the industry are categorized in two 
phases (CRTC, 2005): Phase one covers 1852 to the early 1980s; Phase two started 
in the mid 1980s with the introduction of competition in mobile cellular market. It 
continued with the introduction of Telecommunications Act of 1993 which set 
competition and efficiency as parameters for the industry. A summary of major 
developments in the industry is presented in Table 2.1. 
 
2.2.1.1 Phase one 
Phase one of the Canadian telecommunications industry which was defined 
by provincial/territorial monopolies and cross-subsidization covers the period 
between 1852 and early 1980s. With a service provider allowed in a particular 
region/territory, the Federal government required universal access and affordability, 
and initially applied rate-of-return regulation (ROR) but later changed to price cap 
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regulation (PCR) to better protect customers (Gundy et al., 2007). Legislation in this 
phase included the Telegraph Act (1852), a Special Act (1880) and an amendment to 
the Railway Act (1906) to cover telephone services and a shared jurisdictional power 
(i.e., between the federal and provincial governments) over the industry (Table 2.1). 
Furthermore, in this phase the Department of Telecommunications assumed 
responsibility for framing Canada‟s telecommunications policy while the regulatory 
responsibility was delegated to the Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). Also, during this phase, Bell Canada 
Special Act was amended, and the „obligation‟ to serve became mandatory for Bell 
Canada (CRTC, 2005; Industry Canada, 2006, p. 6.5). In addition, several aspects of 
the industry, including tariffs, the nature and mix of services, infrastructure use and 
business activities complementary to telecommunications became subject to 
regulation by the CRTC. 
 
2.2.1.2 Phase two 
Phase two, which overlaps with phase one, took roots in the late 1970s with 
the easing of price and entry controls in utility industries (i.e., energy, transportation, 
telecommunications etc.) (Industry Canada, 2008). In addition, this phase was shaped 
by the Supreme Court‟s ruling in 1989 that ceded jurisdictional powers over 
telecommunications carriers to the Federal government. Furthermore, this phase 
witnessed a series of deregulatory policy initiatives, a consolidation of 
telecommunications laws and the inclusion of „forbearance‟ clause in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1993 (Minister of Justice, 2014, p. 21). The forbearance 
clause gives the CRTC the option to stay the application of regulatory provisions if 
doing so is consistent with Canadian telecommunications policy objectives. Also, in 
this phase, price cap regulation (PCR) replaced rate-of-return regulation (ROR). In 
addition, competition was introduced in the long distance sector, review of the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Telecommunications Policy Review 
Panel was carried out, and directives issued to the CRTC to allow the industry rely 
on market forces. 
 
2.2.2 Objectives of telecommunications industry deregulation in Canada 
Canada‟s telecommunications deregulatory policy was a response to the 
industry‟s changing landscape. It was instituted to curtail regulatory costs and make 
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the industry competitive internationally (Industry Canada, 2006). However, the 
forbearance provision in the Telecommunications Act of 1993 requires but does not 
mandate competition when the competitive force is strong enough and protects 
consumers (CRTC, 2005). As set out in Industry Canada (2006, pp. 2.3), the 
objectives of Canada‟s telecommunications industry deregulation are to: 
i. Facilitate telecommunications development and affordability across 
Canada. 
ii. Enhance efficiency and competitiveness locally and abroad. 
iii. Foster reliance on market forces in the provision of services. 
iv. Protect the interest of users and respond to their economic and social 
requirements. 
v. Promote the use of Canadian transmission facilities. 
 
2.2.3 Assessment of Canada’s deregulated telecommunications industry 
The Canadian telecommunications industry plays an important role in the life 
of Canadians and in the Canadian economy by linking the widely dispersed 
population and by yielding social and economic benefits for all regions (Statistics 
Canada, 2002). Unlike most countries where an incumbent national monopoly 
existed prior to deregulation, Canada had no national incumbent as monopolies were 
held provincially. Major players in Canada‟s deregulated telecommunications 
industry are: Rogers, Bell Canada, Telus and MTS Alstream. The industry also has 
some 43 independent firms providing services to rural and remote communities 
(OECD, 2002b). The industry is concentrated with five firms accounting for about 
66% of industry revenue (Middleton, 2011). The services provided are wireline and 
mobile (i.e., wireless) which in 2013 accounted for 37% and 63% of subscriptions 
respectively; unlike wireline, the mobile sector is the least concentrated (Church & 
Wilkins, 2013). Furthermore, markets in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia are 
more competitive than in provinces (e.g., Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, 
Newfoundland and Labrador) that delayed the introduction of competition (Statistics 
Canada, 2002). Prior to deregulation, the requirement for universal service preserved 
cross-subsidization. Since deregulation, the cross-subsidization of local and 
residential services by long distance and business customers has been eliminated 
(Lacobucci, Trebilock, & Winter, 2006). Also, increased competition in the 
deregulated environment has slowed price increases and profitability growth (CRTC, 
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2014). The industry has experienced growth with 99% of Canadian households 
subscribing to either a fixed or mobile service (Lacobucci, Trebilcock, & Winter, 
2006). Also, the industry‟s contribution to GDP has is relatively stable at 
approximately 2% between 2001 and 2013 (Business Monitor International, 2009). 
The industry provides direct employment to 114,346 people and indirect employment 
to some 16,580 individuals (Industry Canada, 2006). Furthermore, Canada‟s average 
revenue per subscriber (ARPS) is relatively stable and the churn rate (i.e., the rate at 
which customers switch service providers) increased from an average of 1.57 in 2008 
to 1.83 in 2011 but declined to 1.67 in 2012 (CRTC, 2013). The high churn rate is 
attributable to CRTC‟s mandated local number portability that has lowered 
customers‟ switching costs by allowing number retention in the event a customer 
chooses to change service providers (Statistics Canada, 2002). Clearly, no known 
empirical study provides an integrated assessment of the performance of the industry. 
By examining the trends in the efficiency and productivity of the industry, this 
research provides a basis for understanding how the industry has performed in the 
deregulated environment. 
 
2.2.4 Deregulatory issues in Canada’s telecommunications industry 
The forbearance clause in the Telecommunications Act of 1993 may apply if 
doing so aligns with Canada‟s telecommunications policy objectives and protects 
customers, but the Act offers no guidance to aid its implementation and creates 
application ambiguity for the CRTC (Industry Canada, 2006, p. 2.10). There is the 
perception that the industry is reliant on market forces and that the forbearance 
clause could be removed. The view is that lack of guidance on the implementation of 
forbearance may increase the risk of cautious forbearance from regulation in 
competitive markets or too much regulation in markets where some regulation may 
be necessary but in which market forces could adequately complement or replace 
regulation (Industry Canada, 2006). Another issue is the requirement for network 
sharing and interconnection. The telecommunications industry is capital intensive 
and new entrants require access to incumbent networks to provide service to 
customers. Advocates of mandatory network access maintain it is uneconomical to 
duplicate telecommunications infrastructure and that mandated network sharing and 
access lowers entry barriers. However, opponents (i.e., carriers with established 
networks) were weary of granting access to new entrants that would compete with 
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them (Industry Canada, 2006). The requirement that incumbents open their networks 
to competition generated complaints about network access and interconnection tariffs 
and necessitated CRTC regulation to require incumbents to implement „functional 
separation‟ by splitting their businesses into retail and wholesale sectors and not 
engage in discriminatory practices that restrict competition from their network 
(Janisch, 2012, p. 775). 
In Canada the regulatory policy that promotes universal access to 
telecommunications services and the „duty to serve‟ which imposes obligations on 
firms in the industry to provide services to customers meant that service providers 
had to make services available to customers at a similar rate regardless of location. 
Supporters of service imposition obligation contend that it ensures geographically 
remote areas have access to services at affordable rates, but critics argue for its 
removal as customers could access services through multiple platforms (Ryan, 2012, 
pp. 521–22). Compounding the debate is the recognition that policies relating to 
universal services and obligations to serve result in cross-subsidizing rural customers 
and are inconsistent with competitive market ideals but they have ensured nearly 
99% of Canadians in both rural and urban locations have access to 
telecommunications services (Rajabiun & Middleton, 2013). An important question 
is whether the duty to serve extends beyond the monopoly industry that necessitated 
its creation? Nonetheless, the debate is ongoing and no consensus has been reached 
(Ryan, 2012). Also, there are concerns regarding the conflicting objectives of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1993 that promotes increased reliance on market forces 
and the Broadcasting Act of 1991 which seeks to encourage Canadian values and 
talents but constrains competition (Anderson et al., 1998). 
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Table 2.1: Major developments in the Canadian telecommunications industry. 
Dates Activities 
1852  Passage of the first Telegraphs Act 
1880  Special Act passed by Parliament to give Bell Canada a Charter to provide 
telephone service throughout Canada; Bell Canada concentrated investments in 
Ontario and Quebec. 
1902  Bell Canada Special Act amended 
 Imposes an obligation to serve on Bell Canada 
 Forms the basis for Canada‟s universal service policy 
1906  Telecommunications Industry regulated by the Canadian Transport Commission 
 Amendment of Railway Act to cover telephone services 
1969  Establishment of Department of Telecommunications 
 Telecommunications and broadcasting policy 
 Radiocommunications policy and regulation 
 Telecommunications and broadcasting services extension to remote areas 
 Research and development 
1976  Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission formed  
 Telecommunications and broadcasting policy and regulation 
1978  Cost inquiry initiated to establish reporting mechanism for CRTC to identify 
cross-subsidization 
1985  Introduction of mobile wireless competition 
 National license granted to Rogers Cantel (now Rogers Wireless) 
 Regional license granted to each provincial monopoly 
 CRTC resisted opening the long distance market to competition 
1989  Supreme Court gave the Federal government power over telecommunication 
carriers and provinces transferred their regulatory powers to the Federal 
government 
1992  CRTC introduced competition to public long distance services 
 Requires open entry and equal access 
1993  Telecommunications Act passed  
 Sets parameters for industry transition to competition 
1994  CRTC reviewed regulatory framework 
 Created framework that increased competition by reducing the number of 
services subject to regulation 
 Announced forbearance from regulation of wireless services 
1995  Announced forbearance from non-dominant carriers 
 Competitive wireless Personal Communications Systems licensed 
1996  National digital mobile license issued to Rogers Wireless and two new entrants 
(i.e., Microcell and Clearnet) 
1997  CRTC announced regulatory framework for competition in local telephone 
markets 
 Mandated interconnection between local providers 
 Identified essential services incumbent should make available to new 
entrants and set prices 
 CRTC narrowed its regulation of incumbent local service providers 
 CRTC forbearance from regulating long distance services and private line 
services  
1998  Competition in the public pay-telephone service market introduced through 
liberalization 
 Replacement of traditional rate-of-return with price cap regulation  
 Establishment of regulatory framework for international services 
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2000  Telesat Canada‟s monopoly on satellite telecommunications carriage ended 
 Long distance competition introduced in areas served by Northwestel 
2005  Appointment of the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel 
 Review Canada‟s telecommunications policy framework 
 Make recommendations on how to make the industry internationally 
competitive  
2006  Telecommunications Policy Review Panel report made available to the Minister 
of Industry 
 Justifies reliance on market forces 
 Recommended the elimination of CRTC‟s economic regulation 
 Government issued directives to CRTC on the implementation of section 7 of 
the Telecommunications Act 
 CRTC to allow the industry to rely on market forces to the extent possible 
 Any regulation should be efficient and less interference with market forces 
required 
Sources: Industry Canada (2006); Middleton (2011, pp. 69.2–3); OECD (2002, p. 9). 
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2.3 Nigerian telecommunications industry deregulation 
2.3.1 Evolution of Nigeria’s telecommunications industry deregulation 
The telecommunications industry in Nigeria spans three eras. The major 
events are outlined in Table 2.2. The first era, pre-liberalization, pre-dates the 
country‟s independence and extends to periods after independence. The second era, 
liberalization, started in 1986. It was dominated by increased interests in the pursuit 
of privatization policies and the introduction of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) (Jerome, 2008). Post-liberalization is the third era, which this 
research indicates is still evolving. 
 
2.3.1.1 Pre-liberalization era 
At independence in 1960, there were 18,724 telephone lines servicing a 
population of 40 million people in Nigeria (Oyatoye & Okafor, 2011). As illustrated 
in Table 2.2, this era witnessed heavy government involvement aimed at facilitating 
access. By 1985, the number of telephone lines increased to 200,000. However, the 
ratio of 1 telephone line for every 440 Nigerians (i.e., a teledensity of 0.23) was 
below the target of 1 telephone line for every 100 Nigerians (Ajiboye, Adu, & 
Wojuade, 2007). In this era, the Department of Post and Telecommunications (P&T) 
was split, and the telecommunications divisions merged with the Nigerian External 
Telecommunications Limited. The merger led to the emergence of Nigerian 
Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) which became the national monopoly. NITEL 
was tasked with providing efficient services, attaining scale economies, improving 
service affordability, harmonizing the planning and coordinating of internal and 
external telecommunications services, and rationalizing investment (Ajiboye, Adu, 
Wojuade, 2007). However, NITEL‟s inability to cope with population growth and its 
slow adoption of automatic switch exchange technology hampered sevice quality 
(Jerome, 2003; Oyatoye & Okafor, 2011). 
 
2.3.1.2 Liberalization era 
In the liberalization era, public faith in NITEL dwindled and the clamour for 
a different model became paramount. Although the Nigerian government initiated the 
move to privatize and commercialize state owned enterprises in 1986 as part of the 
structural adjustment program (SAP) for economic growth and development, 
deregulation of the telecommunications industry did not start until 1992 after the 
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Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) Decree Number 75 was promulgated 
(Table 2.2). NITEL‟s monopoly ended in this era as new entrants – a second national 
carrier, five global systems for mobile communications (GSM) operators, and several 
code division multiple assess (CDMA) operators were granted operating licenses 
(Mughele, Olatokun, & Adegbola, 2012). 
 
2.3.1.3 Post-liberalization era 
The post-liberalization era started in 2006 upon the expiration of the five-year 
exclusivity period granted GSM operators. In this era, the unified license which 
authorizes firms to provide a group of services (i.e., mobile and fixed telephone, 
national long distance and gateway) in a region of the country or nationally was 
implemented (NCC, 2016b). This provision was meant to enable firms take 
advantage of new technology and be cost effective in providing services to customers 
(Omowunmi, Niran, & Oluseyi, 2009). Furthermore, the registration of subscriber 
identity module (SIM) card to customer‟s name became a strict requirement. In 
addition, mobile number portability (MNP) which gives customers the right to cancel 
a service with a provider and to migrate to a different network without losing their 
phone numbers was implemented. This allows customers more freedom and forces 
operators to reduce costs and improve service quality (Tiamiyu & Mejabi, 2012). 
Remarkably, competition in the industry was high at the start of this era but some 
providers unable to compete exited the industry thereby reducing competition. 
 
2.3.2 Objectives of telecommunications industry deregulation in Nigeria 
Deregulation was intended to address NITEL‟s inefficiency, improve 
teledensity and the sector‟s contribution to the economy (Hassan, 2011). Initially, the 
deregulatory agenda was focused on commercialising NITEL. It gravitated to 
divestment and eventual sale of NITEL. As indicated in Chidozie, Odunayo, & 
Olutosin, (2015, pp. 178-179), the motives for deregulating NITEL and for which the 
Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC) was established in 1992 were to: 
i. Promote competition and facilitate telecommunication services provision. 
ii. Protect the public (e.g., on prices, service quality etc.). 
iii. Promote the entry of private entrepreneurs and investors to the 
telecommunications industry. 
iv. Issue licenses to firms in a manner that is transparent and equitable. 
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v. Manage spectrum allocation to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency. 
vi. Promote investment in the industry. 
 
2.3.3 Assessment of Nigeria’s deregulated telecommunications industry 
Prior to deregulation, the industry was dominated by the state-controlled 
incumbent (i.e., NITEL). Since deregulation, competition has increased with the 
entry of new service providers, which has benefitted customers through lower prices 
(Hassan, 2011). The industry is concentrated and consists of two national carriers 
(i.e., NITEL and Globacom) and five firms with MTN Nigeria controlling the largest 
share of the market. Also, the industry is dominated by GSM service providers who 
account for 99.1% of the market while CDMA and fixed line/fixed wireless services 
account for 0.8% and 0.1%, respectively (NCC, 2016). In addition, some firms have 
operating license that allows them to participate across multiple spectrums. For 
example, NITEL and Globacom also offer GSM services. Furthermore, the CDMA 
operators offer fixed line/fixed wireless services, and one GSM operator (MTN) is in 
partnership with VGC Communications Limited that offers fixed line/fixed wireless 
services. 
Teledensity which was approximately 1 in 2001 increased to 91.15 in 2013 
and the industry‟s contribution to GDP reached 7.4% in 2013 (NCC, 2016a). 
However, the rapid subscriptions growth resulted in network congestion with 
negative effect on service quality, prompting the Nigerian Communications 
Commission (NCC) to impose fines on firms that failed to meet service 
requirements. Awoleye et al. (2012) noted that investment in the industry rose, but 
average revenue per subscriber (ARPS) declined (Pyramid Research, 2010); 
considering mobile number portability (MNP), the market has become competitive. 
The incidence of increased subscriptions and teledensity suggest improved 
performance from the view of the regulator but declining industry revenue shows 
otherwise from the perspective of the industry, thus generating some ambiguity in 
measuring the performance of the industry. This research will make it possible to 
draw definite conclusions about the performance of the industry. The use of 
aggregate measures in the efficiency and productivity analysis of the industry will 
enable policy makers and industry managers to have a similar understanding of the 
industry‟s performance. It will shed more light on the factors that may have 
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contributed to or detracted from the performance of the industry and actions that 
could be taken to enhance performance. 
2.3.4 Deregulatory issues in Nigeria’s telecommunications industry 
The process of deregulation and the sale of NITEL met with political and 
public resistance (Ariyo & Jerome, 2004). Also, NITEL‟s sale to private owners was 
hindered by disagreements between the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) and the 
ministries responsible for NITEL (Otobo, 2002). In addition, the Nigerian Labour 
Congress, the union representing employees, voiced its objection through strikes and 
legal injunctions that were meant to frustrate the deregulation of the industry (Otobo, 
2002). Other issues included the lack of transparency and the poor implementation of 
subscriber identity module (SIM) card registration (Okpanachi & Obutte, 2011), lack 
of robust legal institutions, and the inability to secure adequate finances (Omoleke & 
Adeopo, 2005). 
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Table 2.2: Major developments in the Nigerian telecommunications industry.  
Dates Activities 
1851  Postal branch of the British Post established  
1886  Telecommunications facilities established by the colonial administration 
1960–85  Telecommunications consisted of two departments: 
 Posts and Telecommunications was responsible for internal 
communications 
 Nigerian External Telecommunications (NET) was responsible for external 
communications 
1984–85  Decoupling of Posts and Telecommunications into two divisions 
 Postal division 
 Telecommunications division 
1986  Structural Adjustment Program introduced by the government 
 Deregulation and privatization of SOEs started  
1988–91  Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization  carried out a 
comprehensive review of NITEL 
1992  National Communications Commission (NCC) Decree Number 75 
promulgated 
 NITEL commercialized as NITEL Plc., a public limited company 
 NITEL Plc. was registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Decree 
of 1990  
1998  Amendment of NCC Act to strengthen the role and powers of the NCC 
2001  GSM license granted to MTN, Econet and M-Tel (a subsidiary of NITEL Plc.) 
2002  NITEL lost its monopoly of the industry when Globacom was granted a 
license to operate as the second national carrier 
2003   A more comprehensive Communications Act was passed 
 Implementation of National Telecommunications Policy 
 Globacom granted GSM license 
2005  Introduction of unified licensing  
2008  Etisalat granted GSM license 
Sources: Onakoya, Tella, & Osoba (2012), Akinpelu & Ayokunle (2011) and NCC (2016b). 
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Summary 
This chapter discusses the Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications 
industries and some of the events that shaped their evolution. Events in the Canadian 
industry occurred over two phases. Phase one was characterized by provincially held 
monopolies and cross-subsidization to attain government objective of universal 
service provision and affordable prices. However, due to the inadequate protection of 
customers through rate-of-return regulation (ROR), the Federal government changed 
the industry‟s regulatory mechanism to price cap regulation (PCR). Phase two was 
prominently influenced by a Supreme Court ruling in 1989 that gave the Federal 
government authority over the industry. In this phase, deregulatory initiatives were 
introduced, telecommunications laws consolidated and the 1993 
Telecommunications Act that allowed the CRTC to forbear introduced. Nonetheless, 
the lack of clarity on the implementation of forbearance created an issue. The 
Nigerian telecommunications industry had a national monopoly but several policies 
adopted by the government shaped the industry‟s evolution. The pre-liberalization 
era was marked with government involvement and poor performance of the industry. 
The liberalization era started in 1992 with the establishment of the Nigerian 
Communications Commission (NCC). National monopoly ended in this erea with the 
introduction of competition in the industry in 2001. The competitive environment in 
the post-liberalization era has intensified due to shift toward unified licenses and 
mobile number portability (MNP), resulting in the less competitive firms exiting the 
industry. While the attainment of deregulatory objectives is ongoing, the issues 
highlighted include the lack of transparency and the inability of the legal system to 
deal with issues relating to the industry. 
This chapter has shown that the overall policies adopted by the Canadian and 
Nigerian governments were aimed at promoting market forces and at facilitating the 
development and improvement of the industry. The next chapter (Chapter 3) presents 
the theoretical review and the framework of this research in order to understand how 
the industry in the two countries performed in the deregulatory environment. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Theoretical Review and Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of regulation and deregulation. It 
details the rationale for regulation, forms of regulation and regulatory mechanisms. 
In addition, the chapter covers the basis for deregulation and discusses the different 
forms of deregulation and deregulatory mechanisms. Also, it elaborates on the 
theoretical underpinnings of market structure and crystalizes the conceptual model 
and theoretical framework for this research. The framework reveals linkages between 
structure, conduct and performance and illunimnates the role of government policies 
and external factors in determining events in the telecommunications industry. 
 
3.2 Describing regulation 
Regulation is a government way of inducing firms to act in consonance with 
its socio-economic pursuits. The premise is that it mitigates „market failure‟ and 
confers maximum benefits to the public (James, 2000, p. 330). The concept of 
regulation in this research reflects market intervention carried out by governments 
for the attainment of economic (e.g., reduced price) and/or socially desirable goals 
(e.g., universal access). 
 
3.2.1 Rationale for regulating monopoly industry 
A monopoly occurs when a single firm provides a product or service for 
which there are no close substitutes (Joskow, 2007). It exists with utilities firms in 
industries such as hydroelectricity, transportation, energy and telecommunications 
which typically have „monopoly power‟ that could be used to influence output and 
price (Yee, 2004, p. 485). Proponents of regulation believe it restricts firms‟ 
behaviour and prevents undesirable market outcome (James, 2000). 
Telecommunication industry regulation advocates cite „public interest‟ doctrine and 
express that it improves the welfare of customers by eliminating inefficiencies and 
by correcting market anomalies and failures (Franco, 2004, p. 178). Another 
rationale for regulation is „economic theory‟ (Church & Ware, 2000, p. 769) which is 
premise on redistributing economic wealth, restricting price and preventing the 
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monopoly firm from arbitrary price increase (Kuo-Tai, 2012) and using entry barriers 
to protect incumbent firms so „scale‟ and „scope‟ economies are achieved 
(Hoffmann, 2008, p. 4). Another justification for regulation is „information 
asymmetry‟ which is a situation where some market participants make suboptimal 
decisions due to lacking information possessed by others (Baron, 2010, p. 313). It is 
construed that regulation mitigates the occurrence of inadequate information and 
prevents irrational decisions from being made. 
 
3.2.2 Forms of regulation 
Regulation takes the form of „ex ante‟ or „ex post‟ regulation (Blackman & 
Srivastava, 2011, p. 30). With „ex ante‟ regulation, the regulator reviews the structure 
of the industry, anticipates actions of industry participants and applies measures (e.g., 
price control, entry terms etc.) to redirect behaviours of market participants toward 
socially desirable goals. On the other hand, with „ex post‟ regulation, the regulator 
uses fines and sanctions to deal with specific conduct and rule violation (Blackman 
& Srivastava, 2011, p. 31). 
 
3.2.3 Regulatory mechanisms 
A natural monopoly situation is expected to result in cost decrease due to 
spreading fixed costs over more units of output (Church & Ware, 2000). However, 
studies show that a monopolist possesses „market power‟ and uses it (e.g., output 
restrictions) to cause consumers to pay more for the product or service (Uukkivi, Ots, 
& Koppel, 2012, p. 225). To prevent the abuse of power, underproduction, and 
inefficiency, mechanisms that have been used in telecommunications industry 
regulation includes: rate-of-return, price cap and earnings sharing. 
 
3.2.3.1 Rate-of-return regulation (ROR) 
Rate-of-return mechanism is used to cap a monopoly‟s profit by limiting the 
return on investment (ROI) to a value considered „fair‟ (Currier & Jackson, 2008, p. 
262). Through rate of return, the regulator advises the monopoly on price that allows 
for recouping operating costs and a modest return on investment. According to Yee 
(2004), the unintended consequence of this mechanism is inefficiency as the 
monopoly is guaranteed a certain level of return on investment. Also, because the 
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monopoly sees no incentive to contain costs, customers may end up paying more 
than they would in a competitive market (Majumdar, 2010). 
 
3.2.3.2 Price cap regulation (PCR) 
Price cap regulation was aimed at eliminating inefficiency and costs 
associated with rate-of-return regulation (Yee, 2004). It involves setting the 
maximum price for a product or service for a given period (e.g., 3–5 years.) and 
allowing it to rise and fall at a rate equal to the difference between the inflation rate 
and a factor (X) that is set in advance by the regulator. This shifts the burden of price 
variations to the monopoly (Currier & Jackson, 2008) and forces it to share any cost 
savings with customers through price adjustment (i.e., inflation adjusted prices) 
(Bernstein, 2000). With price cap regulation, the actual return on investment deviates 
from the forecast as the monopoly could set a price below or at a capped rate. 
Illustratively, if the inflation rate was 2.5% and the X-factor set at 3%, the monopoly 
will be required to reduce the price by 0.5% (2.5%-3% = -0.5%). However, when 
price cap regulation results in a lower rate of return, it provides no incentive for the 
monopoly to respond to higher product or service demand; thus constraining the 
drive for improved efficiency and innovation in the industry (OECD, 1995). 
 
3.2.3.3 Earnings Sharing Regulation (ESR) 
With earnings share regulation, the regulator specifies a target rate of return 
and earnings or profits for the monopoly. It also specifies the range (e.g., 10%–12%) 
where „no sharing‟ of profits with customers is required. Although regulators require 
the transfer of all or part of the earnings above the specified range to customers 
through refunds and/or reduced price, the monopoly is allowed to increase price 
when earnings fall below the lower limit (Sappington & Weisman, 2010). Earnings 
share regulation diminishes technical efficiency and is considered an unviable 
regulatory mechanism (Majumdar, 1997). 
 
3.3 Describing deregulation 
Deregulation is often associated with „privatization‟ (Doellgast, 2009, p. 4; 
Megginson & Netter, 2001, p. 321), „commercialization‟ (OECD, 2003a, p. 13; 
Adeyemo, 2005, p. 224) and „liberalization‟ (Bance, 2007, p. 331; Jho, 2007, p. 633). 
In the context of privatization, it projects delegating production decisions to private 
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owner(s) and shifting ownership and control from government to the private sector 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). Viewd Through the lens of „commercialization‟, 
deregulation connotes reorganizing and making public enterprise less dependent on 
government subventions (Adeyemo, 2005). In the context of liberalization, 
deregulation is the removal of restrictions on entry, prices, output and profits 
(Williams, 2010) and/or using „market-driven‟ policies to promote competition 
(Eckel, 2007, p. 78). In this research, deregulation is considered to be ownership 
transfer from government to the private sector and the lessening of government 
interventions; a description that has both theoretical and ideological meanings that 
traverse privatization, commercialization and liberalization. Studies show 
deregulation has positive impacts on the industry due to alterations in the number of 
participants and the nature of products/services offered (Rosenblut, 1998). 
 
3.3.1 Rationale for telecommunications industry deregulation 
Rate-of-return regulation, price cap regulation and earnings share regulation 
have been applied to restrict monopoly. However, the administrative cost and the 
fostering of the non-competitive environment in which they are applied removes 
incentive(s) for firms to improve performance (Yee, 2004). The rationale for the shift 
from regulation to deregulation is discussed under the following themes. 
 
3.3.1.1 Increasing regulatory costs 
Skyrocketing regulatory costs (e.g., „compliance‟, „opportunity‟, „defence‟, 
and „administrative‟) have created the demand for a shift in the regulatory approach 
so as to synchronize permitted conduct with public interest (Vance, 2012, p. 271). 
For governments, the desire to curtail the direct and indirect costs of regulation 
rationalizes the shift away from regulation. For firms, the shift is predicated on 
„unnecessary burdens‟ of compliance that raise costs for firms and inhibit their 
competitiveness of (OECD, 2010, p. 11). 
 
3.3.1.2 Political ideology 
The rationale for deregulation has been examined through political views – 
the right wing (i.e., conservatives) and left wing (i.e., liberals) (Cabeza & Gomez, 
2011). While the left wing favours regulation and government interventions, the right 
wing endorses „unfettered operation of markets‟ (Larner, 2000, p. 6) and holds the 
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view that government intervention in markets is fiscally imprudent, stifles innovation 
and erodes individual consumer choice and freedom. The political spectrum and 
philosophical constructs from which public officials emerge defines the level of 
support for deregulation. 
 
3.3.1.3 Performance 
Efficiency and productivity are vital to the long-run sustainability of an 
industry. Productivity measures output per unit of inputs (Coelli et al., 2005) while 
efficiency deals with how well resources are used to create value for customers by 
producing a mix of products/services that meets their needs (Treacy & Wiersema, 
1993; Porter, 1996). Poor performance contributes to the decision to deregulate 
because entry barriers in monopoly industry and the guarantee of a particular level of 
return on investment contribute to inefficiency and inflate prices for customers 
(Baumol & Klevorick, 1970). 
 
3.3.1.4 Addressing fiscal issues 
Pressure to tackle fiscal issues is an impetus for deregulation. Deficit 
spending is addressed through reduction and/or removal of subventions granted to 
state owned enterprises (SOEs). Also, proceeds from deregulation are used to 
ameliorate government liquidity problems (Omoleke & Adeopo, 2005). In addition, 
deregulation generates revenue for government to enhance social programs (Abbott, 
2013). Also, it is seen as a way of facilitating direct investment in infrastructure and 
a means for accelerating the attainment of salient economic growth objectives 
(Cabeza & Gomez, 2011). 
 
3.3.1.5 Advancement in telecommunications, computer and information 
technology 
Innovation in telecommunications, computer and information technology, 
including the shift from analogue networks to digital and satellite transmissions, are 
contributory to the industry‟s deregulation (Vogelsang, 2003). The advancement 
blurs the lines between telecommunications, computer and information technology 
and validates the quest for deregulation (Stolfi & Sussman, 2001). The innovation in 
network infrastructure and service delivery facilitates new service provisions and 
challenges the existence of the regulated monopoly provider. 
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3.3.1.6 Meeting the lending requirement of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund 
As a prerequisite for financial assistance, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) require structural reforms targeted at eliminating 
anti-competitive legislation and/or barriers to entering industries considered essential 
for economic growth and development (Adeyemo & Salami, 2008). Following the 
recommendations of two international financial institutions (i.e., World Bank and 
IMF), several countries have made telecommunications industry deregulation part of 
their reform for access to aid packages to shore up their economies and to address 
broader macroeconomic issues (Latipulhayat, 2010). A contemporary example is the 
Greece crisis within the European Union and the mandate for Greece to engage in 
economic reform and curtail deficits spending prior to bailout funds agreements with 
the IMF and the European Central Bank (Featherstone, 2011). 
 
3.3.2 Forms of deregulation 
Deregulation changes the competitive landscape and imposes an obligation 
on firms to operate efficiently. However, the degree of deregulation and the speed 
with which it occurs determines firms‟ response. Kim & Prescott (2005, p. 416) uses 
„scope‟ and „pace‟ to describe the elements of deregulation. While the former focuses 
on the degree of deregulation (low vs. high) and determines the level of competition 
and price, the latter centres on the speed (slow vs. fast) of deregulation and defines 
smoothness in the transition that firms have to make. 
 
3.3.2.1 Frame-breaking 
The „frame-breaking‟ form of deregulation occurs when the „scope‟ is high 
and „pace‟ is fast and firms are expected to rely more on internal mechanisms (Kim 
& Presccott, 2005, p. 417). Although many business opportunities abound with the 
frame-breaking form of deregulation, the uncertainty associated with it requires that 
incumbent and new firms quickly adapt and leverage core competencies (Kim, 
2002). 
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3.3.2.2 Metamorphic 
The „metamorphic‟ form of deregulation is known for its high „scope‟ but 
slow „pace‟ (Kim & Prescott, 2005, p. 418). Though the scope of deregulation is 
high, the slow pace reduces uncertainty and creates less urgency because market 
participants have time to adjust. Furthermore, the slow pace of deregulation does not 
lead to a rapid increase in competition as incumbent and potential entrants have time 
to assess deregulatory policies before taking actions. With this form of deregulation, 
firms rely on internal mechanisms as government regulation will not be quickly 
eliminated. 
 
3.3.2.3 Piecemeal 
The „piecemeal‟ form of deregulation is characterized with low „scope‟ but 
fast „pace‟ (Kim & Prescott, 2005, pp. 418–19). The fast pace causes a quick 
introduction of competition and puts pressure on market participants to adapt. 
However, the slow scope does not allow competitive environment to be fully 
entrenched. Like the metamorphic form of deregulation, piecemeal allows firms to 
rely on internal mechanisms but with convergence among firms and retention of 
regulatory power by government (Udayasankar & Das, 2007). 
 
3.3.2.4 Plodding 
„Plodding‟ is a form of deregulation with low „scope‟ and slow „pace‟ (Kim 
& Prescott, 2005, p. 419). The low scope signals that deregulation is limited and that 
market opportunities are restricted; the slow pace indicates gradual deregulation and 
firms view it as less beneficial to institute internal mechanisms (Udayasankar & Das, 
2007). Unlike the other forms of deregulation where reliance on internal mechanism 
is embraced, in order to accommodate reality, this form allows the regulatory agency 
to maintain significant control and to modify rather than outrightly eliminate 
regulation. 
 
3.3.3 Deregulatory mechanisms 
The mechanism used to deregulate an industry is dependent on government 
objectives (Hoffmann, 2008) and the nature of the monopoly – “private” or “public” 
(Blackman & Srivastava, 2011, p. 10). With a private monopoly, the direct 
introduction of competition is favoured. On the other hand, with a public monopoly, 
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the approach could involve granting entry to private operators to compete with the 
public or state owned enterprise, transferring ownership of the state owned enterprise 
to the private sector and concurrently introducing competition and/or breaking up the 
state owned enterprise with monopoly power into several units (Alabi, Onimisi, & 
Enete, 2010; Megginson & Netter, 2001). As noted in Industry Canada (2008), 
transferring ownership from public to private retains the monopoly structure and may 
not benefit customers, but privatizing the state owned enterprise and introducing 
competition results in efficiency gains and benefits customers through reduced prices 
and better services. 
 
3.4 Describing market structure 
Market structure identifies an industry‟s nature and characteristics and is the 
„consequence‟ and „determinant‟ of competition (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 2006, 
p. 409). It describes the organization and actions of market participants (i.e., buyers 
and sellers) and their relative competitiveness and ability to influence market price 
(Sigmund, 2008). „Perfect‟ and „imperfect‟ competitions are the two ends in the 
market structure continuum (Foshee, 2010, p. 68). The „perfect‟ competitive 
structure is characterized by many sellers with no market influence but each exhibits 
„price taking‟ behaviour due to the inability to control price (Julien, 2010, p. 661). 
The imperfect competitive structure embodies „monopolistic competition‟, 
„oligopoly‟ and „monopoly‟ (Luo, 2009, p. 512) and is characterized by reduced 
competition and more market power concentrating in one firm or only a few due to 
decline in the number of participating firms, product differentiation and/or entry 
barriers as the structure trends from monopolistic competition to oligopoly and to 
monopoly. 
Boone & van Witteloostuijn (2006, pp. 412–13) uses „organizational density‟ 
(i.e., number of firms) and „concentration‟ (i.e., size of firms) to categorize market 
structure in four. First is the „fragmented‟ structure which is a structure that is 
accentuated in perfectly competitive market where power is dispersed and each 
participant adopts market price. In this market, easy entry and/or exit is the norm and 
each firm is a „price taker‟ (Makowski & Ostroy, 2001, p. 480). Studies such as 
Makowski and Ostroy (2001) and Hayes (2008) show that due to product 
homogeneity, this type of industry is rivalrous, creating incentives for firms to be 
efficient and effective. Second is the „uniform‟ market structure. This reflects 
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monopolistic competitive industries where a number of firms offering similar but 
differentiated products compete (Chang, 2011). Firms in this industry produce 
similar or close substitute products but the uniqueness of each firm‟s products creates 
opportunity to earn above average market price (Carson, 2006). Given that there is a 
price range beyond which customers would switch to competitors, the desire to 
maximize profit causes firms to under produce, resulting in capacity underutilization 
and inefficiency (Lou, 2009). Third is the „concentrated‟ market structure. This 
structure is exhibited in oligopoly markets where a handful of large firms competing 
with each other recognize their „strategic interdependence‟ (Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 
2006, p. 482). Church & Ware (2000) noted that collaboration among firms in 
oligopoly markets influences their behaviour and that agreeing to output restrictions 
increases each firm‟s profitability. Boopathi & Sujen (2012) indicates that firms in 
oligopoly market pay attention to rivals‟ reactions and struggle to choose between 
promoting self-interest and collaborating with others. Usually, firms are aware of 
anti-trust policies and express bans on colluding for the purpose of increasing price 
or engaging in any actions that reduces benefits for customers (Brock & Obst, 2009, 
p. 67). Nonetheless, there is also the understanding that the law does not directly 
forbid „conscious parallelism‟ – a covert cooperation attained by matching rivals‟ 
actions especially if the firm making the initial move is the market leader in the 
industry (Dibadj, 2010, p. 590). Fourth is the „dual‟ market structure, which is 
prevalent in markets where a dominant market participant allows smaller but 
specialized firms to operate in the market. This categorization does not directly refer 
to monopoly but the mention of market dominance suggests monopoly characteristic. 
An obvious assumption is that a monopoly often maximizes profits by charging the 
highest price but it faces an elastic demand (i.e., a downward sloping demand curve) 
and so would not always emphasize the highest price but will search for the best 
output and price combinations that maximizes profitability, causing it to give less 
consideration to the efficient use of resources (Rosenberg & Clements, 2000; Lee & 
Tollison, 2011) 
 
3.5 Theoretical underpinnings of market structure 
Several theoretical constructs have been used to explain firm behaviour and 
industry performance. One is the Austrian school of thoughts which holds that 
„disequilibrium‟ and „monopoly power‟ are normal in competitive markets (Leon, 
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2014, p. 8). This school of thought maintains that efficient resource allocation is 
attained via rivalry and that competition results in more efficient firm(s) dominating 
the industry and conferring benefits to consumers. The exit of inefficient firms may 
allow efficient ones to temporarily attain monopoly profits until their actions are 
copied by others. Another perspective is the Chicago school of thought which gained 
prominence in the 1970s and 1980s. The Chicago school asserts ideas similar to the 
Austrian school and cautions against market interference by government by 
maintaining that efficiency and benefits to customers are achievable if markets are 
left alone (Cook, 2002). The assertion from the perspective of the Chicago school is 
that with time highly efficient firms with low production costs will increase in size 
and market share, plausibly increasing market concentration (Bhandari, 2010), thus 
the motivation for others in the industry to seek efficient production methodologies 
to be competitive (Baker & Shapiro, 2008). Unlike the Austrian school, the Chicago 
school rationalizes why firms increase in size and why high profitability may not 
necessarily be due to market power but the result of operational scales, high 
efficiency and/or the effectiveness of a small group of firms (Shaik et al., 2009; 
Delvin, 2010). Given the Chicago school‟s rationale for market concentration and 
efficiency, it is possible that the increase in market concentration and power would 
result in monopoly profit for the incumbent (Cook, 2002). To curb this, the post-
Chicago school evolved. Unlike the Chicago school, this holds a moderate view and 
concurs that market power emanates from barriers to entry and other forms of anti-
competitive practices; hence its tolerance of some level of government interventions 
(Delvin, 2010).  
Another view is the „contestable market‟ phenomenon which was initiated by 
Baumol, Panza, and Willig in the 1980s (Bratland, 2004, p. 2; Amavilah, 2012, p. 2). 
As a theory in the field of industrial organization, contestable market is one in which 
„entry is absolutely free, and exit absolutely costless‟ (Baumol, 1982, p. 3). 
Possessing some preconditions, contestability is found to apply in all types of market 
structures. According to Church & Ware (2000, p. 508), the first condition is that all 
incumbent firms and potential entrants are predisposed to the same technology; 
second is the absence of sunk costs due to recoverability of entry costs upon an 
entrant‟s exit from the industry; third is the lack of „entry lag‟, meaning that a new 
entrant can produce at any level; fourth, the response time requirement of the 
incumbent firm is greater than the entrant‟s exit time requirement, implying that a 
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new firm can enter an industry, sell at a price below what incumbent firm sells at, 
and exit in a „hit-and-run‟ fashion with no cost to itself before the incumbent could 
initiate a response (Baumol, 1982, p. 4). Contestable market posits that a specific 
market structure does not necessarily yield a particular performance. Instead, the 
contestable nature of the market and the possible entry and/or costless exit of firms 
serves as a check to the conduct and behaviour of existing firms irrespective of the 
industry structure (Machaj, 2013). This construct is elaborated in Evenden & 
Williams (2000) who noted that the behaviour of existing firms does not preclude the 
potential impact of the behaviour of new entrants. In essence, potential entrants can 
enter an industry to tap profit opportunities and then exit when conditions change 
without incurring a loss. Although theorists of contestable markets hold that 
contestability and threats of new entrants motivate incumbents to pursue cost 
effectiveness and efficiency improvements, support for it has waned due to empirical 
limitations and the difficulty surrounding the determination of the degree to which 
markets are imperfectly contestable (Evenden & Williams, 2000). 
Furthering the discussion on market structure and firms‟ behaviour, Boopathi 
& Sujen (2012, p. 1) focused on the oligopoly market and used „game theory‟ to 
explain how ambiguity surrounding the decisions firms face in choosing between 
promoting self-interest and cooperating with others can affect operational, 
investment and competitive strategies. Sirghi (2009, p. 260) elaborated on the game 
theory and describes how firms in oligopoly markets behave by first acknowledging 
their mutual interdependence followed by a consideration of their expected or 
anticipated behaviours. Thus firms may use resources unproductively, resulting in 
inefficiencies and higher prices for customers (Bompard et al., 2010). Game theory 
application extends to the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) which was 
coined by Bresnahan in 1989 (Einav & Levin, 2010). NEIO premises that marginal 
costs are unobservable and impossible to be estimated directly and that each industry 
is unique and so assessing behaviours from a cross-sectional sample of industries is 
implausible (Parsons, 2007). Kadiyali, Sudhir, & Rao (2001, p. 167) present the three 
main considerations essential to NEIO applicability (i.e., demand specification, cost 
specification, and competitive interaction specifications). They noted NEIO provides 
adequate understanding of the competitive behaviour of firms in defined markets and 
industries rather than in cross-sectional studies across industries. Overall, NEIO is 
useful for approximating market power and marginal cost, but it relies on 
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behavioural differences that exist when price taking firms and those with market 
power are subjected to new demand and/or cost requirements (Church & Ware, 
2000). 
A model that has contributed to the understanding of market structure, level 
of concentration and performance is the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model 
developed by Edward Mason and Joe Bain in the 1940s and 1950s (Nazari & Tajdini, 
2011) and which is referred to as the „Harvard paradigm‟ (Pope & Ma, 2008, p. 949). 
It assumes causality between industry structure, firm conduct and performance 
(Church & Ware, 2000). Originally applied to the study of the relationship between 
profitability and concentration in US manufacturing industries, it articulates that 
structure influences conduct which in turn determines performance. Within the 
context of SCP, structural variables which are observable and measurable include the 
number of market participants, product differentiation, entry barriers, and degree of 
market power (Wirth & Bloch, 1995; Tung, Lin, & Wang, 2010). The conduct 
variables are behavioural variables and include product strategies, advertising, 
pricing strategies, and research and innovation. The performance variables include 
productive and allocative efficiency, product and service quality, profitability and 
technological advancement (Wirth & Bloch, 1995; Tung, Lin, & Wang, 2010). Two 
constructs of the SCP model are discussed in Edwards, Allen, & Shaik (2006, p. 1). 
The first is the „structure performance‟ model which premises that there is an inverse 
relationship between market concentration and level of market competition; the 
second is the „efficient structure‟ model which rationalizes the dependence of a 
firm‟s performance on efficiency. Conceptually, the SCP hypothesizes that market 
power increases with concentration (Pope & Ma, 2008; Delvin, 2010) and that there 
exists a positive correlation between concentration, market power and profitability 
(Church & Ware, 2000). In the telecommunications industry, market power is 
increased due to barriers relating to high capital requirements, network effects, 
regulations and firm created barriers such as exclusive dealings and high switching 
costs. These barriers prevent or limit entry and concentrate market power in the 
hands of one (monopoly), two (duopoly) or a few (oligopoly) incumbent firms. 
 
3.6 Building the theoretical framework for this research 
The theoretical framework establishes the philosophical basis for the research 
and lays the foundation for conceptualizing the research (Berman, 2013; Imenda, 
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2014). The framework presented in Figure 3.1 is a product of a blend of several 
studies on the SCP paradigm. These studies were examined for relevance and 
applicability to the case being investigated but were found to need modifications to 
fit the research objective. In constructing the framework in Figure 3.1, the outcomes 
in Kadiyali, Sudhir, & Rao (2001, p. 164), Sahoo & Mishra (2012, p. 239) and Tung, 
Lin, & Wang (2010, p.1123) were amalgamated in ways that eliminated the 
deficiencies identified in each. 
 
3.6.1 The structure, conduct and performance (SCP) framework 
The SCP model presumes that structure shapes conduct which then influences 
performance. Tung, Lin, & Wang (2010) and Kadiyali, Sudhir, & Rao (2001) present 
a causal effect and flow from structure to conduct to performance but there exists the 
influence that conduct has on structure, performance on conduct and performance on 
structure. Figure 3.1 shows the interrelationship between structure, conduct and 
performance and depicts how governments through policies relating to regulation, 
deregulation, competition and the macroeconomy influence the SCP components. 
Broader macroeconomic objectives of government, policy shift from regulation to 
deregulation and the requirement to comply with anti-competitive „ex ante‟ and „ex 
post‟ regulations are essential to ensuring competition and altering firms‟ conduct 
and performance (Blackman & Srivastava, 2011, pp. 30–1; Garcia & Anson, 2012). 
This research recognizes the structural presumption in the SCP model and relies on 
the depiction in Figure 3.1 to fully capture the significance of the interdependent 
nature of structure, conduct and performance. 
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Market Structure 
 Concentration 
 Product differentiation 
 Entry barriers 
 Vertical integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conduct 
 Pricing strategies 
 Advertising 
 Product strategies 
 Product differentiation 
 Research and innovation 
 Conglomerate/merger 
 Collusion 
 Legal strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
 Allocative efficiency 
 Productive efficiency 
 Profitability 
 Technological progress 
 Product and service quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Assembled from Kadiyali, Sadhir, & Rao (2001); Tung, Lin, & Wang (2010), & Sahoo &  
              Mishra (2012, p. 239). 
Figure 3.1: The refined SCP model. 
 
 
 
Government Policies 
 Regulation 
 Deregulation 
 Competition policy 
 Macroeconomic policy 
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3.6.2 Theoretical framework of this research 
The underlying theoretical framework of this research is „deductive 
reasoning‟ at a macro level and culminates in the use of „middle-range‟ theory so that 
the observed phenomena are grounded in empirical evidence for easy generalization 
(Liehr & Smith, 1999, p. 81; Neuman, 2011, p. 69). The various layers used to frame 
this research are depicted in Figure 3.1. This framework relies on the SCP model that 
has been refined with the inclusion of government policies and also the identification 
of conduct and performance as having impacts on structure and vice versa. 
Government policies cut across economic and social objectives (Korsching, Sapp, 
El-Ghamrini, 2003; Williams, 2010) and broader macroeconomic policies directed at 
economic growth, job creation, wage increase and better trade policies influence 
government actions. Telecommunications industry promotes economic growth and 
satisfies government‟s macroeconomic objectives (Giray, 2007; Awoleye et al. 
2012). However, the direction embraced (i.e., regulation vs. deregulation) influences 
the industry‟s structure, conduct and performance which in turn determines 
macroeconomic outcomes. In a monopoly situation, a firm makes decisions that 
maximize profitability with little attention to efficient resource utilization causing 
„welfare‟ loss for customers (Round & Zuo, 2008, p. 33; Brock & Obst, 2009, p. 67) 
as „wealth‟ is transferred from customers to the firm (Balasooriya, Alam, & Coghill, 
2010, p. 370). On the other hand, in a deregulated and competitive situation, the lack 
of market power by firms stimulates effective resource use (Kalejaiye, Adebayo, & 
Lawal, 2013). 
On the social front, telecommunications allow people to break distance and 
location barriers (Yilmaz, Haynes, & Dine, 2002) and enrich the experience and 
social wellbeing of those accessing the technology (Katz, 2009). The social policy 
regarding universal service provisions to a wider group (e.g., rural and remote areas) 
coupled with government investments through direct involvement in infrastructure 
results in social benefits (Williams, 2010; Rajabiun & Middleton, 2013). Universality 
hinges on scale and scope economies and favours the monopoly model but may 
undermine performance (Madden, Savage, & Ng, 2003). The competitive market 
structure is assessed using the number of participants, concentration, product 
differentiation, entry barriers and degree of vertical integration. To determine an 
industry‟s concentration, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) index is used. The 
index is calculated by adding the squared market share of all firms in the industry. 
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The revised HHI merger guidelines by the US Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission (2010, p. 19) is shown in Table 3.1. Based on this widely 
accepted guideline, a high HHI indicates highly concentrated industry with a firm or 
a few firms having market power. 
 
Table 3.1: Categorizing an industry using HHI. 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI)  Level of Concentration  
Less than 1500 Unconcentrated 
1500–2500 Moderately concentrated 
Greater than 2500 Highly concentrated 
Source(s): US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010, p. 19) 
 
 
Market structure reflects the level of industry concentration and is considered 
to have an influence on conduct and performance of firms in an industry. Since 
competition results from low levels of concentration, government and regulatory 
agencies have the tendency to intervene through policy change should there be 
evidence of high concentration and/or reduced competition. The intervention could 
change market structure variables and influence conduct and performance (Martin, 
2012). Studying the effect of policy reform in the Mongolian mobile 
communications industry, Byambaakhuu, Kwon, & Rho (2014) describe the desire 
for increased competition as the basis for deregulating the industry. The study applies 
SCP framework and reckons that changes in market structure cause behavioural 
change among firms, and define firms and market performance. In their view, once 
operationalized, deregulation causes reconfiguration of structure, conduct change 
(e.g., investment in infrastructure) and performance augmentation. 
 
Summary 
Insights on regulation and deregulation have been provided in this chapter. 
The description of regulation depicts market intervention meant to mitigate 
monopoly firm from misusing market power. A common view is that regulation 
protects the general public and restricts the monopoly from arbitrary price increases. 
Rate-of-return regulation, price cap regulation and earnings share regulation have 
been used to regulate monopolies but are subject to criticism due to the high costs 
associated with monitoring compliance by firms in the industry and the need for the 
monopoly to constrain costs or to strive for an increased level of performance. Issues 
 42 
associated with regulation made the pursuit of deregulation apparent. The change in 
the competitive environment fostered by deregulation motivates firms in the industry 
to operate more efficiently. However, the degree of deregulation and the speed with 
which it occurs shape how firms respond in a deregulated environment. Hence the 
study of the Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications industries offers a good 
glimpse of deregulated environment. 
In addition, this chapter discusses market structure and highlights how the 
organization, nature and competitiveness in an industry are affected by the number 
and size of market participants. Aside from the four predominant market structures 
(i.e., perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly) often 
discussed in the market structure continuum, this chapter presents an elaborate 
understanding of market structure and uses the four categorization in Boone & van 
Witteloostuijn (2006, pp. 412–413). The first is „fragmented‟ industry structure 
which is tantamount to perfectly competitive market where each participant is 
obligated to comply with market dictates. The second is „uniform‟ market structure 
and reflects monopolistic competitive markets in which firms profit by offering 
differentiated products but the underutilization of resources prevails due to profit 
maximization motives of firms in the industry. The third is „concentrated‟ market 
structure. This foreshadows oligopoly situation with a small number of firms 
dominating the market. The fourth is the „dual‟ market structure which is prevalent in 
markets with a dominant participant. The theoretical underpinning of market 
structure presents the review of industry structure and performance through a variety 
of perspectives (i.e., Austrian school, contestable market, Chicago school, post-
Chicago school, game theory, NEIO and SCP) that show that views differ on why an 
industry could become concentrated and/or on how structure influence conduct and 
performance. This chapter also discusses the SCP model and conceptualizes it as the 
framework for understanding the performance of deregulated telecommunications 
industry. The next chapter (Chapter 4) provides a review of literature on deregulated 
telecommunications industry efficiency and productivity analysis. It details studies 
on deregulation and performance, highlights the results of deregulated utilities 
industries and directs attention to the efficiency and productivity studies on 
telecommunications industry. 
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Chapter 4 
Review of Literature on Deregulated Telecommunications Industries 
and Efficiency and Productivity Analyses 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 discusses market structure and the theoretical framework for this 
research. Also, it was used to set the stage for understanding performance in 
deregulated environment. This chapter (Chapter 4) provides a review of relevant 
literatures on the outcome of industry deregulation. The chapter is organized as 
follows: Section 4.2 reviews prior studies on deregulation and performance; and 
Section 4.3 presents empirical studies on telecommunications industry efficiency and 
productivity analysis. Maintaining focus on the objectives of this research, the review 
of literature was carried out to identify gaps in existing studies and to serve as the 
basis for rationalizing the methodology used in the analysis of performance in this 
research. The chapter concludes with a summary. 
 
4.2 Review of studies on deregulation and performance 
The evaluation of the relationship between deregulation and industry 
performance is of interest because of the impact of deregulation on performance and 
policy implications. There is a plethora of studies on deregulation, but there is no 
consensus on its influence on performance. Comparing the average value of 
performance indicators five years before and after privatization, Jerome (2008) relied 
on profitability (i.e., return on assets [ROA], return on equity [ROE], and return on 
sales [ROS]), operating efficiency (i.e., net earnings per employee and revenues per 
employee) and capital expenditure to sales to analyze the performance of some 
privatized enterprises in Nigeria. The study found improvements in „allocative 
efficiency‟ and „consumer welfare‟ (p. 49). However, the study ignored the role of 
exogenous factors. Liu & Whalley (2011) examined the behaviour of firms through 
the lens of market concentration, investment and pricing, and showed that 
restructuring alone cannot prevent anti-competitive behaviour by operators with 
market power, thus highlighting the need for policy makers to pursue the 
introduction of competition and the disintegration of the dominant player in the 
industry during deregulation. La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) examined the 
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benefits of deregulation in Mexico and found that it has economic impact on some 
privatized enterprises‟ profitability, operating efficiency, capital expenditure, output 
and capital structure. Similar indicators were used in Boubakri & Cosset (1998) 
study of the financial and operating performances of 79 newly privatized firms in 21 
developing countries. Focusing on profitability (i.e., return on sales [ROS], return on 
assets [ROA] and return on equity [ROE]), efficiency (i.e., sales efficiency – real 
sales/number of employees), net income efficiency (i.e., net income/number of 
employees), capital investment spending (i.e., capital expenditure/sales), number of 
employees, leverage (i.e., debt/total assets and debt/equity) and dividends (i.e., 
dividends/sales and dividends/net income), the study shows an increase in all areas of 
performance measures when ownership moved from public to private hands. 
Furthermore, using simple averages and Wilcoxon Z statistic test, the study 
establishes that privatization resulted in increased financial performance and that it 
was also responsible for the decline in leverage ratios. Extending the work of 
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) in the analysis of corporate governance and performance 
of newly privatized firms, Boubkari, Cosset, & Guedhami (2001) used performance 
indicators similar to the ones used in earlier studies. Focusing on profitability, 
efficiency, investment and output, the study applied descriptive statistics and 
regression model to show that economic reforms and corporate governance influence 
post-privatization performance of newly privatized firms, a hint that factors other 
than deregulation may play a role in post-deregulation performance. 
Wei et al. (2003) studied the financial and operating performance of China‟s 
newly privatized firms. Relying on performance measures that include profitability 
(i.e., return on sales and net profit), output (i.e., real and nominal sales and real 
assets), employment, operating efficiency (i.e., sales efficiency – ratio of sales to 
number of employees), and leverage (i.e., debt-to-total asset), the research assessed 
performance three years before and after privatization and used Wilcoxon sign-rank 
test to examine if there is significant difference in performance. Furthermore, the 
study used regression analysis to understand the influence of some other variables on 
the pre and post-privatization performance of firms. The findings show that output, 
sales efficiency, real assets and profitability increased post-privatization. Similarly, 
in a comparison of the pre and post-privatization performance of partially privatized 
firms in India, after adjusting for changes in competition, Gupta (2002) itemized 
evidence of increased profitability, efficiency and productivity (i.e., ratio of sales 
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revenue to labour), and return to labour (i.e., ratio of operating income to labour) of 
the firms examined. 
Capital intensive industries appear to be of interest in most studies on 
deregulation. Delmas & Tokat (2005) apply DEA in the analysis of performance of 
deregulated electricity utility sector in the US and reported that deregulation has a 
negative impact on the efficiency of firms in the industry. However, the study only 
focused on the short-term impacts of deregulation and reviewed three years of data 
(1998–2001). Nonetheless, the study‟s finding that efficiency is affected by the level 
of fragmentation in the competitive environment adds value to the debate regarding 
industry concentration and efficiency. Jamasb et al. (2005) provides empirical 
evidence on the determinants of performance of electricity sector reform in 
developing countries. The study notes that deregulation increased operating 
efficiency but that the gains have not been passed on to customers effectively. Zhang, 
Parker, & Kirkpatrick (2008) examination of electricity sector reform in developing 
countries and the effects of privatization, competition and reforms reveal interesting 
dynamics. Using data from 36 countries from 1985 to 2003, the study relates that 
competition results in improved capacity utilization and labour productivity. 
However, it notes that situations involving privatization alone showed no evidence of 
improved performance. The lack of competition in situations involving privatization 
indicates no benefits accrue in the transfer of monopoly from public to private. 
Dempsey (2008) investigated impact of US airline industry deregulation and notes 
that it has benefitted customers through price reductions, but rising costs and excess 
capacity meant reduced profitability for firms in the industry. Although, deregulation 
has contributed to the growth in the industry, the increase in competition has resulted 
in consolidation and mergers and an increase in the level of concentration; a 
phenomenon considered necessary in order to leverage scale and scope economies 
for the attainment of increased efficiency and productivity (Scharpenseel, 2001). In 
the banking industry, Strahan (2003) notes that deregulation led to an increase in 
bank size and the ability to service more customers over a wider geographical area at 
lower prices. Nevertheless, the elimination of less efficient banks through mergers, 
acquisitions or outright bankruptcy raises the possibility of increased concentration 
and higher market power. Competition and increased levels of efficiency and 
productivity were evidenced in the Indian banking sector that showed increased 
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productivity after deregulation (Casu, Ferrari, & Zhao, 2013). However, the recorded 
gain benefitted foreign banks rather than locally owned banks 
The telecommunications industry is a capital intensive network industry that 
has gone through deregulation. The liberalization of the industry in China took the 
form of share issues on major stock exchanges instead of an outright sale of the state 
owned enterprises to private individuals (Zheng & Ward, 2011). The application of 
regression model in the study of the effects of liberalization on China‟s telecom 
industry showed improvements in the average revenue per user, average revenue per 
minute, industry concentration and number of subscribers. Focusing on Korea 
Telecom and the impact of competition on the efficiency of public enterprise in 
Korea, Lee, Park & Oh (2000) found significant improvements in a number of 
performance measures which led to the conclusion that significant improvements in 
performance is achievable only if markets are competitive. This finding is similar to 
Naessi & Neven (2005) who applied regression analysis in the examination of 
competition, regulation and privatization of telecommunications sector in Latin 
American countries and found a combination of decline in price and increase in 
labour productivity (i.e., number of lines per worker and revenue per worker), 
investment in infrastructure and higher teledensity when the industry became 
deregulated. In a multi-country analysis of telecommunications reform, achievement, 
and challenges in Indonesia, The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, Lee & Findlay 
(2005) found that Indonesia failed to attain the desired performance objective 
through partial privatization (i.e., public–private partnership) hence it embraced full 
deregulation and opened the industry to competition in 1999. This is buttressed by Li 
& Xu (2004) who used regression model to evaluate the impact of privatization and 
competition on telecommunications firms and reported that telecommunications 
firms in countries with full privatization have better performance than those in 
countries with partial privatization. Lee & Quayes (2005) applied the Cox 
proportional hazard model to shed lights on the relationship between public 
ownership and productive efficiency. Using teledensity, productive efficiency 
(number of lines per employee) and revenue per line, they suggested that ending state 
ownership of telecommunications improves productive efficiency. Hung & Lu 
(2007) did a comparative study of the performance of global telecommunications 
operators. Using inputs (i.e., total assets, capital expenditures and employees), and 
outputs (i.e., revenues, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
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[EBITDA], EBIT and net income), they suggested that telecommunications firms 
could attain higher levels of efficiency by reducing input. Interestingly, the study 
found that publicly owned telecommunications firms were more efficient than 
privatized ones but quickly  concludes that the reason for this observation was not 
clear, thus necessitating further empirical studies. Among empirical studies that 
present inconsistent results is Petrović et al. (2012). The study examined 
telecommunications industries in 22 European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development countries and found that countries that exhibited greater deregulation 
had better performance, suggesting that differences in post-deregulation performance 
is attributable to country-specific differences and prevailing environmental factors in 
each country. 
Overall, industry performance in deregulated environment has drawn much 
interest, but many of the studies on developed and developing countries present 
mixed results. While studies such as Fink, Mattoo, & Rathindran (2002) and  
Madden, Savage, & Ng, (2003) indicate improvement in performance, some show 
otherwise and infer that firms in non-deregulated environments display better 
performance (Hung & Lu, 2007) or no detection of difference in performance 
immediately following deregulation (Resende & Facanha, 2002). In general, two 
competing theories are dominant – „market power‟ (MP) paradigm and „efficiency 
structure‟ (ES) paradigm (Gajurel & Pradhan, 2011, p. 25). The former states that 
increased market concentration resulting from low competition leads to better 
profitability and performance. In contrast, the latter affirms no causality between 
market concentration and performance but that higher level of efficiencies explains 
better profitability and performance. Of particular significance is the discussion 
regarding the level of competition, market power and performance noted in Uukkivi, 
Ots, & Koppel (2012) and Gutierrez-Hita & Georgantzis (2012) that indicate market 
power prevails in an environment of low or absence of competition and so does 
inefficiency and poor performance but that deregulation fosters competition and 
results in improved performance. 
Studies seem to converge in ascribing improved performance in deregulated 
environment to deregulation, but the degree of success and enumerated performance 
vary partly due to using inconsistent performance measures which makes it difficult 
for reliable conclusions to be drawn on the impact of deregulation. An example is 
Zhang, Tang, & He (2012) who investigated the impact of macro and firm-specific 
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characteristics on the post-privatization performance of state owned enterprises in 
China. The study indicates no profitability improvement post-privatization but 
reported efficiency improvement. However, it relied on a simple partial measure of 
efficiency (i.e., sales per employee). Also, Cabeza & Gomez (2007) measured 
performance using profitability, productivity and efficiency ratios such as sales 
divided by number of employees and operating profit divided by the number of 
employees. The study did not show medium-term post-privatization improvement in 
firms‟ profitability but revealed significant improvements in the long term. Based on 
this observation, they asserted that there is need to consider longer time horizons 
when analyzing privatization process and its influence on firm performance. With the 
exception of Cabeza & Gomez (2007), other studies are silent on the time horizon 
(i.e., short term vs. long term) for attaining improvement in performance. 
Additionally, studies have used econometric analysis and regression models to 
provide useful insights on factors that affect performance, but the robustmess of the 
models used in several studies, including Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami (2001), is 
questionable due to inadequate provision for dealing with issues of correlation and 
bias. A major deficiency in these studies is their dependence on partial measures of 
performance which creates difficulty in identifying a benchmark without being 
impartial. 
 
4.2 Empirical studies of telecommunications industry efficiency and 
productivity analysis 
The evaluation of efficiency and productivity is necessary for an 
understanding of the performance of an industry prior to designing and implementing 
improvement measures. Studies have examined performance using frontier and non-
frontier methods (Figure 4.1). Wallsten (2001) used a non-frontier econometric 
technique to investigate the effect of competition, privatization and regulation on 
telecommunications industry performance in 30 countries from Africa and Latin 
America from 1984 to 1997. It found that competition benefitted the industy and that 
privatization together with independent regulatory authority improves performance. 
Similarly, Wallsten (2004) examined privatized monopolies in developing countries 
and confirmed that reform improves performance but granting exclusivity shifts 
monopoly from public to private and decreases investment. Ros (1999) investigated 
telecommunications industry reform effect on network expansion and efficiency. 
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Using data from 1986 to 1995 and fixed effect model, the study finds that 
privatization and competition impoves labour efficiency (i.e., mainlines per 
employee) and that competition has no effect on network expansion. Also, it found 
that countries that have at least 50% telecommunications assets in private domain 
experienced higher teledensity, however the study maintains that no evidence of 
increased teledensity for countries with GDP per capita below $10 000. The research 
presents astonishing results but uses partial measure of performance (i.e., teledensity 
and labour productivity) as dependent variables in the model instead of aggregate 
measures which would have generated a robust result. Fink, Mattoo, & Rahindran 
(2003) applied econometric technique and assessed telecommunications reform in 86 
developing countries across Africa, Asia, Middle East, Latin America and the 
Caribbean from 1985 to 1999. While the technique used does not capture the 
multifaceted reform process, the study concludes that teledensity and labour 
productivity increased but that complete liberalization (i.e., privatization and 
concurrent introduction of competition) increases teledensity and labour productivity 
by 8% and 21% respectively than reform involving privatization and delayed 
introduction of competition. Banker, Chang, & Majumdar (1998) also used non 
frontier econometric technique to examine economies of scope in U.S 
telecommunications industry between 1988 and 1992 and note that technology 
deployment contributed to cost reduction and improved performance. However, 
serial correlation in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) used to regress the time series 
data may have biased the coefficients of the variables in the model. 
The frontier approach in Erber (2005) took the form of parametric and 
involves stochastic production possibility frontier in the analysis of the efficiency of 
telecommunications industries in the US, UK, Germany, France and Netherlands. 
The study determined technology efficient frontier for each of the countries and 
measured inefficiency over time with reference to the frontier. Analyzing data from 
1981 to 2002, it notes France and UK displayed better technical efficiencies. The 
study attributed efficiency differences to time lag in adopting technology but 
suggests observed differences diminished with time. However, the study‟s use of 
unbalanced data and dependence on a series of assumptions regarding the Cobb-
Douglas function and translog function creates difficulty in generalizing the results. 
Supplementing stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) with data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), Li (2009) examines the efficiency and total factor productivity growth 
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(TFPG) of 22 mobile carriers across seven countries over 13 years (i.e., 1995–2007). 
The study shows that as the number of decision making units (DMUs) increases, 
DEA displays lower efficiency scores than SFA. Additionally, it examined 
productivity under both approaches and finds total factor productivity growth under 
DEA (5.6% per year) is higher than under SFA (2.2% per year). Also, the DEA 
approach showed that contribution from efficiency change (EC: 4.8% per year) 
surpasses contribution from technical change (TC: 1.1% per year) whereas the SFA 
showed contribution from technical change (TC: 2.2% per year) is greater than 
contribution from efficiency change (EC: 0.9% per year) hence the study‟s reasoning 
that efficiency and productivity scores are sensitive to methodlogy. Additionally, the 
study indicates reform influences the sector positively and that GDP growth 
enhances DEA technical efficiency and SFA technical efficiency whereas time trend 
has no consistent effect because it shows no influence on DEA technical efficiency 
but positively influences SFA technical efficiency scores. Seo et al. (2010) apply 
DEA and SFA in the investigation of market consolidation and productivity in US 
telecommunications industry. Focusing on 25 Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers 
(ILECs) over 10 years (i.e., 1996–2005), the study finds incidence of post-merger 
productivity deterioration under both methodologies but notes firms that consolidated 
alleviated productivity decline, insinuating increase in concentration enhances 
productivity. The study is fascinating in that it contradicts earlier study by Li (2009) 
that reported productivity increase. The controversy is compounded by findings in 
Resende (2008) who investigated the robustness of different efficiency measures: 
SFA, DEA, Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS), and a random effect model in 
the study of incentive regulation implementation in US telecommunications industry. 
The study‟s comparison of efficiency scores showed moderate level of consistency 
across the models, representing a departure from Li (2009) and others that seemed to 
indicate performance is sensitive to methodology. 
The frontier approach in Diskaya, Emir, & Orhan (2011) involves non-
parametric method (i.e., DEA) which was applied in a comparative analysis of the 
effect of the 2008 financial crisis on the technical efficiency of Turkish 
telecommunications industry and G8 countries. Using four inputs and three outputs 
and data from nine firms, the study concludes that the industry came out of the 
recession stronger. Furthermore, sample mean constant returns to scale technical 
efficiency (CRS TE) and variable returns to scale technical efficiency (VRS TE) 
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declined in 2008 and 2009 but increased in 2010 and is higher than the mean score in 
2007, implying improvement in efficiency over time. The productivity analysis 
showed that Turk Telecom experienced total factor productivity decline (1.7% per 
year) due to technological regress and efficiency retardation. Although, the overall 
sample displayed technological regress (1.67% per year), it attained total factor 
productivity growth mainly through efficiency improvement of 1.84% per year. 
However, the study‟s use of four inputs and three outputs suggests it needed at least 
12 firms instead of 9 in the sample size to be empirically sound. In addition, no 
statistical tests was performed to determine if the efficiency and productivity scores 
of Turk Telecom is statistically and significantly different from those of firms in the  
G8 countries, nonethesless, the study provides useful basis for understanding the 
sources of efficiency and productivity performance. Applying DEA to study 
productivity change in telecommunications industries in 13 OECD countries from 
1979 to 1998, Calabrese, Campsi, & Mancuso (2002) note total factor productivity 
growth averages 4.87% per year with technological change contributing the most 
(4.83% per year). The study also indicated efficiency could be improved through 
input-output mix rather than scale, however it inappropriately used number of 
mainlines rather than capital investment to proxy capital input (Coelli et al., 2005). 
Utilizing two inputs and one output in the examinination of 
telecommunications industry in 11 European countries, Torres & Bachiller (2013) 
analyzed data from 1997 to 2005 and reported decline in technical and scale 
efficiency over the study period. Regressing efficiency scores in the second stage 
analysis, the study noted investment increased efficiency and that liberalization alone 
does not affect efficiency unless it is accompanied by increased competition which is 
consistent with Fink, Mattoo, & Rahindran (2003). Similar analysis by Gokgoz & 
Demir (2014) revealed decrease in mean technical and scale efficiency of European 
telecommunications industry. Commendably, the study examined industry data from 
32 countries in Europe and utilized production and revenue approaches with three 
inputs and two outputs but the implied conclusion is not objective due to dependence 
on two years of data (i.e., 2010 and 2011) and lack of information on efficiency 
trends in the industry in each country. Usero, & Asimakopoulos (2013) investigated 
productivity change and its drivers among 23 leading mobile operators in Europe 
between 2008 and 2009 and finds that all except one experienced productivity 
decline. The study failed to decompose the productivity results and provides no 
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analysis of the sources of the productivity decline thereby detracting from its 
practical implications. Petrovic et al. (2012) used DEA to examine 22 European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development countries from 1998 to 2007. Relying on 
three inputs and one output, it found that the 10% per year total factor productivity 
growth was the result of technical change progression (TC: 9.4% per year) and 
efficiency change improvement (EC: 0.5% per year) but it failed to decompose the 
efficiency change into pure technical efficiency change (PTEC) and scale efficiency 
change (SEC) components which would have provided more insights on how the 
efficiency improvement was attained. Similarly, Petrović et al. (2011) examined the 
efficiency of 20 developing countries in Europe in 2002 and 2007. Employing three 
inputs and one output in the DEA, the study found that only four of the 20 countries 
in the study showed growth in performance score and rankings. Also, the study made 
broad statement that efficiency attainment in Estonia was due to good regulatory 
framework and that economic development does not determine events in 
telecommunications industry but it gave no empirical examination to support these 
statements. Prior studies (e.g., Li, 2009) proved otherwise. In addition, regressing 
efficiency scores against some environemental variables that proxy regulation and 
economic growth would have provided greater insights rather than the broad 
statement lacking empirical validity. 
An integral study by Madden & Savage (1999) investigated 
telecommunications industry productivity, catching-up, and innovation in 74 
countries. Applying the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) and relying on five 
years of data (i.e., 1991–95), the study reported that the average total factor 
productivity growth of 0.9% per year was due to technical change rather than 
efficiency change. Additionally, the study found that the category of industrialized 
countries displayed the highest total factor productivity growth (10.2% per year) due 
to technological innovation only and the deterioration in efficiency noted was caused 
by inappropriate scale. Developing European countries also experienced total factor 
productivity growth (8.9% per year) but was attributed to innovation and efficiency 
improvement. African countries as a group experienced total factor productivity 
decline (3.7% per year) due to technical change regress and efficiency retardation. 
Also, countries in the Western Hemisphere experienced total factor productivity 
decline (10.2% per year). While Asia and Middle East categories experienced total 
factor productivity growth (1.2% per year) which was attributed to technical change 
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improvement (i.e., innovation) but the two regions experienced efficiency decline. 
Using Generalized Least Square, the study stated that market size and privatization 
positively influence innovation in the industry but that market concentration has no 
significant effect. The study is informative but telecommunications industry has 
changed since 1995, suggesting the need for a contemporary study with more recent 
data. Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita (2004) apply DEA to study telecommunications 
industry in 39 countries from Africa, Americas, Asia–Paific, and Europe. Using 10 
years of data (i.e., 1989 to 1998), it found total factor productivity declined in the 
sample of countries due to technological regress. While categorizing the data by 
region reveals Europe (1.293) experienced the highest total factor productivity 
growth followed by Americas (1.040), and Asia–Pacific (1.033), and Africa (1.003), 
the lopsidedness of input (i.e., two outputs) and output (i.e., four outputs) and the 
small samples in each category may have caused limited comparison and reduced the 
discriminatory power of the DEA. Nonetheless, the finding regarding the source of 
total factor productivity growth mirrors prior empirical findings (e.g., Madden & 
Savage, 1999). 
Hu & Chu (2008) used two-stage procedure to analyze the efficiency and 
productivity of 24 major telecommunications firms in Asia–Pacific over a five year 
period (i.e., 1999 to 2004). The study reports technical and scale inefficiency in all 
years in the sample of firms except KDDI of Japan and TNZ of New Zealand. Also, 
the second stage regression with Tobit model shows that the level of competition 
(i.e., HHI) has no statistically significant effect on efficiency but GDP per capita and 
scope and scale economies positively influence efficiency. In addition, the Mann-
Whitney test relayed that wealthy countries in Asia–Pacific displayed better 
efficiency scores than less economically buoyant countries in the region which 
harmonizes with Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita (2004). Furthermore, the study notes 
total factor productivity growth (0.2% per year) was due to 3.4% per year 
technological progress because efficiency deteriorated by 3.1% per year and was due 
to decline in pure technical efficiency (1% per year) and scale efficiency regress 
(2.2% per year). The study applied sound methodology and its findings would be 
generalizable had it investigated the industry in each country instead of a firm in the 
industry in each country; however, its finding on total factor productivity growth 
sources contradicts Diskaya, Emir, & Orhan (2011) but supports Calabrese, Campsi, 
& Mancuso (2002) and Madden & Savage (1999). Also, Tsai, Chen, & Tzeng (2006) 
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study of global telecoms looks at data on 39 firms categorized into three regions (i.e., 
America, Asia–Pacific, and Europe). Utilizing three inputs and three outputs, the 
study found that Asia–Pacific region (0.7783) displayed better efficiency, followed 
by Europe (0.7597) and America (0.7043) but the Mann-Whitney test shows the 
performances are not statistically significantly different. Furthermore, the study notes 
that as a group, state owned telecom firms displayed higher efficiency (0.7649) than 
privatized firms (0.7419) due to their scale and scope of services but this difference 
is not statistically significant based on the Mann-Whitney test result. However, the 
finding that state owned firms performed better than privatized firms contradicts 
conventional assertions and studies that show deregulation enhances performance 
(e.g., Wallsten, 2004; Torres & Bachiller, 2013) but aligns with studies that indicate 
no performance benefits from deregulation. Like Tsai, Chen, & Tzeng (2006), Hung 
& Lu (2007) examined efficiency of 36 global telecom operators from three regions 
(i.e., America, Asia–Pacific, and Europe). Using three inputs and four outputs, the 
study noted that firms in Europe displayed superior efficiency (0.9720) than the other 
two regions (America: 0.8480; Asia–Pacific: 0.9340). In addition, the study 
examined performance and signals that state-owned telecom are more efficient 
(0.9690) than privatized ones (0.9050) but there is no statistically significant 
difference in their pure technical efficiency, suggesting the technical inefficiency is 
scale related. Also, the study noted that operational scale has influence on efficiency 
and that consolidating small operators improves scale and efficiency. Although 
similar to Tsai, Chen, & Tzeng (2006) in methodology, the divergence in findings 
may be due to differences in the number of inputs and outputs and sample of firms 
studied. Nevertheless, the notion of consolidation noted in the research seems to 
ignore the underlying premise for deregulation which is to increase competition and 
reduce market power. 
Moshi, Mwakatumbula, & Mitomo (2013) studied telecommunications 
industry productivity in 30 African countries from 2000 to 2009 and made use of two 
inputs and a single output in the DEA. The mean efficiency scores in the sample 
showed inefficiency but the industry experienced 18.7% per year total factor 
productivity growth which was mainly due to 21% per year technical change 
progression as the efficiency change deteriorated (1.9% per year). The retardation in 
efficiency change was caused by inappropriate scale (SEC decline: 1.9% per year) 
and marginal improvement in pure technical efficiency change (0.1% per year). In 
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the second stage analysis, the study found that revenue, subscriptions, Internet users, 
level of competition, international operators, and time trend positively influence 
productivity growth but that the presence of regulatory agency and GDP per capital 
declines productivity, a finding inconsistent with Li (2009) which indicated that GDP 
drives efficiency and Hu & Chu (2008) that expressed that GDP per capital 
positively influence efficiency. Country specific study carried out by Banker et al. 
(2010) apply DEA to study technological progress and productivity growth in US 
mobile telecommunications industry. Covering 16 firms in the industry over a three 
year period (i.e., 2000 to 2002), the study reported no significant improvement in the 
relative efficiency of the industry but noted that the industry experienced 13% 
productivity growth mainly due to technological progress. Because the study utilized 
four inputs and two outputs, its sample size of 16 firms suggests it met the minimum 
sample size requirement of eight however, to yield more robust results the study 
could have used the maximum of 24 allowed by the DEA and an elongated study 
period beyond three years. Nonetheless, the study is insightful and identifies 
technological progress as the source of productivity. In addition, the second stage 
OLS regression analysis finding that national operators with larger market share 
displayed superior productivity growth than regional service providers seems to 
imply providers with larger operational scale and scope perform better. On the 
contrary, Moreno, Lozano, & Gutierrez (2013) indicated competition has not made 
firms efficient and that increased market share detracts from efficiency, however it 
investigated 26 firms over a longer period (i.e., 1997 to 2007) rather than 16 over 
three year period in Banker et al. (2010) and relied on single input and single output 
in the DEA. Assessing the efficiency performance of 10 telecommunications service 
providers and 23 service circle areas, Sharma, Momaya, & Manohar (2010) 
depended on a single input and two outputs in the DEA and found that technical 
inefficiency resulted from pure technical inefficiency (PTIE) and scale inefficiency 
(SIE) but pure technical inefficiency contributed mostly to the technical inefficiency. 
Mohamad (2004) examined the pre-reform and post-reform productivity of Malaysia 
telecommunications industry. Using six years of data (i.e., 1996 to 2001) and four 
inputs and one output, the results showed CRS technical efficiency and VRS 
technical efficiency improved. In addition, the research identified that the total factor 
productivity growth was the result of technical change progression of 42.1% per year 
with minute contribution from efficiency change improvement (1% per year). 
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An overview of prior studies on telecommunications industry efficiency and 
productivity presented in Table 4.1 shows several apply DEA with a handful utilizing 
SFA. The findings in many of these studies reveal operating in deregulated 
environment improves performance over time and that inefficiency is caused by pure 
technical inefficiency and inappropriate scale while productivity decline is caused by 
either the inadequate utilization of technology or inefficiency and/or both. 
Nonetheless, not all agree that deregulation leads to efficiency and productivity 
improvements. Also, among studies that indicated deregulated environment results in 
performance improvement, there seems to be controversy on the source of efficiency 
improvement with some (e.g., Calabrese, Campsi, & Mancuso, 2002; Naimy & 
Merheb, 2014) indicating managerial effectiveness is allocating inputs as responsible 
for increased efficiency but others (e.g.,  Hung & Lu, 2007) signifying operational 
scale as the source. Also, the review shows disagreement on the source(s) of 
productivity growth with some (e.g., Hu & Chu, 2008; Moshi, Mwakatumbula, & 
Mitomo, 2013) expressing technological progress as responsible for productivity 
growth but Diskaya, Emir, & Orhan (2011) attributed the growth in productivity to 
efficiency gains whereas Petrović et al. (2012) findings appear to indicate technical 
and efficiency change progressions as respondsible for total factor productivity 
growth. From the foregoing, it is apparent that a study is needed to clarify the sources 
of efficiency improvement and/or productivity growth. In addition, the review shows 
detailed attention has not been paid to the telecommunications industry in Canada 
and Nigeria, showing the need for a methodological examination of the industry in 
the two countries. 
 
Summary 
Reviewing the literature on telecommunications industry deregulation and 
performance, it is pertinent to note that studies on the phenomenon have largely 
ignored Canada and Nigeria thus revealing a gap and presenting an opportunity to 
comparatively examine the case of Canada and Nigeria. Also, the literature review 
shows that majority of the studies demonstrates that deregulation contributes to 
improved performance but studies also exist that contradict this assertion, making it 
difficult to ascertain the impact of deregulation on performance. A study of the case 
of Canada and Nigeria will contribute to the understanding of telecommunicatons 
industry performance in deregulated environment. Furthermore, the review of 
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literature showed that efficiency and productivity are often used to evaluate 
telecommunications industry performance but the findings in these studies are not 
easily generalized to fit the case of Canada and Nigeria, however, while the findings 
in these studies may serve as useful benchmark in construing the experience of 
Canada and Nigeria, literature elucidation provided the impetus and direction for this 
research. The next chapter (Chapter 5) discusses the methodology and data. It details 
the methodological approach of this research, highlights efficiency and productivity 
measurement techniques, inputs and outputs selection, sample size, data collection 
and treatment, and ethical considerations that guided the conduct of this research. 
 
 
 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Sources: Adapted from Resende (2008) & Coelli et. al. (2005) 
Figure 4.1: Telecommunications industry performance measurement techniques. 
  
Telecommunications 
Industry Performance 
Frontier Method Non-Frontier Method 
Parametric Approach 
 Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA) 
 Distribution Free 
Approach (DFA) 
 Thick Frontier 
Approach (TFA) 
 
Non-Parametric Approach 
 Free Disposal Hull 
(FDH) 
 Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
Parametric Approach 
 Least Square 
method 
 Other 
Econometric 
methods 
Non-Parametric Approach 
 Index method 
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Table 4.1: Measurement of firm‟s performance. 
Research Industry Method Input Output Findings 
Bollou & 
Ngwenyama (2008) 
Telecommunications 
industry in six African 
countries, 1995–2002 
Time series 
DEA 
 
Regression 
 
 
Investment in ICT 
 
Number of staff 
Revenue from ICT 
 
Number of Internet 
users 
 
Number of lines 
 
Total telephone traffic 
 
Number of cellular 
phones 
Growth in TFP has slowed 
in all countries studied 
Cabanda,  Ariff,  & 
Viverita (2004) 
Examine productivity, 
efficiency and 
technological progress in 
39 samples of global 
telecommunications in 
Africa, Asia–Pacific, the 
Americas and Europe, 
1989–1998 
 
Uses DEA-
type 
Malmquist 
Productivity 
Index to 
determine 
performance 
 
Capital investments 
 
Number of employees 
Total telecom services 
revenue 
 
Total fixed line 
 
International outgoing 
telecom minutes 
 
Teledensity 
Order of productivity 
growth is Europe, the 
Americas and Asia–
Pacific. 
 
Technological progress 
rather than efficiency 
changes is highly 
correlated with the 
increased TFP growth 
 
Africa shows a greater 
potential for 
telecommunications 
productivity growth 
 
Low innovation is the 
cause of decline in overall 
TFP across the sample 
studied. 
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Calabrese, Campisi, 
& Mancuso (2002) 
Telecommunications 
industries in 13 OECD 
countries, 1979–1998 
DEA 
 
Cobb-Douglas 
production 
function 
 
ANOVA 
Labour (number of full 
time staff) 
 
Number of lines in 
operation 
 
Telecommunications 
revenue 
Technological change is 
the most important factor 
in the sectors‟ 
improvement 
 
Slight inefficiency exists in 
the industry 
 
Source of inefficiency lies 
in input-output utilization 
rather than the size of the 
operation 
Cho & Park (2011) 109 firms in the mobile 
content industry in Korea  
Input oriented 
DEA 
 
Principal 
component 
analysis 
 
Regression 
Total assets 
 
Operating costs 
 
Number of employees 
 
Number of years in 
operation 
Revenue Of the 109 examined, only 
11 are determined to be 
efficient; there exists 
varying levels of efficiency 
among them 
Hu & Chu (2008) 24 telecom firms in 
APEC member 
economies, 1999–2004 
DEA 
 
Tobit 
regression 
 
Malmquist 
Productivity 
Index 
Number of staff 
employed (full and part-
time) 
 
Total fixed assets 
 
 
 
Fixed line and non-
fixed line revenues 
 
Technical efficiency is 
attributed to economies of 
scale and scope rather than 
competition 
Hung & Lu (2007) 36 global leading 
telecommunications 
firms  
Input oriented 
DEA 
Total assets 
 
Capital expenditures 
 
Number of employees 
Revenues (includes 
consolidated 
subsidiaries) 
 
EBITDA 
 
EBIT 
Holding the input ratios 
constant, telecom operators 
can generate the same level 
of output with less inputs 
 
Inefficiency is mainly due 
to technical inefficiency 
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EAT 
 
Operational scale has 
influence on efficiency 
Li (2009) 22 carriers in 
telecommunications 
firms, 1995–2007 
Output 
oriented TFP 
 
SFA 
 
DEA 
Labour costs 
 
Material costs 
 
Capital costs 
 
Capital quantity 
Operating revenue Performance sensitive to 
method 
 
Higher technical 
efficiency, innovation, and 
total factor productivity 
 
Majumdar (1997) 45 local operating 
companies in the US 
telecommunications 
industry, 1988–1993 
Input oriented 
DEA 
Number of switches 
 
Number of lines 
 
Number of employees 
 
Local calls 
 
Inter-LATA toll calls 
 
Intra-LATA toll calls 
Regulation results in 
inefficiencies 
 
PCR as a replacement to 
ROR has a positive but 
lagged effect on technical 
efficiency 
 
ESR found to be 
detrimental to technical 
efficiency 
Moreno, Lozano & 
Gutierrez (2013). 
Assessment of US 
wireline 
telecommunications 
industry Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers, 
1997–2007 
Dynamic DEA 
 
Multiple 
Regression 
OPEX Telecommunications 
revenue 
Findings show no clear 
relation between size and 
efficiency 
Moshi, 
Mwakatumbula, & 
Mitomo (2013). 
30 African 
telecommunications 
industry, 2000 to 2009 
DEA 
 
Malmquist 
Productivity 
Index 
 
Regression 
Number of full time staff 
 
Telecommunications 
investment  
Telecommunications 
revenue 
 
Number of telephone 
subscription (fixed and 
wireless) 
 
Number of Internet 
Productivity improvement 
mainly from technological 
progress and less from 
technical efficiency. 
 
Improving technical 
efficiencies will enhance 
productivity 
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users 
 
 
Competition and increased 
subscriptions have positive 
impact on productivity 
Naimy & Merheb 
(2014) 
16 mobile telecom 
operators in Middle East  
Input oriented 
DEA 
 
Partial Factor 
Productivity 
Total number of 
employees 
 
Total assets 
 
Capex 
Total Revenue 
 
EBITDA 
 
Seven operators were 
found to be operating; nine 
while 9 were not 
 
The most efficient was in 
Turkey 
Oh, Lee, & Heshmati 
(2008) 
580 Japanese 
manufacturing industries, 
1993–2003 
Input oriented 
TFP 
 
Time Trend 
 
General Index  
 
Chained-
Multilateral 
Index  
Capital stock 
 
Labour 
 
Material 
 
Production costs 
Gross production 
 
Higher return to scale for 
larger plants 
 
Higher technical change 
and productivity growth for 
larger plants 
Petrović, Gospić, 
Tarle & Bogojević 
(2011). 
Telecommunications 
industries in 20 
developing (transition) 
countries, 2002–2007. 
 
DEA 
 
Composite 
indicators 
Total subscribers 
 
Total number of 
employees 
 
Annual 
telecommunications 
investment 
Telecommunications 
service revenue 
Countries that progressed 
had effective 
telecommunications 
policies. 
 
Progress in one dimension 
(e.g., regulatory reform), 
does not imply better 
performance in other 
dimensions (e.g., economic 
efficiency) 
Papadimitriou & 
Prachalias (2009) 
18 telecom operators; 15 
from the European 
Union, 1 each from 
Africa, Asia and South 
Output 
oriented DEA 
Staff 
 
Investments 
 
Revenue Total productive efficiency 
improved over time 
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America  Marketing expense 
 
Traffic of fixed 
telephony 
 
Traffic of mobile 
telephony 
Sharma, Momaya, & 
Manohar (2010) 
10 telecommunications 
service providers in India 
Input oriented 
DEA 
Capital employed Number of subscribers 
 
Total value of output 
Industry growth driven by 
competition 
 
Tremendous scope for 
improvement in resource 
utilization in less efficient 
firms 
Torres & Bachiller 
(2013). 
Comparative analysis of 
the efficiency of 11 
European privatised 
public 
telecommunications 
operators, 1997–2005 
DEA 
 
Regression 
Number of employees 
 
Total assets 
 
Operating revenues 
 
Concluded that 
privatisation is positively 
related to efficiency and 
that firms do not show the 
same degree of response to 
the liberalisation 
Tsaia, Chenb, & 
Tzeng (2006). 
Examined productivity 
efficiency of 39 leading 
global telecom 
companies as ranked in 
Forbes 2000 
DEA Total assets 
 
Capex 
 
Number of employees 
Revenue 
 
EBITDA 
 
EBIT 
No significant difference in 
regional performances 
 
Asia–Pacific telecom 
firms‟ performance better 
than Europe but superior to 
America 
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Chapter 5 
Methodology and Data 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapter 4 presents efficiency and productivity as 
measures used in the determination of performance in deregulated environments. 
This chapter (Chapter 5) presents information on the methodology and data in this 
research. Two phases were involved in the conduct of this research. The first was the 
secondary data analysis to yield information on the efficiency and productivity of the 
telecommunications industry and the use of Tobit regression to understand the 
impact of external factors on efficiency performance. The second entailed the 
analysis of the results of survey questionnaire completed by industry participants. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 details the concepts 
and measurement of efficiency. Section 5.3 discusses the productivity concept and 
productivity change measurements. Section 5.4 explains the second stage 
econometric regression involving the Tobit model and highlights the variables used 
in the model. Section 5.5 sheds lights on the case study as the empirical approach 
adopted in this research. Section 5.6 details the model specification. Section 5.7 
discusses the inputs and outputs selection and sample size. Section 5.8 describes the 
data collection. Section 5.9 highlights the data treatment. Section 5.10 narrates the 
data analysis approach used in this research. Section 5.11 provides information on 
the ethical considerations adhered to in this research. The chapter concludes with an 
integrated summary. 
 
5.2 Efficiency concept and measurement 
5.2.1 The efficiency concept 
Efficiency refers to the use of economic resources in ways that mitigate 
waste. It relates to the use of inputs in producing outputs and is achievable by 
minimizing inputs or by maximizing outputs (Norman & Stoker, 1991; Kumar & 
Gulati, 2008). Thus, a firm that wants to attain efficiency would use its resources to 
produce a high amount of outputs at low costs. Referencing Farrell (1957), Coelli et 
al. (2005, p. 51) note that a firm‟s efficiency consists of technical efficiency (TE) and 
allocative efficiency (AE). Whereas technical efficiency demonstrates the production 
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of the maximum output from input and is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, allocative 
efficiency reveals the use of an optimal input mix given a particular price and 
technology constraint. The combination of technical and allocative efficiency results 
in „economic (i.e., cost) efficiency‟ (CE) (Coelli et al., 2005, p. 51). Furthermore, 
technical efficiency is subject to managerial decisions and is attained when it is not 
possible for a firm to raise output without increasing at least one of the inputs. But 
allocative efficiency is attained when the mix of inputs (e.g., capital and labour) is 
optimized to meet organizational objectives (e.g., profitability) (Kumar, 2013, p. 
150). 
 
5.2.2 Measurement of change in efficiency 
According to Kumar (2013, p. 150), both „parametric‟ and „non-parametric‟ 
approaches are applied in studies relating to efficiency. A parametric approach is 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) which allows for the statistical testing of 
hypotheses relating to differences in technical efficiency scores (Seo et al., 2010, p. 
275). The SFA model originally advanced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen & 
Van den Broeck (1977) describes a production function with error term and allows 
for the estimation of the „least cost‟ function for the industry with the best 
performing firm (Ariss, 2008, p. 934). Its drawback is that any difference between 
the actual and the potential output is ascribed to inefficiency. Also, it neglects any 
unobserved and omitted variables and „stochastic noise‟, thus resulting in higher 
inefficiency scores (Gatto, Liberto, & Petraglia, 2011, p. 961). Other parametric 
approaches – the Distribution Free Approach (DFA) and the Thick Frontier 
Approach (TFA) – have also been used to evaluate efficiency. DFA was introduced 
by Berger (1993) and is less dependent on the „distributional assumptions‟ than SFA. 
It contains one-sided error term representing cost inefficiency but makes no 
assumption about the specific distribution for the inefficiency (Wagenvoort & 
Schure, 1999, p. 8). TFA, which was developed by Berger and Humphrey (1991; 
1992), assumes that aside from inefficiency that results in deviation from the frontier, 
deviation is also caused by measurement errors or factors beyond management 
control. Starting with average costs, it identifies two „thick frontiers‟, one for the 
lowest and one for the highest average costs quartile of firms (Wagenvoort & Schure, 
1999, p. 9; Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000, p. 176). To detect inefficiency level, the 
average inefficiency of the highest quartile firms is computed in comparison to the 
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two „thick frontiers‟ (Wagenvoort & Schure, 1999, p. 9). Firms that are located on 
the lower quartiles are considered relatively efficient while those on the top quartile 
are considered inefficient. Although TFA allows for the avoidance of the restrictive 
assumption essential in the other approaches, its major drawback is that its reliance 
on „average production‟ and output performance tends to ignore (i) small efficient 
firms when considering the case involving increasing returns to scale (IRS) and (ii) 
large efficient firms when considering the case involving decreasing returns to scale 
(DRS) (Wagenvoort & Schure, 2005, p. 5). 
Non-parametric approaches used to measure efficiency include Free Disposal 
Hull (FDH) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). FDH was introduced in 1984 by 
Deprins, Simar & Tulkens. As an alternative to DEA, it does not require „convexity‟ 
but assumes the free disposability of inputs and outputs (Simar, 2007, p. 184). Some 
shortcomings of FDH are its sensitivity to the number of observations in the dataset, 
the distribution of the observations, and the number of inputs and outputs. 
Commenting on the shortcomings, De Borger et al. (1994) stated that a larger sample 
size increases the possibility of efficiency notation and that having more inputs or 
outputs in the analysis results in greater possibility for efficiency. Data Envelopment 
Analysis put forward in 1978 by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) for evaluating 
profit and non-profit organizations is an extension of the single input–output 
approach introduced by Ferrell in 1957 for determining efficiency relative to a 
production frontier (Haridasan & Venkatesh, 2011; Hadad et al., 2013). DEA relies 
on the input and output parameters of the decision-making units (DMUs) to generate 
efficiency frontier on which DMUs are assessed (Amindoust, Ahmed, & Saghafinia, 
2012). A DMU can be an entity, a business firm, any organization or unit that 
converts inputs to outputs (Cooper et al., 2001, p. 220).  
In DEA applications, attention is drawn to „radial‟ and „non-radial‟ 
characteristics of DEA models (Avkiran, Tone & Tsutsui, 2008, p.128). The former 
is „unit invariant‟ which implies that a change in the unit of measurement does not 
change the efficiency value (Coelli et al., 2005, p. 57). Furthermore, Avkiran, Tone 
& Tsutsui (2008) noted that while the use of „radial‟ measure of efficiency relies on 
finding the proportional amount by which all inputs will have to decrease without 
diminishing the current output level,  the „non-radial‟ (also known as the slack-based 
measurement[SBM]) focuses on identifying the maximum rate of input  reduction (p. 
128). DEA can be input or output oriented (Coelli et al., 2005). The input oriented 
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DEA focuses on minimizing inputs in generating a given level of output (Hung & 
Lu, 2007). It directs attention to the inputs required to yield observable outputs and 
makes possible the evaluation of inputs reduction tolerable without a negative effect 
on outputs (Milana & Zeli, 2002). Output oriented DEA emphasizes maximizing 
outputs generated from specified level of inputs (Kim, Kim, Shin, 2014). When an 
input-oriented DEA is used, any inefficient DMU receives a score below 1 but when 
an output-oriented model is used, the inefficient DMU receives a score that is greater 
than 1. 
In practical terms, DEA measures the relative efficiency for a given number 
of DMUs by comparing each DMU‟s input and output data with others. It operates 
on the assumption that efficiencies cannot be greater than 1 and DMUs with values 
of 1 are efficient. Thus, performance is measured with respect to the efficient or best 
performing DMU (Charles & Kumar, 2012) and is based on the distance from the 
frontier or envelopment surface (Nigam, Thakur, & Singh, 2009). Norman & Stoker 
(1991, p. 179) distinguish DMUs by efficiency scores under the following groupings: 
 Robustly Efficient Units: Efficient DMUs that also serve as benchmark for 
peers. These DMUs are considered effective in utilizing resources. 
 Marginally Efficient Units: DMUs considered efficient due to CRS 
technical efficiency score that is equal to 1. However, these DMUs do not 
serve as benchmarks for others in that they may possess distinctive 
characteristics that differentiate them from peers and risk being inefficient 
with a slight change in inputs or outputs. In addition, inefficient DMUs 
under CRS but with VRS technical efficiency score of 1 are included in this 
category. 
 Marginally Inefficient Units: DMUs with efficiency scores greater than 0.9 
but less than 1. They could become efficient with a slight adjustment to 
their inputs or outputs. 
 Distinctly Inefficient Units: DMUs with efficiency scores of below 0.9. 
These DMUs would have difficulties becoming efficient. 
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Although DEA is sensitive to outliers and sample size, it does not require a 
specific assumption relating to inputs (e.g., minimization of cost) and outputs (e.g., 
maximization of profit) (Kong & Tongzon, 2006; Charles & Kumar, 2012). Other 
advantages of DEA as outlined in Cronin & Motluk (2007, p. 47) are its ability to: 
i. Accommodate multiple inputs and outputs; 
ii. Decompose efficiency into technical, allocative, and scale efficiencies; 
iii. Measure efficiency without needing price information; and 
iv. Calculate relative efficiency by establishing a reference point of 
potential efficiency for DMUs. 
 
In addition, Cronin & Motluk (2007) noted that DEA can be sensitive to 
outliers and data errors caused by measurement or reporting errors, suggesting the 
need to be meticulous when entering input and/or output data. 
DEA models are developed based on the envelopment surface. According to 
Nigam, Thakur, & Singh (2009), the first approach is constant returns to scale (CRS), 
which assumes a direct relationship between input and output parameters and that all 
DMUs operate at optimal level such that a 1% increase in input will result in 
equivalent increase in output (Hu & Chu, 2008; Kim, Kim, & Shin, 2014). However, 
several factors such as management and internal constraints, government policy and 
regulation, and market structure may affect a DMU‟s scale of operations thus using 
constant returns to scale when not all firms operate at optimum scale could result in 
biased technical efficiency scores. The second approach is the Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (BCC) model which adds „convexity assumption‟ to the DEA to permit 
piecewise estimation of the envelopment surface (Banker & Morey, 1986, p. 1164). 
This allows variable returns to scale (VRS) with the supposition that operational 
scale influences the relationship between input and output such that a 1% increase in 
input could yield an output level that is greater than or less than 1%. Therefore, the 
use of variable returns to scale in determining technical efficiency removes scale bias 
as it compares inefficient DMUs to those similar in size (Coelli et al., 2005). 
Commenting further, Ngwenyama & Morawczynski (2009) note that scale efficiency 
occurs when the value of scale efficiency is 1 and technical efficiency under constant 
returns to scale is equal to the technical efficiency under variable returns to scale but 
that scale inefficiency is exhibited when scale efficiency is less than 1 and technical 
efficiency under constant returns to scale is less than technical efficiency under 
 69 
variale returns to scale. The third approach is non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) 
which emphasizes that operational scale affects efficiency and the relationship 
between input and output (Hung & Lu, 2007). In addition, the nature of returns to 
scale (RTS) (e.g., increasing returns to scale [IRS] vs. decreasing returns to scale 
[DRS]) is determined by comparing the technical efficiency under non-increasing 
returns to scale to that under constant returns to scale. A DMU exhibits increasing 
returns to scale if it is scale inefficient and the technical efficiency under non-
increasing returns to scale is equal to the technical efficiency under constant returns 
to scale but displays decreasing returns to scale if the technical efficiency under non-
increasing returns to scale is greater than the technical efficiency under constant 
returns to scale (Ngwenyama & Morawczynski, 2009). 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the efficiency measurement described in Hung & Lu 
(2007, p. 1121). It is a simplified input-oriented DEA that uses a single input to 
generate a single output. The constant returns to scale (CRS) represented by 0C is 
based on the assumption that all DMUs are operating at optimum scale and that the 
technically efficient DMU will have efficiency score of 1 and lie on point C. The 
other DMUs (i.e., B, E and D) operate outside the efficient frontier and are 
considered inefficient. The variable returns to scale (VRS) is represented by ABCD 
and the DMUs that lie on points B, C and D have score of 1 each and are considered 
efficient while the DMU on point E is not. Also, the non-increasing returns to scale 
(NIRS) is represented in Figure 5.1. To understand the level of a target DMU‟s scale 
inefficiency that results from increasing returns to scale or decreasing returns to 
scale, the technical efficiency score under non-increasing returns to scale and 
variable returns to scale are compared; any variation in the two as demonstrated by 
point E indicates increasing returns to scale and means the DMU is too small, 
suggesting that its efficiency could be increased through an operational size increase. 
But decreasing returns to scale occur if the two are equivalent, as shown in point F; 
implying the DMU is too large and its efficiency could be increased through 
operational size decrease. 
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Source: Hung & Lu (2007, p. 1121). 
Figure 5.1: Simplified input-output DEA. 
 
 
As pointed out in Martin & Roman (2006), DEA model selection may be 
influenced by data availability, industry characteristics and market structure. The 
mathematical notations for the input-oriented DEA are based on the measures and 
the approach for evaluating performance in Cooper et al. (2007, p. 154), Nigam, 
Thakur, & Singh (2009, pp. 43–44) and Hung & Lu (2007, p. 1122) and are 
expressed as: 
 
 ∑      
 
   
 ≤ ∑      
 
   
       (5.1a) 
 
Maximization results in: 
                             ∑     
 
   
                                                                                        
 
 
P 
B 
R 
E 
A 
C 
Q 
CRS 
D 
NIRS 
VRS 
 F 
x 
y 
0 
Output 
Area 
Input Area 
 71 
Subject to: 
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As specified in Hung & Chou (2013, p. 35), the ratio of the output to input is 
less than or equal to 1, but as indicated in (5.1d), if input is set at 1, the efficiency 
score will reflect the weight of output shown in (5.1b). Consequently, when either of 
the optimal solutions (i.e.,    or   ) is 0, the solution „degenerates‟ such that a DMU 
that seems efficient may actually be inefficient due to using too much input (Hung & 
Chou, 2013, p. 35). 
Cooper et al. (2007, p. 154) introduces a „non-Archimedean element‟ (ɛ) 
smaller than any positive number (i.e., ɛ > 0). This constraint is written as: 
 
0 < ɛ ≤    and 0 < ɛ ≤    
 
The value of ɛ is infinitesimally small and specified to range between      
and      (Hung & Chou, 2013). This infinitesimally small number is used to 
multiply the input slack (si
-
) and output slack (sr
+
) to yield solution weights that are 
all positive in all input and output variables to create the „dual‟ form (p. 35). 
According to Cooper et al. (2007, p. 154), the linear programming for the duality 
mode results in an equation which when applied to each of the DMUs produces an 
efficiency frontier that „envelopes‟ a „production possibility set‟. The linear 
programming duality mode is expressed as: 
 
Min θ0 – ɛ ( ∑  
 
   i
- 
+ ∑      i
+
 )    (5.2) 
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Where: 
j = number of DMUs being compared 
θ = efficiency rating of DMUs being evaluated using DEA 
   = value of output r by DMU j 
   = value of inputs i used by DMU j 
   = value of output by the DMU being evaluated 
   = value of inputs by the DMU being evaluated 
i = number of inputs used by DMU 
r = number of outputs generated by DMU 
µr = coefficient or weight assigned by DEA to output r 
ʋi = coefficient or weight assigned by DEA to input i 
si
-
 = input slack and represents the excess amount of input that resulted in  
        inefficiency of the DMU 
sr
+ 
= the output slack and represents the shortfall amount of output that resulted in  
        inefficiency of the DMU 
λ = the optimal set of weights that satisfy the constraints and results in efficiency  
      score identified as θ 
 
The DEA model applies an efficiency rating of 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 to demonstrate an 
efficiency rating of between 0% and 100%. According to Abokaresh & Kamaruddin 
(2011), a DMU is considered strictly efficient if and only if θ = 1 and si
-
 = sr
+ 
= 0 for 
all values of i and r; and a DMU is considered weakly efficient if θ = 1 and si
-
 ≠ 0 
and/or sr
+ ≠ 0. 
The Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes version of the model relies on constant 
returns to scale which assumes a proportionate increase (decrease) in outputs if 
inputs increase (decrease) by a certain quantity (Charles & Kumar, 2012). The 
duality mode is: 
Subject to: 
 
∑      
 
   
 + si
-
 = θ     where: i = 1, 2, ….., m  (5.3a) 
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∑      
 
   
 - sr
+
 =     where: r = 1, 2, ……s   (5.3b) 
 
λ, si
-
, sr
+ ≥ 0         (5.3c) 
 
The Banker, Charnes and Cooper model as shown in (5.4c) adds „convexity 
constraint‟ to the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes model (Charnes, Rousseau, & 
Semple, 1996, p. 5) and relies on variable returns to scale with the notion that 
changes in inputs may not result in proportional change in output (Hung & Lu, 2007; 
Kontodimopoulos et al., 2011). The duality mode is: 
Subject to: 
 
∑      
 
   
 + si
-
 = θ     where: i = 1, 2, ….., m  (5.4a) 
 
∑      
 
   
 - sr
+
 =     where: r = 1, 2, ……s   (5.4b) 
 
∑   
 
   
  , and λ, si-, sr+ ≥ 0      (5.4c) 
 
5.3 Productivity concept and measurement 
5.3.1 The productivity concept 
Productivity is the ratio of outputs to inputs and is used to measure the 
amount of output generated per unit of input (Coelli et al, 2005; Nigam, Thakur, & 
Singh, 2009). Productivity could be attained through input minimization or output 
maximization. Its measurement yields information on how well a DMU uses inputs 
to generate output (Jaforulla & Whiteman, 1999; Kumar, 2013). 
 
5.3.2 Measurement of change in productivity 
Productivity measurement gives information on the sources of productivity 
differentials between DMUs and from one period to another (Cvetkoska, 2011). As 
noted in Nigam, Thakur, & Singh (2009), productivity change could be ascribed to 
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differences in production technology, production process efficiency and 
environmental conditions. A productivity measurement approach includes partial 
factor productivity, multifactor productivity and total factor productivity (Coelli et 
al., 2005). Partial factor productivity determines output that results from an input 
without considerations for usage interdependence among outputs (Manonmani, 
2014). It is expressed as output per unit of labour, output per labour hour or any other 
outcome that represents an output and input ratio (Coelli et al., 2005). However, its 
use is limited due to outcomes that improperly represent productivity when the 
direction of at least two partial measures of productivity conflict with each other 
(Lee, Park & Oh, 2000). 
Multifactor productivity is suitable in situations involving a single output but 
multiple inputs (Subhash & Kankana, 1996). It focuses attention on how inputs are 
employed and measures the growth in output that could not be linked to labour and 
capital growths but „disembodied‟ technological changes such as improvement in 
labour quality and business processes (Acheson, 2011, p. 68). However, like partial 
factor productivity, it fails to capture all inputs (OECD, 2001). Total factor 
productivity (TFP) identifies the increase in outputs that are not attributable to or 
accounted for by an increase in input but to changes in technology (Bollou & 
Ngwenyama, 2008; Lam & Shiu, 2008). It considers aggregate input in determing 
productivity change and is viewed as a better measure when performing comparisons 
across DMUs and/or a productivity of particular DMU over a given period of time 
(Coelli et al., 2005). Because it reveals the ratio of total output to total input, given 
equality in inputs, a DMU with higher total factor productivity will have greater 
output than that with a lower total factor productivity (Syverson, 2011). 
Uri (2001) discusses stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) in productivity change 
measurement and notes productivity is affected by technical inefficiency and that the 
degree of inefficiency shown varies in magnitude depending on the distance below 
the frontier. A frontier approach is practical in situations involving individual and 
aggregate data and disentangles technological change (technical change [TC]) and 
technical efficiency (TE) which typically are sources of productivity growth (Gatto, 
Liberto, Petraglia, 2011). Another method used in productivity change analysis is 
„econometric‟ which is a non-frontier and parametric approach (Uri, 2001, p. 169). 
This approach came to light through the separate works of Aigner et al. (1997) and 
Meeusen & Van den Broeck (1977) which integrates efficiency change into a model 
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of productivity growth (Uri, 2001). In addition, Coelli et al. (2005) identify indices, 
which are non-frontier, but non-parametric approach for measuring productivity. The 
„Fisher Index‟ is used when input and output quantities and prices are known. Its 
simplicity and non-requirement for a benchmark makes it appealing, but it fails to 
identify the sources of productivity change (Subhash & Kankana, 1996, p. 1660). 
Another index is the Törnqvist Productivity Index (TPI) which measures price and 
quantity change over time (Dumagana & Ballb, 2009; Diewert & Fox, 2010; 
Barcenilla-Visus et al., 2013).  
The Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) which requires finding the 
„geometric mean‟ of two Malmquist indexes is also utilized in productivity change 
measurement (Fare et al., 1994, p. 66). This approach signifies the ratio of efficiency 
measures from one time period to another or between two different observations for 
the same period (Emrouznejad et al., 2011). As indicated in Li (2009), comparing 
inputs from two different time periods and identifying the maximum factor by which 
the input from one period could be decreased without negative impact on output was 
conceived by Malmquist and was put forth in 1953. However, the work of Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert (CCD) (1982) extended the Malmquist input index to the 
productivity measurement now known as the MPI. It entails decomposing total factor 
productivity into technical change (TC) and efficiency change (EC) (Sung, 2012, p. 
491). The technical change provides information on productivity growth resulting 
from technological innovation while the efficiency change measures the contribution 
from efficiency improvements (Mohamad, 2004, p. 326). Like DEA, MPI could be 
input or output oriented (Kim, Kim, & Shin, 2014). The input-oriented form is akin 
to DEA (Kim, Kim, & Shin, 2014; Mathur, 2007) in that it estimates the minimum 
input necessary to produce a particular output while the output-oriented MPI 
provides information on the maximum output a given level of input could generate. 
The notation Mt and Mt+1 used in Usero & Asimakopoulos (2013, p. 2921) 
reveals the two Malmquist indices used to generate MPI. 
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In an input-oriented MPI, between two periods (i.e., period t and t+1) the 
geometric mean of the two indices above results in MPI (Kim, Kim, & Shin, 2014, p. 
59) and is depicted below: 
 
        
                    
                
                         
                         
                
 
Where: 
                        are input and output vector at period t and t + 1. 
  
         
    are the distance function at t and t + 1 when technology (T) is 
considered as reference point in period t. 
  
               is the distance function that measures the maximum proportional 
change in output that is necessary to make             feasible relative to 
technology in period t. 
  
            is the distance function that measures the proportional change in 
output that is necessary to make         feasible in relation to technology t + 1. 
With the initial level of total factor productivity estimated under CRS, an 
MPI above 1 indicates a total factor productivity increase from period t to period t + 
1 and implies the input required to produce the output decreased between period t 
and t + 1 (Calabrese, Campisi, & Mancuso, 2002; Kim, Kim, & Shin, 2014). 
Additionally, provided cross-sectional data (e.g., Liu et al., 2014) and time series 
data (e.g., Kong & Tongzon, 2006) are available, the above MPI can further be 
𝑀 𝑖
𝑡 𝑡  
  (𝑋𝑡, 𝑌𝑡, 𝑋𝑡  , 𝑌𝑡  ) = 
1/2 
Mt + 1  =  
Mt   =  
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broken down into efficiency change (i.e., „catching up‟) and technical change (i.e., 
„innovation‟) (Fare et al., 1994, p. 66) to determine source of productivity change. 
The decomposed MPI shown in Kim, Kim, & Shin (2014, p. 59) is represented as: 
 
 
                                                      
                      
                   
          
                            
                        
                  
           
    
 
= Technical Efficiency change x Technological change 
   = Effch  *   Techch 
   =  EC * TC 
 
Furthermore, efficiency change could be broken into the pure technical 
efficiency change (PTEC) index and the scale efficiency change (SEC) index 
 
                                                     
                           
              
                
                                               
                               
             
                
 
EC  =  PTEC * SEC 
 
The Malmquist productivity index (MPI) is expressed as: 
 
MPI = PTEffch * SEffch * Techch 
 
MPI = PTEC * SEC * TC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀 𝑖
𝑡 𝑡  
(𝑋𝑡, 𝑌𝑡, 𝑋𝑡  , 𝑌𝑡  ) = 
1/2 
Technical Efficiency  
Change index  =  
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5.4 Second stage econometric regression model 
Regression model which is considered „econometric‟ (Green, 2003, p. 7) is 
used to account for the influence of environmental factors outside management 
control on performance (Moreno, Lozano, & Gutierrez, 2013; Sung, 2012). This non-
frontier parametric approach is based on the representation of DEA scores as a 
function of environmental variables in a process referred to as „second stage 
analysis‟ (Kontodimopoulos et al., 2011, p. 982). The approach was first applied by 
Ray (1991) but has been subject to debate. Notably, model choice(s) vary by study 
and there is no general consensus on the most appropriate model as the choice of 
model depends on the underlying assumption(s). Models that are acceptable and that 
have been utilized include Tobit (Li, 2009; Hu & Chu, 2008), Generalized Least 
Square (Ng, 2012; Moshi, Mwakatumbula, & Mitomo, 2013), multiple regression 
(Moreno, Lozano, & Gutierrez, 2013), Ordinary Least Square (Banker & Natarajan, 
2008; Yadav & Katib, 2015) and Logistic (Kumar & Gulati, 2008). Simar & Wilson 
(2007; 2011) expresss concern relating to possible serial correlation of estimated 
efficiency scores and Coelli et al. (2005) and Ramalho, Ramalho & Henriques (2010) 
caution that the second stage results could be biased if variables (i.e., inputs and 
outputs) used in the DEA model in the first stage highly correlate with independent 
variables in the second stage analysis. Nevertheless, several studies (e.g., Banker & 
Natarajan, 2008; Ramalho, Ramalho, & Henriques, 2010) favour its use (Simar & 
Wilson, 2011). 
Studies (e.g., Banker & Natarajan, 2008; Hoff, 2007; McDonald, 2009) seem 
to indicate no significant difference in values generated using Tobit and other 
regression models (e.g., OLS) when investigating the influence of environmental 
variables on performance. However, the underlying assumption on which this 
assertion lies has been challenged by Simar & Wlson (2011) with an inference that 
OLS is inadequate. Also, Wooldrige (2002) notes the inability of OLS to handle the 
confinement of efficiency scores to 0 and 1 results in inconsistent estimates. Similar 
to Ngwenyama & Morawczynski (2009) and following the recommendation in Hoff 
(2007) and Coelli et al. (2005), the censored Tobit model is deemed appropriate in 
this research because the distribution of efficiency is restricted to 0 and 1 (i.e., 
identified inefficiency is denoted by 0 and efficiency is denoted by 1). The Tobit 
model was suggested in Tobin (1958) as a model that integrates probit analysis and 
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multiple regression. The standard censored Tobit model is expressed in Wooldrige 
(2002, p. 519) as: 
                                 =     +     
Where         ~ Normal (0, σ
2
) and                 
 
For panel data, the applicable model is pooled Tobit model (Wooldrige, 2002, 
p. 538) which is stated as: 
 
     = max (0,      +     ) for t = 1, 2, 3, ……, T 
 
Where           ~ Normal (0, σ
2
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In a two-stage analysis involving telecommunications industry, independent 
variables vary by study but include GDP growth (OECD, 2001; Li, 2009), population 
(Moshi, Mwakatumbula & Mitomo, 2013; Li & Xu, 2004) and GDP per capita (Fink, 
Mattoo, & Rathindran, 2002; Moshi, Mwakatumbula & Mitomo, 2013). Other 
independent variables  that have been utilized are teledensity, (Ospina, 2002; Fink, 
Mattoo, & Rathindrin, 2003), years in deregulation (Ospina, 2002; Moshi, 
Mwakatumbula & Mitomo, 2013), level of concentration (HHI) (Usero & 
Asimakopoulos, 2013; Hu & Chu, 2008), average revenue per subscriber (Lee & 
Quayes, 2005; Karamti & Kammoun, 2011), labour productivity (subscriptions per 
employee) (Li & Xu, 2004; Lee & Levendis, 2006), and Capex per employee (Ng, 
2012). The independent variables used in the second stage analysis in this research 
are: Change in real GDP per capita (CRGDPPC) which is used to capture economic 
growth and wealth effect on affordability of telecommunications product and 
services; HHI which highlights the level of competition in the industry and reflects 
deregulatory impact on industry competition; capital expenditure to revenue ratio 
(CapexRev) which is a proxy for capital intensity and measures investment in 
technology and network infrastructures; subscriptions to employment ratio  
(SubEmp) which represents labour productivity; revenue to subscriptions ratio 
(RevSub)  which is an industry specific variable that captures the financial viability 
of the industry; number of years in deregulation (NYRS) captures the number of 
years the industry has been deregulated; consumer price index (CPI) reflects the 
influence of inflation in the economy; dummy variable is applied to the level of 
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development (LDev) to capture the influence of the level of development. The 
dummy is equal to zero if the country is a developing country and one if it is a 
developed country.  
 
The model is explicitly expressed as: 
 
     =    +          +              +             +                + 
              +           +           +            +       
 
Where: 
E: represents the efficiency performance of the industry 
i: represents the cross sectional individual countries under study 
t: represents the time series and covers period from 2001 to 2013 
β0: is the intercept which is a constant 
uit: is the error term that denotes the unobserved factors that affect the dependent 
variable. 
 
5.5 The empirical approach for this research 
Case study is an approach used in conducting empirical research and has 
gained wide appeal. A case study research aims at understanding „bounded‟ system 
such as an event or a process (Creswell, 2012, p. 465). Compared to other 
approaches (e.g., surveys, experiments, histories and archival analysis), a case study 
is appropriate when the researcher is seeking answers to „what‟, „how‟ or „why‟ 
questions, has little control over the events, and focuses on phenomenon or events 
that are contemporary and within a particular context (Yin, 2003, pp. 1 & 6). It sheds 
more light on a problem and allows an in-depth understanding of the issue being 
studied. Case study research could be a single case or multiple cases and may include 
either quantitative or qualitative data or both (Yin, 2003; Gerring, 2004). Unlike the 
single case, multiple cases allow for a deeper understanding of the similarities and 
differences between cases and within and across cases (Baxter & Jack, 2008). 
Although the nature of the case and the boundary could be limited by the researcher 
when deciding what to/not to include in the study thus creating difficulty in 
generalizing the research findings (Brown, 2008; Beins, 2009), using multiple cases 
increases the prospect for generalization (Yin, 2003) and has been applied in 
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performance analysis and in-depth exploration of the telecommunication industry by 
Debnath & Shankar (2008), Lam & Shiu (2008), Barcenilla-Visus et al. (2013), 
Moshi, Mwakatumbula, & Mitomo (2013), Resende & Facanha (2002) and 
Calabrese, Campsi, & Mancuso (2002). 
This research explores the performance of telecommunications industry in 
deregulated environment, thus a multiple case study approach has been adopted to 
understand the phenomenon. The multiple cases cover two countries and use a 
comparative format that involves describing, explaining and evaluating the cases of 
Canada and Nigeria. According to the World Bank classification, Canada is an 
OECD member country and is considered a high income country while Nigeria is 
considered middle income country (The World Bank, 2016). A comparative 
approach is suitable when dealing with two or more cases (Goodrick, 2014) and 
where there exists interest in discovering empirical relationships among variables 
that help confirm or disprove a theory (Lijphart, 1971). In addition, it provides deep 
insight and uncovers how similar and dissimilar the cases are in relation to the events 
being investigated with the potential for generalization of „how‟ or „why‟ a policy 
intervention succeeds or fails (Goodrick, 2014, p. 2). Multiple cases involving cross-
country analysis have been carried out using this approach in Madden, Savage, & Ng 
(2003) examination of the productivity growth in 12 Asia–Pacific 
telecommunications service providers from 1987 to 1990 and in Mariscal (2004) 
study of Mexican telecommunications industry reform in comparison with Brazil, 
New Zealand and the US. In these studies, it was noted that each country exhibited 
unique characteristics that could be considered to have emanated from deregulation. 
Given the research objectives (see Chapter 1) this research lends itself to a 
comparative approach of inquiry. Additionally, it is not uncommon for countries to 
adopt different approaches in tackling similar policy issues (Iwuagwu, 2014). Thus, 
the comparative approach illuminates the rationale for certain actions and the impacts 
in a way not possible from studying a single case. 
For a thorough understanding of the deregulatory milieu using the experience 
of a developed country and a developing country, this research broadly considers 
high income countries and middle income countries but specifically draws attention 
to Canada and Nigeria. These two countries were chosen because they are English 
speaking and the researcher was born and raised in the latter but lives and work in 
the former. Additionally, both have exposed the telecommunications industry to 
 82 
market forces. Hence, the comparative analysis isolates similarities and differences 
in events that culminate in policy shift, including trends in performance. 
Furthermore, the industry is constantly changing and deregulatory events are still 
manifesting in both countries. Therefore the research results which shed light on each 
country‟s experience provide a basis for learning from each other and for the 
knowledge gained to be extended to other sectors of the economy. Also, analyzing 
the two countries comparatively reveals factors affecting deregulation outcomes and 
gives policy makers better information for adjudging current policy effectiveness and 
in designing and implementing news ones. Canada and Nigeria have both 
deregulated their telecommunications industries. However, differences exist in the 
level of overall industry performance and regulatory frameworks. A comparative 
analysis highlights these differences while their similarities in these areas and with 
other high income countries and middle income countries provide a basis for drawing 
inference(s). 
As identified in Cameron (2011, p. 96), case study research may entail 
„mixed methods‟ and combines elements of „qualitative‟ and „quantitative‟ data that 
enriches the understanding of the research problem than either type alone. However, 
it requires bridging through integration and linkages to maximize the benefits 
(Creswell, 2012, p. 536). Considering the merits of this approach, this research 
adopts a mixed methodology and diversifies data sources such that they do not share 
the same or similar weaknesses (Farquhar, Ewing, & Booth, 2011). The procedure 
applied is similar to Serebrisky (2012) and involves two phases to provide a holistic 
view and an in-depth understanding of the event under study. The first phase entails 
using secondary data in a two-stage efficiency and productivity analysis. The 
efficiency and productivity analysis provides information relevant to answering the 
research questions RQ1 and RQ2. The second phase is complementary and entails 
gathering primary data from industry practitioners through a survey questionnaire 
developed for this research. To ensure reliability, secondary data were sourced from 
the World Bank, the ITU, the OECD Communications outlook, regulatory agencies, 
statistics bureaus, annual audited financials statements of telecommunications firms, 
and published academic journals. Information was collected on industry revenue, 
concentration, subscriptions, teledensity, employment and capital expenditures. The 
survey questionnaires were completed by practitioners with management 
responsibilities and knowledge in the areas of inquiry to extend the inquiry beyond 
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DEA efficiency and productivity analysis and to reflect industry practitioners‟ 
perspectives in the research outcome. 
 
5.6 DMU and model specification 
A DMU is a business, firm, organization or unit that uses inputs to generate 
outputs (Cooper et al., 2001, p. 220). In this research, the industry itself rather than 
individual firms is considered to be the DMU. The industry reflects the performance 
of all firms and maintains the research focus enunciated in Chapter 1. Also, treating 
industries as DMUs is a common practice in the field of inquiry and has been applied 
in prior empirical studies (e.g., Sharma, Momaya, & Manohas, 2010; Gokgoz & 
Demir, 2014). To avoid issues relating to non-homogeneous DMUs in DEA, Dyson, 
Allen, Camanho, Podinovski, Sarrico, & Shale (2001) suggest that DMUs with 
comparable processes and similar products be utilized; a condition satisfied in this 
research by considering the telecommunication industry in each country as DMU. 
Also, DEA results could be biased if homogeneous DMUs in non-homogeneous 
environments are evaluated (Dyson et. al., 2001). To address this, it is recommended 
that DMUs operate under similar environmental condition (Dyson et. al., 2001) or 
that environmental variables be accommodated in the DEA through a two-stage DEA 
analysis where the efficiency scores in the first stage DEA is regressed against the 
environmental variables (Haas & Murphy, 2003; Ralmalho, Ralmaho, & Henriques, 
2010). To ascertain homogeneity in environment, all DMUs in this research were 
from countries with deregulated telecommunications industry. Also, the two-stage 
analysis procedure was employed to allow correction of the efficiency scores for the 
influence of environmental variables.  
No general consensus exists among researchers on the most appropriate 
approach to adopt when engaging in efficiency and productivity DEA (Kumar, 2013, 
p. 151). Thus, the methodological approach is subject to data availability and 
relevance, and ease of application (Martin & Roman, 2006). Like Torres & Bachiller 
(2013) and Banker et al. (2010), this research adopts input-oriented radial DEA. It 
accommodates multiple inputs and outputs and allows for cross-country comparison 
irrespective of any dissimilarity in input and output combinations. Also, it allows 
inputs and outputs to be considered as a group (Delmasi & Tokat, 2005), thus 
preventing each country from being the benchmark on the basis of a single input and 
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a single output which is a problem often associated with partial measures of 
performance (Serebrisky, 2012). 
Furthermore, a radial form of DEA removes the shortcomings of 
„proportionality‟ loss associated with the „non-radial‟ (i.e., slack base measurement) 
and allows for the evaluation of change in efficiency over a period of time (Avkiran, 
Tone, & Tsutsui, 2008, p. 130). The rationale for adopting input-oriented DEA is that 
it fits situations involving managers having control over inputs (Coelli et al., 2005), 
thus the input-oriented DEA in this research is suitable because managers in the 
industry have control over input use relative to outputs. The CRS DEA assesses the 
overall efficiency but the pure technical efficiency (i.e., VRS TE) and scale 
efficiency are also assessable. VRS technical efficiency produces better results 
(Petrović et al., 2011) and is used to eliminate the bias associated with CRS technical 
efficiency that all DMUs operate at optimal scale (Hung & Lu, 2007). Although 
incorporating weight restrictions would have introduced human dynamics and forced 
the DEA to reflect efficiency scores that are different from DEA without restrictions, 
it would have contradicted the estimation of efficiency using data obtained from 
DMUs (Forsund, 2013). Hence the DEA in this research did not include weight 
restrictions. The benefit is that weights generated by the model are impartial due to 
no exposure to subjective value judgements regarding the importance of inputs and 
outputs (Liu, 2009). In addition, using DEA without weight restrictions is acceptable 
and has been applied in Naimy & Merheb (2014). Because non-bootstrapped DEA is 
determinstic and lacks statistical basis, Simar and Wilson (2007) proposed 
bootstrapped DEA to correct for possible bias in the DEA efficiency scores. 
However, the bootstrapped DEA is saddled with “dimensionality” problem and its 
statistical significance is dependent on the sample size (Adler & Yazhemsky, 2010, 
p. 277). Also, Banker and Natarajan (2008) show that regressing the non-
bootstrapped DEA against environmental variables yield consistent results. While 
non-bootstrapped DEA is used in this research, its robustness was checked through a 
sensitivity analysis involving variations in inputs and outputs mix. 
Three alternative approaches are available for constructing efficiency 
frontiers (Estache, Rossi, & Ruzzier, 2004, p. 287). The first is referred to as „single 
period‟ analysis which involves establishing a frontier in each period under 
investigation and computing the efficiency of each DMU relative to the frontier 
established in each period. The merit lies in its flexibility in estimating efficiency 
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scores rather than the approach involving a grand frontier which is sometimes 
overstated due to the effect of technological progress over time (Kumar, 2013). Also, 
establishing a frontier in each period permits technical progress and regress and 
allows variability in computed efficiencies such that a DMU that is efficient in one 
period may not be efficient in another period thereby eliminating error persistence 
that might affect efficiency scrores over time (Kumar, 2013). The second approach is 
the „multiple period‟ which involves treating the panel data as a single cross-section 
such that each DMU in each period under investigation is considered an independent 
observation. With this approach, a master frontier (i.e., single best practice frontier) 
is established and computed efficiency scores of each DMU in each period are 
evaluated against this master frontier. Although this approach allows each DMU to 
be evaluated against the same benchmark, the assumption that the technology used 
by the main frontier does not change is not tenable. The third approach, the 
„intermediate‟, relies on window analysis and was proposed by Charnes et al. in 1985 
(Estache, Rossi, & Ruzzier, 2004, p. 287). It requires selecting a window width prior 
to the efficiency analysis. However, Estache, Rossi, and Ruzzier (2004) notes that it 
is problematic because the window width determined by trial and error results in 
efficiency scores that vary by the window width and increases the risk of biased 
efficiency estimates should the specified window width be inappropriate 
(Maidamisa, Ahmad, & Ismail, 2012). 
Similar to Lavado (2004), this research adopts the „single-period‟ approach 
with a frontier constructed in each of the 13 years under investigation after which the 
efficiency of each country in each year is evaluated relative to the frontier. Also, 
unlike the multi-period approach, the single-period approach allows for productivity 
change measurement. To evaluate the total factor productivity change (TFPC), an 
input-oriented DEA based MPI was used. Using DEA-based MPI allows for the 
source of productivity to be identified through decomposition into technical (i.e., 
technological) change (TC) and efficiency change (EC) (i.e., „catching-up‟) (Fare et 
al., 1994, p. 71). Technical change provides insight on productivity growth/decline 
resulting from technological progress/regress while efficiency change measures the 
contribution from efficiency gains/deterioration (Mohamad, 2004, p. 326). 
Consistent with prior research, the DEA efficiency results are supplemented with a 
censored Tobit model in the second stage analysis. As noted in Section 5.4, no 
consensus exists regarding the choice of model in the second stage regression 
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analysis but studies gravitate toward the Tobit model due to its ability to handle 
censored data with values between 0 and 1, and it is touted as yielding consistent and 
more reliable regression estimates (Tupper & Resende, 2004). 
 
5.7 Inputs–outputs specifications and sample size 
DEA is sensitive to sample size and input and output specifications. As noted 
in Industry Commission (1997), large sample size results in reduced efficiency score 
but provides greater scope for DEA in finding similar peers. On the other hand, small 
sample size may inflate efficiency sores. A rule of thumb is that sample size be at 
least equal to the product of the number of inputs and outputs. Another rule of thumb 
is that the sample size be at least three times the sum of inputs and outputs (Cooper et 
al., 2001; Kumar, 2013; Naimy & Merheb, 2014). As applied in studies by Hadad et 
al. (2013), Li (2009), Lu & Hung (2008) and Halkos & Tzeremes (2007), this 
research utilizes three inputs and two outputs. The use of three inputs and two 
outputs suggests a minimum sample size of 6 and a maximum of 15 is sufficient. The 
data from a sample of 19 countries (HICs, 10; MICs, 9) is greater than the maximum 
that could have been used. This may result in reduced efficiency scores but it 
provides the DEA with better explanatory power and latitude in determining 
efficiency scores. Also, it prevents artificial inflation of efficiency scores if data on 
fewer countries were used. Another benefit of using a sample of 19 countries over 
the 13-year period is that it generates adequate panel data essential for the censored 
Tobit regression analysis. For the second phase involving the survey of industry 
participants, purposive sampling was used to recruit participants. This resulted in a 
total of 37 (Canada: 5; Nigeria: 32) participants who took part in the survey. 
Concerted effort made to collect data from more participants proved abortive. The 
difficulty experienced in the collection of primary data reflects the small sample size. 
Although, a larger sample size would have been preferred, the sample size of 37 is 
considered satisfactory in that it falls within the sample sizes of 19 participants in 
Serebrisky (2012) and 50 in Ross & Bamber (2009). In addition, the core of the 
thesis is the analysis of the efficiency and productivity of telecommunications 
industry using DEA. The primary data was meant to complement the DEA efficiency 
and productivity results. 
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The inputs selected harmonize with Naimy & Merheb (2014) and Petrović et 
al. (2011) and include annual capital expenditures (Capex), yearly subscriptions 
(SUB) and employment (EMP) (Figure 5.2). Capital input provides insight regarding 
the cause of inefficiency. Using both too much capital for a given level of output, and 
capital with an inappropriate mix of other inputs may suggest inefficiency. The 
absence of accord on capital input treatment results in variations across researches. 
For example, Torres & Bachiller (2013) use total assets, Hu & Chu (2008) apply 
fixed assets (i.e., total assets less current assets), and Bollou & Ngwenyama (2008) 
and Gokgoz & Demir (2014) embrace capital expenditures (Capex). To mitigate the 
influence of financial reporting differences across countries in the treatment of 
capital, this research uses Capex to proxy capital inputs. 
Another prevalent input is the number of lines available which is proxied by 
subscriptions (Lee, Park, & OH, 2000; Gokgoz & Demir, 2014). Under the 
assumption that subscriptions are active and in use by customers, this research 
considered subscriptions as input though the possibility exists that some lines may 
have been deactivated. Nonetheless, deactivated lines are often a minute proportion 
of the total subscriptions and customers who deactivate line(s) from a particular 
service provider usually switch to a different service provider in a phenomenon 
called „churning‟ (Jadhav & Pawar, 2011, p. 17). Also, several studies, including 
Gokgoz & Demir (2014), Petrović et al. (2011) and Usero & Asimakopoulos (2013), 
lend support to subscriptions as input. In addition, it is appropriate to use 
subscriptions because operators and regulators measure the ratio of industry revenue 
to subscriptions when assessing competitive pressure, affordability and accessibility 
of telecommunications services (ITU, 2014) 
An important input used to generate output is labour, hence the use of 
employment as an input is ideal. Total industry employment, number of full time 
employees and the total number of hours employed are commonly used to reflect 
labour input. While the total number of hours employed is considered the most 
suitable and preferred proxy for labour input (Coelli et al., 2005), the lack of data on 
this measure necessitated reliance on industry employment with the recognition that 
firms in the industry contract out work and this may result in understated 
employment. On the contrary, some countries may report aggregate post and 
telecommunications employment and overstate employment. Nonetheless, the use of 
persons employed is suitable as it eliminates measurement issues relating to the 
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accuracy of hours worked and whether the individual is part-time or full-time. Also, 
its use as proxy for labour input is widely accepted and has been applied in prior 
studies (e.g., Lu & Hung, 2008; Sung, 2012). 
The output selection proved difficult as some studies (e.g., Cho & Park, 2011; 
Moreno, Lozano, & Gutierrez, 2013) relied on a single output (e.g., revenue) and 
expressed operators‟ view of performance as operators usually focus on revenue 
increase to attain better profitability (Moshi, Mwakatumbula, & Mitomo, 2013). 
However, others (e.g., Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita, 2004) expressed the operators‟ 
and policy makers‟ views of performance and utilize multiple outputs (e.g., revenue) 
and one or more variables relating to the level of coverage (e.g., teledensity). As 
shown in Figure 5.2, this research utilizes two output variables (i.e., revenue and 
teledensity) and harmonizes with prior research (e.g., Petrović et al., 2011). Because 
the industry‟s aggregate revenue was used for each country in each period, it is 
possible that some operators may report revenue unrelated to telecommunications 
which may lead to overstated revenue. Recognising inflationary impact, adjustment 
was made to account for differences in consumer price index (CPI) over the 13-year 
period between the countries and the data treatment is presented in Section 5.9. 
Teledensity, which accompanies revenue as an output variable in this research is a 
popular measure of telecommunication services diffusion and is based on 
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (Meso et al., 2009). Higher teledensity reflects 
increased subscription levels and connotes increased availability of 
telecommunications services. Incorporating teledensity as an output embeds policy 
makers‟ view of performance (Moshi, Mwakatumbula, & Mitomo, 2013) and is 
similar to the approach in Cabanda, Ariff & Viverita (2004). 
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Source(s): Developed for this research 
Figure 5.2: DEA input and output variables. 
 
 
5.8 Data collection 
5.8.1 Quantitative data collection 
To meet the research objectives, the quantitative data on each of the 19 
countries were obtained from secondary sources such as: International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Bank, the OECD communications 
monitoring report, bureau of statistics, regulatory agency‟s published information 
and published empirical research. The information extracted covers 2001–13 and 
consists of Capex, subscriptions, employment, revenue, teledensity, HHI, GDP and 
population. The two-stage efficiency and productivity DEA with a Tobit model 
requires quantitative panel data. Panel data allow several analyses that are not 
possible with cross-sectional or time-series data, but a concern is potential 
„hererogeneity bias‟ which is a situation where some of the effects that exist in a 
cross-section or time series are not captured by the explanatory variables thus 
resulting in inconsistent parameter estimates (Hsiao, 2003, p. 8). Another concern is 
„selectivity bias‟ which may occur when the selection constituting the panel is not 
random but based on preconceived characteristics (Hsiao, 2003, p. 9). In spite of 
these concerns, panel data are widely used in empirical research and have been 
Revenue 
Teledensity 
CAPEX Subscriptions 
Input Variables 
Output Variables 
 90 
applied in Li (2009) and Petrović et al. (2012). The panel data in this research consist 
of 247 observations from 19 countries (N = 19) over a 13-year period (T = 13) with 
each observation representing the industry in each country in a given year. Using 
panel data provide more information and generate better efficiency estimates of the 
regression parameters with less restrictive assumptions. In addition, the increased 
data points in the panel data generate high degree of freedom and reduce the 
potential for collinearity among the explanatory variables thereby contributing to the 
robustness of the model in yielding better parameter estimates (Hsiao, 2003). The 
time period of 2001 and 2013 is inclusive and contributes to mitigating „statistical 
noise‟ (Kong & Tongzon, 2006 p. 2309). Furthermore, the panel data which rely on 
observations from each country over a period of time allow for statistical inferences 
to be made (Hsiao, 2003). Additionally, the 13-year period is consistent with 
Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita (2004), Moshi, Mwakatumbula & Mitomo (2013) and 
Petrović et al. (2012) and is longer than time periods used in Usero, Grigorios, & 
Asimakopoulos (2013) and Gokgoz & Demir (2014). 
In deciding the primary data to collect for this research, consideration was 
given to participants from the industry, regulatory angency, and service recipients. 
Because the research focuses on productive use of inputs in generating outputs, 
surveying service recipients was deemed unsuitable. Hence, the research sought to 
data from participants from the industry and regulatory agency.  The primary data 
gathered through the survey questionnaire also yielded quantitative data. The 
„purposive sampling‟ method used to recruit participants is a non-probability 
technique effective in research requiring information from individuals with particular 
expertise and knowledge (Beins, 2009, p. 130). In recruiting participants, information 
(names, addresses, telephone numbers etc.) on telecommunication firms in the 
industry were gathered to initiate a conversation on the research and to establish a 
commitment from potential participants. A questionnaire was used to gather 
information from the participants (Appendix 11). To incorporate the perspective of 
regulators, the CRTC and the NCC were contacted but the CRTC declined outright 
to participate as a matter of policy (Appendix 15), and three staff from the NCC who 
participated were unwilling to recommend others to participate. One of the three who 
participated did so relunctantly and was perceived to be under the influence of a 
personal relationship with the researcher. For these reasons, a decision was made not 
to include the regulatory agency in the survey. 
 91 
The survey questions were the outcome of the literature review and a pilot 
study. The pilot study was conducted to determine the feasibility of the survey 
instrument (Leedy & Omrod, 2013). The pilot study carried out prior to the 
implementation of the survey questionnaire uncovered areas needing refinement. It 
exposed weaknesses relating to the structure and interpretation of the questions and 
the evaluation of the responses. The information gathered from the pilot study was 
used to refine the survey instrument and procedure. Guidelines in Ghauri & 
Gronhaug (2010) were adhered to in constructing the questionnaire so as to eliminate 
leading questions that would cause participants to answer in a particular direction. 
The questionnaire was deployed and retrieved between April 2014 and November 
2014. It consists of 20 questions and gathered information on the description and 
understanding of (i) the driving forces and reasons for deregulating the industry; (ii) 
the extent to which the structure, conduct and performance of the industry has been 
influenced in the deregulated environment; and (iii) the strategic implications of 
industry trends. In addition, the questionnaire incorporated the question 
classifications in Ambrose & Anstey (2010). Thus, the questionnaire consisted of 
five sections – deregulation, structure of the industry, conduct of firms in the 
industry, performance, and background. Each survey questionnaire took 
approximately 30–45 minutes to complete and contained closed-ended and open-
ended questions intended to answer research questions RQ1 and RQ2 and achieve the 
main research objectives. The individuals who completed the questionnaire were 
asked to identify others in the same firm and/or industry who were prime candidates 
to participate in the research. Relying on referrals, other potential participants were 
contacted and invited to participate in the study but many declined. In spite of the 
recruitment constraint, the research approach adopted allowed for the research 
questions to be answered and for the research objectives to be realized. 
 
5.8.2 Qualitative data collection 
The open-ended questions in the survey questionnaire allowed participants to 
express their unbiased views, thus permitting the gathering of qualitative data. 
Another method that could have been used to gather qualitative data is an interview 
(Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2010). However, particpants contacted were not willing to be 
recorded. The inability to conduct a face-to-face interview did not affect the outcome 
of this research because questions that would have been asked in an interview were 
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in the questionnaire. The open-ended questions placed no constraints on participants 
and allowed them to provide answers according to their thoughts but it did not lend 
itself to follow-up questions that would have permitted the researcher to probe 
participants further on their responses. 
 
5.9 Data treatment 
5.9.1 Primary data treatment 
The primary data was collected using the questionnaire and consists of 
quantitative and qualitative data. Each questionnaire was coded and the quantitative 
data entered in an Excel spreadsheet according to the sections in the questionnaire. 
The quantitative data were subsequently analyzed using STATA 14.1 which is a 
statistical analysis program used to generate descriptive statistics. The qualitative 
data which provides information that augments the quantitative data were reviewed, 
categorized and organized into meaningful themes relevant to the research questions. 
 
5.9.2 Secondary Data Treatment 
To ensure comparability among countries, Capex and revenue data were 
expressed in US dollars. Using a common currency unit is indispensable in cross-
country research and has been applied in Petrović et al. (2011) who examined the 
benchmarking of telecommunications in developing countries using US dollars for 
the revenues and investments for each country. The US dollar is adopted because it is 
a major trading currency in international markets. It is not uncommon to experience 
missing data when compiling panel data for cross-country analysis. Thus, the 
relatively small amounts of missing data were approximated. The practice of 
estimating missing data is appropriate and has been used in OECD (2013) and is 
consistent with practices in empirical research (e.g., Dedrick, Kraemer, & Shih, 
2013; Petrović et al., 2012; Petrović et al., 2011). Also, HHI information was 
calculated to reveal the level of concentration and industry structure (Ertl & 
McCarrell, 2002). The HHI was calculated using the sum of the square of the market 
share of each firm in the industry. Where market share information was not available, 
the HHI from published empirical research was considered adequate. 
This research adjusted for any price change that may have occurred to inputs 
and output over the 13-year period under investigation. To adjust Capex, revenue and 
GDP for price changes, GDP deflator and CPI were consisdered. GDP deflator 
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reflects change in price and quantity of goods and services produced in an economy. 
CPI measures price changes of a given market basket of goods and services 
purchased by consumers (Csipak & Zuccaro, 2014). While both methods reflect 
inflationary trends, the CPI has a wide appeal and, unlike the GDP deflator, it has a 
less varied yearly structure (Litra, 2009). Using 2010 as the base year, the impact of 
inflation on revenues and Capex were eliminated by deflating using CPI as suggested 
in Coelli et al. (2005) and applied in Majumdar (1994) and Byambaakhuu, Kwon, & 
Rho (2014). However, it is possible that eliminating the impact of price change may 
inadvertently diminish genuine price increase that resulted from improved product 
and service quality (Greenlees & McClelland, 2011). Nonetheless, the base year of 
2010 allowed for constant dollar expressions and eliminated plausible influence of 
inflationary price changes on the efficiency and productivity measurement variables. 
In addition, the GDP data obtained from the World Bank database were in current 
dollars (i.e., nominal amount) and were converted to real GDP using the yearly GDP 
deflator. 
 
5.10 Data analysis 
5.10.1 Analysis of primary data 
The analysis of the primary data was done in the following order: background 
and profile of participants; deregulation; structure of the industry and level of 
competition; conduct of firms in the industry; and performance. The analysis of 
quantitative data from completed questionnaires entailed „inferential statistics‟ which 
typically rely on sample information in making inferences about the population 
(Charles & Mertler, 2002, p. 189). For a meaningful description, the analysis also 
involved presenting the data in tabular form with numerical measures. The analysis 
of the qualitative data took the form of inferences and quotes to avoid diluting the 
significance of participants‟ views. In addition, the analysis and discussion integrates 
the quantitative and qualitative data in ways that preserve participants‟ anonymity 
and contribute to meeting the research objectives. 
 
5.10.2 Analysis of secondary data 
The industry data gathered reflects information on all firms in the industry. 
Thus the analysis of the secondary data involves „descriptive statistics‟ which is 
appropriate when information on the entire population is gathered and it is possible 
 94 
to analyze the population parameter (mean, standard deviation etc.) (Charles & 
Mertler, 2002, p. 188). Research on the telecommunication industry use a variety of 
data analysis methods involving descriptive analysis (Tuman, 2007; Cabeza & 
Gomez, 2011), regression (Banker, Chang, & Majumdar, 1998; Akhtar, 2009), DEA 
(Rosende & Facanha, 2002; Sharma et al., 2010; Gokgoz & Demir, 2014) or a 
combination of methods (Hu & Chu, 2008; Banker et al., 2010; Usero & 
Asimakopoulos, 2013). The analysis involved financial and non-financial variables 
and focuses on partial factor analysis (PFA) and total factor analysis (ToFA). The 
partial factor analysis measures are revenue, Capex to revenue, revenue to 
employment, Capex, Capex to subscription, revenue to subscriptions and the 
nonfinancial measures are subscriptions, subscriptions to employment, subscriptions 
per 100 inhabitants (teledensity) and industry concentration level (HHI). The ToFA 
concentrated on technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
scores of the industry and the productivity change over time. This was attained using 
productivity improvement management-DEA software Version 3.0 which was 
developed by Emrouznejad & Thanassoulis (2011) and was used in an empirical 
study by Haruna & Maishanu (2013). STATA 14.1 which was used for the 
descriptive statistical analysis, censored Tobit model and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
(Mann-Whitney) statistical test is popular statistical analysis software. 
Additionally, the MPI used to generate total factor productivity growth 
(TFPG) was decomposed into its components. The decomposition of MPI under 
constant returns to scale relies on the FGNZ index (Fare et al., 1994, pp. 66–7) which 
bases productivity change on the geometric mean of two MPIs. The approach yields 
total factor productivity by decomposing MPI into technical change („innovation‟) 
and efficiency change („catching-up‟) and measuring their distances relative to the 
frontiers. As noted in Ray & Desli (1997, p. 1033), the FGNZ index correctly shows 
the shift in technical efficiency under constant returns to scale. However, if scale 
effect exists as pronounced in variable returns to scale, FGNZ index will fail to 
account for „autonomous‟ shift in the frontiers and will yield inconsistent results as it 
does not indicate how optimal output changes due to technical change provided the 
inputs is constant. In view of this, this research utilizes Ray and Desli‟s Malmquist 
index for the measurement of total factor productivity under variable returns to scale 
condition. Unlike the FGNZ index, Ray and Desli‟s index removes potential 
understating or overstating of technical change by not relying on shifts in benchmark 
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technology but on shifts in best practice technology (Lovell, 2003). Furthermore, 
compared to the FGNZ index under constant returns to scale, Ray and Desli‟s index 
allows for the measurement of technical change by the ratio of variable returns to 
scale distance functions. While this affects the scale efficiency change, the pure 
technical efficiency change value is unaltered (Ray & Desli, 1997). 
The analysis presents the data in tabular and graphical forms with numerical 
measures (i.e., mean, standard deviation etc). As demonstrated in Hung & Lu (2007, 
p. 1125), the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) test, which is a non-parametric 
test, was performed to determine if a difference in the performance ( CRS TE, VRS 
TE, SE and TFPC) of the two countries exists. If differences exist, the test allows for 
the statistical significance to be determined. This test, like the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
accommodates two population groups to be tested, does not place normal distribution 
restrictions on the population, and has been used in empirical studies that have 
carried out intra and inter-country telecommunication industry performance 
comparisons (e.g., Tsai, Chen, & Tzeng, 2006; Hung & Lu, 2007; Lam & Shiu, 
2008). The analysis and discussion of the quantitative data and key findings are 
discussed using „descriptive‟ and „inferential‟ statistics in ways that allow the results 
to be presented objectively (Creswell, 2012, p. 182). 
 
5.11 Ethical considerations 
Because human participants were involved, this research sought ethics 
approval from Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Southern 
Queensland and was granted full approval on 19 November 2013 (Appendix 14). In 
compliance with this approval, participants were asked by letter to consent to 
participate voluntarily (Appendix 13). Through a participant information sheet 
(Appendix 12) that accompanied the questionnaire, participants were informed about 
the research objectives and the purpose for which the data was being gathered and 
their right to withdraw from the research. In addition, the privacy, anonymity and 
confidentiality of participants were ethical requirements that this research complied 
with through the avoidance of intruding questions not related to the research and by 
ensuring that any features that may identify participants were removed. Coding and 
aggregate reporting of data were also used to ensure anonymity. Furthermore, the 
confidentiality of participants was maintained by ensuring that completed 
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questionnaires and consent forms were stored in a secure cabinet and electronic 
copies password protected and only accessible to the researcher. 
 
Summary 
This chapter elaborated on parametric and non-parametric approaches used to 
measure efficiency and productivity. The comparison of stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques in performance analysis 
showed that either method is suitable but that the choice of method depends on the 
researcher and data availability. The adoption of DEA and MPI and the use of the 
Tobit model in the second stage analysis in this research are consistent with 
methodological approach in prior researches. Additionally, the case study approach 
provided a basis for understanding the phenomenon being studied. Furthermore, the 
survey questionnaires completed by industry participants complement the efficiency 
and productivity analysis and allowed the perspective of industry experts to be 
reflected in the outcome of this research. In particular, this chapter explained the 
approach and methodology of this research, the data gathering, issues and treatment, 
analysis of data, and the measures taken to ensure validity, reliability and consistency 
with prior empirical research in the area of inquiry. The next chapter (Chapter 6) 
presents the data analyisis and interprets the results of the analyzed data. Focusing on 
the research objectives established in Chapter 1, it details the theme(s) and identifies 
trends and patterns that relate to the research objectives. 
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Chapter 6 
Results and Discussion of Efficiency and Productivity Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 describes the methodology adopted in this research. Chapter 6 
details the results of the DEA and discusses the efficiency and productivity 
performance of the telecommunications industry. The chapter consists of five main 
parts after this introduction. Section 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics (mean, 
standard deviation, and maximum and minimum) of the data. Section 6.3 briefly 
discusses the performance analysis in this research. Section 6.4 is the analysis of the 
partial measures of performance. Section 6.5 is on the DEA efficiency and 
productivity and discusses the sources of efficiency and productivity change. Section 
6.6 discusses the Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum) test carried out to examine 
any statistical differences between the efficiency and productivity performance of the 
industry in the two countries. Section 6.7 presents the analysis and discussion of the 
censored Tobit model and provides an understanding of the effect of environmental 
factors on efficiency. Section 6.8 presents specifications and estimation method 
change carried out to ascertain the robustness of the model. The chapter concludes 
with a summary. 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs 
Table 6.1A presents the share of total Capex, subscriptions, employment and 
revenue for the two countries and country categories (i.e., HICs, MICs and OECD). 
The table shows that in 2001 Capex in HICs constituted 73% of the total in the panel 
data but declined to 67% by 2013. For MICs, it increased from 27% to 33% in the 
same period. For OECD member countries, Capex declined from 80% in 2001 to 
70% in 2013. Concentrating on the two countries of focus, the table reveals that 
Canada accounted for 2% of total Capex in 2001 and 4% in 2013 while the amount 
accounted for by Nigeria was relatively stable at 1%. Furthermore, in 2001 HICs 
accounted for 59% of subscriptions and MICs 41%, but by 2013, HICs subscriptions 
as a percentage of the total declined to 24% while MICs rose to 76%. Noticeably, 
Canada‟s share of total subscriptions decline by 1% while Nigeria‟s share increased 
from almost 0% in 2001 to 3% in 2013. 
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Table 6.1A also shows HICs total share of industry employment declined 
from 45% to 24% in the study period, and a similar pattern was exhibited by the 
OECD category. Meanwhile, MICs percentage of employment rose from 55% of 
total employment in 2001 to 76% in 2013. The table also shows Canada‟s share of 
total employment declined from 2% in 2001 to 1% in 2013, but Nigeria‟s share of 
total employment doubled in the same period. Furthermore, HICs share of revenue 
declined from 83% in 2001 to 73% in 2013 but it rose in MICs from 17% to 27%. In 
addition, the table indicates that Canada and Nigeria experienced an increased share 
of total revenues. However, while Nigeria displayed a pattern similar to MICs, 
Canada exhibited a pattern that deviated from HICs and OECD. 
 
Table 6.1A: Percentage distribution by categories. 
 Capex (%) Subscriptions (%) Employment (%) Revenue (%) 
 2001 2013 2001 2013 2001 2013 2001 2013 
HICs 73 67 59 24 45 24 83 73 
MICs 27 33 41 76 55 76 17 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
         
Canada 2 4 2 1 2 1 2 3 
Nigeria 1 1 0.07 3 3 6 0.06 1 
OECD 80 70 65 29 48 27 88 77 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
Table 6.1B presents the descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs in the 
panel data. The table indicates an average Capex of $10,741 million for the sample 
with a standard deviation of $17,964 million. The median Capex is $5,068 million 
which indicates that half of the countries in the sample engaged in Capex spending 
above $5,068 million. The sample mean subscriptions and employment are 151,734 
thousand and 328,114. The average revenue for the sample is $63,107 million with a 
standard deviation of $111,874 million and a median of $29,943 million. Teledensity 
average 103.36 for the sample and the median and standard deviation are 111.33 and 
48.96 (Table 6.1B). Also, the table shows that the sample of countries in HICs and 
OECD have a higher Capex average (HICs: $14,639 million; OECD: $12,855 
million) and a higher median (HICs: $7,093 million; OECD: $6,309 million) than the 
average ($10,741 million) and median ($5,068 million) for the sample panel data and 
the MICs sample average of $6,410 million and median of $3,494 million, but with 
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higher standard deviations. Average subscriptions for the sample of countries in 
HICs (97,904 thousand) and OECD (94,150 thousand) is below the panel data 
average (151,734 thousand) and MICs (211,544 thousand). The mean employment in 
MICs (449,480) is higher than the overall sample average (328,114), HICs 
(218,884), and OECD (203,357). Additionally, the average revenue for the countries 
in MICs ($30,051 million) is below the overall sample average ($63,107 million), 
HICs ($92,857 million) and OECD ($81,271 million). The teledensity average for 
the sample of countries in HICs (137.63) and OECD (128.74) are higher than the 
average for MICs (65.29) and the panel‟s overall sample average (103.36) (Table 
6.1B). 
For Canada, the average Capex of $7,099 is below the panel‟s average 
($10,741) and the average for the sample of countries in HICs ($14,639) and OECD 
($12,855), but above the average displayed by MICs ($6,410) (Table 6.1B). Also, the 
table shows average subscription in Canada is 39,030 thousand with a standard 
deviation of 5,090 thousand. Average employment is 117,268 with a standard 
deviation of 3,005. The mean and median revenue are $34,153 million and $36,621 
million and the standard deviation is $6,394 million. The mean teledensity in Canada 
is 117.88 (Table 6.1B). In the case of Nigeria, Table 6.1B shows average Capex of 
$2,825 million which is 40% of Canada‟s average of $7,099. The average 
subscription of 52,044 thousand is 1.3 times the average for Canada but with a 
standard deviation of 44,710 thousand which is 7 times that of Canada. The average 
employment is 403,516 with a standard deviation of 107,852. The average revenue of 
$8,176 million is 24% of Canada, but with a standard deviation of $4,949 million 
which is 77.4% of the $6,394 million displayed by Canada. The average teledensity 
of 37.51 is lower than Canada‟s average of 117.88. 
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Table 6.1B: Descriptive statistics. 
 
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 
Capex  
(USD millions)  
Subscriptions 
(thousands) 
Employment Revenue  
(USD millions) 
Teledensity 
All 19 Countries  (247 observations) 
Mean 10,741 151,734 328,114 63,107 103.36 
Median 5,068 71,494 147,994 29,943 111.33 
STD 17,964 242,429 467,493 111,874 48.96 
Maximum 130,030 1,496,098 3,273,000 524,896 193.77 
Minimum 239 867 7,459 607 0.74 
High Income Countries  (10 countries; 130 observations) 
Mean 14,639 97,904 218,884 92,857 137.63 
Median 7,093 50,133 116,019 39,838 139.35 
STD 23,018 114,176 302,782 144,268 25.50 
Maximum 130,030 443,931 1,423,900 524,896 193.77 
Minimum 400 4,111 7,459 2,717 54.78 
Middle Income Countries  (9 countries; 117 observations) 
Mean 6,410 211,544 449,480 30,051 65.29 
Median 3,494 79,314 193,682 17,053 67.12 
STD 7,697 321,379 577,319 36,084 39.79 
Maximum 43,665 1,496,098 3,273,000 184,596 157.78 
Minimum 239 867 52,895 607 0.74 
OECD Countries (12 countries; 156 observations) 
 Mean 12,855 94,150 203,357 81,271 128.74 
Median 6,309 62,417 116,529 33,618 131.53 
STD 21,393 105,020 278,711 134,183 32.31 
Maximum 130,030 443,931 1,423,900 524,896 193.77 
Minimum 400 4,111 7,459 2,717 33.73 
Canada (13 Observations) 
Mean 7,099 39,030 117,268 34,153 117.88 
Median 7,143 38,559 116,997 36,621 117.24 
STD 2,265 5,090 3,005 6,394 10.85 
Maximum 11,449 45,446 124,652 41,924 131.36 
Minimum 3,709 31,775 111,338 24,649 102.23 
Nigeria (13 Observations) 
Mean 2,825 52,044 403,516 8,176 37.51 
Median 3,036 41,975 462,115 6,926 29.98 
STD 985 44,710 107,852 4,949 31.63 
Maximum 3,908 127,607 485,177 17,335 91.15 
Minimum 1,339 867 193,682 607 0.74 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
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6.3 Measures of performance 
This research focuses on the performance of telecommunications industries in 
deregulated environement. The assessment has two parts. First is the partial measure 
of performance (PMP). It involves evaluating each of the single performance 
measures. Second is ToFA which utilizes aggregate measures in the DEA of the 
efficiency and productivity. 
 
6.4 Partial measure of performance (PMP) 
Partial measure of performance is a useful tool that provides insights on the 
performance of an industry. Its advantage is that it is simple to calculate and easy to 
comprehend (Serebrisky, 2012). Partial measure of performance involves using ratios 
(e.g., of input to output). However, using it in situations involving multiple inputs 
and outputs ignores potential interactions between the multiple inputs and outputs, 
resulting in misleading performance assessment (Serebrisky, 2012). Nonetheless, it 
has been used in empirical research to evaluate the performance of industries such as 
transportation (Serebrisky, 2012) and telecommunications (ITU, 2003). In the partial 
measures of performance analysis carried out in this research, the measures used are 
similar to ITU (2003) and include average revenue per subscriber (ARPS), 
teledensity, subscriptions to employment (SubEmp) ratio, revenues to employment 
(RevEmp) ratio, revenue to subscriptions (RevSub) ratio, capital expenditure to 
revenue (CapexRev) ratio, and capital expenditure to subscription (CapexSub) ratio 
and the level of competition (HHI). 
 
6.4.1 Subscriptions and teledensity. 
6.4.1.1 Subscriptions 
Subscriptions in Canada increased from 31,775 thousand in 2001 to 45,281 
thousand in 2013 (Figure 6.1A) which is a 42.5% rise or an average of 3.26% in each 
of the 13 years in the study but is less than the average increase in OECD (4.42%), 
HICs (3.51%), MICs (42.3%) and panel data (19.43%) (Figure 6.1B). In Nigeria, 
subscriptions rose from 867 thousand in 2001 to 127.6 million in 2013 (Figure 6.1A) 
representing average yearly increase of 1124% (Figure 6.1B) which is 345 times the 
average yearly percentage increase in Canada. Other countries with high average 
yearly growth rates are: Kenya (263%), Indonesia (185%) and India (149%); all are 
MICs (Figure 6.1B). Canada was deregulated in 1985 and Nigeria in 1999, hence, the 
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enormous subscriptions increase in Nigeria may be due to the later deregulation of 
the industry. This finding harmonizes with Herath (2012) who stated 
telecommunications subscriptions tend to increase post-deregulation and linked 
subscriptions increase in several countries (e.g., India and Sri Lanka) to deregulation. 
The subscriptions pattern in Canada and Nigeria shown in Figures 6.1C and 6.1D 
reveal declining wireline subscriptions but rising wireless subscriptions, suggesting 
subscribers‟ migration from wireline to wireless services. Assuming that subscription 
is the yardstick used to evaluate the industry, the data indicates that average yearly 
subscriptions growth in Nigeria is slowing, as it did in Canada, but the cushion for 
growth makes the industry outlook superior to Canada which is trending towards 
stagnation and negative growth. The implication for Canada‟s saturated and 
Nigeria‟s declining growth market is that competitive intensity among 
telecommunications firms would increase. 
 
 
Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.1A: Subscriptions change (in Thousands) 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.1B: Average yearly increase in subscriptions (%) 
 
 
Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.1C: Wireline and wireless subscriptions in Canada (in Thousands). 
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Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.1D: GSM, CDMA and fixed line subscriptions in Nigeria (in Thousands) 
 
6.4.1.2 Teledensity 
Teledensity depicts the number of lines available per 100 inhabitants (Batuo, 
2015). Teledensity in Canada was 128.81 in 2013 and 91.15 in Nigeria (Appendices 
1D and 1N). Canada‟s average teledensity of 117.88 is below the average for HICs 
(137.63) and OECD member countries (128.74) but higher than the MICs (65.29), 
Nigeria (37.51) and the panel dataset (103.36) (Table 6.1B). Canada‟s teledensity 
average of 117.88 is higher than the median of 111.33 for the panel dataset, 
suggesting that Canada performed better than half of the countries but this 
teledensity performance is below the median displayed by HICs (139.35) and OECD 
member countries (131.53). Nigeria‟s mean teledensity of 37.51 is below half of the 
countries in the study. The low teledensity in Nigeria indicates low levels of phone 
lines per capita and/or low levels of access to telecommunications services probably 
due to limited infrastructure and the lateness in deregulating the industry. Canada has 
a higher teledensity, signifying a higher level of access to telecommunications 
services. The finding of higher teledensity in Canada is consistent with Li & Xu 
(2004) who noted that industrialized and wealthier countries with stable economy 
tend to have higher teledensities than countries with less stable economy. 
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signal differences in level of access to telecommunications services. Care should be 
exercised in the use of teledensity as a performance measure. Wallsten (2001) used it 
with an interpretive caution, noting that using the number of lines per capita to access 
industry performance may result in wrong conclusions due to the multiple line 
subscriptions held by some individuals. Although teledensity as the only measure of 
performance should be interpreted with caution, Nigeria is yet to attain one telephone 
line per inhabitant (teledensity: 91.15), indicating growth potential for firms in the 
industry. On the other hand,  Canada‟s high teledensity suggests limited growth 
opportunities. 
 
6.4.2 Subscriptions to employment ratio 
Subscription to employment (SubEmp) ratio is considered a measure of 
labour productivity (Dabler, Parker, & Saal, 2002). Appendices 1D and 1N shows 
upward trends in subscriptions in Canada and Nigeria, however, employment in the 
Canadian telecommunications industry is relatively constant, increasing by a modest 
7,500 (7.28%) over the 13-year period which is an average of 0.56% per year. In 
addition, Appendix 1D reveals that SubEmp which was 301 in 2001 peaked at 412 in 
2008 but declined to 362 in 2009. Since 2010, it has continued to rise. Appendix 1N 
shows 483,801 employments in 2013 in Nigeria, an increase of 149.8% over the 13-
year period. Figure 2A depicts the SubEmp trends. It reveals an upward trend for the 
categories of countries except MICs. SubEmp in Nigeria was four in 2001 but rose to 
264 in 2013 (Table 6.2B). The SubEmp growth in Nigeria is 97 times that in Canada 
(Figure 6.2B), suggesting greater labour productivity growth in Nigeria. However, on 
average, the 112 SubEmp in Nigeria is smaller than the average for Canada (334), 
HICs (538), OECD (550), MICs (483) and the overall average (512) (Figure 6.2C). 
Countries that have SubEmp comparable to Canada are Australia (320) and United S 
(386), but Australia has a standard deviation similar to Canada while the US has a 
larger standard deviation (Table 6.2A). In addition, the coefficient of variation (CV) 
for Canada is 15% and 81% for Nigeria, suggesting a high variability in SubEmp in 
the case of Nigeria. Furthermore, Canada‟s average SubEmp (334) is three times that 
of Nigeria but it lags behind most HICs and OECD countries and is comparable to 
Australia (320), India (387) and US (386) (Figure 6.2C). 
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Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.2A: Subscriptions to Employment trends. 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2B: Subscriptions to employment growth by country and category (%). 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2C: Average subscriptions to employment by country and by categories. 
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Table 6.2A: Summary of partial measures of performance analysis. 
     Subscriptions 
to Employment 
Ratio 
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD) 
Revenue to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD) 
Capex to 
Revenue  
Ratio 
Capex to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD) 
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD) 
All 19 Countries (247 observations) 
Mean 522 257,598 536 0.23 122 45,965 
Median 506 266,715 530 0.19 92 47,861 
STD 312 177,305 349 0.30 220 32,855 
Maximum 1,594 632,676 1,614 4.50 3,152 251,741 
Minimum 4 3,135 26 0.03 4 1,025 
High Income Countries (HICs) (10 countries; 130 observations) 
Mean 538 381,725 770 0.18 136 65,284 
Median 546 387,585 764 0.17 121 62,621 
STD 178 109,912 275 0.06 62 19,131 
Maximum 909 632,676 1,614 0.38 406 128,883 
Minimum 225 163,645 246 0.09 54 29,925 
Middle Income Countries (MICs) (9 countries; 117 observations) 
Mean 504 119,679 276 0.29 106 24,499 
Median 448 63,765 233 0.21 42 14,052 
STD 412 129,543 212 0.42 313 31,609 
Maximum 1,594 514,284 1,072 4.50 3,152 251,741 
Minimum 4 3,135 26 0.03 4 1,025 
OECD Member Countries (12 countries; 156 observations) 
Mean 549 351,218 698 0.18 124 60,319 
Median 545 356,427 672 0.16 109 58,483 
STD 180 125,043 303 0.07 67 23,191 
Maximum 915 632,676 1,614 0.50 406 128,883 
Minimum 225 96,550 160 0.03 11 5,121 
Canada (13 observations) 
Mean 334 292,339 870 0.20 179 60,788 
Median 330 314,051 883 0.20 184 61,257 
STD 50 59,681 71 0.04 44 20,122 
Maximum 407 360,475 963 0.30 284 98,314 
Minimum 255 199,469 759 0.14 109 31,664 
Nigeria (13 observations) 
Mean 112 19,026 390 0.72 444 7,627 
Median 94 15,020 300 0.31 93 7,988 
STD 91 9,753 336 1.17 874 3,366 
Maximum 264 37,512 1,068 4.50 3,152 14,105 
Minimum 4 3,135 53 0.18 11 2,759 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
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Table 6.2B: Summary of percentage change in partial measures of performance. 
 Subscriptions  
to Employment 
Ratio 
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD) 
Revenue to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD) 
Capex to 
Revenue  
Ratio 
Capex to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD) 
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD) 
All 19 Countries (247 observations) 
Year 2001 328 218,205 687 0.53 355 65,277 
Year 2013 677 245,968 406 0.19 79 45,978 
Overall 
Increase (%) 106.50 12.72 -40.89 -63.95 -77.72 -29.57 
Yearly 
Increase (%) 8.19 0.98 -3.15 -4.92 -5.98 -2.27 
High Income Countries (10 countries; 130 observations) 
Year 2001 412 299,675 805 0.24 185 67,801 
Year 2013 612 383,631 672 0.20 135 75,194 
Overall 
Increase (%) 48.63 28.02 -16.49 -14.08 -27.03 10.90 
Yearly 
Increase (%) 3.74 2.16 -1.27 -1.08 -2.08 0.84 
Middle Income Countries (9 countries; 117 observations) 
Year 2001 235 127,683 556 0.86 545 62,473 
Year 2013 750 93,010 110 0.18 17 13,516 
Overall 
Increase (%) 219.20 -27.16 -80.17 -79.19 -96.82 -78.37 
Yearly 
Increase (%) 16.86 -2.09 -6.17 -6.09 -7.45 -6.03 
OECD Member Countries (12 countries; 156 observations) 
Year 2001 414 291,054 770 0.27 195 74,240 
Year 2013 641 349,482 597 0.19 117 66,278 
Overall 
Increase (%) 54.82 20.07 -22.37 -29.54 -40.22 -10.72 
Yearly 
Increase (%) 4.22 1.54 -1.72 -2.27 -3.09 -0.82 
Canada (13 observations) 
Year 2001 255 199,469 783 0.25 193 49,093 
Year 2013 407 352,521 867 0.22 187 76,086 
Overall (%) 
Increase 59.55 76.73 10.77 -12.31 -2.86 54.98 
Yearly 
Increase (%) 4.58 5.90 0.83 -0.95 -0.22 4.23 
Nigeria (13 Observations) 
Year 2001 4 3,135 700 4.50 3,152 14,105 
Year 2013 264 14,057 53 0.21 11 2,890 
Overall 
Increase (%) 5793.67 348.42 -92.39 -95.43 -99.65 -79.51 
Yearly 
Increase (%) 445.67 26.80 -7.11 -7.34% -7.67 -6.12 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
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The results show that SubEmp in the deregulated environment increased in 
Canada and Nigeria, but the pattern varies, confirming findings in Dabler, Parker & 
Sall (2002) that labour productivity improvement is not consistent across countries. 
Labour productivity increase in the Nigerian telecommunications industry shows 
steady rise which is not unusual after deregulation and affirms the observation in 
Wallsten (2001) of increased labour productivity following deregulation. In general, 
there is evidence of increased SubEmp in the two countries, but it is higher in 
Canada.  Labour productivity in the industry in Canada is almost three times that in 
Nigeria which suggests better deployment and utilization of labour. Nevertheless, the 
increase in SubEmp in both countries is consistent with Ros (1999) who discusses 
that deregulation is associated with increased lines per employee. Also, the finding of 
lower SubEmp in Nigeria compared to Canada is consistent with Lee & Quayes 
(2005) who investigated global evidence of post-privatization of the 
telecommunications sector and found that SubEmp in South Asia is less than that in 
more developed OECD countries. The general increase in SubEmp could be 
attributed to investment in advanced technology and automated systems that allow 
the industry to be more productive by maintaining employment growth at a lower 
rate than growth in subscriptions; a finding that harmonizes with Carbone (2006). 
Nonetheless, caution should be exercised when using SubEmp to measure 
performance. As observed in ITU (2008), it is not uncommon for 
telecommunications firms to outsource or contract out tasks thereby understating 
total employment which may result in inflated SubEmp ratios. Also, this measure 
ignores differences in input prices and does not consider the substitution of one input 
for another (Serebrisky, 2012). Therefore, in comparison to Canada, the lower 
SubEmp in Nigeria may have been due to the substitution of labour for capital as 
labour costs are lower in Nigeria than in Canada and may not suggest ineffective use 
of labour or poor performance. 
 
6.4.3 Revenue to employment ratio  
Figure 6.2E displays the average revenue to employment (RevEmp) ratio. 
Average RevEmp in Canada is $292,339, which is comparable to the sample average 
but only 77% of the average in HICs, 83% of the average in OECD and 2.4 times 
that in MICs. The $19,026 average for Nigeria is 6.5% of Canada‟s average (Figure 
6.2E). The trend in RevEmp is shown in Figure 6.2D. RevEmp declined in the last 
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three years of the study in Canada, Nigeria, and the categories of countries. Overall, 
all except MICs exhibited higher RevEmp in 2013 than in 2001. In  2001 RevEmp in 
the Canadian telecommunications industry was 64 times that in the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry but declined to 25 times by the end of the study period, 
indicating that RevEmp is growing faster in Nigeria than in Canada. In addition, 
Figure 6.2F which depicts the growth in RevEmp over the study period reveals 
0.98% overall growth in RevEmp for the panel data, 5.9% and 26.8% growth in 
Canada and Nigeria, respectively, thus pointing to increased labour productivity in 
the study period. The results show that the Canadian telecommunications industry 
displayed higher RevEmp than Nigeria but the difference shrunk in the study period, 
suggesting RevEmp is growing faster in Nigeria than in Canada and that the industry 
in Nigeria is improving its utilization of labor in generating revenue. However, 
unlike Nigeria, RevEmp in the industry in Canada increased steadily except in 2012 
and 2013 when it declined but was still comparable to previous years. This 
observation is unique to Canada: no other country in the study displayed this level of 
stability. Its peers in HICs and OECD showed erratic RevEmp (Figure 6.2D). This 
irregular pattern creates difficulty in predicting labour effectiveness and signifies any 
increase or decrease may be attributed to variability in revenue rather than to labour 
effectiveness. Nonetheless, the findings of growth in RevEmp for the panel dataset 
and for Canada and Nigeria points to increased revenue per labour employed in the 
deregulated environment. This finding harmonizes with Megginson et al., (1994) 
who reported increased sales per employee in an empirical analysis of the financial 
and operating performances of newly privatized firms. 
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Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.2D: Revenues to Employment trends. 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2E: Revenue to employment by country and category (USD). 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2F: Annual revenue to employment growth by country and category. 
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6.4.4 Revenue to subscriptions ratio 
The average yearly revenue to subscriptions (RPS) in the sample countries is 
$536, and Canada‟s average ($870) is higher than Nigeria‟s ($390) (Figure 6.2H). 
Only two countries (Australia: $1,048; US: $1,290) have higher average RPS, and 
Japan‟s is somewhat comparable to Canada. Nigeria‟s average yearly RPS is 45% of 
Canada‟s and is less than all countries in HICs except Chile. Furthermore, the 
average yearly RPS for Nigeria is 23% more than Brazil ($318), but the average for 
Brazil which is comparable to South Africa ($311) is almost twice that of India 
($162) and 2.5 times the average for China ($128) (Figure 6.2H). The revenue to 
subscriptions trends in Figure 6.2G shows relatively stable pattern in Canada and a 
decline in Nigeria. On monthly basis, the the average revenue per subscriber (ARPS) 
in Nigeria which was $58 in 2001 declined significantly to $4.4 in 2013, indicating 
an average annual decline of 7.11% (Figure 6.2I). The Canadian telecommunications 
industry recorded ARPS increase from $65.25 in 2001 to $80.25 in 2007, but 
experienced a decline in the following two years to $71.75. However, it has remained 
relatively stable and was $72.35 in 2013, which represents 0.84% average annual 
increase. ARPS, which is rendered average revenue per user in Deshpande & 
Narahari (2014, p. 557), is a yardstick used in the telecommunications industry: it is 
obtained by dividing the yearly revenue per subscriber (RPS) by 12. Figure 6.2I 
reveals that all countries experienced negative growth in average revenue per 
subscriber (ARPS) except Australia and Canada. 
Average revenue per subscriber, which is considered a reliable proxy and an 
indicator of price, is used widely in empirical research (e.g., Deshpande & Narahari, 
2014). The finding of decline in average revenue per subscriber in all countries in the 
sample except Australia and Canada may be due to a combination of the need to 
increase telecommunications services affordability and high competitive intensity in 
the industry (GSMA, 2014). Average revenue per subscriber continues to decline as 
firms compete fiercely for market share. However, the decline has generated an 
increase in subscriber base as revealed by subscriptions increases in all countries. 
Furthermore, regulators often review the revenues and fees that firms charge each 
other for network access and in a number of cases have encouraged downward 
reviews of fees which erode revenues (Gruber, 2005). The result also reveals that in 
2001 subscribers in Nigeria paid 89% of what Canadian subscribers paid to access 
telecommunications services but by 2013 it had declined to 6%. The average revenue 
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per subscriber trends support the finding in Li & Xu (2004) that deregulated 
telecommunications industries in industrialized countries (e.g., Canada) tend to have 
higher average revenue per subscriber than less industrialized countries (e.g., 
Nigeria). However, while Li & Xu (2004) associated the price differential to high 
inflation and price control that artificially depressed price in less industrialized 
countries. The observed difference in average revenue per subscriber between 
Canada and Nigeria in this research may be related to intensified competition among 
service providers in Nigeria (Hassan, 2011) and the difference in the choice of 
service demand by customers in the two countries. Furthermore, the average revenue 
per subscriber trend shows it is higher and relatively stable in Canada but lower and 
in decline in Nigeria, an observation that corroborates ITU (2007) that reported low 
average revenue per subscriber in telecommunications markets in Africa but 
attributed it to limited economic resources and the prudence of customers. 
 
 
 
Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.2G: Revenues to Subscriptions trends. 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2H: Revenue to subscriptions and Capex to subscriptions. 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2I: Annual growth in revenue to subscriptions by country and category (%). 
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6.4.5 Capex to subscription ratio 
Table 6.1A displays Capex by category and shows that HICs and OECD 
countries have higher Capex than MICs. In addition, Table 6.1A reveals that MICs‟ 
share of total Capex rose from 27% in 2001 to 33% in 2013. Capex increase in MICs 
could be rational. Compared to HICs, MICs have less developed infrastructure and 
require investment commitment to accommodate subscriptions growth in the 
deregulated environment. The data lends support to this notion because MICs are 
increasingly accounting for a greater percentage of Capex to accommodate 
subscriptions growth (42.3%) (Figure 6.1B). For country-specific Capex, Nigeria‟s 
average Capex of $2,825 million pales in comparison to the $7,099 million for 
Canada. Capex trends in the last five years of the study (2009–13) shows that 10 
(53%) of the countries in the sample increased Capex (Appendices 1A–1S): the 10 
countries are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Mexico, New 
Zealand, South Korea and the US. Surprisingly, only three of the 10 are MICs: 
Brazil, China and Mexico. This is contrary to the initial expectation that most 
countries with Capex increase would be from MICs. Figure 6.2H reveals the average 
CapexSub by country and by categories. The Figure shows that the average 
CapexSub in Nigeria ($444) is the highest in the sample and is 2.5 times the average 
in Canada, suggesting increased investment per subscription in the industry in 
Nigeria than in Canada. However, it suffices to say that since 2006, Canada has 
continued to surpass Nigeria on this measure (Appendices 1D and 1N). Australia 
($215) has the second highest CapexSub and is followed by the US ($205) while 
India ($49), Indonesia ($45) and China ($29) have low CapexSub. Nigeria‟s 
CapexSub could be associated with the newness of the industry to deregulation and 
the accompanying higher spending on network deployment in the industry; a finding 
in consonance with Bollou & Ngwenyama (2008) who stated that increased network 
deployment usually accompanies deregulation. 
CapexSub declined in the period of study (Figure 6.2J). However, the country 
by country CapexSub growth presented in Figure 6.2K  indicates negative growth in 
all but Australia, Belgium and New Zealand. Additionally, the decline in Nigeria (-
7.67%) is larger than the decline in Canada (-0.22%) and the sample of countries (-
5.98%) (Figure 6.2K). The decline in Nigeria is about 35 times that of Canada and 
may be associated with declining average revenue per subscriber which does not 
encourage firms to invest in network infrastructure (GSMA, 2013). Furthermore, the 
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decline noted in both countries may signal that subscriptions are increasing faster 
than Capex, signifying underinvestment to bolster profitability given the declining 
average revenue per subscriber and the margin squeeze caused by increased 
competition. However, as noted in Masse & Baundry (2014), to enhance coverage 
and agility in responding to customers‟ needs, firms need to continually invest in 
network infrastructure. While Capex spending in a current period may result in 
inferior performance, it would benefit the industry in future periods by keeping pace 
with technological innovation and in offering products of value to customers. Care 
should be exercised when CapexSub is used as a performance measure. Asserting a 
condition of underinvestment based on reduced Capex and/or CapexSub may be 
inappropriate if firms in the industry engage in cost reduction joint ventures and 
cooperate in the area of infrastructure and network development (GSMA, 2014). 
 
 
Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.2J: Capex to Subscriptions trends. 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2K: Capex to subscriptions growth by country and category (%). 
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6.4.6 Capex to Revenue Ratio  
Figure 6.2L presents the Capex to revenue (CapexRev) trends. Used in Gupta 
(2005) and Majumdar (2014), this measure evaluates investments in assets essential 
to enhancing future operations. From 2001-02, the decline in CapexRev was steep. 
Thereafter, the decline has been relatively steady in Canada and the categories of 
countries. (Figure 6.2L). Interestingly, in the last three years of the study, CapexRev 
in Canada, Nigeria, HICs, and MICs seemed to have gravitated towards the average 
for all of the countries in the study (Figure 6.2L). Figure 6.2M depicts the Capex to 
revenue (CapexRev) ratio by country and categories.   The average for Canada (0.20) 
is similar to the average for the sample of countries in HICs and OECD but is less 
than the sample average of 0.23 for all of the countries in the study and MICs (0.29) 
and is only 28% of the average for Nigeria (0.72). Table 6.3 displays the CapexRev 
ratio bands. Three countries (i.e., Belgium, Germany and Japan) have CapexRev 
ratios that are in line with the 0.10 and 0.15 for most telecommunications firms in the 
research conducted by PWC (2014) which examined factors that drive EBITDA 
multiples and the valuation of telecommunications firms. While the objective in 
PWC (2014) is not the focus of this research, its use of CapexRev indicates the 
measure is appropriate in the assessment of performance. Six countries (i.e., Canada, 
Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, the UK and the US) have ratios between 0.16 and 
0.20; six countries (i.e., Australia, Brazil, China, Indonesia, New Zealand and South 
Africa) have ratios between 0.20 and 0.25; and four countries (i.e., Chile, India, 
Kenya and Nigeria) have ratios above 0.25 (Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3: Capex to revenue ratio bands. 
Capex to Revenue 
Ratio Range 
Number of 
Countries 
0.1–0.15 3 (15.8%) 
0.16–0.20 6 (31.6%) 
0.21–0.25 6 (31.6%) 
Above 0.25 4 (21%) 
Total 19 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
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Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.2L: Capex to Revenue trends. 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2M: Average Capex to revenue ratio. 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2N: Annual growth in Capex to revenue ratio (%). 
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Similar to other partial measures of performance, CapexRev ratio should be 
interpreted with caution. A low ratio in a current period implies low capital 
expenditures per dollar of revenue and may enhance short-term performance to the 
detriment of long-term performance. Several reasons may be adduced for the low 
CapexRev ratio in Canada. First, it may reflect limited growth opportunities as the 
industry approaches saturation with a teledensity of 128.8 in 2013. Second, it may be 
due to increased partnership among firms in the industry on project financing and 
infrastructure development. Third, it may signify flattened capital expenditure amidst 
rising revenues. However, this may not indicate efficiency improvements because the 
industry is capital intensive and requires firms to commit cash outlays in current 
periods to enhance profitability in the future. Flattened or declining CapexRev ratios 
may signal underinvestment and jeopardize service quality and the ability to 
introduce new products and/or respond to customers‟ needs. This may increase 
churning risk and cause customers to switch service providers (Ahn, Han, & Lee, 
2006). In addition, it may increase the motivation for customers to explore 
alternative communications platforms, resulting in revenue loss and diminished 
performance for the industry. The finding of high CapexRev ratio in Nigeria 
complements ITU (2007) which examined ICT and market trends in Africa and 
found African countries displayed a higher ratio than other regions but noted that this 
may be due to increased confidence regarding industry profitability. However, it is 
possible that the high CapexRev rati in Nigeria reflects the shortage of infrastructure 
and/or the deplorable state of essential infrastructure (e.g., an unstable power supply) 
that has been neglected by various levels of government. The infrastructure gaps 
necessitate building and maintaining basic infrastructure prior to developing 
platforms and network infrastructure for telecommunications product and service 
delivery. Furthermore, the high CapexRev may suggest increased spending on 
network expansion as firms in the industry deploy new network infrastructure and/or 
upgrade existing ones to accommodate subscription growth and to enhance services 
with a view to retaining/attracting new customers (Esselaar, Gillwald, & Stork, 
2007). Also, as shown in Figure 6.2N, the negative CapexRev growth in MICs (-
6.09%) and the sample of countries (-4.92%) combined with the decline in HICs (-
1.08) and OECD countries (-2.27) reveals a general decline in CapexRev but the 
decline is more pronounced in MICs. Additionally, the decline in Canada is 0.14% of 
that in Nigeria. Surprisingly, among the four countries with a substantial percentage 
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decline (i.e., Nigeria, Turkey, Mexico and the UK), Nigeria is the only country with 
CapexRev in the band above 0.25 (Figure 6.2M; Table 6.3). The other three have 
ratios between 0.16 and 0.20 (Figure 6.2M; Table 6.3). 
 
6.4.7 Capex to employment ratio  
The Capex to employment (CapexEmp) trend is presented in Figure 6.2O. 
The trend shows that the pattern of the decline in Nigeria is similar to MICs. On the 
other hand, the pattern in Canda deviated from HICs and OECD countries (Figure 
6.2O). Figure 6.2P displays the average CapexEmp and shows that Brazil has the 
highest Capex to employment (CapexEmp) ratio. The CapexEmp for the sample of 
countries is $45,965. However, it is $65,284, $60,319, and $24,499 for HICs, OECD 
countries and MICs respectively. In HICs category, Germany and Chile spent less 
than $60,000 per employment in the industry. With the exception of Brazil, all 
countries in MICs appeared to have low CapexEmp ratios. Three MICs (i.e., 
Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria) have a CapexEmp ratio of less than $10,000. 
Furthermore, Figure 6.2P shows that the $60,788 average for Canada is 74% of 
Brazil‟s $82,555 and 88% of Australia‟s $68,839 but is eight times the average in 
Nigeria and 4.5 and 5.7 times the average in China and India. Deductively, for every 
dollar in CapexEmp spending in the industry in Nigeria, Canada spent $8 whereas it 
spent up to $4.50 and $4.70 for each CapexEmp dollar in the industry in China and 
India respectively. Similar to other partial measures of performance, caution is 
needed when using Capex to employment ratio to gauge plausible labour 
productivity improvement. High CapexEmp may be due to outsourcing and decline 
in employment that result. In addition, high CapexEmp may be the result of 
increased Capex only and may not confer any labour productivity improvement. 
The average yearly growth in CapexEmp is presented in Figure 6.2Q. 
Australia has the highest with an annual growth rate of 8.55%. It is followed by 
Belgium (4.92%), Canada (4.23%), China (3.86%) and New Zealand (3.84%). The 
remaining countries have negative growth, including Brazil which was identified 
earlier as spending the most on CapexEmp ($82,555) (Figure 6.2P). The panel 
dataset negative growth of 2.27% suggests a general decline. Unlike Canada with 
positive growth of 4.23%, Nigeria exhibited a decline of 6.21%. A combination of 
factors may be responsible for this. In Canada, employment in the industry was 
relatively stable but Capex spending of $8,471 million in 2013 was  39% above what 
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it was in 2001. On the other hand, in Nigeria, the Capex of $1,398 million in 2013 
was a 49% decline from the Capex spending in 2001 but employment in the industry 
increased by 150% in the same period. The finding of low CapexEmp and declining 
growth in Nigeria is somewhat surprising given that the country‟s infrastructure is 
inadequate and requires firms in the industry to build their own infrastructure to 
support product and service delivery to customers. Also, given that Canada‟s 
teledensity suggests that the industry in Canada is saturated, the expectation was that 
CapexEmp in Canada would decline. However, the high CapexEmp and positive 
growth in Canada may suggest investment in new technologies and network 
expansion that would facilitate the delivery of services (Ovum Consulting, 2010). 
 
 
Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.2O: Capex to Employment trends. 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2P: Average Capex to employment ratio (USD). 
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Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
Figure 6.2Q: Annual growth in Capex to employment ratio (%). 
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6.4.8 Level of industry concentration 
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the square of 
the market share of each firm in an industry (Noam, 2005), is an acceptable indicator 
of industry concentration that regulators and firms use to access industry 
competitiveness and market power. The HHI scale ranges from 0 to 10,000; the 
closer the HHI is to 0, the greater the number of firms and level of industry 
competition (Ertl & McCarrell, 2002). Figure 6.2R shows the HHI trend. Compared 
to Canada, Nigeria attained significant reduction in HHI during the study period. 
HHI for each of the 19 countries is shown in Appendices 1A to 1S. The appendices 
show that HHI declined in the study period in all countries in the sample panel 
dataset. The decline in HHI is consistent with the findings in Noam (2005) that show 
unregulated industries are less concentrated than those regulated. Also, it supports 
Ertl & McCarrell (2002) revelation that deregulation diminishes HHI and creates 
competition. However, the HHI findings indicate deregulation has a greater impact in 
HICs than in MICs as more countries in MICs exhibited high HHI. 
 
 
Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.2R: Industry Concentration (HHI) trends. 
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Although HHI for all countries declined in the period of study, the findings 
indicate that the industry is concentrated as each country displayed HHI above 1,500 
(US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2010). In 2013 Turkey 
(2,146) and Brazil (2,405) with HHI in the range of 1,500 to 2,500 met the guideline 
for a moderately concentrated industry. All other countries have concentration level 
above 2,500, signifying a concentrated industry. However, if the more liberal 
classification in Ertl & McCarrell (2002) is used, none would be considered as 
having a perfectly competitive industry. However, the industry in ten countries 
would have HHI ranging between 2,000 and 4,000 and would be considered as 
monopolistic competition. The industry in the remaining nine countris would have 
HHI ranging between 4,000 and 7,000 and would be considered as oligopolies. None 
of the countries fit monopoly classification as all had HHI below 7,000 in 2013. 
Although the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010) is 
credible and is a widely used regulatory guideline, the classification in Ertl & 
McCarrell (2002) is ideal for using the conventional market structure classifications 
(i.e., perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly and monopoly) that 
makes it possible to describe the structure of the market in each country. 
Adopting the classifications in Ertl & McCarrell (2002), the industry in 
China, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and 
South Korea fits oligopoly description. The industry in the remaining countries 
would be considered monopolistic competition. In view of this, the HHI for Canada 
(3,078) and Nigeria (3,062) suggests monopolistic competition. However, in the 
context of this research, the notation in Djolov (2013) and Ferreira (2013) describing 
an industry lying between 1,800 and 10,000 on the HHI as a concentrated oligopoly 
is considered more appropriate. This is because an oligopoly describes a market 
structure where a few firms control and dominate the market (Ciobanu, 2011; 
Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 2006). A significant portion of the Canadian and Nigerian 
telecommunications industry is controlled by a few firms, thus making the assertion 
of an oligopoly plausible. In addition, some studies (e.g., Byambaakuu, Kwon, & 
Rho, 2014; Herath, 2012; Karamti & Kammoun, 2011) have linked evidence of price 
decline in a deregulated industry to an increase in competition. Therefore, the 
rationale given for the average revenue per subscriber decline in Nigeria in Section 
6.4.4 is tenable with HHI declining from 6,934 in 2001 to 3,062 in 2013 (Appendix 
1N). HHI in Canada has been relatively stable (3,078 in 2013), although the rise 
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experienced between 2004–05 and 2007–08 creates the impression of increased 
concentration and market power that typically results in higher prices (Masse & 
Beaudry, 2014). Nonetheless, like Nigeria, it could be described as an oligopoly. 
HHI decline may signal lower concentration and increased competition, caution 
should be exercised because it is possible for HHI to decline a minimum of 2,500 
without changes in the number of firms in the industry provided the market share 
among the firms in the industry trends towards equality. 
One-sample t test was conducted to determine if the mean HHI is 
significantly different from the theorectical HHI of 2,500 for moderate level of 
concentration (US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2010). 
Given the null hypothesis (H0) that the sample mean is equal to the hypothesized 
mean, the result in Table 6.4A shows that the null could not be accepted (p-value = 
0.000; < 0.05). This indicates that the mean HHI for the sample of countries in the 
period of study is above the theoretical level of moderate concentration, indicating 
that the decline in HHI has not been significant in the deregulated environment. 
Research (e.g., Blackman & Srivastava, 2011; Noam, 2005; Usero, Grigorios, & 
Asimakopoulos, 2013; Fink, Mattoo, & Rathindran, 2003) that have exmined 
telecommunications industry deregulation present that deregulation leads to an 
increase in competition in the industry. The finding in this research confirms this 
assertion but also shows that the decline in HHI is not substantial to declare that the 
industry is highly competitive. In addition, the concentration of the industry in the 
two countries of interest (i.e. Canada and Nigeria) was examined to determine if the 
mean level of concentration differs. The null hypothesis (H0) is that mean value of 
HHI in the two countries are equal. The result presented in Tble 6.4B indicates that 
the null could not be rejected (p-value = 0.4266; > 0.05), implying that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the mean HHI in the two countries.   
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Table 6.4A: One-sample t test  
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculation 
 
 
Table 6.4B: HHI comparison test between Canada and Nigeria using Mann-Whitney      
                     (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum) test                        
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculation 
 
 
 
 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
   Ha: mean < 2500             Ha: mean != 2500               Ha: mean > 2500
Ho: mean = 2500                                  degrees of freedom =      246
    mean = mean(HHI)                                              t =  23.2313
                                                                              
     HHI       247    4404.567    81.98295    1288.463    4243.089    4566.045
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-sample t test
    Prob > |z| =   0.4266
             z =   0.795
Ho: HHI(Countr~s==Canada) = HHI(Countr~s==Nigeria)
adjusted variance        380.12
                               
adjustment for ties       -0.13
unadjusted variance      380.25
    combined         26         351         351
                                               
     Nigeria         13         160       175.5
      Canada         13         191       175.5
                                               
   Countries        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
 136 
6.5 Efficiency and productivity performance in deregulated environment 
The partial measures of performance results in Section 6.4 show the two 
countries under study elicited different levels of performance on each measure, a 
finding consistent with Naimy & Merheb (2014) that DMUs tend to show different 
levels of performance depending on what is being measured. The results showed that 
Canada displayed better performance on teledensity, SubEmp, RevEmp, CapexSub 
and CapexRev. Although Canada exhibited higher RevSub, Nigeria attained better 
price decline in the deregulated environment. Also, Nigeria showed better 
performance on subscriptions growth and RevEmp growth albeit Canada had a 
superior average RevEmp. Furthermore, the two countries displayed comparable 
industry concentration and are oligopolies. 
The partial measures of performance provide information on the performance 
(i.e., operational efficiency and productivity) of the industry but the results in Section 
6.4 failed to show that a single country consistently performed better on each 
measure. Rather, each country displayed better performance than the other depending 
on what is measured, making it difficult to identify the country with superior 
performance without a normative statement. Even though the partial measures of 
performance are considered insufficient because they fail to capture the series of 
inputs used simultaneously to generate outputs, nonetheless their use provided 
insightful information on the performance of the industry in the two countries. For a 
complete picture of the performance of the industry, the partial measures of 
performance are complemented with total factor analysis (ToFA) of the efficiency 
and productivity of the industry. The results are presented below. 
 
6.5.1 Efficiency analysis 
The approach discussed in Estache, Rossi, & Ruzzier (2004) was used to 
evaluate the efficiency scores under constant returns to scale and variable returns to 
scale. It involves establishing a frontier for each of the 13 years with the efficiency of 
each country relative to the frontier determined for each year. DEA efficiency 
frontiers were constructed in reference to a benchmark which is the best performer in 
the group and not the „theoretical maximum‟ that could be attained (Petrović et al., 
2011, p. 731). Thus the efficiency scores for each country in this research are relative 
in comparison to the best frontier that represents the best performer in the group of 
countries being studied. Furthermore, it is possible that differences in regulatory and 
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economic order in the countries under study may have accounted for some of the 
variations in efficiencies. This will be investigated in the second stage analysis. 
Trends in mean CRS technical efficiency scores for all countries, categories of 
countries, and Canada and Nigeria are shown in Figure 6.3 and Appendix 2A which 
provides the CRS technical efficiency pattern from 2001 to 2013. Figure 6.3 reveals 
an upward trend in CRS technical efficiency scores. However, while the pattern in 
Canada is upward and relatively stable, Nigeria displayed a haphazard pattern with 
wide variations. Nonetheless, it increased from 0.45 in 2001 to 0.6206 in 2013 
(Appendix 2A). Given that an objective of deregulation is to improve efficiency, the 
outcomes in Canada and Nigeria are insightful. Eliminating cross-subsidization in 
Canada compelled the industry to effectively allocate resources. This may have 
resulted in the upward and relatively stable CRS technical efficiency. The CRS 
technical efficiency pattern in Nigeria rose in 2001-02. This may have been due to 
the issuance of licenses that allowed new entrants into the industry. While the 
increase in competition stimulated infrastructure investment and enhanced network 
coverage, the introduction of unified licensing code and number portability 
heightened price competition, slowed revenue growth, and inhibited CRS technical 
efficiency performance in the remaining periods of the study. Additionally, on a 
yearly basis, the long-term trend indicates that the percentage of countries that 
displayed efficiency (i.e., a CRS TE score of 1) increased from five (26%) in 2001 to 
eight (42%) in 2013 (Appendix 2A), suggesting that the industry in more countries 
became technically efficient in the deregulated environment with the passage of time. 
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Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.3: CRS technical efficiency trends. 
 
Table 6.5 shows the mean CRS technical efficiency, VRS technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency scores for all countries. The CRS technical efficiency provides 
information on efficiency levels and assumes that firms in the industry have 
flexibility and could adjust their size to that similar to the best performer (Kritikos, 
Markellos, & Prastacos, 2010). Under CRS technical efficiency, Table 6.5 reveals 
three countries (i.e., Belgium, New Zealand and the US) are efficient with each 
having a mean efficiency score of 1. All other countries have mean CRS technical 
efficiency scores of less than 1 and are considered inefficient (Table 6.5; Appendix 
2A). In addition, the mean CRS technical efficiency score for the sample of countries 
in the panel dataset is 0.7464, suggesting that on average the industry in each country 
would have reduced inputs by 25.4%. This signifies that only 74.64% of current 
inputs is needed to produce the same level of output or that the current level of inputs 
could have been used to produce an output 1.34 times (i.e., 1/0.7464) the current 
output level; implying overall technical inefficiency of 34% (i.e., 1.34 less 1). 
The mean CRS technical efficiency for the HICs (0.8895) and OECD 
countries (0.8691) are higher than the overall average, indicating that countries in 
these two categories have better efficiency performance than the average firm in the 
panel dataset. The mean CRS technical efficiency score for the sample of countries 
in MICs (0.6331) is lower and highlights technical inefficiency in MICs. While these 
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findings confirm inefficiencies in all categories of countries, HICs are 1.4 times more 
efficient than MICs in that they would require 88.95% of current inputs to produce 
the same level of output whereas MICs would require 63.31%. The mean CRS 
technical efficiency score for Canada is 0.7960 and for Nigeria is 0.5062. This 
suggests that both countries were inefficient in the period of study, but Canada is 
closer to the best performing frontier than Nigeria. For Canada, the score reveals that 
the industry could utilize 79.6% of current input to produce the same amount of 
output (i.e., reduce inputs by 20.4%) or utilize the current level of inputs to produce 
an output that is 1.26 times (i.e., 1/0.7960) the current output level. This is 
tantamount to a CRS technical inefficiency of 26% (i.e., 1.26 less 1). The mean CRS 
technical efficiency score of 0.5062 in Nigeria indicates that it could double its 
output level using the current level of inputs, signifying a CRS technical inefficiency 
of 98%. A remarkable feature of DEA is that it allows for peer comparison and 
identifies role models for inefficient DMUs. Under CRS technical efficiency the five 
countries that serve as peers for others are HICs: South Korea (for Brazil, Mexico 
and Turkey), Belgium (for Chile, Mexico and Turkey), New Zealand (for Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Germany, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and the UK), 
Japan (for Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Mexico, South Africa and the UK), the US (for Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and the UK). Interestingly, Australia which is 
marginally inefficient could become efficient with a slight reduction in inputs or an 
increase in outputs and learn from New Zealand, Japan and the US. These three 
countries also serve as role models for Canada which is distinctively inefficient; but 
only New Zealand and the US) are role models for Nigeria. 
Constant returns to scale allows comparability of telecommunications 
industries in different countries irrespective of the size. However, the assumption of 
scale flexibility and adjustment typical under constant returns to scale may not hold 
if firms operate at suboptimal scales due to organizational (e.g., financial constraints) 
and non-organizational (e.g., imperfect competition) factors (Hung & Lu, 2007). To 
remove the impact of scale, the DEA efficiency was determined under variable 
returns to scale imposition to generate the VRS technical efficiency scores. The VRS 
technical efficiency scores reflect pure technical efficiency and reveals any 
inefficiencies relating to underperformance of management in allocating productive 
inputs (Kumar & Gulati, 2008). Exploring the VRS technical efficiency scores allow 
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the industry in each country to be compared to those similar in size but it increases 
the potential for a handful that are large to display efficiency due to lack of peers 
(Kumar, 2013). Figure 6.4 shows the VRS technical efficiency trends. Additionally, 
consistent with Sharma et al. (2010) and Gokgoz & Demir (2014) who examined 
performance under constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale, the 
observations in Table 6.5 reveal that the variable returns to scale generated efficiency 
scores that are greater than or equal to the constant returns to scale efficiency scores. 
 
 
Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.4: VRS technical efficiency trends. 
 
The VRS technical efficiency trend in Canada increased from 0.701 in 2001 
to 0.7938 in 2013, although there was a decline in trend in 2008 (Figure 6.4; 
Appendix 2B). The VRS technical efficiency trend in Nigeria varied widely with an 
indication of a decline from 1 in 2001 to 0.6164 in 2013 (Appendix 2B). 
Furthermore, Table 6.5 reveals four countries are efficient under VRS technical 
efficiency with each displaying a score of 1. It consists of the three countries that 
were efficient under constant returns to scale and Germany. Furthermore, five 
countries (i.e., Australia, Japan, Kenya, South Korea and the UK) though not 
efficient exhibited an average VRS technical efficiency score greater than 0.9 
(Appendix 2B). The marginal inefficiency in these countries suggests each may have 
attained efficiency status by making slight adjustments to how productive inputs are 
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used. The overall mean VRS technical efficiency score for the panel dataset is 0.8223 
and is 110% of the average CRS technical efficiency score. This indicates 22% 
inefficiency in that current inputs could have been used to produce outputs that are 
1.22 times (i.e., 1/0.8223) the current output level. HICs and OECD countries 
showed average VRS technical efficiency scores higher than 0.9. Nonetheless, both 
categories displayed inefficiency of 7% and 9.9%, respectively, and could have 
generated more outputs from current level of inputs. The mean VRS technical 
efficiency score in MICs (0.6967) is lower in comparison to HICs (0.9346), OECD 
countries (0.9097) and the overall average (0.8223) (Table 6.5). The average MICs 
could have produced the current output with only 69.7% of current inputs, suggesting 
44% inefficiency as it could have produced outputs that are 1.44 times the current 
levels without having to increase inputs. The telecommunications industry in Kenya 
exhibited mean VRS technical efficiency score of 0.9290 and is the highest among 
MICs while India (0.4761) is the lowest. Nigeria (0.6164) is near the middle, 
implying an inefficiency of 62% (i.e., 1.62 less 1). The industry in Nigeria could 
have produced current outputs with only 61.64% of inputs or output should have 
been 1.62 times (i.e., 1/0.6164) what it produced given the current level of inputs. 
During the study period, a second national carrier entered the industry in Nigeria and 
interconnection rules in favour of new entrants were implemented. However, the 
uncertainties created may have caused managers of firms in the industry to make 
suboptimal decisions that resulted in the exhibited inefficiencies. Additionally, 
Appendix 2B shows the VRS technical efficiency score of 0.8022 in the Canadian 
telecommunications industry is below the average displayed by each country in HICs 
except Chile, suggesting it could have reduced inputs by 19.8% or it could have 
produced an output that is 1.25 times (i.e., 1/0.8022) the current output levels, 
indicating an inefficiency of 25% (i.e., 1.25 less 1). Delineating the nature of 
inefficiency in the Canadian telecommunications industry, the CRS and VRS 
technical efficiency scores show that within the period of this study the Canadian 
telecommunications industry is distinctly inefficient (CRS TE < 1; VRS TE < 0.9), 
signifying it could not have attained efficiency in the short term with slight 
modifications of productive inputs (Demirag et al., 2010). Like Canada, Chile 
consistently displayed a distinctly inefficient status. But Germany is unique in that it 
was marginally efficient (CRS TE < 1; VRS TE = 1) in 2001 and ran the risk of 
becoming inefficient if there was a slight increase in input or a slight change in 
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output. However, since 2002 it has been robustly efficient (CRS TE = 1; VRS TE = 
1). Unlike Germany, South Korea was robustly efficient in 2001 (CRS = 1; VRS = 1) 
but relapsed to marginally efficient status (CRS TE < 1; VRS TE = 1) in 2002 and 
2003, declined further to marginally inefficient status (CRS TE < 1; 0.9 < VRS TE < 
1) in 2004, regained marginally efficient status between 2005 and 2007 but has 
continued to display a marginally inefficient status since 2008 (Appendices 2A and 
2B). South Korea‟s marginally inefficient status signals it could attain efficiency 
status by slightly reducing inputs or by slightly increasing outputs. The experience of 
Japan is similar to that of South Korea. However, the difference is that Japan has 
been able to attain and maintain robustly efficient status (CRS TE = 1; VRS TE = 1) 
since 2010. Other countries in the HICs that were marginally inefficient but became 
robustly efficient include the UK in 2013 and Australia. But Australia has not been 
consistent in that it was robustly efficient from 2010 to 2012 but regressed to 
marginally efficient status in 2013 (Appendices 2A and 2B). 
Nigeria reveals marginally efficient status in 2001 (CRS TE < 1; VRS TE = 
1), indicating it could have become inefficient with a slight increase in inputs or a 
slight decline in output. Nonetheless, deterioration in efficiency after 2001 shows the 
industry in a marginally inefficient status in 2002 (CRS TE < 1; 0.9 < VRS TE < 1) 
and it has remained distinctly inefficient since 2003 (CRS TE < 1; VRS TE < 0.9) 
(Appendices 2A and 2B). Like Canada, the distinctly inefficient status implies that 
the industry would have difficulty in becoming efficient in the short term through 
slight modifications in inputs. Aside from Kenya, all other MICs are distinctly 
inefficient. Surprisingly, Mexico is an OECD country but it is categorized in MICs 
and its efficiency performance in 2013 is superior to Canada‟s. Both are North 
American countries, but Canada‟s performance in 2013 lags behind Mexico and the 
US (Appendices 2A and 2B). Among MICs, Brazil is the best performer under CRS 
technical efficiency while Kenya is the best performer under VRS technical 
efficiency. However, unlike Brazil, Kenya attained distinctively efficient status in 
2012. 
Although the telecommunications industries in Canada and Nigeria are 
distinctly inefficient, it is important to note that the Canadian telecommunications 
industry experienced growth in CRS and VRS technical efficiency scores whereas 
the Nigerian telecommunications industry experienced growth in CRS technical 
efficiency but a decline in VRS technical efficiency (Figure 6.4; Appendices 2A and 
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2B). This observation may be because VRS technical efficiency ignores scale impact 
and compares the telecommunications industries in the two countries (i.e. Canada 
and Nigeria) to those of comparable sizes in the panel dataset rather than to all 
countres in the sample. VRS technical efficiency provides information on the 
effectiveness of management. Thus, its decline in Nigeria signifies deteriorating 
managerial effectiveness. Another finding is that the mean CRS and VRS technical 
efficiency in Canada is higher than in Nigeria; an observation attributable to using 
less inputs and better managerial acumen. 
The mean efficiency scores in this research show HICs possess better 
efficiency performance than MICs. This finding is consistent with Gokgoz & Demir 
(2014) analysis of the efficiency of European telecommunications sector in 32 
countries that indicated that telecommunications industries in high income countries 
in Europe displayed efficiency scores superior to those in low and middle income 
countries. Nonetheless, while Gokgoz & Demir (2014) data reveals decline in mean 
efficiency over the two years of study focus, this research finds an increase in the 
overall mean efficiency of the 19 countries. The difference in findings could be 
because Demir & Gokgoz (2014) examined the industry over a shorter period (i.e., 
two years) while this research examined the industry over a longer period (i.e., 13 
years) which is appropriate in DEA studies (Li, 2009). Additionally, peer 
comparisons under VRS technical efficiency were examined. The result shows six 
countries as peers to others and one of them is MICs. Belgium (for Australia), Japan 
(for Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and 
Turkey), Kenya (for Canada, Chile, Indonesia and South Africa), New Zealand (for 
Australia, Canada, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and 
Turkey), South Korea (for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey) and the US (for Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Indonesia and South Africa). While Canada has four countries as 
peers it could learn from to address any inefficiency caused by pure technical 
efficiency, Nigeria has no peers, signifying it would have difficulty finding a role 
model it could learn from to eliminate pure technical inefficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 
Table 6.5: Mean estimate of CRS TE, VRS TE and SE. 
 
CRS TE VRS TE SE 
Australia 0.9038 0.9462 0.9532 
Belgium 1 1 1 
Brazil 0.8159 0.8630 0.9472 
Canada 0.7960 0.8022 0.9924 
Chile 0.5860 0.6654 0.8830 
China 0.4785 0.5208 0.9202 
Germany 0.9852 1 0.9852 
India 0.4650 0.4761 0.9755 
Indonesia 0.5785 0.6103 0.9475 
Japan 0.9450 0.9732 0.9712 
Kenya 0.6544 0.9290 0.6800 
Mexico 0.7370 0.7594 0.9690 
New Zealand 1 1 1 
Nigeria 0.5062 0.6164 0.8516 
South Africa 0.6653 0.6922 0.9591 
South Korea 0.8945 0.9640 0.9278 
Turkey 0.7972 0.8111 0.9826 
United Kingdom 0.7844 0.9955 0.7888 
United States 1 1 1 
HICs 0.8895 0.9346 0.9502 
MICs 0.6331 0.6976 0.9147 
OECD 0.8691 0.9097 0.9544 
All Countries 0.7464 0.8223 0.9334 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
Scale efficiency is used to determine whether efficiency is affected by scale 
size, indicating an efficiency increase could be attained by moving to a technically 
optimal productive scale (i.e., the most productive scale size, MPSS) (Coelli et al., 
2005, p. 59). A DMU is scale efficient if CRS technical efficiency equals VRS 
technical efficiency but scale inefficient if CRS technical efficiency is less than VRS 
technical efficiency. Scale inefficiency may mean a DMU‟s size is too large and has 
difficulty allocating inputs effectively. This situation requires decreasing returns to 
scale in which case the firm will benefit from operational scale size reductions 
because increasing inputs will result in a less than proportionate increase in the 
output level. Scale inefficiency could also occur if a DMU is too small an operation 
than its productive size indicates. This situation requires increasing returns to scale in 
that it would benefit from size increase because an increased inputs will result in a 
higher than proportionate increase in outputs. To determine the returns to scale 
status, the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) is generally imposed to yield the 
returns to scale status for the DMU which could fall under categories that include 
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CRS, IRS or DRS (Coelli et al., 2005). While a scale efficiency value of 1 is 
categorized as CRS (i.e., MPSS), the scale efficiency yields decreasing returns to 
scale (DRS) if the NIRS technical efficiency is equal to VRS technical efficiency and 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) otherwise (Hung & Lu, 2007). 
Figure 6.5 shows that the trend in mean scale efficiency scores for all 
countries increased in the study period. Appendix 2C shows the mean scores for each 
year for the categories of countries and scale efficiency scores for each country. 
Three countries (i.e., Belgium, New Zealand and the US) are scale efficient as each 
displayed mean scale efficiency score of 1, the remaining countries are scale 
inefficient, indicating they operated at an inappropriate scale and would benefit from 
scale adjustment (Appendix 2C). Of the remaining 16 scale inefficient countries, 
Australia, Canada, China and South Korea experienced a decline in scale efficiency 
as their scale efficiency in 2013 was less than what it was in 2001, providing a hint 
that scale inefficiency is increasingly contributing to the technical inefficiencies in 
these countries and that the industry in the four countries is moving farther away 
from MPSS. Surprisingly, three of the four countries with deteriorating scale 
efficiency are HICs. The remaining 12 scale inefficient countries experienced scale 
improvement in the study period. This creates the impression that the contribution of 
scale inefficiency to technical inefficiency in these countries is declining and that the 
industry in these countries gravitated towards MPSS during the study period; 
signifying improved efficiency attainment in the 12 countries as the scale impact 
diminished. 
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Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
Figure 6.5: Scale efficiency trends. 
 
 
To decipher the nature of scale inefficiency, the non-increasing returns to 
scale was imposed to yield the true nature of the returns to scale. However, it is 
worth mentioning that a DMU‟s returns to scale  is dependent on the position of 
efficient DMU and that changes in an efficient DMU‟s position may change the 
returns to scale (Seiford & Zhu, 1999). Appendix 2D shows that in 2001 the 
telecommunications industry in most countries experienced diseconomies of scale as 
10 of the 19 countries (52.6%) were under increasing returns to scale which indicates 
that increasing input would result in a more than proportionate increase in output and 
that size increase would benefit the industry. This suggests that firms in the industry 
could liaise with others and engage in mergers and acquisitions or patronize other 
forms of collaboration on projects and network infrastructure sharing that would 
result in expanded operational scale and improved efficiency performance (Glynn & 
Tymburski, 2010). Nonetheless, this research does not promote this strategy because 
the number of countries exhibiting increasing returns to scale diminished to four 
(21%) in 2013 and slightly more than half (52.6%) of the countries displayed MPSS 
in 2013. Three countries displayed decreasing returns to scale in 2001, by 2013 the 
number increased to five; two (i.e., Australia and UK) of the three (i.e., Australia, 
Germany and UK) that exhibited decreasing returns to scale in 2001 were among the 
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five that showed decreasing returns to scale in 2013. The findings that countries 
under decreasing returns to scale increased from three in 2001 to five in 2013 
indicates that more firms are becoming scale inefficient due to being too large. This 
suggests that increasing inputs results in a less than proportionate increase in outputs 
for these countries and that they would benefit from operational size decrease. As 
size decrease and downsizing is expected through a reduction of offices/service 
centres and rationalization of human resources, any consolidation that would result in 
size increase of existing large telecommunications firms in the industry could be 
subjected to rigorous review by the regulatory agencies. 
Furthermore, while Canada‟s scale efficiency diminished slightly, it increased 
in Nigeria from 45% in 2001 to 99.5% in 2013 (Appendix 2C), showing that the 
Nigerian telecommunications industry benefitted scale-wise from operating in the 
deregulated environment more than the Canadian telecommunications industry, 
although its mean scale efficiency of 0.8516 is less than Canada‟s average of 0.9924 
(Table 6.5). Both countries have similar returns to scale and exhibited increasing 
returns to scale in most of the years. Nigeria reached MPSS in 2013, providing a hint 
at the difficulty attaining MPSS through operational size increase. It suffices to say 
that the motivation for size increase may be dampened by regulatory authority that 
may be unwilling to issue new spectrum licenses or to allow mergers and 
acquisitions if it is perceived that doing so would limit competition. Also, the level of 
existing competition, declining average revenue per subscriber and unfavourable 
macroeconomic conditions may impact on operational scale decisions. 
In addition to the display of increasing returns to scale, the scale inefficiency 
in both countries seemed to occur in years when the industry was technically 
inefficient. This finding contradicts Moreno, Lozano, & Gutierrez (2013) who 
claimed that no relationship exists between scale and efficiency. However it is 
consistent with Sung (2012) and Naimy & Merheb (2014) who affirm the 
relationship between scale and efficiency and reported inefficient operators operate 
below MPSS. Furthermore, the mean scale efficiency score of 0.9924 in Canada is 
closer to 1 but reflects scale inefficiency of 0.77% (1/0.9924 less 1), indicating that 
technical inefficiency in Canada is caused mostly by pure technical inefficiency with 
a minute contribution from scale inefficiency. This finding implies that technical 
inefficiency in Canada is mostly the result of managerial inefficiency. Hence, 
improved efforts concentrating on enhancing management capacity would steer the 
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industry towards better efficiency in the short term. The mean scale efficiency score 
of 0.8516 in Nigeria indicates that it could increase efficiency by 14.8% if it were to 
increase its scale of operation to MPSS. Also, it is an indication of scale inefficiency 
of 17.4% (1/0.8516 less 1) which is 23 times the scale inefficiency in Canada. This 
finding suggests that the technical inefficiency in the Nigerian telecommunications 
industry is jointly caused by scale inefficiency and pure technical inefficiency and 
that addressing the technical inefficiency will necessitate a long-term focus as the 
industry would require a combination of scale increase and enhanced managerial 
capabilities. However, while it could learn from New Zealand and the US to improve 
technical efficiency, it would have difficulty identifying an appropriate role model to 
learn from in order to eliminate the pure technical inefficiency in the 
telecommunications industry. 
Following the observation of increasing returns to scale in most years for 
Canada and Nigeria (Appendix 2D), their returns to scale peers were examined. The 
result shows that the countries that serve as peers are from HICs: Belgium (for 
Australia, Chile, Mexico and Turkey), Japan (for Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey), New Zealand 
(for Australia, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa), South 
Korea (for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey) and the US (for Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa). While Canada has three countries (Japan, New 
Zealand and the US) as peers, these countries were earlier identified as its role 
models for correcting the technical inefficiency. Two countries (New Zealand and 
the US) that serve as peers for Nigeria in rectifying the technical inefficiency are also 
its returns to scale peers. This result suggests that if Canada and Nigeria were to 
work together to explore opportunities for improving their telecommunications 
industries, it would be appropriate for them to involve either New Zealand or US or 
both.  
 
6.5.2 DEA sensitivity analysis 
To evaluate if a change in input and/or output will greatly influence the 
efficiency scores, two sensitivity analyses were performed on the DEA model. The 
first (Model 1) assessed the sensitivity of the original DEA model to input reduction 
involving the removal of employment as an input variable. The second evaluated the 
sensitivity of the original DEA model to output change and entailed deleting 
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teledensity as an output variable (Model 2). The results in Appendix 2F show 
efficiency estimates that are comparable to the original DEA results (Table 6.5). The 
overall average efficiency scores did not change by much. Also, the efficiency scores 
for the two countries of focus (i.e., Canada and Nigeria), HICs, MICs and OECD 
member countries are comparable to the original DEA model. The relative stability 
of the CRS technical efficiency, VRS technical efficiency, and scale efficiency 
suggests that the original DEA model produced consistent estimate of the efficiency 
scores. 
 
6.5.3 Productivity analysis 
The productivity analysis carried out in this research provides information on 
changes in productivity and identifies which of the two countries (i.e., Canada and 
Nigeria) is making progress. Using productivity change is appropriate and has been 
applied in studies involving comparative analyses across two or more countries (e.g., 
Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita, 2004; Petrović et al., 2012). To determine productivity 
change for each country in the panel dataset, DEA-based MPI was used with variable 
returns to scale imposed. Unlike the constant returns to scale assumption that yields 
information on technical change and efficiency change but no details about the 
sources of the efficiency change, imposing variable returns to scale decomposes 
efficiency change into pure technical efficiency change (PTEC) and scale efficiency 
change (SEC). The MPI is greater than 1 if productivity increases, less than 1 if it 
declines, and equal to 1 if no productivity change occurs (Margaritis, Fare & 
Grosskpf, 2007). 
Table 6.6 reveals the mean technical change (TC), efficiency change (EC) 
and total factor productivity change (TFPC) and the decomposition of efficiency 
change into pure technical efficiency change (PTEC) and scale efficiency change 
(SEC). The table shows that TFPC is 1.0569 for the sample of countries in the study 
period. While total factor productivity declined in four of the periods, it increased 
overall (Figure 6.6). The total factor productivity change of 1.0569 signifies 5.7% 
(1.0569 less 1 times 100) per year growth in total factor productivity. In addition, the 
table indicates mean efficiency change of 1.0572 (5.7% increase per year) and mean 
technical change of 1.0009 (0.09% increase per year), signifying that technical 
change stagnated and that the major source of productivity growth was efficiency 
improvements or that there was „catching up‟ (i.e., convergence towards efficiency) 
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(Hu & Chu, 2008, p. 230). This finding also suggests that for the sample of countries 
in the study, it is easier to leverage efficiency improvement measures than it is to 
engage in innovation to attain improved productivity. In decomposing the sources of 
the efficiency change for the sample, Table 6.6 shows the mean pure technical 
efficiency change and scale efficiency change are 1.0357 and 1.0208 respectively, 
showing that pure technical efficiency change contributed more to the efficiency 
improvements than scale efficiency change. This implies that efficiency 
improvement was attained through managerial effectiveness. Similar observations 
were noted in all of the categories of countries. 
 
Table 6.6: Mean estimate of TC, SEC, PTEC and TFPG. 
 
TC EC SEC PTEC TFPG 
Australia 1.0132 0.9837 0.9698 1.0144 0.9963 
Belgium 1.0000 1.0049 1.0049 1.0000 1.0049 
Brazil 1.0099 1.0163 1.0144 1.0018 1.0331 
Canada 1.0047 1.0129 1.0010 1.0120 1.0181 
Chile 0.9471 1.1157 1.0684 1.0442 1.0398 
China 1.0524 0.9933 0.9756 1.0181 1.0362 
Germany 1.0045 1.0217 1.0217 1.0000 1.0273 
India 1.0108 1.2522 1.0036 1.2478 1.2543 
Indonesia 1.0089 1.1244 1.0063 1.1174 1.1273 
Japan 1.0199 1.0016 1.0003 1.0013 1.0220 
Kenya 0.9697 1.1960 1.1810 1.0127 1.2104 
Mexico 1.0133 1.0552 0.9996 1.0556 1.0667 
New Zealand 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Nigeria 0.9689 1.1228 1.1087 1.0127 1.0809 
South Africa 0.9768 1.0743 1.0087 1.0650 1.0389 
South Korea 1.0086 0.9851 0.9862 0.9989 0.9935 
Turkey 1.0086 1.0773 1.0008 1.0765 1.0879 
United Kingdom 0.9997 1.0442 1.0439 1.0003 1.0433 
United States 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
HICs 0.9998 1.0168 1.0096 1.0071 1.0145 
MICs 1.0022 1.1029 1.0332 1.0675 1.1040 
OECD 1.0016 1.0251 1.0080 1.0169 1.0250 
All Countries 1.0009 1.0572 1.0208 1.0357 1.0569 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
India displayed the highest total factor productivity growth (25.4% per year) 
which was attained through 25.2% per year efficiency improvement (EC: 1.2522) 
and 1.1% per year technological progress (TC: 1.0108). The source of the two digits 
growth in efficiency change was pure technical efficiency change (1.2478) and scale 
efficiency change (1.0036), but the contributions from pure technical efficiency 
 151 
change (PTEC: 24.8% per year) surpassed operational scale improvement (SEC: 
0.04% per year). Hence, the efficiency improvement was mostly due to improved 
managerial capabilities and effectiveness in making rational decisions. Indonesia 
(1.1273) and Kenya (1.2104) are two other countries with double digits total factor 
productivity growth. However, while Indonesia displayed characteristics similar to 
India, Kenya attained total factor productivity growth through efficiency 
improvements in spite of a 3% per year retardation in technical change, suggesting 
inadequate Capex on technological innovations with potential impact on future 
productivity of labour and capital. Unlike India and Indonesia, the source of 
efficiency change in Kenya was mostly  operational scale improvement. Two 
countries (i.e., Australia and South Korea) experienced total factor productivity 
regress due to efficiency deteorioration. Inefficient scale caused efficiency 
deterioration in Australia but managerial ineffectiveness and inefficient scale were 
responsible for the efficiency decline in South Korea (Table 6.6). 
Four countries (Chile: 0.9471, Kenya: 0.9697, Nigeria: 0.9689 and South 
Africa: 0.9768) experienced technological regression, while two countries (Belgium: 
1; the US: 1) had no technological change. Together, these six countries represent 
32% of the countries in the sample. The remaining 13 countries experienced 
technical change progression. However, some (Canada: 1.0047, Germany, 1.0045, 
Indonesia: 1.0089 and South Korea: 1.0086) had marginal improvements. The 
occurrence of technical change decline, no growth and/or marginal increase suggests 
difficulty in achieving total factor productivity growth through technology in most of 
the countries in the study period and may have been spurred by the increase in 
competition in the industry (GSMA, 2013). Also, the high costs associated with 
innovation through research and development or Capex relating to adopting new 
technologies and the impact on financial results may have played a role. However, as 
noted in GSMA (2013), an industry that invests in innovative technologies may 
broaden its customer base by delivering existing products and services to more 
customers cheaper and/or delivering new products to customers. The mean efficiency 
change for each country reveals three countries (i.e., Australia, China and South 
Korea) experienced efficiency change decline and the remaining 16 countries 
experienced efficiency change of at least 1. The deterioration in efficiency change in 
Australia and China were the result of inappropriate scale while for South Korea it 
was due to managerial ineffectiveness and inappropriate scale. 
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Appendix 2E shows that four countries (i.e., Belgium, Germany, New 
Zealand and the US) displayed no decline in mean technical change, efficiency 
change and total factor productivity growth in each of the period of study. Countries 
that experienced regression in technical change but were able to augment total factor 
productivity growth through efficiency enhancement are Chile, Kenya, South Africa 
and UK. However, the caveat is that for total factor productivity growth to accrue, 
efficiency improvement should be large enough to absorb retardation in technical 
change. Without this, total factor productivity will decline. Australia, China and 
South Korea are interesting in that they experienced efficiency change deterioration. 
However, China attained total factor productivity growth through technological 
progress and the cases of Australia (TC: 1.0132; EC: 0.9837) and South Korea (TC: 
1.0086; EC: 0.9850) show it is possible for total factor productivity to decline if 
growth from technical change does not sufficiently accommodate deterioration in 
efficiency (Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita, 2004). The total factor productivity decline in 
Australia and South Korea may suggest diminishing labour productivity and capital 
productivity relative to other countries in the panel dataset. The major revelations are 
that while it is desirable to pursue productivity increases through a combination of 
efficiency improvements and technological innovation, it is not impossible to attain 
productivity growth by focusing only on efficiency improvement measures or on 
innovation. This finding is consistent with Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita (2004) who 
presented evidence of either efficiency change or technical change or both having an 
impact on total factor productivity growth in a study of telecommunications industry 
productivity in 39 countries in Africa, Asia–Pacific, Europe and the Americas. 
Canada‟s total factor productivity growth of 1.0181 is greater than the mean 
for HICs (1.0145) but less than the overall mean of 1.0569 (5.7% per year). 
Conversely, Nigeria‟s mean of 1.0809 is less than the average for MICs (1.1040) but 
greater than the 1.0569 overall mean for all countries in the study. This observation 
suggests that Canada‟s total factor productivity growth performance is better than the 
average country in HICs and that while Nigeria‟s total factor productivity growth 
lags behind the average country in MICs, it seemed to have outperformed Canada. 
Furthermore, Table 6.6 shows Canada‟s mean technical change (TC: 1.0047) and 
efficiency change (EC: 1.0129) and signals that total factor productivity growth 
occurred due to improvements in technical and efficiency change but that the 
contribution from efficiency change is greater. However, the technical change trend 
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shown in Figure 6.6 reveals technological regression in 8 of the 12 periods while 
efficiency change deteriorated in 6 of the 12 periods. The decomposition of the 
sources of 1.29% (1.0129 less 1 times 100) per year efficiency improvements, 
indicates scale improvement (SEC: 1.0010) and managerial effectiveness (PTEC: 
1.0120) played a role, but the the efficiency growth was mainly due to enhanced 
managerial capability (Table 6.6). The result of productivity growth in Canada 
indicates efficiency improvement as the main source of productivity growth. This 
observation mirrors the overall source of productivity for the panel dataset and 
harmonizes with Li (2009) who applied stochastic frontier analysis and data 
envelopment analysis in the study of efficiency and the total factor productivity of 22 
mobile telecommunications firms in seven countries from 1995 to 2007. Similar to 
this research, the results in Li‟s study show efficiency change and technical change 
contributed to total factor productivity growth but the contribution from efficiency 
change is greater. However, it is inconsistent with Calabrese, Campsi, & Mancuso 
(2002) who investigated telecommunicatons industry productivity change in 13 
OECD countries and found that efficiency change and technical change contributed 
to total factor productivity growth but identified technical change as the main source 
of the growth. The difference in outcome may be related to the proxy for capital 
inputs. Calabese, Campsi, & Mancuso (2002) used number of lines to proxy capital 
input while this research applied Capex. However, Coelli et al. (2005) relate that 
investment which Capex reflects is more appropriate proxy for capital inputs if the 
focus of the study is to measure productivity growth. 
In the case of Nigeria, Table 6.6 reveals technological retardation of 3.1% per 
year (TC: 0.9689) but 12.3% per year improvement in efficiency (EC: 1.1228), 
suggesting that the total factor productivity growth of 8.1% per year (TFPG: 1.0809) 
was mainly due to efficiency improvement. The decline in technical change signals 
technological retardation is an issue in the industry and may indicate 
underinvestment or that the industry is yet to realize gains from existing investment. 
Furthermore, the trends in scale efficiency change and pure technical efficiency 
change shown in Figures 6.9 and 6.10 reveal more varied scale efficiency change and 
pure technical efficiency change in Nigeria than in Canada. However, the mean scale 
efficiency change of 1.1087 and pure technical efficiency change of 1.0127 are 
higher than that of Canada (Table 6.6). The decomposition of efficiency change 
indicates 10.87% per year scale improvement and 1.27% per year improvement in 
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managerial effectiveness, implying that efficiency improvement was due to an 
enhanced operational scale with little contribution from better managerial acumen. 
The finding for Nigeria is similar to Li (2009) and Moshi, Mwakatumbula & Mitomo 
(2013). However, while similar to Li (2009) in identifying efficiency change as the 
source of total factor productivity growth, it differs from Moshi, Mwakatumbula & 
Mitomo (2013) who studied productivity growth of telecommunications firms in 
Africa and noted technical change as the main source of total factor productivity 
growth. The variation between Moshi, Mwakatumbula & Mitomo (2013) and this 
research may be related to differences in focus. It may also highlight the observation 
in a comparative study of European telecommunications by Dabler, Parker, & Saal 
(2002) that presented mixed evidence of sources of productivity. Nonetheless, the 
result in this research is congruent with Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita (2004) who 
investigated telecommunications industry productivity growth in Africa, Asia–
Pacific, the Americas and Europe. While the study acknowledges differences in 
productivity pattern in the countries studied, it concludes that technical change was 
the main cause of the overall decline in total factor productivity, suggesting that 
efficiency change rather than technical change was the driver of total factor 
productivity growth. 
 
 
 
   Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
   Figure 6.6: Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications TFPG. 
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   Source(s): Developed by the author for this research h 
   Figure 6.7: Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications industry technical change. 
 
 
 
 
   Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
   Figure 6.8: Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications industry efficiency     
          change. 
 
 
 
 
   Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
   Figure 6.9: Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications industry pure technical     
                     efficiency change.  
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   Source(s): Developed by the author for this research 
   Figure 6.10: Canadian and Nigerian telecommunications industry scale efficiency  
                       change.  
 
 
6.6 Mann-Whitney test of efficiency and productivity scores 
Mann-Whitney test, also considered Wilcoxon Rank-sum test (Fan & Datta, 
2013), was conducted to test the null hypothesis that no statistical difference exists in 
the performances of the industry in the two countries with Canada as country 1 and 
Nigeria as country 2 at 95% confidence interval (i.e., 5% significance level). The 
results of the comparison of the CRS technical efficiency shows a higher mean rank 
for Canada (19.77 vs. 7.23) and it is statistically significant (p value < 0.05) which 
indicates that the Canadian telecommunications industry attained better CRS 
technical efficiency scores. Also, the test was ran for the VRS technical efficiency 
and indicates a higher mean rank for Canada (16.77 vs. 10.23) and the p value of 
0.029 (p value < 0.05) implies the VRS technical efficiency score of the industry in 
Canada is higher than in Nigeria. In addition, Mann-Whitney test was conducted on 
the scale efficiency and the tests produced a higher mean value for Canada (18.23 vs. 
8.77) and an exact p value of 0.01 which is less than 0.05 indicates that the industry‟s 
operational scale differs and that Canada displayed better operational scale. 
Furthermore, the test was performed on the total factor productivity growth results. 
The mean rank for Canada (12.42) is less than Nigeria (12.58) but the the p value of 
0.977 in two-tail (p value > 0.05) implies that the null hypothesis that there is no 
statistical difference between the total factor productivity growth results could not be 
rejected. The conclusion is that Nigeria seem to display slightly higher average total 
factor productivity growth than Canada, there is no statistically significant difference 
in the total factor productivity growth performance of the two countries. 
0
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6.7 Second stage Tobit regression results 
Random effect (RE) panel Tobit model was applied to avoid incorrect 
estimate of the influence of environmental factors. According to Ramalho, Ramalho, 
& Henriques (2010) and Karagiannis (2015), the use of Tobit model  was first 
introduced in Ray (1991) and has become the standard approach used to generate a 
model that corrects efficiency scores for environmental factors (Coelli et al., 2005). 
The DEA efficiency analysis was presented in Section 6.5.1. However, it is possible 
that firms strove to enhance performances but were constrained by environmental 
factors. Evaluating the effect of environmental factors on technical and scale 
efficiency performance provides better insight on efficiency drivers. The correlation 
of dependent variables (i.e., CRS TE, VRS TE and SE) and explanatory variables are 
presented in Appendices 3A–3C. Each appendix indicates that all of the explanatory 
variables have a low correlation between of +0.7 and -0.7 and is consistent with the 
recommendation in Anderson et al. (2014, p. 703) and the suggestion in Choi & 
Zhang (2011).  The results of Tobit regression analysis with specified left censoring 
limit of 0, right censoring limit of 1 and 95% confidence level are presented in 
Tables 6.7A-6.7C. Parameters with positive signs improve efficiency performance 
while those with negative signs detract efficiency. The regression parameters for the 
CRS technical efficiency scores are presented Table 6.7A, and the regression 
parameters for VRS technical efficiency and scale efficiency scores are presented in 
Table 6.7B and Table 6.7C.  
The proxy for the number of yeard in deregulation is NYRS. This measure 
has a negative and statistically insignificant influence on CRS technical efficiency 
(p-value = 0.165; > 0.05) (Table 6.7A), VRS technical efficiency (p value = 0.182; > 
0.05) (Table 6.7B) and scale efficiency (p value = 0.373; > 0.05) (Table 6.7C). The 
observation that NYRS has negative and insignificant influence on technical and 
scale efficiencies is contrary to the notion of efficiency improvement over time 
reported in Li and Xu (2004) and Karamti & Kammoun (2011). The finding indicates 
that the number of years in deregulation has little to do with efficiency performance 
and that over time the efficiency of the industry will fluctuate irrespective of the 
number of years it has been deregulated. The fluctuation in efficiency is the outcome 
of the industry‟s response to regulatory policies and changes in operating 
environment. As the operating environment changes, the industry will require time to 
adjust its operational size and reorganize productive inputs, causing fluctuations in 
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technical and scale efficiencies over time. RevSub, which reflects financial viability 
positively influence CRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Table 6.7A) 
and VRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Table 6.7B) and the 
coefficient is statistically significant. Also, its effect on scale efficiency is positive 
and significant (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Table 6.7C) This finding indicates that 
higher RevSub enhances technical and scale efficiency performance and 
substantiates Li & Xu (2004) who noted that lower prices are disincentives for firms 
in the industry to invest in infrastructure which in turn diminishes efficiency. 
Furthermore, the findings imply that the telecommunications industry with rising 
RevSub would exhibit better technical efficiency and enhanced Scale.  
HHI, which is indicative of the structure of the industry, has a positive but not 
statistically significant effect on CRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.781; > 0.05) 
(Table 6.7A) but negative and insignificant relationship with VRS technical 
efficiency (p value = 0.520; > 0.05) (Table 6.7B). Its impact on scale efficiency is 
positive and not statistically significant (p-value = 0.686; > 0.05) (Table 6.7C). The 
statistically insignificant relationship between HHI and efficiency performance 
seems to suggest that the level of concentration in the telecommunications industries 
does not influence technical efficiency and scale performance. The positive but not 
significant relationship between HHI and efficiency performance in this research 
contradicts Li & Price (2011) who indicated a significant and positive relationship 
between efficiency and level of competition. The difference in findings could be 
related to the narrow focus (i.e., the mobile sector) in Li & Price (2011) while this 
research has a broader focus. It also departs from Gutierrez (2003) who uses a partial 
measure of performance (i.e., subscriptions to employment) as efficiency instead of 
the aggregate measure applied in this research. Also, the finding is inconsistent with 
Moreno, Lozano, & Gutierrez (2013) who noted that competition detracts from 
efficiency, but their study use single input and single output in the DEA analysis and 
the Durbin Watson score of 2.083 in the multiple regression in the second stage is 
indicative of higher risk of autocorrelation although it is within the recommended 
range of 1.5 to 2.5. Nevertheless, the finding in this research harmonizes with Hu & 
Chu (2008) which shows that HHI has no significant effect on technical efficiency. It 
is plausible that HHI is not an important consideration for technical and scale 
efficiency due to regulatory barriers (e.g., licensing requirements) and firm imposed 
barriers (e.g., economies of scale, network effect, access to infrastructure etc.). In 
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spite of the increase in competition, the barriers insulate existing firms and make 
HHI less of a consideration for technical and scale efficiencies. In addition, HHI 
decreased in some years in the study period and yet the industry displayed poor 
technical and scale efficiency levels. Also, the industry exhibited increased 
concentration in other years but showed poor efficiency performances. These 
observations signify that post deregulation increase in competition and resultant price 
decline may have deterred network augmentation essential to enhancing efficiency 
performance. Nonetheless, the finding in this research does not seem to indicate that 
HHI is important to technical and scale efficiency performance. CapexRev ratio, 
which reflects the intensity of capital expenditures to revenues generated (Elmasr, 
2007),  has no significant negative influence on CRS technical efficiency (p-value = 
0.077; > 0.05) (Table 6.7A),  and a positive but not statistically significant effect on 
VRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.069; > 0.05). While Torres & Bachiller (2013) 
indicated that investment in infrastructure positively influence efficiency, the finding 
that capital intensity has no significant influence on technical efficiency aligns with 
Torres & Bachiller (2013). The insignificance of capital intensity to technical 
efficiency enhancement may be due to the reduction in capital expenditures in the 
industry when the return from investment is lower than the cost of capital. 
Furthermore, the Tobit model shows capital intensity has a statistically significant 
negative influence on scale efficiency (p value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Table 6.7C). The 
negative sign indicates that increasing capital intensity decreases scale efficiency, 
suggesting that the industry could attain scale efficiency improvement by optimising 
Capex. This does not imply underinvestment in infrastructure but full capacity 
utilization and/or avoiding infrastructure duplication by collaborating and engaging 
in infrastructure sharing and construction to reduce costs (GSMA, 2015).  
The proxy for labour productivity used in the Tobit model is SubEmp. This 
measure has a positive and significant relationship with CRS technical efficiency (p-
value = 0.0024; < 0.05) (Table 6.7A), VRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 
0.05) (Table 6.7B). On the other hand, its influence on scale efficiency is negative 
and insignificant (p-value = 0.652; > 0.05) (Table 6.7C). This implies that increased 
labour productivity drives technical efficiency performance but it is not 
consequential to operational scale enhancement. The increase in labour productivity 
in the deregulated environment is the outcome of   effective use of labour. While the 
effect of labour productivity is insignificant to scale efficiency, the finding that it has 
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negative influence on it is puzzling. It may be that with increased labour 
productivity, firms in the industry do not see the need to make scale adjustments that 
may be required to move the industry closer to the most productive scale size. 
Change in real GDP per capita (CRGDPPC) proxy economic growth. It was found to 
have a negative and insignificant effect on CRS technical efficiency (p value = 
0.257; > 0.05) (Table 6.7A), VRS technical efficiency (p value = 0.870; > 0.05) 
(Table 6.7B) and scale efficiency (p value = 0.0928; > 0.05) (Table 6.7C). The 
discovery implies that a change in real GDP per capita is irrelevant to technical and 
scale efficiency. Also, the finding indicate that telecommunications industries in 
countries with lower economic growth may display technical and scale efficiency 
levels that are similar to telecommunications industries in countries with higher 
economic growth and wealth.  However, the finding differs from Akhtar (2009) that 
suggests a negative relationship between real GDP per capital and efficiency 
performance. The difference in findings may be due to Akhtar‟s focus on allocative 
efficiency. Also, it contradicts Lemstra et al. (2014) and Li (2009) who suggest 
growth in GDP enhances technical efficiency. Nonetheless, it complements 
Bortolotti, D‟Souza, Fantini, & Megginson (2002) observation that GDP has no 
significant relationship with efficiency. The finding also aligns with Petrović et al. 
(2011) that noted uncertainty in the link between economic development and 
telecommunications industry performance and concludes that telecommunications 
industries in developing countries could perform as successful as those in 
economically developed countries. The probable explanation for CRGDPPC 
appearing to have no important effect on technical and scale efficiency is that it 
signifies a country‟s wealth (Moshi, Mwakatumba, & Mitomo, 2013; Koski & 
Kretschmer, 2007) and does not reflect income distribution and/or disposable income 
which have effects on the propensity of individuals to purchase telecommunications 
products and services (Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2014). 
The influence of CPI which is a measure of inflationary trend in an economy 
(Csipak & Zuccaro, 2014) is found to have positive and significant effect on CRS 
technical efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Table 6.7A), VRS technical efficiency 
(p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Table 6.7B) and scale efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) 
(Table 6.7C). This result shows that CPI is important to technical and scale 
efficiency but deviates from Li & Xu (2004) finding that higher CPI results in lower 
telecommunications outputs. It is possible that the higher inflation in the economy, 
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the more likely it is for prices and output to rise in the industry. Also, it may indicate 
that the industry is able to increase/decrease price at a rate higher/lower than 
inflation/deflation in the economy. The level of development (LDev) variable is 
positively associated with CRS technical efficiency but its effect is not significant (p 
value = 0.416; > 0.05). Also, it has positive but insignificant impact on VRS 
technical efficiency (p-value = 0.267; > 0.05) (Table 6.7B). On the other hand, its 
relationship with scale efficiency is negative but also statistically insignificant (p-
value = 0.739; > 0.05) (Tale 6.7C). This implies that the level of development in a 
country has unimportant influence on technical and scale efficiency of the industry. 
This outlook is inconsistent with Cabanda, Ariff, & Viverita (2004) that show 
telecommunications industries in developed countries exhibited better performance 
than those from developing countries. Nonetheless, the finding that the level of 
development does not seem to have important influence on technical efficiency and 
scale of operations suggests that telecommunications industry in developed and 
developing countries may exhibit similar levels of managerial effectiveness and 
operational scale. In some years during the study period, telecommunications 
industries in some developing countries achieved better technical and scale 
efficiency performances than their counterparts from developed countries 
(Appendices 2A, 2B, & 2C).  
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Table 6.7A: CRS technical efficiency regressed with explanatory variables 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
            69 right-censored observations
           177     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                              
         rho     .5473316   .1050245                      .3443153    .7384451
                                                                              
    /sigma_e     .1356535   .0074967    18.09   0.000     .1209602    .1503469
    /sigma_u     .1491648   .0311907     4.78   0.000     .0880322    .2102974
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1494133    .136059    -1.10   0.272     -.416084    .1172573
        LDev     .0731775   .0898803     0.81   0.416    -.1029846    .2493396
         CP1     .0071352   .0012188     5.85   0.000     .0047463    .0095241
         HHI     4.73e-06    .000017     0.28   0.781    -.0000287    .0000381
     CRGDPPC    -5.55e-06   4.90e-06    -1.13   0.257    -.0000152    4.05e-06
    CapexRev    -.0636291   .0359756    -1.77   0.077    -.1341399    .0068818
      RevSub     .0005627    .000085     6.62   0.000     .0003961    .0007292
      SubEmp     .0002076   .0000668     3.11   0.002     .0000767    .0003385
        NYRS    -.0071464   .0051523    -1.39   0.165    -.0172448     .002952
                                                                              
       CRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =  54.224432                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =     120.56
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         13
                                                              avg =       12.9
                                                              min =         12
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        246
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Table 6.7B: VRS technical efficiency regressed with explanatory variables 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
           103 right-censored observations
           143     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                              
         rho     .6658437   .0940838                      .4688361    .8251383
                                                                              
    /sigma_e     .1437862   .0089903    15.99   0.000     .1261655    .1614069
    /sigma_u     .2029684   .0422014     4.81   0.000     .1202553    .2856816
                                                                              
       _cons     .0726513   .1638663     0.44   0.658    -.2485208    .3938234
        LDev      .132396   .1193362     1.11   0.267    -.1014986    .3662906
         CP1     .0054022   .0014237     3.79   0.000     .0026117    .0081926
         HHI    -.0000131   .0000204    -0.64   0.520    -.0000532    .0000269
     CRGDPPC    -1.04e-06   6.36e-06    -0.16   0.870    -.0000135    .0000114
    CapexRev     .0767571   .0422777     1.82   0.069    -.0061057    .1596198
      RevSub     .0006007   .0001111     5.41   0.000      .000383    .0008183
      SubEmp     .0002912   .0000776     3.75   0.000     .0001391    .0004433
        NYRS     -.008101   .0060738    -1.33   0.182    -.0200054    .0038033
                                                                              
       VRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =  15.924201                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =      70.28
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         13
                                                              avg =       12.9
                                                              min =         12
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        246
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Table 6.7C: Scale efficiency regressed with explanatory variables 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
            71 right-censored observations
           175     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                              
         rho     .5862811   .1035936                      .3808713    .7700984
                                                                              
    /sigma_e     .0897652   .0050177    17.89   0.000     .0799307    .0995998
    /sigma_u     .1068584   .0222761     4.80   0.000      .063198    .1505187
                                                                              
       _cons     .6026006   .0933819     6.45   0.000     .4195754    .7856258
        LDev    -.0209656   .0628105    -0.33   0.739    -.1440719    .1021407
         CP1     .0037414   .0008193     4.57   0.000     .0021355    .0053472
         HHI     4.72e-06   .0000117     0.40   0.686    -.0000182    .0000276
     CRGDPPC    -5.43e-06   3.23e-06    -1.68   0.092    -.0000118    8.93e-07
    CapexRev    -.1295805   .0239753    -5.40   0.000    -.1765713   -.0825897
      RevSub     .0002287   .0000568     4.02   0.000     .0001173    .0003401
      SubEmp    -.0000209   .0000464    -0.45   0.652    -.0001118    .0000699
        NYRS    -.0031043   .0034846    -0.89   0.373     -.009934    .0037254
                                                                              
          SE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =  124.93661                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =      88.72
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         13
                                                              avg =       12.9
                                                              min =         12
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        246
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6.8 Robustness check 
Robustness checks involving specifications and estimation method change 
were carried out on the baseline regression models (Table 6.7A, Table 6.7B & Table 
6.7C). The varied specification test has three parts. The first part was the introduction 
of efficiency lag in the mix of explanatory variables to ascertain if prior period‟s 
efficiency influences future efficiency performance. The second part was the 
inclusion of an interaction term (i.e., SubEmp*CapexRev) as an explanatory variable 
to provide insight on the joint impact of labour productivity (SubEmp) and capital 
intensity (CapexRev) on efficiency performance. The third part was the introduction 
of quadratic terms. NYRS was introduced as quadratic term and its influence on 
efficiency examine. This was followed by the inclusion of CRGDPPC as a quadratic 
term. Appendices 4A, 4B, & 4C are the results of the model with the lag of the 
dependent variable (i.e., CRS TE, VRS TE, and SE). The efficiency lag was found to 
have positive and significant influence on CRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.000; 
< 0.05) (Appendix 4A), VRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) 
(Appendix 4B) and scale efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Appendix 4C). The 
coefficient of the lag in each Appendix indicates that prior periods‟ efficiency 
substantially influence future efficiency performance. Compared to the baseline 
regression model (Table 6.7A, Table 6.7B, & Table 6.7C), introducing the efficiency 
lag in the model caused reduction in the magnitude of the coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables. In addition, modest differences were noted on how lags 
influence future efficiency scores. With the CRS technical efficiency lag, CapexRev 
became significant. In the case of VRS technical efficiency lag, CapexRev became 
significant and CPI turned insignificant. The scale efficiency lag did not change the 
significance of the other explanatory variables. Overall, these findings imply that 
past periods‟ technical and scale efficiencies have substantial influence on future 
periods‟ technical and scale efficiency scores.  
Appendices 5A, 5B, & 5C are the results of introducing the interaction term 
(i.e. SubEmp*CapexRev) in the model. The interaction term has a negative and 
significant influence on CRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Appenix 
5A) and VRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.000; < 0.05) (Appendix 5B). 
However, its influence on scale efficiency is positive but not significant (p-value = 
0.508; > 0.05) (Appendix 5C). These findings imply that the complementary 
relationship between labour productivity and capital intensity impairs technical 
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efficiency but not scale efficiency. Technical efficiency impairment by the 
interaction of labour productivity and capital intensity may be due to increased hiring 
and/or training of employees when new infratructures and technologies are acquired. 
However, it is less of a concern when seeking scale efficiency. NYRSSquare as a 
quadratic term has positive but insignificant association with CRS technical 
efficiency (p-value = 0.233; > 0.05) (Appendix 6A), VRS technical efficiency (p-
value = 0.129; > 0.05) (Appendix 6B), and scale efficiency (p-value = 0.527; > 0.05) 
(Appendix 6C). Surprisingly, all of the variables displayed the same statistical 
significance they had prior to including NYRSSquare. The positive influence of 
NYRSSquare signifies that it could have irrelevant improvement on the technical and 
scale efficiencies due to the industry gaining more experience in the deregulatory 
environment, better adaptability and stability in the regulatory and policy 
frameworks governing the industry (Banker et. al., 2010; Li, 2009). Also, the 
influence of change in real GDP per capita (CRGDPPC) as a quadratic term was 
investigated. It has a positive but insignificant influence on CRS technical efficiency 
(p-value = 0.127; > 0.05) (Appendix 7A), negative and insignificant effect on VRS 
technical efficiency (p-value = 0.534; > 0.05) (Appendix 7B). Its influence on scale 
efficiency is positive and significant (p-value = 0.020; < 0.05) (Appendix 7C). Also, 
all of the variables maintained the statistical significance they had before the 
introduction of CRGDPPCSquare. Furthermore, the effect of both quadratic terms 
(i.e., NRRSSquare & CRGDPPDSquare) in the model was investigated. The 
presence of both revealed a positive and insignificant relationship with CRS 
technical efficiency (Appendix 8A). On the other hand, NYRSSquare has a positive 
influence on VRS technical efficiency (p-value = 0.141; > 0.05) while the effect of 
CRGDPPCSquare on VRS technical efficiency is negative but both are insignificant 
(p-value = 0.635; > 0.05) (Appendix 8B). Their effect on scale efficiency is positive 
but while the NYRSSquare is insignificant (p-value = 0.268; > 0.05), 
CRGDPPCSquare is significant (p-value = 0.015; < 0.05) (Appendix 8C). 
Using Tobit model with continuous endogenous covariates, a change in 
estimation methods was effected to check for possible endogeneity among some of 
the independednt variables. The results are presented in Appendices 9A, 9B, & 9C. 
Compared to the baseline model for VRS technical efficiency (Table 6.7B), 
significance of the coefficients in Appendix 9B are remarkably consistent with the 
VRS technical efficiency baseline model. Also, the result in Appendix 9A is 
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comparable to the baseline CRS technical efficiency in Table 6.7A except that the 
NYRS (p-value = 0.002; < 0.05) and CapexRev (p-value = 0.024; < 0.05) turned 
significant. Results for scale efficiency (Appendix 9C) is also similar to the baseline 
scale efficiency results in Table 6.7C but the variables NYRS (p-value = 0.038; < 
0.05) and SubEmp (p-value = 0.007; < 0.05) are significant. Another estimation 
method involving instrumental variable regression was carried out but with Hausman 
test conducted to determine if fixed effect (FE) model or the random effect (RE) 
model would be appropriate for the estimation of the influence of environmental 
variables on efficiency. The null hypothesis (H0) was that the random effect model 
would be appropriate. The Hausman test results with CRS technical efficiency, VRS 
technical efficiency, and scale efficiency as dependent variables are shown in Table 
6.8A, Table 6.8B, & Table 6.8C. The p-value in each Table is greater than 0.05, 
indicating that the random effect model is appropriate. If the p-values were less than 
0.05, H0 would have been rejected and the fixed effect model would be deemed 
suitable.  
The results of the random effect instrumental variables are shown in 
Appendices 10A, 10B, & 10C. The significance of the coefficients of the variables in 
the model with CRS technical efficiency in Appendix 10A is similar to the baseline 
random effect (RE) Tobit (Table 6.7A) except that the NYRS turned significant (p-
value = 0.014; < 0.05). Similarly, most of the coefficients in the model with VRS 
technical efficiency as dependent variable in Appendix 10B are similar to the VRS 
technical efficiency baseline results in Table 6.7B but RevSub (p-value = 0.069; > 
0.05) turned insignificant while CapexRev (p-value = 0.019; < 0.05) became 
significant. On the other hand, the result with scale efficiency as dependent variable 
in Appendix 10C displays coefficients with the same level of significance as the 
baseline model in Table 6.7C. Similar to Gutierrez (2003) and Ros (1999) that 
indicated models that assumed exogeneity and those that mitigated endogeneity 
yielded comparable results, the results in this research show that endogeneity had 
minimum effect on the baseline regression estimates. Overall, the robustness checks 
suggest that the baseline model is seemingly insensitive to change in specification 
and estimation methods. Also, it indicates that the baseline model is relatively 
effective in estimating the impact of environmental variables on technical and scale 
efficiency performance.       
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Table 6.8A: Result of Hausman Test with CRS technical efficiency as dependent 
variable 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
Table 6.8B: Result of Hausmant test with VRS technical efficiency as dependent 
variable 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8779
                          =        2.41
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtivreg
                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtivreg
                                                                              
         CP1      .0109915     .0070717        .0039198        .0029138
         HHI      .0000291     8.87e-06        .0000202        .0000294
      SubEmp      .0002157     .0002044        .0000113        .0000937
        NYRS     -.0063118    -.0086165        .0023047        .0055415
     CRGDPPC      -.000062     -.000017        -.000045         .000026
    CapexRev     -.0962201    -.0336274       -.0625928        .0703346
      RevSub        .00117     .0005361        .0006338        .0004521
                                                                              
                CRSTEFixed~t CRSTERando~t    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9841
                          =        1.45
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtivreg
                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtivreg
                                                                              
         CP1      .0049956     .0049143        .0000813        .0010665
         HHI     -6.84e-06    -1.75e-06       -5.09e-06        .0000135
      SubEmp      .0002498     .0002295        .0000203        .0000349
        NYRS     -.0068641    -.0063821       -.0004819        .0020226
     CRGDPPC     -.0000226    -.0000209       -1.69e-06               .
    CapexRev      .1098266     .1057722        .0040544        .0263583
      RevSub      .0004739     .0004548        .0000191         .000185
                                                                              
                VRSTEFixed~t VRSTERando~t    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Table 6.8C: Result of Hausman test with scale efficiency as dependent variable 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
Summary 
This chapter analyzes and discusses the partial measures of performance and 
total factor analysis of the efficiency and productivity performance. The partial 
measures of performance show that Canada performed better than Nigeria in the 
period of study on measures such as labour productivity (i.e., SubEmp and RevEmp) 
while Nigeria attained better results on CapexSub through reduced capital 
expenditures but this proved to be detrimental to its efficiency performance. The 
assessment of the efficiency analysis indicates the two countries are distinctly 
inefficient and need to supplement the required decrease in input–output mix with 
increased operational scale to attain efficiency. Nonetheless, improvements in mean 
efficiency scores in both countries and for the sample of countries in the study 
indicate that operating in deregulated environment enhances efficiency and confirms 
prior empirical studies (e.g., Ros, 1999; Lee, Park, & Oh, 2000; Gutierrez, 2003) but 
contradicts Torres & Bachiller (2013). 
While the total factor productivity growth (TFPG) in the two countries 
varied, both achieved productivity growth. The decomposition of total factor 
productivity growth showed both chose different paths. Technical and efficiency 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.6862
                          =        3.93
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtivreg
                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtivreg
                                                                              
         CP1      .0071319     .0040815        .0030504        .0020234
         HHI      .0000334     5.33e-06         .000028        .0000206
      SubEmp     -.0000272     .0000224       -.0000495        .0000648
        NYRS     -.0008242    -.0043409        .0035167        .0038512
     CRGDPPC     -.0000447    -.0000225       -.0000221        .0000178
    CapexRev     -.1997038     -.141621       -.0580828        .0491157
      RevSub      .0008118     .0003252        .0004866        .0003151
                                                                              
                SEFixedEff~t SERandomEf~t    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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change were responsible in Canada, but the contribution from technical change was 
marginal. Efficiency change was the main contributor in Nigeria as the country‟s 
technical change regressed. Further analysis of efficiency change showed that pure 
technical efficiency change was mostly responsible for the efficiency improvement 
in Canada, whereas scale efficiency enhancement was the main contributor in 
Nigeria. The finding of improved efficiency is not entirely suprising given the level 
of competition in the industry and the constant threats from non-traditional low cost 
service providers such as Skype, Watzapp etc. that compel firms in the industry to 
engage in efficiency and productivity improvements. However, the finding that both 
countries attained total factor productivity growth through efficiency chnage suggests 
it is easier to augment productivity through efficiency improvement measures (e.g., 
employee training and development, proper management, enhanced managerial 
acumen, input reduction, output increase, scale adjustment etc.) that contribute to 
effective allocation of organizational resources rather than technical change which 
typically requires capital expenditure and could take longer to implement. The 
Mann-Whitney tests indicate that Canada has higher mean efficiencies than Nigeria 
but their total factor productivity growth is comparable.  
Environmental factors that influence efficiency performance were 
investigated using a random effect (RE) panel Tobit model. The model showed that 
the number of years in deregulation has a negative but insignificant influence on 
technical and scale efficiencies, indicating it may detract efficiency performance. 
However, when included as a quadratic term, the coefficient is positive albeit 
insignificant statistically. This finding suggests that as the number of years in 
deregulation increases, its effect on technical and scale efficiency is strengthened and 
the industry may start to experience efficiency gains but the gains could be less of a 
consideration for technical and scale efficiency improvements. It would not be 
unsual to expect newly deregulated telecommunications industry to display lower 
technical and scale efficiency scores. This is because after deregulation, the industry 
would require time to adjust its operational size and reorganize productive inputs. 
However, as time progresses, efficiency would improve due to increased experience 
in the deregulatory environment, better adaptability and stability in the regulatory 
and policy frameworks governing the industry (Banker et. al., 2010; Li, 2009).  
Revenue to subscriptions was found to drive technical and scale efficiency 
performances. This signals that countries with rising revenue per subscriptions will 
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display better technical and scale efficiency scores. Also, high economic growth has 
a negative and statistically insignificant relationship with efficiency, implying that it 
has irrelevant negative influence on efficiencies. This suggests that the industry in a 
country with low economic growth may display technical and scale efficiencies that 
are comparable to countries experiencing high economic growth. However, when 
added as a quadratic term, its effect on scale efficiency is positive and significant 
(Appendices 7C & 8C), signifying that economic growth may have unimportant 
influence on technical efficiencies, the marginal influence on scale should not be 
ignored. Although infinitesimally small, the value of the coefficient signals that 
countries with high economic growth may express better scale efficiencies but it 
would be marginal.  
Labour productivity is important in determining technical but not scale 
efficiency, suggesting that countries with high labour productivity tend to display 
better technical efficiency performance. Capex to revenue ratio does not appear to 
have an influence on technical efficiency, but it does have a negative and statistically 
significant influence on scale efficiency. This implies that the higher the capital 
expenditure per dollar of revenue in the industry, the lower the scale efficiency. This 
is an interesting finding and should not be interpreted to imply cutting capital 
expenditures as doing so would imperil innovation and responsiveness of firms in the 
industry to customers‟ needs (GSMA, 2013). Rather, it should be construed to 
indicate maximizing capacity usage and/or avoiding infrastructure duplication by 
sharing and collaborating on infrastructure spending. Nonetheless, the foregoing 
shows that a higher CapexRev ratio in Nigeria (0.72) compared to Canada (0.2) 
contributed to the inefficiency noted in Nigeria. Furthermore, the partial measure of 
performance in Section 6.4.8 showed HHI declined in all of the countries in the 
sample over the study period, thus indicating the occurrence of increased 
competition. However, its influence on technical and scale efficiencies are not 
statistically significant, meaning that it has no relevant influence on efficiency 
performance. Prior studies present mix evidence. Some (e.g., Gutierrez, 2003; Li & 
Price, 2011) found it influences performance while others (e.g., Hu & Chu, 2008) 
established it does not. This research confirms the findings in the latter. 
Inflation was found to have significantly positive influence on technical and 
scale efficiency levels, suggesting improvements in performance in an inflationary 
economy. The level of development positively drives technical efficiency but 
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negatively impacts scale efficiency. Because these impacts are statistically 
insignificant, a country‟s development level is not essential to technical and scale 
efficiency of the industry, suggesting that irrespective of the level of development, 
the industry in different countries may display similar technical and scale efficiency 
levels. The evaluation of the effect of lags of technical and scale efficiency 
performance revealed a significantly positive relationship and the magnitude of the 
coefficient is also large, suggesting that past periods‟ efficiency score has the greatest 
influence on future technical and scale efficiency performance. The interaction term 
(i.e., SubEmp*CapexRev) provided insight on how the complementary relationship 
between labour productivity and capital intensity influence technical and scale 
efficiency. It has a statistically significant negative influence on technical efficiency 
scores but a statistically insignificant positive link with scale efficiency. The 
undermining of technical efficiency by the interaction term may be due to labour 
productivity not sufficiently compensating for the higher capital intensity. 
 
  
 173 
Chapter 7 
Results and Discussion of the Survey of Industry Participants 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the efficiency and productivity analysis of 
the telecommunications industry and showed that the industry improved in the period 
of study. Also, the chapter discusses the influence of environmental factors and 
higlights variables that influence technical and scale efficiency levels. Chapter 7 
presents the analysis of the survey questionnaire completed by industry participants 
and provides more insights on the deregulated environment and events in the 
industry in the two countries (i.e. Canada and Nigeria) of focus. The chapter 
concludes with a narrative that summarizes the findings. 
 
7.2 Results of the survey questionnaire 
The industry‟s performance evaluated in Chapter 6 was further examined by 
asking individuals knowledgeable about the industry to complete a survey 
questionnaire consisting of 20 questions (Appendix 11). In completing the 
questionnaire, participants were allowed to describe and interpret events in the 
industry from their own perspective. Involving individuals with knowledge of the 
industry enriches the research process, provides in-depth understanding of the 
problems and complements the partial measures of performance and total factor 
analysis findings. Participants‟ responses were analyzed with the outcomes presented 
descriptively and inferences drawn. The descriptive statistics provides useful 
understanding and interpretation of responses from participants. To allow inferences 
to be made about the two countries, econometric analysis was considered. Given that 
the sample size that yielded the primary data is not large enough, alternative 
inferenctial statistics (i.e. t-test and nonparametric test) which have been used in 
studies (e.g. Demirbag, Tatoglu, Glaister, & Zaim, 2009) with similar approach to 
this research were considered. Unlike the t-test, the nonparametric test 
accommodates categorical and quantitative data and does not require the assumption 
that the population has a normal probability distribution (Egboro, 2015). In view of 
this, Mann-Whitney (Wicoxon rank-sum) test which is a nonparametric test was 
applied and the level of significance was set at alpha of 0.05. The analysis provided 
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insightful information and allowed inferences to be made on the differences between 
the two countries of focus in this reseracrch. 
 
7.2.1 Background and profile of participants 
7.2.1.1 Number of years at current employment 
Participants‟ background and profile provide the basis for understanding 
participants‟ views and placing their responses in the context of the research. Table 
7.1 shows how long participants have worked at their current place of employment. 
Three of the five participants from Canada have spent over 20 years at their place of 
employment. Of the remaning two, one indicated less than five years and the other 
stated 6-10 years. Responses from participants form Nigeria clustered around less 
than five years (22 participants). The remaining 10 participants identified 6-10 years 
as the number of years they have spent at their current employment. Most 
participants, 23 (62%), have been at their current employment for less than five 
years, 10 (27%) for 6–10 years, 1 for 11–15 years and 3 (8%) for more than 20 years. 
 
Table 7.1: Participant‟s response on duration at current place of employment. 
Duration Canada  
n = 5 
Nigeria 
n = 32 
Total 
n = 37 
Less than 5 years 1 22 23 
6–10 years - 10 10 
11–15 years 1 - 1 
16–20 years - - – 
Over 20 years 3 - 3 
Total 5 32 37 
    Source: Survey data analysis 
 
7.2.1.2 Occupational title of participants 
Table 7.2 presents the job titles of participants. Of the five participants from 
Canada, three were directors, one was a manager, and the remaining participant 
indicated other as job title but did not specify. Most (19) participants from Nigeria 
were managers, six were supervisors, three were coordinators, two were directors. 
The remaning two particpants indentified other as their job titles but did not specify. 
Overall, 20 (54%) of pariticipants in the study were managers, 6 (16%) were 
supervisors, 3 (8%) were coordinators, 5 (14%) were directors and 3 (8%) indicated 
other but did not specify their exact titles. 
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Table 7.2: Participants‟ job title. 
Job Title Canada 
n = 5 
Nigeria 
n = 32 
Total 
n = 37 
Manager 1 19 20 
Supervisor - 6 6 
Coordinator - 3 3 
Director 3 2 5 
Executives - - – 
Other (Please Specify) 1 2 3 
Total 5 32 37 
Source: Survey data analysis 
 
7.2.1.3 Educational attainment of participants 
Participants were asked to indicate their educational attainment. All have at 
least a college level education (Table 7.3): 13 (35%) possess a postgraduate degree 
(Masters/PhD), 21 (57%) have a university education and 3 (8%) indicated college 
education. 
Table 7.3: Participants‟ educational attainment. 
Educational Attainment Canada 
n = 5 
Nigeria 
n = 32 
Total 
n = 37 
Less than high school - - – 
High school - - – 
College (e.g., certificate/diploma) 1 2 3 
University 1 20 21 
Postgraduate (e.g., Masters/PhD) 3 10 13 
Other (Please Specify) - - – 
Total 5 32 37 
Source: Survey data analysis. 
 
7.2.1.4 Types of services provided 
To gain knowledge of the services provided in the industry, participants were 
asked to indicate the services their firms offer. Because participants were allowed 
select all that applied to them, a total of 51 responses were obtained (Table 7.4). 29 
(56.8%) responses identified Wireless/mobile phones (GSM) services, 6 (11.8%) 
responses indicated CDMA, 9 (17.7%) specified fixed/wireless services and 7 
(13.7%) stated other services (Table 7.4). In the category of „other services‟, 
Canadian participants specified Internet/data, TV, satellite TV and video content 
while Nigerian participants specified Internet, data and customer care services. The 
response pattern shows firms offer multiple services to customers. Also, Table 7.4 
reveals wireless/mobile phone as the service most mentioned by participants from 
both countries. In addition, the analysis of other services shows multiple 
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product/service offerings which suggest diversification in the industry. The benefit of 
diversification is that it reduces revenue risks (Ernst & Young Global Ltd, 2015). 
Due to a greater scope for diversification (i.e., TV, satelite TV and video content), 
the Canadian telecommunications industry may withstand competitive pressures 
better than the Nigerian telecommunications industry in a period of declining 
telecommunications revenue. However, it may reduce the flexibility of management 
in using inputs and also expose the industry to new sets of risks (Noam, 2006). 
 
Table 7.4: Types of services provided. 
Services Canada Nigeria Frequency 
Wireless/mobile phone services 3 26 29 
CDMA 1 5 6 
Fixed/wireless services 1 8 9 
Others (Please specify) 5 2 7 
Total 10 41 51 
Note: Participants were allowed to select all that apply  
Source: Survey Data Analysis 
 
7.2.2 Deregulation 
7.2.2.1 Telecommunications industry stage 
To assess performance from participants‟ perspectives, it was important to get 
a sense of their views of the industry. When asked to indicate the nature of the 
industry, all of the five participants from Canada indicated it was maturing, a finding 
that is consistent with the partial measures of performance in Section 6.4.1 that 
showed limited opportunity for growth in the Canadian telecommunications industry. 
On the other hand, most participants from Nigeria, 21 (66%) described the industry 
as emerging, a finding that harmonizes with the teledensity trend in Section 6.4.1 that 
showed potential for growth in the industry in Nigeria. Unexpectedly, a sizeable 
number of participants from Nigeria, 10 (31%) viewed the industry as maturing 
which is contrary to the majority opinion. This observation may be due to the 
negative impact of slowed growth and increased competition on profitability (Enders, 
König, Hungenberg, & Engelbertz, 2009). Furthermore, the results demonstrate 
perception differs among participants from the two countries. This is not entirely 
surprising given that the telecommunications industry in Canada was deregulated 
earlier than the telecommunications industry in Nigeria. In addition, the finding that 
the Canadian telecommunications industry is mature is consistent with Simon (2013) 
who noted that the mature state of the industry in Canada compels firms to be 
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customer-centric while the observation that the Nigerian telecommunications 
industry is emerging align with Omowunmi, Niran, & Oluseyi (2009) who evaluated 
Nigeria‟s telecommunications policy and suggested the industry fits the description 
of an emerging industry. 
 
7.2.2.2 Pattern of change in the industry 
When asked to classify change in the industry, all of the 8 (22%) participants 
who indicated it was very rapid were from Nigeria (Table 7.5). Of the 18 (49%) that 
said it was rapid, 5 were from Canada and 13 from Nigeria. 10 (27%) stated it was 
moderate and one identified it as slow (Table 7.5). The responses cluster around very 
rapid and rapid, suggesting that most participants viewed the change in the industry 
as rapid or very rapid. Nonparametric Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum) test was 
conducted to determine if the views expressed by Canadian participants differ from 
that expressed by Nigerian participants. With the null hypothesis that participants 
from the two countries have similar views of the pattern of change in the industry, 
the result in Table 7.5 singifies the null hypothesis could not be rejected (p-value = 
0.7187; > 0.05). This finding highlights that participants from both countries have 
similar views of the pattern of change in the industry which they noted as at least 
rapid. This harmonizes with Massey & Beaudry (2015, p. 6) who reported that the 
Canadian telecommunications industry has undergone „substantial and rapid change‟. 
It is also consistent with the view in Obayemi (2014) that competition in the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry has led to remarkable growth. 
 
Table 7.5: Pattern of change in the industry. 
Change Pattern Canada 
n = 5 
Nigeria 
n = 32 
Total 
n = 37 
Very rapid - 8 8 
Rapid 5 13 18 
Moderate - 10 10 
Slow - 1 1 
Very slow - - – 
Rank sum 
Expected 
z = 0.360 
p-value = 0.7187 
102.5 
95 
600.5 
608 
703 
703 
Source: Survey data analysis 
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7.2.2.3 The role of the industry regulator 
For insights on the perception of the regulatory agency‟s role, participants 
were asked to describe the role of industry regulator. The responses formed seven 
categories (Table 7.6). While all five participants from Canada answered this 
question, 12 (38%) participants from Nigeria did not. However, the result shows that 
participants identified a variety of roles performed by the regulatory agency. Most 
see the regulator as promoting competition (8) and protecting customers (8). Other 
roles are policy maker and enforcer (6), supervision (6), regulator (4), resolving 
disputes (1) and support (1). This result indicates respondents view the main role of 
the regulator as promoting competition and protecting customers. 
The answer from one participant was: 
‘Regulate broadcast and Telecom industry to promote competition and 
better options for customers’. 
This response cuts across multiple categories and provides a comprehensive view of 
the role of the regulatory agency. The finding that the regulator promotes 
competition and protects customers is consistent with the goals of regulation noted in 
Blackman & Srivastava (2011). In addition, the perception that the regulaor performs 
many functions aligns with (OECD, 2002b) which identifies telecommunications 
industry regulators as performing several functions.   
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Table 7.6: Describing the role of the industry regulator. 
Category Reasons 
Regulator  „Regulation‟ 
 „Regulator‟ 
 „Regulation‟ 
 „Regulate broadcast and telecom industry‟ 
Sub total 4 
Promote competition  „Maintain competition‟ 
 „Promote competition‟ 
 „To promote healthy competition in the industry‟ 
 „Promoting competition‟ 
 „Maintain competitiveness of the industry‟ 
 „Controls vertical integration‟ 
 „Allocates wireless spectrum‟ 
 „Promote competition‟ 
Subtotal 8 
Policy maker and 
enforcer 
 „Policy maker‟ 
 „To maintain stability‟ 
 „Policy maker‟ 
 „Policy enforcement‟ 
 „Setting guidelines‟ 
 „Mandate minimum levels of content‟ 
Subtotal 6 
Consumer protection  „Protecting consumer interest‟ 
 „Protecting customers‟ 
 „The do protect customers interest‟ 
 „Customer right protector‟ 
 „Consumer protection‟ 
 „Customer transaction policy‟ 
 „Maintain consumer fairness‟ 
 „Better options for customers‟ 
Subtotal 8 
Supervision  „To supervise industry activities‟ 
 „Supervisory‟ 
 „Watchdog‟ 
 „They ensure that telecom firms operate by the rule‟ 
 „Market monitoring‟ 
 „Minimum product performance‟ 
Subtotal 6 
Resolving disputes  „Dispute Settlers‟ 
Subtotal 1 
Support  „Provide any necessary support to telecom firms‟ 
Subtotal 1 
Grand total 34 
Source: Survey data analysis 
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7.2.2.4 Support received from the regulatory agency 
Participants were asked to indicate the type of support received from the 
regulatory agency. Because participants were allowed to select all that apply, 75 
responses were obtained, resulting in an average of two responses per participant 
(Table 7.7). Of the 75 responses, 5 (7%) identified financial support, 11 (15%) 
related to industry and market analysis, 6 (8%) indicated infrastructure development 
and 13 (17%) referred to training and development. Furthermore, 24 (32%) responses 
leaned toward the provision and availability of information, and 15 (20%) responses 
identified contract/dispute resolution. The remaining response (1%) indicated „other‟, 
but did not specify the support. The provision/availability of information, 
industry/market analysis and contract/dispute resolution were the top three areas 
identified by Canadiaan participants. Interestingly, the provision/availability of 
information and contract/dispute resolution were also identified by Nigerian 
participants, thus indicating that regulators perform the role of disseminating 
information and resolving disputes which typically arise from network access, fees 
and tariffs (Bruce et al., 2004). Nonetheless, a difference is noted. Canadian 
participants indicated industry/market analysis as one of the top three areas of 
support but Nigerian participants identified training and development as one of the 
top three areas of support, suggesting the need for capacity building and competency 
acquisition in the industry in Nigeria. The DEA technical efficiency scores in Section 
6.5.1 showed a lower average technical efficiency performance for Nigeria, hence, 
the findings relating to training and development provide insights that buttress the 
DEA findings. In addition, the total factor productivity change analysis in Section 
6.5.3 reflects the beneficial effect of training and development as the pure technical 
efficiency change of the industry in Nigeria which was 0.9002 between 2001 and 
2002 (i.e., a decline of 10% per year) was reversed to a progress of 18.3% between 
2012 and 2013. The training may have contributed to the industry‟s 1.27% per year 
pure technical efficiency change improvement. Without it, the total factor 
productivity growth would have been lower than the 8.1% per year (Table 6.6). 
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Table 7.7: Support received from the regulatory agency. 
Type of Support Canada Nigeria Frequency 
Financial 1 4 5 
Industry/market analysis 3 8 11 
Infrastructure development 2 4 6 
Training and development - 13 13 
Provision/availability of 
information 
3 21 24 
Contract/dispute resolution 3 12 15 
Other(s) please specify - 1 1 
Total 12 63 75 
Note: Participants were allowed to select all that apply  
Source: Survey data analysis 
 
7.2.2.5 Motivation for deregulating the telecommunications industry 
To guage participants‟ views on the reasons for deregulating the industry, 
participants were asked to identify motivations for deregulating the industry. 
Participants were asked to select all reasons that apply from the list provided in the 
questionnaire. The list is comprehensive and was the outcome of the review of 
literature (see Section 3.3.1). A total of 214 responses (Canada: 28; Nigeria: 186) 
were obtained (Table 7.8). The 28 responses obtained from Canadian participants 
respresent approximately 6 responses per participant. Also, the 186 responses 
obtained from participants from Nigeria indicate approximately 6 repsonses per 
participant. The ranking of the responses shown in Table 7.8 reveals that participants 
perceive the top six reasons for deregulating the industry as: universal service/wider 
access to telephone services (30), service quality improvement (26), promote 
competition (23), economic development (22), promote investment (20), maintain 
reasonable rates (20) and technological trend (18). Surprisingly, government deficit 
was the least identified while political and legal trends had 11 and 12 responses, 
respectively. Some studies (e.g., Akhtar, 2009; Torres & Bachiller, 2013) suggest 
increased competition is the primary reason for deregulating the industry, but the 
results in this research proved otherwise. However, it identified increased 
competition as one of the reasons for deregulating the industry which is consistent 
with OECD (2003b) and Latipulhayat (2014). Also, the finding aligns with Wallsten 
(2004, p. 306) who identified the main objectives of deregulation as to „get 
consumers more, better, new, and less costly services‟. 
In addition, the finding buttresses a similar observation in Ikpe & Idiong 
(2011) who stated that the objective of deregulation is to extract the maximum public 
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benefit from the free market and competition, indicating that competition is not the 
goal of deregulation but the vehicle through which deregulatory objectives are 
achieved. Furthermore, the identification of investment as one of the top six reasons 
corroborates Awoleye et al., (2012) who identified increased investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure as stemming from deregulation. Interestingly, 
technological trend was also identified among the top reasons for deregulating the 
industry. This is fitting as the industry has been shaped by technological innovations 
(Gruber, 2005). Also, Table 7.8 shows socio-cultural trends as an additional 
motivation for deregulating the industry. Awoleye et al. (2012) recognize the social 
and economic significance of the telecommunications industry and note that 
deregulation generates economic growth and social development. 
 
Table 7.8: Motivation for deregulating the telecommunications industry. 
Change Pattern Canada Nigeria Total 
response 
Ranking 
Promote investment 2 18 20 5
th
 
Universal/wider access 3 27 30 1
st
 
Increase teledensity 2 11 13 8
th
 
Promote competition 3 20 23 3
rd
 
Maintain reasonable rates 2 18 20 5
th
 
Service quality improvement 3 23 26 2
nd
 
Address government deficit - 4 4 11
th
 
Technological trend 4 14 18 6
th
  
Economic development 3 19 22 4
th
 
Socio-cultural trend 3 13 16 7
th
 
Political trend 2 8 10 10
th
 
Legal& and regulatory trend 1 11 12 9
th
 
Other (Please Specify) -  -  
Total 28 186 214  
Note: Participants were allowed to select all that apply  
Source: Survey data analysis 
 
7.2.2.6 Level of the impact of government policies 
On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest, participants were asked to rank 
the impact of government policies on the industry. The result presented in Table 7.9 
shows that deregulation, licensing, competition and tax policies have mean ranking 
of least three each in Canada, suggesting each has an above moderate impact on the 
industry. Wage, trade and macroeconomic policies ranked less than three, indicating 
below moderate impact. In Nigeria, all but wage and trade policies have mean rank 
above three and are considered to have above moderate impact. Furthermore, Mann-
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Whitney (Wilcoxon rank-sum) test was performed on each to reveal if there were 
dfferences in participant‟s responses from the two countries. The result in Table 7.9 
indicates that the null hypothesis that no difference exist could not be rejected, 
suggesting similarities in the perception of the impact of each policy in both 
countries. Competition, deregulation and tax are the top three policies that impact the 
industry in Canada. The top three policies in Nigeria are competition, licensing and 
deregulation. In addition, Table 7.9 reveals interesting commonalities between the 
two counties. Competition ranks above three in both countries and two of the top 
three policies with an above moderate impact in Canada (i.e., competition and 
deregulation) were also in the top three in Nigeria. The recognition of deregulatory 
policy as having an above average impact on the industry has the support of Petrović 
et al. (2011) who infer good regulatory reform positively influences performance. 
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Table 7.9: Level of the impact of government policies. 
Government Policies Level of 
Impact in 
Canada 
Level of 
Impact in 
Nigeria 
Z score p-value 
Deregulatory policy 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.4 
0.9 
99 
92.5 
 
3.3 
1.1 
567 
573.5 
0.311 0.7559 
Licensing policy 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.0 
0.7 
81.5 
95 
 
3.4 
1.2 
621.5 
608 
-0.644 0.5197 
Wage policy  
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.6 
0.5 
103 
95 
 
2.6 
1.1 
600 
608 
0.381 0.7028 
Trade policy 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.4 
0.5 
74.5 
95 
 
2.8 
1.0 
628.5 
608 
-0.962 0.3362 
Competition policy  
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.8 
1.1 
110.5 
95 
 
3.5 
1.1 
592.5 
608 
0.715 0.4744 
Macroeconomic policy  
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.6 
0.9 
65.5 
95 
 
3.2 
0.8 
637.5 
608 
-1.425 0.1542 
Taxes policy  
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.2 
1.3 
91 
95 
 
3.2 
1.2 
612 
608 
-0.190 0.8491 
Other(s) (Please specify) – – - - 
Note: Participants were allowed to rate more than one area 
Source: Survey data analysis 
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7.2.2.7 Influence of government policies on the industry 
On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest, participants were asked to 
identify the influence of government policies on the industry. The Mann-Whitney 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum) test result in Table 7.10 shows that the similarities between the 
two countries. The mean responses from participants from both countries indicate 
that participants viewed increased competition as the area where government policies 
had the most influence (Canada: 3.8; Nigeria: 3.7). Network access, increased 
subscriptions, innovation, and product pricing and delivery each have a score of at 
least 3. In addition, participants from both countries saw partnership among operators 
as a low impact area. However, there exist some subtle and insignificant differences 
between the two countries. Canadian participants viewed government policy impact 
on reduced cost and investment in infrastructure as low and high respectively, 
signifying that government policies have minimum effect on operators‟ costs but 
higher effect on investment in infrastructure. The opposite is the case in Nigeria. 
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Table 7.10: Influence of government policies on the industry. 
Areas of Impact Level of Policy 
Impact in 
Canada 
Level of 
Policy 
Impact 
in 
Nigeria 
z score p-value  
Innovation 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.0 
0.7 
73 
87.5 
 
3.4
 
1.3 
522 
507.5 
-0.725 0.4682 
Product pricing and delivery 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
 
3 
0.7 
89.5 
90 
 
 
3.0
 
1.1 
540.5 
540 
-0.025 0.9802 
Increased partnership 
among operators 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
 
2.4 
0.9 
68 
85 
 
 
2.9 
1.3 
493 
476 
-0.883 0.3370 
Network access 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.4 
0.5 
83.5 
87.5 
 
3.5
 
1.0 
511.5 
507.5 
-0.207 0.8362 
Increased competition 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.8 
0.4 
72 
85 
 
4.0
 
1.0 
489 
476 
-0.693 0.4883 
Reduced costs 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.8 
0.8 
77.5 
87.5 
 
3.1
 
1.2 
517.5 
507.5 
-0.504 0.6146 
Increased subscriptions 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.2 
1.3 
62 
82.5 
 
3.8
 
1.1 
466 
445.5 
-1.125 0.2605 
Increased investment in 
infrastructure 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
 
3.0 
0.7 
91.5 
80 
 
 
2.7
 
1.3 
404.5 
416 
0.636 0.5248 
Other(s) (Please specify) –    
Source: Survey data analysis  
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7.2.2.8 Perception of operating in a deregulated environment 
Participants were asked to describe their perception of the deregulated 
environment. As shown in Table 7.11, 5 (14%) participants said it was very 
successful, 23 (62%) indicated it was successful, six (16%) were neutral and 3 (8%) 
said it was unsuccessful. The Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon rank-sum) test indicated that 
percepton in both countries are statistically similar. Overall, the findings reveal that 
majority of participants perceived that operating in the deregulated environment has 
been a success, suggesting the industry benefitted from deregulation. This finding 
harmonizes with the result of the DEA (Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.3) that showed 
efficiency improvement and total factor productivity growth in the two countries in 
the period of study. 
 
Table 7.11: Perception of operating in a deregulated environment. 
Perception Canada 
n = 5 
Nigeria 
n = 32 
Total 
n = 37 
Very successful 1 4 5 
Successful 3 20 23 
Neutral 1 5 6 
Unsuccessful - 3 3 
Very unsuccessful - - – 
Total 5 32 37 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
z = 0.486 
p-value = 0.6267  
4 
0.7 
104.5 
95 
 
3.78 
0.8 
598.5 
608 
3.8 
0.1 
Source: Survey data analysis 
 
7.2.2.9 Difficulty experienced in the deregulated environment 
To identify challenges affecting performance, participants were asked to list 
difficulties experienced in the industry. Overall, finance (8), infrastructure (7), policy 
(5) and compliance (3) issues are the dominant difficulties in the industry (Table 
7.12). Other issues identified were technology (2), disputes (2) and scale economies 
(2). Difficulties specific to each country were examined. The difficulties most cited 
by the Canadian participants were changing technology, infrastructure funding and 
scale economies. One of the participants from Canada invoked competition as an 
issue expecially for small players in the industry and stated:  
„It is hard for small companies to compete against the well established giants‟. 
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The issues most mentioned by Nigerian participants were financial, policy, 
infrastructure and compliance. The findings show both countries face infrastructure 
issues. Inadequate infrastructure would affect service delivery and erode average 
revenue per subscriber (ARPS) which is detrimental to efficiency performance. Also, 
the responses show a difference in issues affecting the industry in the two countries. 
It was noted in Section 6.5.1 that the Canadian telecommunications industry would 
benefit from operational scale increase; the mention of scale economies by 
participants from Canada supports the DEA returns to scale findings. It also shows 
that inappropriate scale is hindering performance of the industry. Policy related 
issues were exclusively mentioned by participants from Nigeria, suggesting that 
frequent changes within the government create policy inconsistencies (e.g., spectrum 
issues, macroeconomic policies, tariffs and network access disputes). Another issue 
stated by participants from Nigeria was compliance, signifying firms are not playing 
by the rules. This is confirmed by a recent event in the industry in Nigeria where the 
regulator (i.e., Nigerian Communications Commission [NCC]) fined MTN 780 
billion naira (USD5.2 billion) for non-compliance with subscriber identity module 
(SIM) card registration. The regulator ordered MTN to remove 5.1 million 
unregistered subscribers from its network but an arrangement is ongoing to settle out 
of court (Elebeke, 2016). It is important for firms to comply with the rules to avoid 
regulatory interference and to allow the industry to be market driven. 
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Table 7.12: Difficulties experienced in the deregulated environment. 
Category Expressed difficulties 
Compliance  „Acceptance by industry stakeholders‟ 
 „Anti-competitive behaviour‟ 
 „Non-disclosure of information‟ 
Subtotal 3 
Technology  „Keep pace‟ 
 „Technology issues‟ 
Subtotal 2 
Infrastructure  „Lack of adequate infrastructure‟ 
 „Infrastructure deficiency‟ 
 „Infrastructure development‟ 
 „Power failure‟ 
 „The services were epileptic‟ 
 „Staff mentoring‟ 
 „High cost of electricity to maintain appliances‟ 
Subtotal 7 
Policy  „Level playing field for small companies‟ 
 „Lack of existing framework‟ 
 „Bureaucratic bottleneck‟ 
 „Frequent changes in government policies‟ 
 „Instability in Government policies‟ 
Subtotal 5 
Disputes   „Interconnection‟ 
 „Timely coordination and agreement‟ 
Subtotal 2 
Financial  „Have funds needed to invest in changing 
technologies and products‟ 
 „Infrastructure costs‟ 
 „Funds to build infrastructure‟ 
 „Capital finance‟ 
 „Finance‟ 
 „Finance‟ 
 „Capital‟ 
 „Financing‟ 
Subtotal 8 
Scale economies  „Hard to compete against the well established giant‟ 
 „Ability to develop economies of scale‟ 
Subtotal 2 
Grand total 29 
Source: Survey data analysis 
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7.2.3 Structure of the industry and level of competition 
7.2.3.1 Structure of the industry 
Participants were asked to indicate the structure of the industry. 
Overwhelming majority of participants from the two countries identified the industry 
as oligopoly (Table 7.13). None of the participants indicated monopoly. 8 (22%) said 
it was a monopolistic competition and 3 (8%) thought it was a perfectly competititive 
structure. The response pattern suggests the industry is oligopolistic and corroborates 
the partial measure of performance analysis in Section 6.4.8 that shows the HHI of 
the industry (Canada: 3078; Nigeria: 3062) indicates an oligopolistic market 
structure. A similar structure was found in the German mobile sector (Gerpott, Rams, 
& Schindler, 2001). 
 
Table 7.13: Structure of the industry. 
Market Structure Canada 
n = 5 
Nigeria 
n = 32 
Total 
n = 37 
Monopoly - - – 
Oligopoly 4 22 26 
Monopolistic competition 1 7 8 
Perfect competition - 3 3 
Other(s) (Please specify) - - – 
Total 5 32 37 
Source: Survey data analysis 
 
7.2.3.2 Indicators of competitive intensity in the industry 
 To gain insight on the competitive intensity of the industry in the two 
countries, participants were asked to rate specific aspects of the industry as low, 
medium or high. The transformation of the responses into mean responses (Low = 1, 
Medium = 2 and High = 3) is portrayed in Table 7.14. The table shows that Canadian 
participants rated capital investment required high (mean = 3) and growth rate below 
medium (mean = 1.8) while the other areas were rated at least medium. Participants 
from Nigeria rated all but profitability growth above medium. In addition, Table 7.14 
reveals that the number of firms was rated medium (mean = 2) by participants from 
Canada but participants from Nigeria rated it as slightly above medium (mean = 2.3), 
suggesting new entrants may be allowed to increase the number of service providers 
and/or competitive intensity in the industry. However, the seeming difference in 
rating is not significant (p-value = 0.2995; > 0.05). Furthermore, the low rating of 
profitability by participants from Nigeria signifies reduced profitability and confirms 
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the observation of decline in average revenue per subscriber in Section 6.4.4.  In 
addition, the trend in competition among firms in the industry in both countries is 
above medium (Canada: 2.4; Nigeria: 2.7), signifying culminating effect of 
deregulatory policy which is consistent with Byambaakhuu, Kwon, & Rho (2014) 
who enunciated increased competition among firms operating in the deregulated 
telecommunications industry. 
 
Table 7.14: Indicators of industry competition. 
Indicators Average 
Rating 
(Canada) 
Average 
Rating 
(Nigeria) 
z-scores p-values 
Number of firms 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.0 
0 
75 
95 
 
2.3 
0.6 
628 
608 
-01.037 0.2995 
Growth rate  
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
1.8 
0.4 
69.5 
95 
 
2.2 
0.4 
633.5 
608 
-1.579 0.1142 
Profitability growth 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.0 
0.7 
105 
95 
 
1.8 
0.5 
598 
608 
0.554 0.5795 
Entry barriers 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.6 
0.5 
83 
95 
 
2.8 
0.4 
620 
608 
-0.693 0.4884 
Competition among firms 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.4 
0.5 
74.5 
95 
 
2.7 
0.5 
628.5 
608 
-1.084 0.2785 
Capital investment 
required 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
 
3.0 
0 
110 
95 
 
 
2.8 
0.4 
593 
608 
1.043 0.2968 
Other(s) (Please Specify) – –   
Source: Survey data analysis 
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7.2.4 Conduct of firms in the industry 
7.2.4.1 Barriers to entry 
An important aspect of a deregulated telecommunications industry is low 
entry barrier. A lower barrier signifies high likelihood of increased competition. 
When asked to list the entry barriers in the industry, the types of barriers identified 
by participants were costs, regulatory policy, ownership rules, spectrum and 
licensing, project financing, small population and technology. One respondent 
presented a salient response and indicated: 
„Low margin‟ and „declining margin‟. 
It is interesting that low and/or declining margins were identified as barriers. 
Strategic management and industry analysis research shows low or declining margins 
as a deterrent to new entrants (Thompson & Strickland, 1995). The finding of low 
and/or declining margins is consistent with GSMA (2015) and also confirms the 
partial measures of performance analysis results in Section 6.4.4 that indicates 
average revenue per subscriber is in decline. This depresses industry revenue and 
leads to margin decline. Another respondent considered the barrier from marketing 
perspectives and stated: 
„Positioning‟ and „marketing mix‟. 
It is reasonable to expect the positioning and marketing mix as barriers 
because customers‟ loyalty to a particular service provider would require new 
entrants to commit significant funds and time to winning customers from incumbent 
service providers. Also, participants gave considerations to high switching costs and 
a new provider‟s lack of wider coverage. Other barriers identified by participants in 
both countries are: inability to access incumbents‟ infrastructure, licensing costs, 
spectrum allocation and costs of building infrastructure. Barriers identified by 
participants from Nigeria but not by participants from Canada are considered unique 
to Nigeria and include: lack of power and technology. Chavula (2004) noted that 
inadequate power increases operational costs and inhibits the effective use of 
productive inputs. In addition, Okafor (2008) study of the power crisis in Nigeria 
shows that the poor state of power constrains firms‟ operations and has caused some 
to reconsider their operations. In view of this, power inconsistency and inadequate 
technology may have contributed to the reason why the efficiency of the 
telecommunications industry in Nigeria lags behind that of Canada as noted in 
Section 6.5.1. 
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7.2.4.2 Deregulation and conduct of firms 
On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being the highest), participants were asked to 
indicate the level of impact of the deregulated environment on firms in the industry. 
The outcome presented in Table 7.15 provides the mean ranking. Participants from 
Canada indicated that deregulation has a high impact on product pricing (mean = 4), 
and product and service differentiation (mean = 3.8), close to moderate impacts on 
business focus, legal strategies and investment, a moderate impact on advertisement 
and promotion, and cooperation with competition, and a low impact on distribution, 
research and innovation. Participants from Nigeria specified that the deregulated 
environment has a high impact on advertisement and promotion (mean = 4), product 
pricing (mean = 3.9). All the other areas were described as experiencing slightly 
above moderate impacts (Table 7.15). Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney (Wicoxon 
rank-sum) test shows that the deregulatory environment has higher impact on 
advertisement and promotion in Nigeria than in Canada (p-value = 0.044; < 0.05), 
signifying that competitive intensity is of great concern for firms in the industry in 
Nigeria. The need to allocate more resources to advertisement and promotion 
provides useful clue to the lower technical and scale efficiency performances in 
Nigeria highlighted in Section 6.5.1. An objective of increased advertisement and 
promotion may include attracting new customers and/or motivating existing 
customers to use more telecommunications products and services, resulting in higher 
revenues and improved efficiency performance.  
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Table 7.15: Impact of deregulation on firms (organizations) in the industry. 
Areas of impacts Average 
Response 
(Canada) 
Average 
response 
(Nigeria) 
z-scores p-values 
Business focus 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.4 
1.3 
90 
95 
 
3.6 
1.1 
613 
608 
-0.240 0.8102 
Product pricing 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
4 
0.7 
91 
95 
 
3.9 
1.1 
612 
608 
-0.187 0.8513 
Advertising  and promotion 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3 
1.2 
52 
95 
 
4.0 
1.2 
651 
608 
-2.014 0.044 
Distribution 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
 2.6 
1.3 
58 
92.5 
 
3.7 
1.0 
608 
573.5 
-1.675 0.0940 
Research and innovation 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.8 
1.3 
72.5 
90 
 
3.3 
1.4 
557.5 
540 
-0.845 0.3982 
Product and service 
differentiation 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
 
3.8 
0.4 
104.5 
95 
 
 
3.5 
1.2 
598.5 
608 
0.446 0.6554 
Cooperation with competition 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.0 
1.2 
92 
92.5 
 
3.1 
1.2 
574 
573.5 
-0.024 0.9810 
Legal strategies 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.4 
1.5 
99 
90 
 
3.3 
1.0 
531 
540 
0.455 0.6493 
Investment in infrastructure 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.4 
1.5 
88.5 
92.5 
 
3.6 
1.1 
577.5 
573.5 
-0.197 0.8440 
Other(s) (Please specify) – – - - 
   Note: Respondents were allowed to rank impact of deregulation on more than one item  
   Source: Survey data analysis 
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7.2.5 Performance 
7.2.5.1 Trends in the industry 
Participants were asked to describe trends in the industry using specified 
criteria (Increase, No change, and Decrease). Responses shown in Table 7.16 
indicate that out of the 34 that responded to this question, 22 (65%) believed the 
number of service providers increased, 8 (23%) said it did not change and 4 (12%) 
indicated it decreased. The finding of an increase in the number of service providers 
suggests a change in the structure of the industry and buttresses the HHI findings in 
Section 6.4.8. Thirty participants (88%) stated that the number of product/service 
substitutes increased, 3 (9%) said it did not change while the remaining 3% said it 
decreased. This result indicates customers have more product/service alternatives to 
choose from, forcing firms to seek to attract customers through low price and better 
service quality (Thompson & Stickland, 1995). 4 (12%) noted price (ARPS) 
increased, 5 (15%) indicated no change and 25 (73%) said price decreased. The 
finding that most participants indicated that price decreased affirms the observation 
of sharp decline in the price of telecommunications products and services in Turel, 
Serenko, & Bontis (2007). The cost of service provision is indicative of profitability 
and performance. Industry profitability will decline as costs rise, but the ability to 
contain cost is an indication of efficiency (Lee, Park, & Oh, 2000). Thirty 
participants (88%) stated that costs increased and four (12%) said no change. The 
finding that costs increased in both countries signifies profitability will decline unless 
firms are able to augment revenue or engage in efficiency and productivity 
improvement measures.  
Network access terms and tariffs may result in disputes among service 
providers with the regulator playing an important role (Bruce et al., 2004). Twenty-
five participants (74%) said access to networks increased whereas nine (26%) said it 
did not change. The inference is that access to networks increased but this may have 
been due to compliance to regulation requiring firms to give competition access to 
their networks. However, as noted in Blackman & Srivastava (2011), to increase 
competition it is essential that firms open up their network to competitors at fair 
rates, but compelling firms to do so at controlled tariffs may discourage 
infrastructure investment (Masse & Beaudry, 2014). Investment in infrastructure is 
an indication of service effectiveness which enhances efficiency and productivity 
(Moshi, Mwakatumbula, & Mitomo, 2013). Participants were asked to express their 
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views on trends in infrastructure investment: 20 (59%) said investment in 
infrastructure increased, four (12%) indicated no change and 10 (29%) stated it 
decreased. This finding signals an increase in investment and is consistent with 
studies such as Li & Xu (2004) and Moshi, Mwakatumbula, & Mitomo (2013) that 
noted increased capital expenditures in deregulated telecommunications industry. 
While this finding affirms the observation of capital expenditures increase in Canada 
(see Section 6.4), it contradicts the finding of capital expenditures decline in Nigeria.  
An important objective of deregulation is to increase competition, thus 
industry competition is an important measure of deregulatory policy effectiveness. A 
decrease in competition signals deregulatory policy ineffectiveness while an increase 
indicates success (Byambaakhuu, Kwon, & Rho, 2014). For this reason, participants 
were asked to indicate their opinions: 27 (79%) indicated industry competition 
increased, three (9%) said it did not change and four (12%) noted it decreased. This 
finding signifies most of the participants believe that industry competition increased 
in the deregulated environment which asserts the partial measures of performance 
findings in Section 6.4.8. Also, it is consistent with Hassan (2011) who showed 
industry competition increased in deregulated environment. Other studies about an 
increased level of competition in deregulated environment include Li & Xu (2004), 
Lu & Hung (2008) and Usero, Grigorios, & Asimakopoulos (2013). Another goal of 
deregulation is to improve services for customers (Wallsten, 2004). 23 (68%) 
indicated that the quality of service increased, 9 (26%) stated it did not change and 2 
(6%) said it decreased (Table 7.16). These responses show that most participants 
perceive service quality improved.  
Churn rate is described as the rate at which customers of a particular provider 
switch to another (Kamalraj & Malathi, 2013). Increased competition and policies 
regarding subscriber number portability is expected to allow subscribers to switch 
service providers and still retain their number(s), thus decreasing the cost of 
switching but increasing the prospect a customer will churn. Since an increase in 
churning could depress revenue and cause performance to deteriorate, it is important 
to understand the trend. Sixteen participants (47%) said the churn rate increased, 9 
(26%), stated it did not change and 9 (26%) said it decreased. Most participants 
believed churning increased; this finding is consistent with Wong (2010) who 
revealed a churning rate of 1.6% per month (19.2% per year) in Canada and that it 
costs the industry an estimated $200 million per year. Also, Tecnotree (2013) shows 
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an actual churning rate of 40% per year (3.33% per month) in Nigeria which is 2.1 
times the rate in Canada. However, a common practice in Nigeria is for subscribers 
to own SIM cards from multiple networks, thus the churning rate may have actually 
reduce in Nigeria. This reasoning is supported by Pyramid Research (2010) that 
showed churning peaked at 48.4% in Nigeria in 2007 but declined steadily to 41.8% 
in 2009. 
 
 
Table 7.16: How would you describe industry trends? 
Areas Responses 
Number of service providers  Increase (22) 
 No change (8) 
 Decrease (4) 
Number of product/service substitutes  Increase (30) 
 No change (3) 
 Decrease (1) 
Prices charged customers for services provided (ARPU & ARPS)  Increase (4) 
 No change (5) 
 Decrease (25) 
Cost of producing services  Increase (30) 
 No change (4) 
 Decrease (0) 
Access to network  Increase (25) 
 No change (9) 
 Decrease (0) 
Investment in telecommunications infrastructure  Increase (20) 
 No change (4) 
 Decrease (10) 
Level of market competition  Increase (27) 
 No change (3) 
 Decrease (4) 
Quality of service provided  Increase (23) 
 No change (9) 
 Decrease (2) 
Churn rate  Increase (16) 
 No change (9) 
 Decrease (9) 
Other(s) (Please specify) – 
Note: Participants were allowed to rate more than one area  
Source: Survey data analysis 
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7.2.5.2 Telecommunications industry performance rating 
Participants were asked to state if they agreed that the industry performed 
better under deregulation. Only three (8%) disagreed and they were among 
participants from Nigeria. The 34 (92%) participants who agreed the industry did 
better consist of all five participants from Canada and 29 from Nigeria. This 
indicates that majority of participants have the opinion the industry performed better 
in the deregulated environment. This finding affirms prior studies, including 
Megginson et al. (1994) and Cabeza & Gomez (2007). For insights on the areas of 
improved performance, participants were asked to rate several areas of the industry 
on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest. Table 7.17 shows the mean rating and 
indicates that participants from Canada viewed improvements in two areas (i.e., 
return on investment [mean = 2.8] and teledensity [mean = 2.6]) below 3, suggesting 
that these areas performed below average. Six areas (i.e., profitability, efficiency, 
productivity, market share, network accessibility and customer service) each had a 
rating of between 3 and 3.8, implying moderate level of perfomance while 
improvements in five areas (i.e., technological advancement, product/service quality, 
investment in infrastructure, new product/service development and increased 
competition) were rated between 4 and 4.4, suggesting above average performance in 
these areas.  
Participants from Nigeria considered improvement in four areas (i.e., 
profitability, efficiency, technological advancement and productivity) below 3, 
indicating below average performance. Improvement in seven areas (i.e., product and 
service quality, return on investment, market share, network accessibility, customer 
service, investment in infrastructure and new product development) above 3 but 
below 4, suggesting a moderate performance in these areas. Teledensity and 
increased competition were identified slightly above 4, implying above moderate 
performance. While the majority of participants from both countries stated that the 
industry experienced improved performance, there exist some differences between 
the two countries. The p-values from the Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon rank-sum) test 
presented in Table 7.17 shows difference in the perception of performance relating to 
profitability, technological advancement, teledensity and investment in 
infrastructure. 
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Table 7.17: Indicate how you would rate the performance of the telecommunications  
                    industry. 
Measures Mean Rating 
(Canada) 
Mean 
Rating(Nigeria) 
z-scores p-
values 
Profitability 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.8 
1.1 
138.5 
95 
 
2.8 
0.8 
564.5 
608 
2.037 0.0416 
Efficiency  
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.3 
1.7 
87.5 
72 
 
2.8 
0.7 
542.5 
558 
0.873 0.3827 
Technological advancement 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
4.0 
0.7 
155 
95 
 
2.7 
0.9 
548 
608 
2.835 0.0046 
Productivity 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.0 
0.7 
118 
95 
 
2.6 
0.6 
585 
608 
1.215 0.2245 
Product/servicequality 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
4.2 
0.4 
130.5 
95 
 
3.4 
1.0 
572.5 
608 
1.656 0.0978 
Return on investment 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.8 
1.3 
81 
95 
 
3.3 
0.77 
622 
608 
-0.666 0.5054 
Market share 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.8 
0.8 
113 
90 
 
3.3 
0.7 
517 
540 
1.182 0.2373 
Network accessibility 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.6 
0.5 
127 
95 
 
3.2 
0.6 
576 
608 
1.684 0.0922 
Teledensity 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
2.6 
0.5 
25.5 
95 
 
4.0 
0.7 
677.5 
608 
-3.303 0.001 
Customer service 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
3.4 
0.9 
107 
95 
 
3.2 
1.0 
596 
608 
0.558 0.5768 
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Investment in infrastructure 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
4.2 
0.8 
140.5 
95 
 
3.1 
1.0 
562.5 
608 
2.108 0.0351 
New product/service 
development 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
 
4 
1.2 
125 
95 
 
 
3.4 
0.8 
578 
608 
1.406 0.1596 
Increased competition 
Mean 
S.D 
Rank sum 
Expected 
 
4.4 
0.5 
105 
95 
 
4.1 
1.0 
598 
608 
0.478 0.6330 
Other(s) (Please specify) – – - - 
Note: Participants were allowed to rate more than one area  
Source: Survey data analysis 
 
 
The deregulated environment increased competition, thus satisfying a major 
regulatory objective of increased competition (OECD, 1999). The mean response 
(Canada: 4.4; Nigeria: 4.1) signifies that the deregulated environment increased 
competition in the industry in the two countries. In addition, the p-value of the 
nonparametric test suggests similarity in the perception of the effect of deregulation 
on the concentration of the industry, signifying support for the HHI finding in 
Section 6.4.8 that showed the industry in both countries as having oligopoly 
structure. Profitability perception which is moderate in Canada but is below 
moderate in Nigeria suggests that the deregulated environment has negative effect on 
profitability in Nigeria than in Canada. This finding may be related to the sharp 
decline in average revenue per subscriber in Nigeria noted in Section 6.4.4. The 
perception of efficiency performance of the industry in the two countries is 
statistically comparable but participants from Canada did express slighty higher 
mean responses, seemingly indicating that the industry did better in the dregulatory 
environment in Canada than in Nigeria. However, the Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum) test showed the mean response is not statistically different which may 
imply similar views of the industry‟s efficiency in the two countries. This is in line 
with the DEA finding in Section 6.5.1 that revealed the industry in both countries 
exhibited technical and scale inefficiencies in the period of study. Nonetheless,  the 
above moderate mean response in Canada gives the impression the industry 
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displayed better efficiency performance and affirms DEA efficiency outcome 
reported in Section 6.5.1.  
The high rating of technological advancement by participants from Canada 
implies improvement in this area, but participants from Nigeria viewed the impact of 
deregulation on this area low. In addition, the mean response differs significantly (p-
value = 0.0046; < 0.05), indicating that the deregulated environment may have 
spurred more innovation and technology use in the industry in Canada than in 
Nigeria. Increased use of technology is considered integral to productivity 
improvement (Ng, 2012); the presumption is that better technology in Canada infers 
higher productivity but this is inconsistent with the DEA MPI analysis that showed 
Canada with a lower total factor productivity growth compared to Nigeria (Section 
6.5.3) but the difference is not statistically significant (Section 6.6). Additionally, 
deregulation resulted in more products and better service quality in Canada and 
Nigeria, but the rating by Nigerian participants is inconsistent with Hassan (2011) 
who noted that inadequate infrastructure impedes service quality in Nigeria. 
Unexpectedly, mean responses from Canadian participants show a lower rating for 
return on investment (ROI) compared to the mean rating by Nigerian participants but 
the p-value reveals both are comparable. Since return on investment is asset turnover 
multipled by profit margin (Jansen, Ramnath, Yohn, 2012), the finding may suggest 
that turnover and/or margin performance are lower in Canada due to higher average 
capital expenditures (Table 6.1B).  
Deregulation has above moderate influence on market share, network 
accessibility and cost of service in the two countries. Teledensity performance is 
below average in Canada but above average in Nigeria, denoting better teledensity 
improvement in Nigeria. This finding augments the partial measures of performance 
resultss in Section 6.4.1. Unlike the slightly above moderate rating of investment in 
infrastructure by participants in Nigeria, the high rating of the impact of deregulation 
on investment in infrastructure by participants from Canada suggests that the 
Canadian telecommunications industry performed better on this measure than 
Nigeria. This observation is consistent with the results in Appendices 1D and 1N that 
shows higher capital expenditures in Canada. The ratio of capital expenditures 
between the two countries was 2.2 in 2001 but increased to 6.1 in 2013. The 
appendices also indicate that Canada experienced capital expenditures increase 
between 2001 and 2013 but that Nigeria experienced a decline. Another area of 
 202 
difference is new product development but the null hypothesis that they are 
comparable could not be rejected (p-value = 0.16; < 0.05) (Table 7.17). Nevertheless, 
the higher mean response on this measure by Canadian participants may indicate that 
the deregulatory environment spurred greater level of new product development and 
introduction in Canada. 
 
7.2.5.3 Competitive strategies 
To understand the strategies of firms in the industry, participants were asked 
to identify the competitive strategies that their firms use. Participants selected from 
Porter‟s (1985, pp. 12–15) three main generic strategies: „cost leadership‟, 
„differentiation‟ and „focus‟. Participants from Canada emphasized cost leadership 
the most (90%), followed by product differentiation (60%) and focus strategy (40%), 
suggesting that the dominant strategy in the Canadian telecommunications industry is 
cost optimization while the secondary strategy is product differentiation. This 
contradicts the position in Simon (2013) that indicates customer focus as the main 
strategy. Participants from Nigeria identified product differentiation the most (51%), 
followed by focus strategy (26%) and cost leadership (23%). It is not surprising that 
product differentiation is the dominant strategy and focus is the secondary strategy in 
the Nigerian telecommunications industry. The high level of competition in the 
industry in Nigeria necessitates firms to distinguish their product/service from 
competiton. Also, the incidence of churning in the industry may have prompted firms 
to embrace a customer focus strategy as the secondary strategy in order to segment 
and effectively tailor services to customers‟ unique needs and curtail churning risks. 
 
Summary 
This chapter presents the results of the survey questionnaires completed by 
participants from the telecommunications industry in Canada and Nigeria. 
Particpants from the industry provided useful insights that complement the efficiency 
and productivity findings. Participants revealed that the industry is maturing in 
Canada but it is emerging in Nigeria, implying limited opportunity for growth in 
Canada. It was also noted that the industry received support (e.g., information and 
contract/dispute resolution) from the regulatory agency. Additionally, the top six 
reasons for deregulating the industry were identified as universal accessibility, 
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service quality improvement, promoting competition, economic development, 
promoting investment and technological trends. The literature suggested addressing 
government deficit is paramount in the decision to deregulate, but this research finds 
that it is the least identified reason for deregulating the industry. Also, policies 
affecting the industry are similar (e.g., competition and deregulatory policies). 
However, there is a difference in the level of impacts. The view of participants that 
operating in the deregulated environement has been a success enhances the total 
factor analysis conclusion that the industry experienced improved efficiency and 
productivity in the period of study (Section 6.5.1 and Section 6.5.3). Issues plaguing 
the industry differ between the two countries. In Canada, the industry is grappling 
with technological change, infrastructure finance and economies of scale. The 
industry in Nigeria is also experiencing financing issues; however, policy 
inconsistencies, inadequate infrastructure and compliance issues are unique to it. In 
addition, the results of the analysis revealed that the industry in the two countries is 
an oligopoly structure with trends that show an increase in the number of service 
providers and products, and a decline in average revenue per subscriber amid rising 
costs and infrastructure investment. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Implications of this Study 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This research empirically examined the efficiency and productivity 
performance of telecommunications industry in deregulated environments and 
comparatively evaluated the cases of Canada and Nigeria. The absence of empirical 
research on the experiences of the two countries is the motivation for conducting this 
research. Using panel dataset consisting of industry data from 19 countries over a 13-
year period, two broad research objectives were addressed. The first was to 
understand how deregulatory policies influenced the competitiveness of the industry. 
To achieve this objective, the research identified the force(s) driving  
telecommunications industry deregulation; explored the similarities and differences 
in the deregulatory milieu between the two countries; and identified the impact of 
operating in a deregulated environment on the industry‟s competitive intensity. The 
second objective was to understand the performance of the industry. To attain this 
objective, comparative analysis of the efficiency and productivity performance of the 
industry was carried out; environmental factors that influence efficiency were 
assessed and the direction of influence and statistical significance were identified. 
The research also ascertained the applicability of the SCP model to the deregulatory 
outcomes in the two countries. The findings in this research provided answers to the 
research questions. 
This research is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduced this 
research. Chapter 2 provided information on the evolution of the industry and 
highlighted the significance of the industry. Chapter 3 provided the the theoretical 
review and framework. It was used as the stage for understanding regulation and 
deregulation. The examination of literature provided insightful information on the 
rationale behind regulation and deregulation and the approaches often applied to 
enact them. The reviews showed social and economic reasons and the desire to 
protect the public as the bases for the prominent roles various governments have 
played in allowing a monopoly telecommunications industry. However, as noted in 
the chapter, there were mechanisms put in place to prevent the monopoly from 
misusing its power. Nonetheless, the literature examined revealed the ineffectiveness 
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of regulated monopolies contributed to the quest for deregulated operating 
environment. Furthermore, using historical narratives, the chapter summarized events 
that culminated in the industry‟s deregulation in the two countries. Also, the chapter 
provided the conceptual and theoretical framework on which this research rests. It 
delved into market structure and presented an array of theoretical constructs on 
market structure. Chapter 4 reviewed the literature on deregulated 
telecommunications industry efficiency and productivity analysis. It elaborated on 
the concepts of efficiency and productivity and their measurement. Also, the chapter 
discussed empirical researches that have evaluated telecommunications industry 
efficiency and productivity in different settings and contexts. While some studies 
related that deregulation increase competitive intensity and that this bring about 
performance improvement, others infer that it impede efficiency and productivity 
performance.  
The research methodology and data presented in Chapter 5 detailed the 
research design and methodology, the DEA model, the MPI, the Tobit model and the 
considerations for involving industry participants. Chapter 6 was used to present and 
discuss the results of the DEA and the Tobit model. The chapter started with a partial 
factor analysis discussion and revealed that no single country was best in all 
categories of the partial measures of performance, hence the total factor analysis 
involving DEA efficiency and productivity analysis of the industry. The result 
showed an overall improvement in the Canadian telecommunications industry‟s 
technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency and total factor 
productivity productivity over the period of study. Nigeria also displayed an 
improvement in all but pure technical efficiency. The Mann-Whitney test results in 
the chapter revealed that Canada displayed higher technical and scale efficiency 
scores but that the total factor productivity growth in the two countries are 
comparable. In addition, the random effect (RE) panel Tobit model identified the 
influence of environmental variables on efficiency scores and showed that the 
number of years in deregulation (NYRS) has an insignificant negative association 
with technical and scale efficiencies. However, the effect of its quadratic term is 
positive but also insignificant. Labour productivity (SubEmp) positively influences 
technical efficiency and its effect on scale efficiency is negative and statistically 
insignificant. Change in real GDP per capita (CRGDPPC) showed a negative and 
 206 
statistically insignificant effect on technical and scale efficiencies. Its quadratic term 
revealed a positive and significant effect on operational scale efficiency.  
In addition, the model revealed that an increase in revenue to subscriptions 
(RevSub) improves technical and scale efficiencies. Also, the model showed that 
capital expenditure to revenue (CapexRev) ratio has insignificant influence on 
technical efficiency but statistically significant negative effect on operational scale 
efficiency. The level of concentration (HHI) was found to have no significant effect 
on technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Level of inflation (CPI) was found to 
have an important positive effect on technical and scale efficiency. The influence of 
the level of development (LDev) variable on technical efficiency is positive and 
insignificant. Its effect on scale efficiency is negative and insignificant. Efficiency 
lags have statistically significant positive effect on technical and scale efficiency. 
The interaction between labour productivity and capital intensity revealed a 
statistically significant negative influence on technical efficiency but a statistically 
insignificant positive association with scale efficiency. Chapter 7 presented the 
results of the survey questionnaires completed by the industry participants involved 
in the study. The participants provided information complementary to the DEA 
findings. The insights provided showed that the telecommunications industry in 
Canada is maturing while that in Nigeria is emerging and that the growth in both 
countries has slowed. The general view of the participants was that the industry 
benefitted from deregulation. The final chapter (Chapter 8) presents the major 
findings, the contribution to the body of knowledge (theory and practice), policy 
implications, limitations, recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
 
8.2 Purpose and research objective revisited 
The purpose and objectives of this research were articulated in the preceding 
seven chapters. The two broad research question and three sub-questions through 
which each was viewed were addressed. The research questions and findings are 
presented in this section. 
8.2.1 RQ1: How have deregulatory policies influenced the competitiveness 
within the telecommunications industry in the two countries? 
This research question was meant to discern the influence of deregulatory 
policies on the competitiveness of the telecommunicatons industries. This 
objective was addressed through quantitative analysis of secondary data and a 
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discussion of the results of the partial factor analysis and total factor analysis 
in Chapter 6 and the presentation of the results and discussion of the 
completed survey questionnaires in Chapter 7. Results from the analysis of 
the secondary data showed increased level of competition in the industry in 
the two countries. This is supported by the participants‟ identification of 
deregulatory policy as having an above moderate impact on the industry‟s 
competitive intensity. Sub-questions to RQ1 and the findings of this research 
are: 
8.2.1.1 RQ1.1: What are the driving forces of telecommunications industry 
deregulation in the Canadian and Nigerian context? 
1. The industry participants identified reasons for deregulating the industry as 
universal service/wider access to telephone services, service quality 
improvement, promote competition, economic development, promote 
investment, maintain reasonable rates, and technological trends. Contrary to 
insinuations in Akhtar (2009) that an increase in competition is the main 
reason for telecommunications industry deregulation, the finding in this 
research indicates increased competition and an array of reasons (i.e., wider 
access, better service quality, economic development, investment promotion, 
technological trends etc.) as motivations for deregulating the industry. This is 
consistent with telecommunications industry reforms and structures discussed 
in OECD (2002b) and Blackman & Srivastava (2011). 
2. Deregulation and competition policies were identified as impacting the 
industry. Thus, they are considered major driving forces shaping the industry. 
Tax policy was identified, but was mostly considered an influencing factor in 
the Canadian case. GSMA (2014) shows that a high tax burden removes 
investment incentives and reduces the capacity to raise capital to finance new 
investments. Another important policy is licensing policy but this mainly 
relates to Nigeria. However, Masse & Beaudry (2014) note that this is a 
concern in Canada‟s search for a fourth player in the industry. Restrictive 
spectrum licensing policy hinders investment and innovation (GSMA, 2014). 
8.2.1.2 RQ1.2: What are the similarities and differences in Canada’s and 
Nigeria’s deregulatory milieu? 
1. The review of literature showed political ideologies influence deregulatory 
decisions. In Canada and Nigeria the moves to deregulate the industry 
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suggest an ideology rooted in political conservatism which favours individual 
liberty, fiscal discipline and free market. The view was that a regulated 
environment constrains choices for customers and impedes the full 
functioning of market forces, but that customers are better served in a 
deregulated environment where competition instills market discipline and 
moves firms in the industry to innovate and improve performance 
(Lacobucci, Trebilcok, & Winter, 2006). 
2. Both countries have a regulatory agency (Canada: CRTC; Nigeria: NCC) 
tasked with attaining deregulatory objectives. In addition, unlike Canada 
where monopoly was held provincially, NITEL held a national monopoly of 
the industry in Nigeria prior to deregulation. Also, CRTC is armed with the 
„forbearance‟ clause that gives it the the ability to stay the application of 
regulatory provisions if doing so is consistent with the Canadian 
telecommunications policy objectives. 
3. A significant majority of the participants agreed that the industry has been 
successful in the deregulated environment. This corroborates the DEA 
efficiency and productivity results. While the industry in both countries is 
experiencing some difficulties, the nature of the difficulty differs. In Canada, 
the difficulties identified were changing technology, infrastructure financing 
and scale economies. In Nigeria, the difficulties identified were financial, 
policy instability, infrastructure issues and compliance. Additionally, the 
industry in both countries appears to have issues related to finance. 
4. The subscriptions increase in both countries suggests better accessibility due 
to improved economic conditions and affordability. This finding harmonizes 
with Wallsten (2001) that indicates correlation between per capita income 
and subscriptions per capital. However, the high teledensity in Canada 
implies greater accessibility but signals limited growth potential. In addition, 
unlike Canada, subscriptions in Nigeria grew at a higher rate than revenues, 
generating greater price decline. 
5. Decline in average revenue per subscriber (ARPS) enhances affordability and 
subscriptions growth; a scenario that benefits customers and satisfies the 
deregulatory objectives (i.e., universal/wider access to telephone services, 
maintain reasonable rates etc.). However, continuous pressure on revenue 
hinders performance but this is being addressed as the industry in Canada 
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utilizes cost and product differentiation strategy while Nigeria uses product 
differentiation and focus strategy. 
6. Capital investment is essential to improving network infrastructure and 
expanding service to customers. The resultant increases in revenues and 
labour productivity would generate efficiency and productivity improvement, 
making the industry competitive (European Telecommunications Network 
Operator‟s Association, 2013). The result of the survey questionnaires 
showed increased collaboration is paramount to reducing infrastructure costs 
and that it enables the industry to offer services through technologically 
advanced platforms. Also, it reduces infrastructure duplication and capacity 
underutilization which contributes to improvements in the performance of the 
industry (GSMA, 2014). 
8.2.1.3 RQ1.3: What impacts does operating in a deregulated environment have 
on the industry’s competitiveness? 
1. The industry in Canada is mature while that in Nigeria is emerging but 
experiencing slow growth. These environments foster competition as 
reflected by the level of concentration (HHI) of the industry in both countries 
in 2013 (Canada: 3078; Nigeria: 3062) which is a decline from the HHI in 
2001. The increased competitive intensity in the two countries discussed in 
Section 6.4.8 is affirmed by the survey findings that showed government 
policies have an above moderate impact on competition. However, as the 
competitive intensity increases, average revenue per subscriber (ARPS) will 
decline, eroding profitability and subjecting the industry to lower efficiency 
and productivity performances. 
2. Both countries experienced CRS technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
improvements and productivitity growth. However, the findings also reveal 
lower technical and scale efficiency scores and a deteriorated VRS technical 
efficiency for Nigeria. The inferior efficicency performance of the industry in 
Nigeria may be due to the ineffectiveness of managers in utilizing inputs and 
the industry‟s inappropriate operational scale. In addition, the total factor 
productivity growth of the industry in the two countries are statistically 
comparable, but Nigeria underperformed Canada on technical and scale 
efficiencies. This implies that to be competitive, Nigeria will have to reduce 
inputs in an amount greater than in Canada or to increase outputs in an 
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amount greater than in Canada. The VRS technical efficiency also reveals 
another setback for the industry in Nigeria. The VRS technical efficiency 
shows that managers in both countries did not optimize resource allocation, 
implying that both countries would benefit from training and development 
targeted at enhancing managerial acumen. However, the lower VRS technical 
efficiency in Nigeria signifies a precarious situation. Participants from 
Nigeria identified training opportunities as a service provided by the 
regulator. Thus, the industry may work with the regulator in establishing a 
training framework that delivers the competencies required to foster 
managerial effectiveness in allocating resources. 
8.2.2 RQ2: How has the performance of the industry been in deregulated 
environment? 
This research question was meant to reveal the efficiency and productivity 
performance of the industry. This was addressed through partial factor 
analysis and total factor analysis. The DEA reveals inefficiency in the two 
countries of focus (i.e. Canada and Nigeria) but both experienced efficiency 
improvement in the period of study. The total factor productivity growth 
which was evaluated using DEA-based MPI suggests that the two countries 
attained productivity improvements in the study period. Specific details of the 
findings were presented in Chapter 6. Sub-questions to RQ2 and the findings 
of this research are: 
8.2.2.1 RQ2.1: What are the performances (i.e., efficiency and productivity) of the 
industry in the two countries and how do they compare? 
The partial factor analysis findings show that: 
1. Canada displayed a higher teledensity but slowed growth compared to 
Nigeria. This indicates increased accessibility in the two countries but the 
growth potential is dim in Canada. Because teledensity signifies subscriptions 
per capita, the higher teledensity in Canada (2013: 128.74) compared to 
Nigeria (2013: 97.15) signifies industry saturation limited growth 
opportunities for firms in the industry. 
3. SubEmp improved in both countries but Canada exhibited a superior 
performance due to using technology that has allowed it to better deploy 
productive inputs and to contain employment growth. Another measure of 
labour productivity is revenue to employment (RevEmp) ratio which also 
 211 
improved in the two countries. Canada displayed higher RevEmp but growth 
in Nigeria is superior. The improvement on these measures provide evidence 
of increased labour productivity in the deregulated environment and is 
consistent with Nadiri & Nandi (1999) study that indicate increased labour 
productivity in deregulated environment. 
4. Capital expenditure to employment (CapexEmp) ratio in Canada is eight 
times that in Nigeria: for every dollar in capital expenditure spending per 
employment in Nigeria, Canada would spend $8. This may have contributed 
to the increase in labor productivity in Canada. However, similar to Nigeria, 
the Canadian telecommunications industry was found to be inefficient, 
suggesting it may not have benefitted greatly from a higher CapexEmp. In 
addition, it was observed that both countries invested in telecommunications 
infrastructures but exhibited negative Capex to subscriptions growth. This 
may signify that subscriptions are rising faster than investment in the industry 
as firms seek to bolster profitability amid increased competition and declining 
average revenue per subscriber. While this preserves short-term performance, 
in the long term, performance will deteriorate due to capacity constraints and 
the inability of the industry to respond to customers‟ needs (GSMA, 2013). 
The total factor analysis findings relating to efficiency performance are: 
1. Both countries experienced efficiency improvements in the study period 
but displayed technical efficiency scores of less than 1, implying they 
were technically inefficient and could further increase efficiency by 
reducing inputs or increasing outputs. Additionally, the CRS technical 
efficiency gaps between Canada and Nigeria shrank, suggesting better 
CRS technical efficiency improvements in Nigeria. 
2. The VRS technical efficiency in both countries is below 1. However, the 
two countries are dissimilar. The VRS technical efficiency improved in 
Canada but declined in Nigeria. The decline in Nigeria indicates 
deterioration in managerial effectiveness. 
3. Both countries were scale inefficient as their scale efficiency scores were 
less than 1. However, Canada displayed a modest scale efficiency decline 
whereas Nigeria exhibited a remarkable scale efficiency improvement in 
the study period. Nonetheless, both countries were scale inefficient. 
Although, the average scale efficiency in Canada is higher, Nigeria 
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outperformed Canada in the last two years of the study. This suggests that 
unlike Nigeria, Canada is departing from the most productive scale size 
and that scale inefficiency is increasingly contributing to its technical 
inefficiency. 
4. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test conducted on each of the 
efficiency scores (CRS TE, VRS TE and SE) is statistically significant, 
confirming that Canada exhibited better efficiency scores than Nigeria. 
This finding is similar to findings in Hu & Chu (2008) that show wealthy 
areas in Asia–Pacific displayed higher efficiency scores than less wealthy 
areas in the region. 
5. Both countries were distinctively inefficient and require long-term 
solutions in tackling the identified inefficiencies. The short-term focus 
should be on improving managerial competencies (e.g., training and skills 
development) and motivating managers through incentives tied to 
enhanced performance. In the long term, the focus should be on 
operational scale adjustment to attain most productive scale size. 
Interestingly, the returns to scale in both countries are increasing resturns 
to scale, indicating that the scale adjustment would require size increase. 
The total factor analysis findings relating to productivity growth are: 
1. It is possible to attain total factor productivity growth through 
improvement in either technical change or efficiency change or both. 
Thus, a country seeking to enhance productivity may concentrate on 
technology utilization or efficiency improvement or both. This finding 
harmonizes with the productivity improvement theory that productivity 
enhancement is attainable through technological progress and efficiency 
improvement (Banker et al., 2010). Furthermore, New Zealand and the 
US are the benchmarks and peers for Canada and Nigeria and a host of 
other countries. Therefore, in seeking improvement measures, Canada and 
Nigeria would benefit from dissecting the US or New Zealand models. 
2. The productivity analysis revealed both countries experienced 
productivity growth in the deregulated environment but it has slowed. 
While the average total factor productivity growth in Nigeria seemed 
higher, the Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon Rank-sum) test showed that it is 
not statistically significantly higher. This implies that the total factor 
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productivity growth in the two countries in the period of study is 
comparable. 
3. The total factor productivity growth decomposition revealed that the 
Canadian telecommunications industry experienced technical and 
efficiency change progressions. However, its total factor productivity 
growth was mainly due to improvement in efficiency. The decomposition 
of the efficiency change shows a negligible contribution from scale, hence 
the noted improvement in efficiency was mainly due to managerial 
effectivenes. Unlike the Canadian telecommunications industry with 
technical and efficiency change improvements, the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry experienced technical change retardation but 
efficiency change progression. Howevr, similar to Canada, the total factor 
productivity growth in Nigeria was due to efficiency change but the 
improvement in efficiency was mainly due to enhanced operational scale. 
In addition, the technical regress in Nigeria suggests it lags behind in 
using new technologies and may have underinvested in 
telecommunications infrastructures. The long-term implications for the 
industry are: reduced capabilities in responding to changes in customers‟ 
needs, poor quality of service, and a higher rate of customer 
dissatisfaction which would culminate in plausible deterioration in 
performance. Nonetheless, the finding signifies that Nigeria could attain 
better total factor productivity growth by optimising existing 
technologies. If existing technologies are inadequate, the industry should 
emphasize the adoption of new technologies to improve performance 
(Banker, Chang, & Majumdar, 1998; Petrović et al., 2012). 
8.2.2.2 RQ2.2: What influence do environmental factors have on efficiency 
performance of the industry? 
The main findings about the influence of environmental factors on efficiency 
are: 
1. Telecommunications industries with higher RevSub will experience 
improved technical efficiencies and operate closer to the most productive 
scale size or have better scale efficiency than those with lower RevSub. 
Higher RevSub which drives technical and scale efficiencies could be 
attained by offering innovative products and services that command a 
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premium price and/or that will motivate current customers to upgrade or 
bundle services. This will increase revenue per subscription and 
contribute to a higher RevSub with a positive influence on technical 
efficiency and operational scale. 
2. The telecommunications industries in countries with low economic 
growth may display technical efficiency performance that is comparable 
to those in countries experiencing high economic growth. However, it is 
possible that countries with high economic growth will display superior 
scale efficiency but it would be marginal. Higher economic growth 
signifies wealth and does not imply increased disposable income that 
influences affordability and usage. 
3. Higher CapexRev has no effect on technical efficiencies (CRS TE and 
VRS TE). However, it detracts scale efficiency; indicating that scale 
inefficiency could be mitigated by avoiding capacity underutilization. 
Capacity underutilization may occur if current capacity is not fully 
utilized or if the industry invests in capital assets and new infrastructure 
but employees lack the requisite training and knowledge in using them 
effectively. 
4. Labour productivity enhances technical efficiency. Its influence on scale 
efficiency is insignificant. Increasing telecommunications industry 
efficiency would require improved labour productivity which could be 
attained through innovative production techniques, training and skills 
development, and better management.  
5. Level of concentration is positively linked with CRS technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency but negatively associated with VRS technical 
efficiency. However, its effect on all three efficiency measures 
isstatistically insignificant. This indicates that the level of competition has 
no effect on technical efficiency and operational scale performance of the 
industry. 
6. The number of years in deregulation has no important negative effect on 
technical and scale efficiencies, suggesting that the number of years in 
deregulation has little to do with technical and scale efficiency 
performances. This finding indicates that efficiency may fluctuate over 
time as the industry reorganizes productive inputs and/or adjusts 
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operational scale in response to changes in regulatory policies and 
operating environment. However, the square of the number of years in 
deregulation has a positive but insignificant association with efficiencies, 
signifying that technical and scale efficiencies may strengthen as the 
number of years in deregulation elongates. Nonetheless, the influence is 
not consequential to technical and scale efficiency improvements.  
7. Inflation is positively associated with technical and scale efficiencies. The 
enhancement to technical and scale efficiency levels may be due to the 
ability of the industry to increase/decrease price at a rate higher/lower 
than inflation/deflation in the economy.  
8. A country‟s level of development does not seem to have significant 
influence on the technical and scale efficiency of the industry. This 
indicates that telecommunications industry in developed and developing 
countries may display similar capabilities in input utilization, managerial 
effectiveness, and operational scale. 
9. Efficiency lags positively influence technical and scale efficiencies. The 
magnitude of the coefficients suggest that efficiency lags are the most 
important drivers of technical and scale efficiencies, implying that past 
periods‟ technical efficiency and operational scale performances have 
substantial influence on future periods‟ performances.  
10. The complementary relationship between labour productivity and capital 
intensity impairs technical efficiency. Its influence on scale efficiency is 
positive but immaterial. The impairment in technical efficiency may be 
related to increased hiring and/or training of employees when new 
infrastructures and technologies are acquired. 
8.2.2.3 RQ2.3: Ascertain the applicability of the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) model to the deregulatory outcome in the two countries. 
This research also sought to ascertain the applicability of the structure-
conduct-performance model to deregulatory outcomes. The findings are that: 
1. The partial factor analysis indicated impoved efficiency and productivity 
performances while the industry concentration declined, signifying that lower 
concentration benefitted the industry. This consistent with prior empirical 
studies (e.g., Dabler, Parker, Saal, 2002) that identified increased competition 
and improved performance in deregulated telecommunications industry. 
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Furthermore, responses from industry participants pointed to a link between 
structure, conduct and performance. However, the Tobit model results 
showed HHI has a positive effect on CRS technical efficiency and operational 
scale performance and could infer that a higher level of industry 
concentration results in a higher technical efficiency and scale performance 
but its influence is stastistically insignificant. In addition, its effect on pure 
technical efficiency (i.e., VRS technical efficiency) is negative and may 
indicate diminishing effect on managerial effectiveness, however, it is not 
statistically significant. These findings do not result in validating or denying 
the SCP model. 
 
8.3 Other findings 
Aside from the findings related to the research questions, other findings from 
this research that have implications are: 
1. The average efficiency score under VRS technical efficiency is greater than 
under CRS technical efficiency. This finding is in congruence with 
established DEA theory that efficiency scores under variable returns to scale 
are higher than under constant returns to scale because scale impact is 
eliminated under variable returns to scale (Gokgoz & Demir, 2014). This 
finding signals reliability and consistency of the DEA model in this research 
with prior empirical studies. 
2. This research finds that efficiency and productivity differences among 
countries diminished during the study period. Similar results have been 
reported in Erber (2005). The performance of the sample of countries and 
categories revealed efficiency and productivity improved and that middle 
income countries narrowed performance difference with high income 
countries and OECD countries on efficiency measures (i.e., CRS technical 
efficiency, VRS technical efficiency, and scale efficiency). Also, middle 
income countries attained faster scale efficiency improvement and 
outperformed high income countries and OECD countries on the total factor 
productivity growth measure. This suggests that high income countries and 
OECD countries are more effective than middle income countries in 
allocating productive inputs and may have operated closer to the most 
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productive scale size, their productivity growth lag behind middle income 
countries. 
3. The three categories of countries (i.e., HICs, MICs and OECD) have 
efficiency scores of less than 1. Further examination revealed that the high 
income countries (HICs) and OECD countries categories are marginally 
inefficient (CRS TE < 1; 0.9 < VRS TE < 1) but middle income countries 
(MICs) category is distinctly inefficient (CRS TE < 1; VRS TE < 0.9). This 
finding implies that high income countries and OECD countries could 
address the technical inefficiency through a slight change in input and output 
configuration but not so for middle income countries. In addition, the sources 
of inefficiency in all three categories are pure technically inefficiency and 
scale inefficiency but the pure technical inefficiency contributed mostly to the 
inefficiency, suggesting that in the short term, enhanced managerial acumen 
and incentives to managers to engage in activities pertinent to improving 
efficiency performance would benefit the industry. In the long term, the focus 
should be on moving the industry closer to the most productive scale size 
through scale adjustment. 
4. This research showed that operating in a deregulated environment improves 
efficiency performance. However, there is evidence of efficiency decline 
from 2001 values in some countries (Brazil and South Korea experienced 
CRS technical efficiency decline; Brazil, Nigeria and South Korea 
experienced VRS technical efficiency decline; and Australia, Canada, China 
and South Korea experienced scale efficiency decline). This signifies that 
deregulated environment generates impacts that vary across countries and 
validates the observation of non-uniform adaptation in competitive 
environment noted in Torres & Bachiller (2013). 
5. Technical change did not contribute greatly to total factor productivity 
growth in middle income countries but efficiency change which was 10.3% 
per year did. This level of efficiency change was attained through scale 
efficiency improvement of 3.3% per year and pure technical efficiency 
change of 6.8% per year. Similar to middle income countries, the source of 
total factor productivity growth in OECD countries was mainly efficiency 
improvement of 2.5% per year that was attained through scale enhancement 
of 0.8% per year and pure technical efficiency progress of 1.7% per year. On 
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the contrary, high income countries category though showed total factor 
productivity growth, its technical change regressed. The total factor 
productivity growth in high income countries was attained through improved 
efficiency but the efficiency change was the result of equivalent contributions 
from operational scale enhancement and improved managerial effectiveness. 
6. The sample of countries in the panel showed total factor productivity growth 
of 5.7% per year. Since no technical change occurred, the total factor 
productivity growth was exclusively due to efficiency improvement. Further 
decomposition of the efficiency change indicated scale improvement of 2.1% 
per year and managerial effectiveness of of 3.6% per year. A similar study 
but with focus on Asia–Pacific and dependence on firm level data instead of 
industry data, shows a lower total factor productivity growth (0.2% per year), 
higher technical change progression (3.4% per year) and efficiency 
retardation (3.1% per year) caused by decline in managerial effectiveness 
(1% per year) and operational scale deterioration (2.2% per year). 
 
8.4 Contributions of this research 
8.4.1 Contributions to theory 
This research contributes to the discussion on the motivation and rationale for 
deregulation and the performance of telecommunications industry. Several studies 
have examined the telecommunications industry‟s performance in developed and 
developing economies, but no known studies have placed African countries in the 
context of other countries as performed in this research. In addition, this research 
provides empirical evidence of efficiency and productivity improvements and their 
sources. It is construed that the interaction between structure, conduct and 
performance is not unidirectional; this resulted in SCP model refinement in this 
research. The refined model is an integrated and empirically relevant framework for 
understanding the interplay between structure, conduct and performance. In addition, 
the refined model made the linkages between structure, conduct and performance 
explicit and provides interaction with external environmental variables. The finding 
in this research revealed inconsistency in the performance of the industry in the 
countries studied and provided insufficient evidence to confirm or refute the SCP 
model. Another contribution of this research is its consistency with prior research 
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and affirmation that a country‟s decision to deregulate the telecommunications 
industry is influenced by an array of factors. 
 
8.4.2 Contributions to research methodology 
This research contributes to the understanding of the efficiency and 
productivity performances of telecommunications industry. It used a diverse set of 
tools and applied both quatitative and quanlitative data in a mixed method approach. 
The data used in the DEA are current and the primary data collected through the 
survey questionnaire were designed to capture greater insights from industry 
practitioners. Unlike other research in the field that relied on secondary data only, the 
approach used in this study involves primary and secondary data to provide a 
complete picture of the industry. Furthermore, the advantage of the approach adopted 
is that they complemented each other and mitigated weaknesses associated with 
using each alone. In addition, the Tobit model which was used to assess the influence 
of environmental variables on efficiency performance gives evidence that the 
industry is affected by external factors. Furthermore, this research provides empirical 
evidence of improved efficiency and productivity performances of 
telecommunications industries in deregulated environments. In addition, the 
approach used is tranferrable and easy to implement should there be an interest to 
replicate this research in the quest to understand the telecommunications industry in 
countries other than those covered in this research or in studies focused on 
investigating the performance of industries other than the telecommunications 
industry. 
 
8.4.3 Contributions to the telecommunications industry 
This research contributes to the industry‟s understanding of events leading up 
to deregulation and the competititive intensity that deregulation brings. In addition, 
this research has identified for the industry how efficiency and productivity could be 
attained and the environmental variables that influence performance. Furthermore, 
this research has identified that declining revenue makes the industry inefficient and 
has also drawn attention to the value of infrastructure investment through 
partnerships on infrastructure funding and development to minimize costs and to 
increase labour productivity, efficiency and productivity. 
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8.4.3.1 Implications for managers in the telecommunications industry 
Chapter 1 touched on the competitiveness of the telecommunications 
industry. The industry continues to experience pressure on price due to increased 
competitive intensity. It is essential for managers in the industry to possess 
knowledge about how events in the industry are unfolding and their impact on the 
industry. This research provides managers with information on efficiency and 
productivity and the changing business environment in order to develop a strategic 
response that leads to increased efficiency and productivity. The response may 
include input minimization, output maximization, managerial effectiveness and 
operating closer to the optimal scale. Furthermore, productivity growth is attainable 
through technological innovation and efficiency improvement measures. This will 
require investment in infrastructure and technology to reduce costs, increase labour 
productivity and enhance efficiency (Calabrese, Campsi, & Mancuso, 2002). 
Additionally, this research provides information on areas that should be focused on 
for better performance to be attained. Hence, the areas of deficiency identified could 
serve as means for evaluating managerial competencies, effectiveness and 
performance. Because organizational resources are limited, it is important for 
managers of firms in the industry to understand the competitive environment and 
allocate resources in ways that maximize value. In addition, managers in 
telecommunications industries that are distinctly inefficient should realize that 
eliminating the inefficiency would require a long-term rather than a short-term focus. 
However, they could set short-term goals that include reallocating inputs, training 
managers to acquire decision-making skills and/or hiring managers who already 
possess those skills. The long-term focus should entail reviewing and making 
adjustments to the operational scale. If the review necessitates increased operational 
scale, a decision such as working with the regulatory authority for issuing more 
spectrum licences should be explored for firms in the industry to expand services and 
to extend their geographical presence and for new firms to enter the industry. 
However, if the evaluation reveals that scale reduction is neccessary, measure that 
discourage scales enlargement should be pursued. 
 
8.4.3.2 Implications for policy 
The background and literature review revealed several forces contribute to 
telecommunications industry deregulation and that a deregulated environment results 
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in performance improvement. The findings in this research showed that participants 
from the industry believe that operating in the deregulated environment benefitted 
the industry, implying that policies favouring deregulation should be sustained. 
Because regulatory authorities in various countries guage the industry to see if it 
meets expectations, this research could serve as a useful tool for assessing the 
industry prior to policy changes. Another policy implication is that regulatory 
policies in the two countries should focus on adjusting the operational scale of the 
industry. The size increase required could be attained through issuing new licences 
and spectrums in a competitive bidding process that is fair to all participants. 
Furthermore, the findings in this research indicate that the telecommunications 
industry in Canada experienced minute technological progression whereas that in 
Nigeria experienced technological deterioration. Also, the results showed that the 
average country in the sample experienced low to neglible technological change in 
the period of study. Since the industry could attain higher productivity growth 
through technological innovation (Madden, Savage, Ng, 2003) policy change in 
favour of innovative technology adoption will benefit the industry. The policy 
change should promote technology acquisition and offer tariffs and incentives 
through tax breaks to firms seeking to import new technology and/or invest in 
research and development activities that enhance the technological capability of the 
industry. 
Additionally, regulatory policies should encourage rather than stifle 
innovation. Government regulatory policies should be geared toward support for 
technological development and innovation. They should stimulate investment in 
capital expenditure and the acquisition of innovative technologies that allow firms in 
the industry to produce value added services that customers will be willing to pay a 
premium for. This will increase the overall industry profitability through revenue 
increase and cost reduction from improved labour productivity with a positive impact 
on performance. Also, the model used to evaluate environmental variables showed 
that economic growth somewhat influences scale efficiency. As part of an inclusive 
measure, governments should consider implementing macroeconomic measures that 
facilitate economic growth. The decline in average revenue per subscriber (ARPS) is 
linked to too much competition and has been noted as removing incentives for 
investment in the industry (GSMA, 2013). This research finds a general decline in 
the average revenue per subscriber (ARPS) in all of the countries except Australia 
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and Canada. Beacause too much competition puts pressure on revenue per 
subscription and leads to poor performance, deregulatory policies should seek to 
maintain competition at a level not detrimental to the performance of the industry 
(OECD, 2003b). Taking contrary actions would result in inferior performance and 
cause firms to leave the industry, increasing industry concentration and counteracting 
the principles behind deregulation. 
 
8.4.3.3 Implications for practice 
This research has practical implications for the two countries of focus. First, 
it details current performances of the industry and provides insights into areas 
needing improvements. Thus, firms in the industry are better informed on what needs 
to be done to enhance efficiency and productivity. Second, this research identified 
New Zealand and the US as peers for Canada and Nigeria. Hence in seeking 
performance improvements Canada and Nigeria may work together to discuss mutual 
areas of interest and learn from the experiences of New Zealand and/or the US. In 
addition, Canada and Nigeria would benefit from exploring relationships with New 
Zealand and/or the US and adopting models that seem to have worked in those 
countries. Third, the research identified the telecommunications industries in Canada 
and Nigeria as being distinctly inefficienct and that both countries require short-term 
and long-term focus. In the short term, technical efficiency could be enhanced 
through better allocation of inputs, improved managerial capabilities, training 
initiatives, and a redesign of the incentive to focus attention on the effective 
utilization of inputs. In the long term, attention should be directed at scale efficiency 
imrprovement. Fourth, the findings in this research show that improvement in 
performance occurs in deregulated environment. Given that a number of countries 
around the world are yet to deregulate their telecommunications industry, this 
research could be used as evidence of the benefits of deregulation. 
 
8.5 Limitations of the study 
Chapter 4 detailed the measures taken to ensure the validity and reliability of 
this research despite the noticeable limitations. First, the study utilized secondary 
data from the ITU, World Bank, OECD Communications outlook, regulatory 
agencies and statistical bureau in each country. However, it is recognized that 
accounting requirements and disclosures differ among the countries and may bias the 
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efficiency and productivity results. Nonetheless, the data are reliable and the 
monetary inputs and outputs for each country are expressed in US dollars with the 
price difference accounted for. Second, the outcome of the survey questionnaire did 
not reflect the regulators‟ views because those who responded positively to the 
invitation to participate were mostly from firms in the industry. The Canadian 
regulatory agency (CRTC) expressly declined to participate and informed the 
researcher to access the necessary information online. Third, DEA efficiency and 
productivity scores are relative. Hence, increasing or decreasing the number of 
countries may change the results. Finally, this research used a panel dataset over a 
13-year period (2001–13) although it is recognized that telecommunications industry 
deregulation occurred earlier in Canada than in Nigeria. While this limits the 
generalization of the result, it does not make it invalid in that the focus of this 
research is maintained and the practice is consistent with studies (e.g., Karayazili, 
2004; Petrović et al., 2012) that have examined telecommunications industry 
efficiency across multiple countries. More so, to provide better insight, the 
experiences of the two countries were discussed in the context of 17 other countries. 
 
8.6 Future research 
This research applied data envelopment analysis (DEA) which is a non-
paramentric method to analyze the efficiency and productivity and did establish 
evidence of improved performance of the industry in the two countries in the period 
of study. The use of DEA is suitable in the context of this research because it allowed 
for multiple inputs and outputs without priori assumptions. However, the efficiency 
scores generated are relative to the benchmark, and DEA requires no statistical tests 
and does not have the ability to deal with measurement error (Coelli et al., 2005). In 
view of this, future research should consider using parametric stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) which requires assumptions about the functional form of the model 
but does allow statistical tests to be perfomed to determine the appropriateness of the 
model. The results of the outcome of DEA and SFA should be compared to provide 
insight on whether the two methodological approaches provide similar findings. This 
research focuses on telecommunications industry performance in deregulatory 
environment. It did not empirically investigate the impact of speed and scope of 
deregulation on the efficiency and productivity performances. Furture research 
should investigate this area. In addition, this research focused on technical and scale 
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efficiencies but the outcome reveals that performance improvement is incumbent on 
resource reallocation. Hence, future research should endeavour to investigate the 
allocative efficiency and cost efficiency of the industry so as to yield information on 
cost savings that will accrue to the industry should it attain efficiency status by 
optimizing inputs.  
Furthermore, the finding in this research that showed that Canada attained 
improved efficiency through pure technical efficiency change but Nigeria mainly 
through scale efficiency change hints at differences in managerial practices and 
effectiveness between the two countries. While this research was not specific on the 
kind of management practice that may have generated improved total factor 
productivity growth in Canada, future research should endeavour to identify the 
management practices that resulted in better performance in Canada. Additionally, 
this research utilized rigorous econometric analysis in the examination of the effect 
of environmental variables on efficiency performance. While it applied descriptive 
analysis to provide a concise summary of the survey data, it used nonparamentric 
Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon rank-sum) test to allow inferences to be made about the 
industry. Econometric analysis was noted to also allow for inferences to be made but 
the sample size in this research is not large enough to yield robust econometric 
models notwithstanding the fact that it would broadened the scope of the research 
beyond its intended focus. In view of this, future research should consider a survey 
of larger population and apply econometric analysis. Also, telecommunications 
service recipients were not included in the study because the intention was to 
complement the analysis of the efficiency and productivity of the industry with 
information gathered from industry participants with knowledge of the industry. 
Given the deregulatory objective of protecting service recipients from abuse by the 
monopoly, future research should consider involving service recipients to get an 
understanding of their views and experience in the deregulated environment.   
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APPENDIX 1: TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY DATA 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1A: Telecommunications Industry Data for Australia
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue          
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions 
per 100 
Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio 
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP per 
Capita (USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 4,292 21,192 84,800 19,902 109.16 250 234,693 939 0.22 203 50,617 18,619 5,314
2002 7,057 23,070 88,700 20,279 117.40 260 228,629 879 0.35 306 79,563 19,504 4,970
2003 5,068 24,807 91,400 23,590 124.69 271 258,101 951 0.21 204 55,451 22,737 4,841
2004 5,346 26,850 99,500 28,286 133.40 270 284,286 1,053 0.19 199 53,725 29,482 4,576
2005 5,141 28,540 100,400 30,814 139.94 284 306,911 1,080 0.17 180 51,202 32,780 4,642
2006 4,890 29,700 102,300 30,211 143.49 290 295,322 1,017 0.16 165 47,801 34,360 4,226
2007 6,611 31,020 95,000 33,693 148.94 327 354,661 1,086 0.20 213 69,591 39,034 4,248
2008 6,389 31,490 90,500 32,258 148.19 348 356,443 1,024 0.20 203 70,594 47,495 4,193
2009 5,833 32,909 90,300 30,076 151.71 364 333,068 914 0.19 177 64,600 40,691 4,174
2010 6,172 33,125 86,000 37,210 150.35 385 432,674 1,123 0.17 186 71,767 51,283 4,201
2011 7,265 34,362 90,000 42,117 153.81 382 467,961 1,226 0.17 211 80,722 58,512 4,149
2012 9,214 34,809 99,700 46,198 153.15 349 463,366 1,327 0.20 265 92,415 66,256 4,076
2013 9,852 35,290 92,200 35,310 152.60 383 382,972 1,001 0.28 279 106,858 67,671 3,744
Source(s): ILO (2015); ITU (2003; 2015); OECD (2011; 2013)
APPENDIX 1B: Telecommunications Industry Data for Belgium
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue          
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions 
to Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 1,710 12,829 21,762 8,495 124.71 589 390,374 662 0.20 133 78,592 23,078 5,357
2002 1,419 13,033 19,290 8,863 126.14 676 459,449 680 0.16 109 73,539 25,007 5,100
2003 1,371 13,481 23,291 11,059 129.92 579 474,825 820 0.12 102 58,855 30,703 4,982
2004 1,408 13,933 23,921 12,341 133.70 582 515,916 886 0.11 101 58,840 35,548 4,673
2005 1,469 14,399 22,445 12,624 137.42 642 562,447 877 0.12 102 65,446 36,928 4,661
2006 1,376 14,575 21,284 11,137 138.18 685 523,264 764 0.12 94 64,636 38,936 4,530
2007 1,451 15,585 18,651 11,800 146.68 836 632,676 757 0.12 93 77,819 44,450 4,819
2008 1,618 16,076 19,230 11,885 150.11 836 618,062 739 0.14 101 84,129 48,561 4,608
2009 1,536 16,411 19,309 11,142 152.01 850 577,021 679 0.14 94 79,543 44,999 3,850
2010 1,633 16,794 18,947 10,402 153.79 886 549,005 619 0.16 97 86,188 44,361 4,315
2011 1,986 17,130 19,031 10,261 155.06 900 539,156 599 0.19 116 104,350 47,802 4,173
2012 1,552 16,961 18,910 9,350 152.42 897 494,425 551 0.17 92 82,075 44,818 3,272
2013 2,397 16,912 18,601 9,292 151.23 909 499,545 549 0.26 142 128,883 46,927 3,824
Source(s): Barnes (2014a; 2014b); BIPT (2012; 2013; 2014); OECD (2013); The World Bank (2006)
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APPENDIX 1C: Telecommunications Industry Data for Brazil
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Total Revenue 
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 23,536 66,177 93,494 36,478 37.39 708 390,161 551 0.65 356 251,741 2,925 3,361
2002 6,763 73,692 93,500 33,555 41.08 788 358,872 455 0.20 92 72,331 2,580 3,961
2003 4,522 85,578 69,475 30,139 47.08 1,232 433,816 352 0.15 53 65,082 2,699 3,221
2004 6,261 105,184 76,120 35,227 57.16 1,382 462,777 335 0.18 60 82,245 3,377 3,204
2005 7,288 126,063 81,597 41,766 67.72 1,545 511,860 331 0.17 58 89,316 4,459 3,187
2006 7,313 138,719 102,920 46,492 73.73 1,348 451,732 335 0.16 53 71,054 5,519 3,535
2007 8,053 160,380 112,954 58,091 84.41 1,420 514,284 362 0.14 50 71,294 6,905 3,401
2008 11,930 191,877 128,357 46,020 100.06 1,495 358,527 240 0.26 62 92,940 8,117 3,194
2009 7,495 210,883 132,327 58,826 108.99 1,594 444,552 279 0.13 36 56,641 8,014 3,279
2010 9,068 239,071 152,100 60,800 122.47 1,572 399,737 254 0.15 38 59,619 10,425 2,948
2011 11,985 277,383 195,000 62,737 140.85 1,422 321,727 226 0.19 43 61,462 12,260 2,830
2012 11,930 292,629 200,000 63,881 147.30 1,463 319,405 218 0.19 41 59,651 11,474 2,658
2013 8,553 316,138 214,694 62,831 157.78 1,473 292,655 199 0.14 27 39,840 11,209 2,405
Source(s): ITU (2003; 2015); MarketLine Industry Profile (2015a); OECD (2015a); 
                      Pyramid Research (2011); Simon (2011); Ramboll Management (2007)
APPENDIX 1D: Telecommunications Industry Data for Canada
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue       
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions 
to Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 6,120 31,775 124,652 24,864 102.23 255 199,469 783 0.25 193 49,093 23,197 3,746
2002 4,839 32,494 119,933 24,649 103.61 271 205,521 759 0.20 149 40,345 23,704 3,908
2003 3,709 33,903 117,134 25,906 107.03 289 221,163 764 0.14 109 31,664 27,121 3,186
2004 4,427 35,583 118,038 28,650 111.21 301 242,719 805 0.15 124 37,504 30,819 3,027
2005 4,979 35,165 118,285 31,046 108.83 297 262,470 883 0.16 142 42,091 34,909 3,538
2006 6,510 36,985 117,974 34,067 113.55 314 288,764 921 0.19 176 55,180 39,183 3,392
2007 7,977 38,559 116,997 37,142 117.24 330 317,460 963 0.21 207 68,180 42,938 2,463
2008 11,449 40,343 116,449 38,423 121.35 346 329,954 952 0.30 284 98,314 44,660 3,526
2009 7,143 42,520 116,608 36,621 126.44 365 314,051 861 0.20 168 61,257 41,657 3,415
2010 8,155 44,219 115,735 40,441 130.04 382 349,428 915 0.20 184 70,463 46,241 3,272
2011 9,227 45,114 116,302 41,924 131.36 388 360,475 929 0.22 205 79,332 50,166 3,241
2012 9,289 45,446 115,040 41,001 130.77 395 356,411 902 0.23 204 80,743 51,552 3,174
2013 8,471 45,281 111,338 39,249 128.81 407 352,521 867 0.22 187 76,086 51,289 3,078
Source(s): CRTC (2006; 2010; 2014); OECD (2013); ITU (2015)
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APPENDIX 1E: Telecommunications Industry Data for Chile
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 1,340 8,568 19,855 3,534 54.78 432 177,992 412 0.38 156 67,500 4,454 5,106
2002 800 9,711 19,391 3,173 61.39 501 163,645 327 0.25 82 41,232 4,306 4,954
2003 717 10,520 16,815 3,116 65.77 626 185,314 296 0.23 68 42,642 4,597 4,727
2004 717 12,580 14,238 3,095 77.80 884 217,387 246 0.23 57 50,334 5,791 4,634
2005 904 14,005 16,291 5,296 85.72 860 325,115 378 0.17 65 55,518 7,080 4,452
2006 1,428 15,834 19,312 5,894 95.94 820 305,190 372 0.24 90 73,969 8,307 4,128
2007 1,603 17,415 30,334 6,688 104.47 574 220,472 384 0.24 92 52,851 9,904 4,005
2008 1,930 18,326 31,059 7,276 108.88 590 234,251 397 0.27 105 62,141 10,622 3,835
2009 1,407 20,015 31,591 6,555 117.79 634 207,500 328 0.21 70 44,524 9,746 3,648
2010 1,920 23,310 36,513 6,677 135.91 638 182,866 286 0.29 82 52,584 11,655 3,550
2011 2,328 25,682 36,897 7,494 148.38 696 203,097 292 0.31 91 63,101 14,033 3,488
2012 2,287 27,222 39,548 7,829 155.86 688 197,952 288 0.29 84 57,839 15,059 3,353
2013 2,337 26,865 38,931 8,306 152.47 690 213,354 309 0.28 87 60,030 15,410 3,210
Source(s): Barnes (2015a; 2015b); Economic Indicators of Countries (2014); ITU (2015); 
                      Foreign Invesment Committee (CIECHile) (2013); OECD (2011; 2013);
                     Entel Group (2014);  Standard and Poor's (2013)
APPENDIX 1F: Telecommunications Industry Data for China
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions 
to Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 18,088 325,188 2,037,000 55,381 25.57 160 27,187 170 0.33 56 8,880 1,026 4,027
2002 14,873 420,227 1,892,914 62,981 32.82 222 33,272 150 0.24 35 7,857 1,135 3,752
2003 16,412 532,700 1,168,000 67,994 41.35 456 58,214 128 0.24 31 14,052 1,248 3,570
2004 17,178 646,580 1,237,000 73,808 49.89 523 59,667 114 0.23 27 13,886 1,401 3,522
2005 17,938 743,851 1,301,000 82,958 57.06 572 63,765 112 0.22 24 13,788 1,675 5,121
2006 19,985 828,844 1,382,000 94,420 63.22 600 68,322 114 0.21 24 14,461 2,004 5,182
2007 22,519 912,943 1,502,000 108,239 69.27 608 72,063 119 0.21 25 14,993 2,479 5,183
2008 27,779 981,604 1,595,000 122,373 74.10 615 76,723 125 0.23 28 17,416 3,192 5,111
2009 25,353 1,060,946 1,738,000 131,791 79.69 610 75,829 124 0.19 24 14,587 3,805 5,027
2010 25,397 1,153,386 1,858,000 158,000 86.22 621 85,038 137 0.16 22 13,669 4,222 4,869
2011 26,847 1,271,368 2,128,000 161,274 94.59 597 75,787 127 0.17 21 12,616 5,155 4,236
2012 35,408 1,390,308 2,228,000 170,969 102.93 624 76,737 123 0.21 25 15,892 6,118 4,156
2013 43,665 1,496,098 3,273,000 184,596 110.22 457 56,400 123 0.24 29 13,341 6,839 4,254
Source(s): Huang & Hao (2014); Normand (2010);   ITU (2003; 2015); 
                     The Economic Intelligence Unit Ltd. (2015); Yin & Chung (2010)
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APPENDIX 1G: Telecommunications Industry Data for Germany
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 11,748 108,456 240,700 61,806 131.70 451 256,777 570 0.19 108 48,809 23,356 5060.5
2002 7,556 112,798 231,500 65,987 136.74 487 285,039 585 0.11 67 32,641 24,837 5052.02
2003 6,901 119,033 230,600 80,170 144.22 516 347,657 674 0.09 58 29,925 29,954 5058.32
2004 7,729 125,848 225,300 90,576 152.51 559 402,025 720 0.09 61 34,304 33,754 5036.98
2005 7,841 134,062 224,100 90,988 162.56 598 406,013 679 0.09 58 34,991 34,436 4563.01
2006 8,651 140,052 214,700 88,244 170.01 652 411,009 630 0.10 62 40,295 36,293 4,089
2007 10,123 149,333 204,600 91,110 181.52 730 445,310 610 0.11 68 49,479 41,068 3,757
2008 10,738 155,823 188,100 92,919 189.77 828 493,987 596 0.12 69 57,089 45,249 3,523
2009 8,566 158,700 184,200 84,815 193.77 862 460,450 534 0.10 54 46,501 40,944 4,322
2010 7,763 141,300 176,900 77,895 172.79 799 440,334 551 0.10 55 43,884 41,417 4,698
2011 8,164 142,300 176,000 79,462 173.97 809 451,489 558 0.10 57 46,384 45,351 4,230
2012 8,123 142,500 173,000 75,486 177.18 824 436,335 530 0.11 57 46,951 43,282 4,338
2013 8,185 148,734 170,000 72,758 184.43 875 427,991 489 0.11 55 48,149 45,322 4,236
Source(s): European Commission (2014); ITU (2015); OECD (2015a; 2013)
                     MarketLine Industry Profile (2015b; 2015c); Statista (2015)
APPENDIX 1H: Telecommunications Industry Data for India
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 6,081 45,076 484,741 21,191 4.25 93 43,716 470 0.29 135 12,545 452 4,125
2002 8,543 54,420 503,889 16,454 5.05 108 32,655 302 0.52 157 16,954 469 3,720
2003 3,418 75,690 525,996 19,259 6.92 144 36,615 254 0.18 45 6,498 544 3,532
2004 5,861 98,418 549,633 21,379 8.86 179 38,896 217 0.27 60 10,663 615 3,596
2005 8,607 140,317 593,207 29,943 12.45 237 50,476 213 0.29 61 14,510 710 3,500
2006 9,765 206,820 662,371 34,801 18.09 312 52,540 168 0.28 47 14,742 780 3,424
2007 10,990 272,870 731,063 44,598 23.54 373 61,004 163 0.25 40 15,032 1,011 2,642
2008 12,335 384,790 847,460 39,620 32.76 454 46,751 103 0.31 32 14,556 959 2,679
2009 8,769 562,150 1,031,914 34,931 47.23 545 33,850 62 0.25 16 8,498 1,082 2,532
2010 20,335 787,280 1,266,049 37,158 65.30 622 29,350 47 0.55 26 16,062 1,300 2,506
2011 3,897 926,698 1,411,044 30,264 75.89 657 21,448 33 0.13 4 2,762 1,413 2,483
2012 3,208 895,662 1,378,766 32,572 72.42 650 23,624 36 0.10 4 2,326 1,376 3,395
2013 5,575 915,337 1,399,229 28,639 73.10 654 20,468 31 0.19 6 3,985 1,399 3,130
Source(s): ITU (2003; 2015); Jain (2008);  Malik (2010); Mani (2011); Normand (2010);
                      Simon (2011); Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) (2012)
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APPENDIX 1I: Telecommunications Industry Data for Indonesia
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 2,896 13,740 167,355 6,398 6.48 82 38,228 466 0.45 211 17,303 662 4,497
2002 2,407 19,450 175,912 7,319 9.04 111 41,608 376 0.33 124 13,680 859 4,941
2003 1,605 26,553 186,553 8,301 12.17 142 44,497 313 0.19 60 8,604 1,020 5,239
2004 1,439 40,713 278,475 13,700 18.40 146 49,195 336 0.11 35 5,168 1,069 5,392
2005 2,239 60,418 333,248 14,870 26.91 181 44,620 246 0.15 37 6,718 1,114 5,709
2006 1,900 78,624 412,691 12,518 34.53 191 30,332 159 0.15 24 4,604 1,403 5,761
2007 4,254 112,916 475,740 15,785 48.89 237 33,181 140 0.27 38 8,942 1,682 5,454
2008 3,169 170,956 414,752 12,623 72.98 412 30,434 74 0.25 19 7,641 1,844 5,141
2009 3,129 198,487 444,063 11,250 83.58 447 25,334 57 0.28 16 7,046 2,098 5,105
2010 1,846 252,221 355,155 11,724 104.80 710 33,010 46 0.16 7 5,197 2,722 4,838
2011 1,995 288,423 322,030 11,483 118.30 896 35,658 40 0.17 7 6,196 3,408 4,804
2012 2,425 319,947 282,160 11,219 129.60 1,134 39,761 35 0.22 8 8,593 3,584 4,730
2013 1,515 343,950 225,345 8,990 137.65 1,526 39,894 26 0.17 4 6,725 3,480 4,814
 Source(s): Barnes (2013a; 2013b; 2015a; 2015b); EXIM Bank of Malaysia (2014); 
                       ITU (2015); The World Bank (2006)
APPENDIX 1J: Telecommunications Industry Data for Japan
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions 
to Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 23,479 136,145 399,139 153,923 107.08 341 385,637 1,131 0.15 172 58,823 33,113 5,594
2002 19,155 141,891 353,025 128,668 111.33 402 364,474 907 0.15 135 54,260 31,727 5,463
2003 20,280 146,874 330,876 138,257 115.00 444 417,852 941 0.15 138 61,292 34,279 5,364
2004 23,032 151,082 298,495 133,807 118.25 506 448,271 886 0.17 152 77,159 36,941 5,264
2005 18,851 154,537 267,244 131,494 120.95 578 492,038 851 0.14 122 70,540 36,235 5,998
2006 20,899 155,855 293,996 129,019 121.90 530 438,845 828 0.16 134 71,087 34,462 6,386
2007 18,355 158,574 303,149 129,065 123.88 523 425,748 814 0.14 116 60,549 34,353 6,051
2008 23,065 158,822 335,986 136,505 124.02 473 406,283 859 0.17 145 68,648 38,351 6,044
2009 25,140 183,090 324,701 150,859 142.99 564 464,610 824 0.17 137 77,424 39,520 5,423
2010 16,936 188,906 329,864 152,292 147.50 573 461,681 806 0.11 90 51,342 43,859 5,202
2011 18,680 197,430 330,000 167,976 154.46 598 509,018 851 0.11 95 56,606 47,075 5,011
2012 20,081 205,355 374,184 169,544 160.98 549 453,104 826 0.12 98 53,666 47,118 4,792
2013 20,161 208,907 362,063 168,261 164.06 577 464,729 805 0.12 97 55,684 38,847 4,628
Source(s): Barnes (2013a; 2013b); ITU (2015); Telecommunications Bureau (2008);
                      European Telecommunications Network Operator's Association (ETNO) (2014)
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APPENDIX 1K: Telecommunications Industry Data for Kenya
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 268 909 52,895 697 2.83 17 13,168 766 0.39 295 5,070 398 4,088
2002 263 1509 57,149 1,617 4.57 26 28,299 1,072 0.16 174 4,602 395 4,622
2003 239 1919 60,000 1,445 5.66 32 24,091 753 0.17 125 3,992 414 3,957
2004 1,111 2845 100,000 1,387 8.17 28 13,869 487 0.80 390 11,105 431 4,424
2005 758 4899 156,250 1,601 13.69 31 10,247 327 0.47 155 4,852 499 4,745
2006 974 7634 187,500 1,435 20.77 41 7,654 188 0.68 128 5,195 568 5,046
2007 1,257 11813 212,500 2,531 31.29 56 11,912 214 0.50 106 5,917 784 5,602
2008 1,363 16950 218,750 1,828 43.72 77 8,354 108 0.75 80 6,229 804 6,613
2009 289 20029 215,625 1,925 50.29 93 8,928 96 0.15 14 1,340 833 6,247
2010 492 25350 237,500 1,295 61.97 107 5,451 51 0.38 19 2,072 958 5,481
2011 455 28364 246,875 1,244 67.49 115 5,041 44 0.37 16 1,842 901 4,715
2012 332 30983 266,420 1,244 71.76 116 4,671 40 0.27 11 1,245 1,066 4,498
2013 281 32034 273,882 1,232 72.22 117 4,499 38 0.23 9 1,025 1,186 4,914
Source(s): Deloitte (2011); Export Processing Zone Authority (2005); ITU (2003; 2015); 
                      The World Bank Group (2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d)
APPENDIX 1L: Telecommunications Industry Data for Mexico
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 8,540 35,532 94,675 23,843 33.73 375 251,845 671 0.36 240 90,201 6,529 7,878
2002 4,425 40,903 90,516 24,142 38.33 452 266,715 590 0.18 108 48,888 6,579 7,636
2003 3,494 46,428 90,002 23,278 42.97 516 258,643 501 0.15 75 38,825 6,229 7,695
2004 4,670 56,524 92,858 24,659 51.68 609 265,558 436 0.19 83 50,288 6,502 7,457
2005 4,364 66,641 100,892 27,697 60.18 661 274,523 416 0.16 65 43,252 7,422 7,019
2006 4,434 75,257 101,501 31,221 67.12 741 307,593 415 0.14 59 43,684 8,112 7,367
2007 3,772 86,557 109,691 33,544 76.24 789 305,804 388 0.11 44 34,392 8,761 6,276
2008 4,001 95,795 117,161 33,155 83.32 818 282,983 346 0.12 42 34,149 9,019 6,176
2009 3,011 102,699 120,072 28,329 88.21 855 235,930 276 0.11 29 25,078 7,427 5,537
2010 5,673 111,302 123,297 30,286 94.41 903 245,635 272 0.19 51 46,011 8,538 6,724
2011 4,821 114,580 127,877 30,775 95.99 896 240,664 269 0.16 42 37,698 9,311 6,870
2012 6,316 121,315 132,567 32,841 100.39 915 247,733 271 0.19 52 47,641 9,507 6,504
2013 4,415 124,799 148,000 35,653 102.02 843 240,899 286 0.12 35 29,829 10,131 6,502
Source(s): ITU (2015); OECD (2015a; 2015b); PWC Mexico (2015)
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APPENDIX 1M: Telecommunications Industry Data for New Zealand
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 484 4,111 7,459 2,717 105.94 551 364,223 661 0.18 118 64,862 13,228 4,784
2002 400 4,214 8,100 3,080 106.72 520 380,234 731 0.13 95 49,361 16,677 6,557
2003 463 4,397 8,100 3,808 109.18 543 470,180 866 0.12 105 57,120 21,253 5,168
2004 501 4,828 8,078 4,225 118.12 598 522,965 875 0.12 104 61,996 24,446 5,596
2005 598 5,259 10,396 4,354 127.22 506 418,820 828 0.14 114 57,533 26,965 5,645
2006 674 5,650 9,647 3,615 135.02 586 374,691 640 0.19 119 69,895 25,737 6,843
2007 863 6,100 10,035 3,950 144.42 608 393,667 648 0.22 141 85,988 30,452 6,483
2008 886 6,440 10,500 3,683 151.18 613 350,716 572 0.24 138 84,346 29,875 5,860
2009 1,102 6,570 11,000 3,199 152.70 597 290,799 487 0.34 168 100,148 26,841 5,403
2010 1,112 6,580 11,378 3,511 151.24 578 308,578 534 0.32 169 97,732 31,995 4,789
2011 954 6,680 11,940 3,796 152.37 559 317,914 568 0.25 143 79,931 36,627 4,263
2012 996 6,780 12,420 4,229 153.81 546 340,527 624 0.24 147 80,221 38,818 4,295
2013 1,254 6,650 12,900 4,380 149.70 516 339,560 659 0.29 189 97,230 40,172 4,300
Source(s): Commerce Commission New Zealand (2014);  ITU (2015); OECD (2013)
APPENDIX 1N: Telecommunications Industry Data for Nigeria
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 2,732 867 193,682 607 0.74 4 3,135 700 4.50 3,152 14,105 376 6,934
2002 2,116 2,271 198,897 2,425 1.89 11 12,193 1,068 0.87 932 10,638 349 4,082
2003 3,663 4,022 315,039 3,652 3.35 13 11,593 908 1.00 911 11,627 489 3,850
2004 2,036 10,202 325,047 6,579 8.50 31 20,239 645 0.31 200 6,263 656 3,016
2005 3,732 19,519 467,260 6,926 16.27 42 14,822 355 0.54 191 7,988 664 2,995
2006 3,781 33,858 439,866 10,155 24.18 77 23,088 300 0.37 112 8,596 885 2,974
2007 3,908 41,975 445,821 13,721 29.98 94 30,777 327 0.28 93 8,765 1,100 3,387
2008 3,799 64,296 462,115 17,335 45.93 139 37,512 270 0.22 59 8,221 1,255 3,346
2009 3,476 74,518 469,513 15,600 53.23 159 33,226 209 0.22 47 7,404 1,148 3,464
2010 3,036 88,348 479,673 8,600 63.11 184 17,929 97 0.35 34 6,329 1,137 2,779
2011 1,339 95,887 485,177 7,287 68.49 198 15,020 76 0.18 14 2,759 2,318 3,016
2012 1,712 113,196 479,812 6,597 80.85 236 13,750 58 0.26 15 3,567 2,499 2,800
2013 1,398 127,607 483,801 6,801 91.15 264 14,057 53 0.21 11 2,890 2,802 3,062
Source(s): ITU (2015); NCC (2013; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e, 2016f); Pyramid Research (2010);
                     The World Bank Group (2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d)
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APPENDIX 1O: Telecommunications Industry Data for South Africa
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions 
to Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 3,152 15,680 79,313 10,917 34.92 198 137,651 696 0.29 201 39,744 2,487 7,625
2002 3,030 18,569 86,577 10,388 40.77 214 119,991 559 0.29 163 34,996 2,355 7,250
2003 2,766 21,704 81,106 12,981 47.05 268 160,054 598 0.21 127 34,103 3,386 7,175
2004 2,580 25,679 73,151 11,802 54.95 351 161,342 460 0.22 100 35,267 4,624 7,075
2005 1,652 38,660 94,466 12,816 81.65 409 135,672 332 0.13 43 17,492 5,111 7,243
2006 1,811 44,263 107,869 13,049 92.23 410 120,970 295 0.14 41 16,785 5,368 7,221
2007 2,545 46,915 107,946 12,221 96.42 435 113,211 260 0.21 54 23,579 5,790 6,979
2008 2,152 49,495 114,479 9,368 100.31 432 81,830 189 0.23 43 18,802 5,339 6,850
2009 2,489 50,837 119,525 8,570 101.56 425 71,697 169 0.29 49 20,822 5,432 6,326
2010 2,101 54,872 120,669 9,495 108.03 455 78,690 173 0.22 38 17,411 6,874 5,762
2011 1,645 68,455 115,285 9,073 132.78 594 78,699 133 0.18 24 14,269 7,598 5,592
2012 1,425 72,809 118,651 7,757 139.10 614 65,375 107 0.18 20 12,006 7,119 5,156
2013 1,242 81,298 119,080 6,149 152.94 683 51,641 76 0.20 15 10,431 6,527 4,760
Source(s): Datamonitor (2005; 2009); Deloitte & GSM Association (2012); ITU (2015)
                     Department of Labour & HSRC (2008); Iset Setta (2011); MarketLine (2015d); 
                     The World Bank (2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d); 
                     Media, Information and Communications Technologies Sector Education Training and Authority (MICTSETA) (2013);
                     Transport Education Training Authourity (TETA) (2015; 2014); 
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APPENDIX 1P: Telecommunications Industry Data for South Korea
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 7,874 54,821 76,287 31,110 115.76 719 407,803 567 0.25 144 103,213 10,860 5,365
2002 8,181 58,078 81,422 34,609 121.95 713 425,053 596 0.24 141 100,482 12,409 5,074
2003 6,432 58,719 77,985 35,978 122.69 753 461,348 613 0.18 110 82,477 13,752 5,058
2004 6,302 60,154 87,085 39,841 125.22 691 457,500 662 0.16 105 72,367 15,461 5,017
2005 6,036 62,247 91,009 46,318 129.31 684 508,940 744 0.13 97 66,319 18,467 5,013
2006 7,098 62,629 100,264 50,981 129.47 625 508,468 814 0.14 113 70,791 20,946 4,908
2007 7,747 67,376 96,607 54,118 138.64 697 560,191 803 0.14 115 80,194 22,561 4,120
2008 6,606 69,965 110,741 46,754 142.93 632 422,190 668 0.14 94 59,651 19,887 5,707
2009 5,252 74,838 109,729 41,107 152.17 682 374,625 549 0.13 70 47,861 17,711 3,985
2010 5,537 79,310 113,353 45,244 160.51 700 399,143 570 0.12 70 48,847 21,472 3,933
2011 6,657 81,975 117,549 46,850 164.68 697 398,557 572 0.14 81 56,629 23,779 3,687
2012 6,905 83,724 120,147 39,556 167.43 697 329,229 472 0.17 82 57,469 24,201 3,668
2013 7,088 85,014 122,060 39,835 169.28 696 326,358 469 0.18 83 58,072 25,778 4,302
Source(s): ITU (2015); OECD (2013); Standard and Poor's (2013)
APPENDIX 1Q: Telecommunications Industry Data for Turkey
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 9,907 38,477 80,758 19,709 60.03 476 244,054 512 0.50 257 122,672 2,001 3,798
2002 5,003 42,213 90,373 15,559 64.92 467 172,162 369 0.32 119 55,362 2,602 3,595
2003 4,076 46,804 102,141 19,277 70.98 458 188,733 412 0.21 87 39,909 3,728 3,462
2004 615 53,833 120,190 19,135 80.53 448 159,205 355 0.03 11 5,121 5,220 3,360
2005 2,109 62,587 172,706 18,815 92.39 362 108,940 301 0.11 34 12,213 6,658 3,183
2006 1,599 71,494 138,696 16,661 104.18 515 120,129 233 0.10 22 11,528 7,076 3,088
2007 2,430 80,177 187,881 20,706 115.37 427 110,210 258 0.12 30 12,931 8,767 3,021
2008 3,705 83,326 187,679 20,542 118.42 444 109,453 247 0.18 44 19,742 9,268 2,959
2009 2,708 79,314 172,050 16,874 111.33 461 98,079 213 0.16 34 15,738 8,193 2,954
2010 2,507 77,971 176,624 17,053 108.09 441 96,550 219 0.15 32 14,194 9,591 2,362
2011 2,174 80,533 147,994 15,405 110.23 544 104,092 191 0.14 27 14,692 9,767 2,272
2012 1,953 81,540 128,514 14,543 110.19 634 113,163 178 0.13 24 15,195 9,972 2,210
2013 1,547 83,213 113,977 13,287 111.05 730 116,578 160 0.12 19 13,575 10,348 2,146
Source(s): Barnes (2013a; 2013b; 2015a; 2015b); ITU (2015; 2003); OECD (2013)
                      Information and Communications Technologies Authourithy (ICTA) (2013)
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APPENDIX 1R: Telecommunications Industry Data for United Kingdom
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions to 
Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 17,206 80,400 264,000 57,293 136.00 305 217,020 713 0.30 214 65,176 25,797 5,048
2002 12,224 85,755 259,000 58,583 143.00 331 226,190 683 0.21 143 47,195 29,386 4,641
2003 12,945 89,177 250,000 68,845 149.00 357 275,379 772 0.19 145 51,780 34,792 4,647
2004 24,381 90,436 222,000 80,965 150.76 407 364,708 895 0.30 270 109,826 39,178 4,730
2005 21,499 95,039 227,000 81,494 157.35 419 359,002 857 0.26 226 94,709 36,917 4,281
2006 19,797 98,168 225,000 84,625 161.34 436 376,110 862 0.23 202 87,988 44,113 3,935
2007 20,702 100,499 214,000 91,909 163.89 470 429,482 915 0.23 206 96,737 46,910 3,735
2008 11,371 102,139 212,000 83,022 165.25 482 391,615 813 0.14 111 53,638 34,497 3,554
2009 8,284 104,824 230,000 66,954 168.32 456 291,104 639 0.12 79 36,015 37,502 3,348
2010 7,897 114,575 204,000 62,361 182.54 562 305,691 544 0.13 69 38,711 37,142 3,497
2011 7,924 114,865 203,000 61,358 181.58 566 302,254 534 0.13 69 39,033 38,597 3,408
2012 7,768 118,154 201,000 46,797 185.48 588 232,820 396 0.17 66 38,646 41,294 3,318
2013 7,544 116,397 213,000 45,796 181.57 546 215,005 393 0.16 65 35,418 43,269 3,392
Source(s): CRTC (2013; 2014); ITU (2015); OECD (2013); Office for National Statistics (2015)
APPENDIX 1S: Telecommunications Industry Data for United States
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 Partial Measures of Performance
Year(s) CAPEX             
(USD Millions) 
Subscriptions 
(Thousands)
Employment Revenue        
(USD Millions)
Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
(Teledensity)
Subscriptions 
to Employment 
Ratio
Revenues to 
Employment 
(USD)
Revenue to 
Subscription 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Revenue 
Ratio (USD)
CAPEX to 
Subscriptions 
Ratio (USD)
Capex to 
Employment 
(USD)
Real GDP 
per Capita 
(USD)
Industry 
Average 
HHI
2001 130,030 320,071 1,423,900 516,530 112.32 225 362,758 1,614 0.25 406 91,319 36,443 2,050
2002 74,474 331,050 1,280,900 498,953 115.10 258 389,533 1,507 0.15 225 58,142 37,589 2,150
2003 71,724 343,570 1,166,800 492,791 118.43 294 422,344 1,434 0.15 209 61,471 38,902 2,250
2004 72,395 362,510 1,115,100 495,711 123.81 325 444,544 1,367 0.15 200 64,922 40,800 2,200
2005 79,005 378,861 1,071,300 495,378 128.20 354 462,408 1,308 0.16 209 73,747 42,927 2,425
2006 86,405 397,060 1,047,600 496,807 133.07 379 474,234 1,251 0.17 218 82,479 45,053 2,781
2007 83,836 407,718 1,030,600 504,835 135.35 396 489,845 1,238 0.17 206 81,347 46,816 2,672
2008 81,682 424,063 1,019,400 504,426 139.45 416 494,827 1,190 0.16 193 80,128 47,470 2,655
2009 68,365 427,156 965,700 503,182 139.24 442 521,055 1,178 0.14 160 70,793 46,647 3,271
2010 70,149 434,770 902,900 507,533 140.54 482 562,114 1,167 0.14 161 77,693 47,790 3,216
2011 68,002 440,723 865,300 509,957 141.38 509 589,341 1,157 0.13 154 78,588 48,774 3,169
2012 70,155 443,433 1,057,616 520,102 141.17 419 491,768 1,173 0.13 158 66,333 50,549 3,333
2013 73,083 443,931 854,500 524,896 140.26 520 614,273 1,182 0.14 165 85,527 52,202 3,036
Source(s):   European Telecommunications Network Operator's Association (ETNO) (2014); 
                        Federal Communications Commission (2011); IBISWORLD (2014); ITU (2015); 
                        OECD (2013); MarketLine Industry Profile (2015e; 2013); US. Census Bureau (2015a; 2015b)
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APPENDIX 2A: CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY (CRS TE) SCORES 
 
 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Australia 0.8419 0.6833 0.7402 0.8403 0.9173 0.9847 0.9688 0.9597 0.8865 1 1 1 0.9267 0.9038
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
Brazil 0.9582 0.788 0.9136 0.8848 0.9101 0.8633 0.8722 0.5801 0.8959 0.8078 0.6262 0.6803 0.8264 0.8159
Canada 0.7005 0.7152 0.824 0.7979 0.8516 0.8496 0.8344 0.8618 0.8006 0.8074 0.7625 0.7574 0.7849 0.7960
Chile 0.4714 0.4906 0.485 0.4813 0.6955 0.6191 0.5657 0.5485 0.7598 0.6553 0.5527 0.5941 0.6984 0.5860
China 0.467 0.4849 0.3566 0.257 0.3985 0.4602 0.534 0.5091 0.525 0.62 0.6172 0.5156 0.4756 0.4785
Germany 0.8075 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9852
India 0.5316 0.2723 0.485 0.3076 0.3085 0.3481 0.4509 0.3712 0.4023 0.1821 0.8076 1 0.578 0.4650
Indonesia 0.3872 0.4107 0.4557 0.6352 0.5726 0.6339 0.4169 0.4893 0.4101 0.8277 0.7742 0.6433 0.8631 0.5785
Japan 1 0.9416 0.9263 0.9025 0.9104 0.8988 0.9531 0.8887 0.864 1 1 1 1 0.9450
Kenya 0.5752 0.886 0.7505 0.3974 0.307 0.2272 0.2715 0.2382 1 0.9261 0.9287 1 1 0.6544
Mexico 0.6503 0.7255 0.6713 0.5577 0.6121 0.721 0.9909 0.9652 0.9708 0.5539 0.6791 0.5734 0.9102 0.7370
New Zeland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
Nigeria 0.45 0.7205 0.6429 0.4816 0.2883 0.3603 0.4317 0.5327 0.4645 0.3485 0.7127 0.5263 0.6209 0.5062
South Africa 0.6067 0.4891 0.5873 0.5125 0.7349 0.7603 0.5657 0.5764 0.4507 0.6392 0.8354 0.8908 1 0.6653
South Korea 1 0.9251 0.9716 0.8747 0.9049 0.99 0.953 0.9252 0.8875 0.9106 0.83 0.7185 0.7379 0.8945
Turkey 0.6217 0.4367 0.5044 1 0.8208 1 0.9814 0.6808 0.7083 0.8058 0.8658 0.9376 1 0.7972
United Kingdom 0.6007 0.6666 0.6954 0.7789 0.7402 0.778 0.8358 1 0.9414 0.8626 0.8519 0.6999 0.7453 0.7844
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
HICs 0.8422 0.8422 0.8643 0.8676 0.9020 0.9120 0.9111 0.9184 0.9140 0.9236 0.8997 0.8770 0.8893 0.8895
MICs 0.5831 0.5793 0.5964 0.5593 0.5503 0.5971 0.6128 0.5492 0.6475 0.6346 0.7608 0.7519 0.8082 0.6331
OECD 0.8078 0.7987 0.8182 0.8528 0.8711 0.9034 0.9236 0.9025 0.9016 0.8830 0.8785 0.8567 0.9003 0.8691
All Countries 0.6958 0.7031 0.7217 0.6982 0.7091 0.7359 0.7445 0.7157 0.7695 0.7616 0.8144 0.7963 0.8377 0.7464
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APPENDIX 2B: VARIABLE RETURNS TO SCALE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY (VRS TE) SCORES 
 
 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Australia 0.8633 0.7907 0.8504 0.9486 1 1 1 0.9613 0.8867 1 1 1 1 0.9462
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Brazil 0.9669 0.8738 0.9757 0.993 1 0.8877 0.975 0.6898 0.9094 0.8105 0.6287 0.6809 0.8274 0.8630
Canada 0.701 0.7153 0.8244 0.7984 0.8538 0.8572 0.8484 0.8778 0.8157 0.8115 0.7684 0.7634 0.7938 0.8022
Chile 0.5344 0.5132 0.6307 0.6987 0.7576 0.6821 0.6663 0.6252 0.8795 0.6931 0.5608 0.6469 0.7611 0.6654
China 0.4695 0.485 0.3577 0.3527 0.3997 0.4917 0.5851 0.5693 0.6027 0.7005 0.6661 0.5729 0.5172 0.5208
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India 0.5416 0.2734 0.511 0.3155 0.318 0.3564 0.4542 0.3834 0.4088 0.1916 0.8507 1 0.5849 0.4761
Indonesia 0.4181 0.4146 0.5104 0.657 0.6598 0.687 0.4411 0.5367 0.4108 0.8556 0.7901 0.6438 0.9088 0.6103
Japan 1 0.9746 0.9832 0.9988 1 0.9377 0.9814 0.8887 0.8871 1 1 1 1 0.9732
Kenya 1 1 1 1 1 0.7401 0.6866 0.65 1 1 1 1 1 0.9290
Mexico 0.6554 0.7526 0.6756 0.5827 0.614 0.7357 1 1 1 0.6041 0.7262 0.6099 0.9158 0.7594
New Zeland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nigeria 1 0.9002 0.8587 0.6412 0.3697 0.3762 0.4347 0.5866 0.5028 0.4063 0.7846 0.5275 0.6242 0.6164
South Africa 0.6396 0.4913 0.5928 0.5176 0.7902 0.7989 0.5878 0.6475 0.4984 0.6962 0.8466 0.8913 1 0.6922
South Korea 1 1 1 0.9875 1 1 1 0.9252 0.8905 0.9222 0.9273 0.9001 0.9786 0.9640
Turkey 0.6258 0.4492 0.5065 1 0.8568 1 0.9883 0.6985 0.7109 0.8335 0.9006 0.9739 1 0.8111
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9417 1 1 1 1 0.9955
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HICs 0.9099 0.8994 0.9289 0.9432 0.9611 0.9477 0.9496 0.9278 0.9301 0.9427 0.9257 0.9310 0.9534 0.9346
MICs 0.7019 0.6267 0.6654 0.6733 0.6676 0.6749 0.6836 0.6402 0.6715 0.6776 0.7993 0.7667 0.8198 0.6976
OECD 0.8650 0.8496 0.8726 0.9179 0.9235 0.9344 0.9570 0.9147 0.9177 0.9054 0.9069 0.9079 0.9541 0.9097
All Countries 0.8113 0.7702 0.8041 0.8154 0.8221 0.8185 0.8236 0.7916 0.8076 0.8171 0.8658 0.8532 0.8901 0.8223
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APPENDIX 2C: SCALE EFFICIENCY (SE) SCORES 
 
 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Australia 0.9752 0.8641 0.8704 0.8858 0.9173 0.9847 0.9688 0.9983 0.9998 1 1 1 0.9267 0.9532
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Brazil 0.9911 0.9017 0.9364 0.8911 0.9101 0.9725 0.8946 0.8409 0.9851 0.9967 0.9961 0.9991 0.9988 0.9472
Canada 0.9992 0.9998 0.9995 0.9993 0.9973 0.9911 0.9835 0.9818 0.9814 0.995 0.9924 0.9921 0.9888 0.9924
Chile 0.8821 0.9559 0.769 0.6888 0.918 0.9077 0.849 0.8773 0.8639 0.9455 0.9855 0.9183 0.9177 0.8830
China 0.9947 0.9997 0.997 0.7286 0.9971 0.936 0.9128 0.8942 0.8711 0.8851 0.9265 0.9001 0.9195 0.9202
Germany 0.8075 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9852
India 0.9815 0.9958 0.9492 0.9751 0.9701 0.9766 0.9927 0.968 0.9841 0.9505 0.9493 1 0.9882 0.9755
Indonesia 0.926 0.9906 0.8929 0.9668 0.8679 0.9227 0.9453 0.9117 0.9983 0.9673 0.9793 0.9992 0.9498 0.9475
Japan 1 0.9661 0.9422 0.9037 0.9104 0.9585 0.9711 1 0.974 1 1 1 1 0.9712
Kenya 0.5752 0.886 0.7505 0.3974 0.307 0.307 0.3954 0.3665 1 0.9261 0.9287 1 1 0.6800
Mexico 0.9922 0.9639 0.9936 0.9571 0.997 0.9799 0.9909 0.9652 0.9708 0.9169 0.9352 0.9401 0.9939 0.9690
New Zeland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nigeria 0.45 0.8003 0.7488 0.7511 0.7797 0.9579 0.9933 0.9081 0.9237 0.8576 0.9084 0.9978 0.9947 0.8516
South Africa 0.9487 0.9955 0.9907 0.9901 0.93 0.9516 0.9624 0.8902 0.9043 0.9182 0.9867 0.9995 1 0.9591
South Korea 1 0.9251 0.9716 0.8857 0.9049 0.99 0.953 1 0.9966 0.9874 0.8951 0.7982 0.7541 0.9278
Turkey 0.9934 0.9722 0.9957 1 0.958 1 0.993 0.9747 0.9962 0.9667 0.9614 0.9626 1 0.9826
United Kingdom 0.6007 0.6666 0.6954 0.7789 0.7402 0.778 0.8358 1 0.9997 0.8626 0.8519 0.6999 0.7453 0.7888
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HICs 0.9265 0.9378 0.9248 0.9142 0.9388 0.9610 0.9561 0.9857 0.9815 0.9791 0.9725 0.9409 0.9333 0.9502
MICs 0.8725 0.9451 0.9172 0.8508 0.8574 0.8894 0.8978 0.8577 0.9593 0.9317 0.9524 0.9776 0.9828 0.9147
OECD 0.9375 0.9428 0.9365 0.9249 0.9453 0.9658 0.9621 0.9831 0.9819 0.9728 0.9685 0.9426 0.9439 0.9544
All Countries 0.9009 0.9412 0.9212 0.8842 0.9003 0.9271 0.9285 0.9251 0.9710 0.9566 0.9630 0.9583 0.9567 0.9334
 273 
APPENDIX 2D: SCALE EFFICIENCY SCORES AND EXHIBITED RETURNS TO SCALE (RTS) 
 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Australia
0.9752 
(DRS)
0.8641   
(CRS)
0.8704 
(DRS)
0.8858 
(DRS)
0.9173 
(DRS)
0.9847 
(DRS)
0.9688 
(DRS)
0.9983 
(IRS)
0.9998 
(IRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
0.9267 
(DRS) 0.9532
Belgium
1          
(CRS) 1 (CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1         
(CRS) 1
Brazil
0.9911 
(CRS)
0.9017 
(DRS)
0.9364 
(DRS)
0.8911 
(CRS)
0.9101 
(DRS)
0.9725 
(DRS)
0.8946 
(DRS)
0.8409 
(CRS)
0.9851 
(CRS)
0.9967 
(IRS)
0.9961 
(IRS)
0.9991 
(IRS)
0.9988 
(IRS) 0.9472
Canada
0.9992 
(IRS)
0.9998 
(IRS)
0.9995 
(IRS)
0.9993 
(IRS)
0.9973 
(DRS)
0.9911 
(IRS)
0.9835 
(IRS)
0.9818 
(IRS)
0.9814 
(IRS)
0.995      
(IRS)
0.9924 
(IRS)
0.9921 
(IRS)
0.9888 
(IRS) 0.9924
Chile
0.8821 
(IRS)
0.9559 
(IRS)
0.769    
(IRS)
0.6888 
(IRS)
0.918       
(IRS)
0.9077 
(IRS)
0.849       
(IRS)
0.8773 
(IRS)
0.8639 
(IRS)
0.9455 
(IRS)
0.9855 
(IRS)
0.9183 
(DRS)
0.9177 
(DRS) 0.8830
China
0.9947 
(IRS)
0.9997 
(IRS)
0.997       
(IRS)
0.7286 
(CRS)
0.9971 
(IRS)
0.936        
(DRS)
0.9128 
(DRS)
0.8942 
(CRS)
0.8711 
(CRS)
0.8851 
(CRS)
0.9265 
(CRS)
0.9001 
(CRS)
0.9195 
(CRS) 0.9202
Germany
0.8075 
(DRS)
1          
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1             
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS) 0.9852
India
0.9815 
(IRS)
0.9958 
(IRS)
0.9492 
(IRS)
0.9751 
(IRS)
0.9701 
(IRS)
0.9766 
(IRS)
0.9927 
(IRS)
0.968       
(IRS)
0.9841 
(IRS)
0.9505 
(IRS)
0.9493 
(IRS)
1         
(CRS)
0.9882 
(IRS) 0.9755
Indonesia
0.926       
(IRS)
0.9906 
(IRS)
0.8929 
(IRS)
0.9668 
(IRS)
0.8679 
(IRS)
0.9227 
(IRS)
0.9453 
(IRS)
0.9117 
(IRS)
0.9983 
(CRS)
0.9673 
(IRS)
0.9793 
(IRS)
0.9992 
(DRS)
0.9498 
(DRS) 0.9475
Japan
1         
(CRS)
0.9661 
(CRS)
0.9422 
(DRS)
0.9037 
(CRS)
0.9104 
(DRS)
0.9585 
(DRS)
0.9711 
(DRS)
1          
(IRS)
0.974    
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1            
(CRS) 0.9712
Kenya
0.5752 
(IRS)
0.886        
(IRS)
0.7505 
(IRS)
0.3974 
(IRS)
0.307        
(IRS)
0.307      
(IRS)
0.3954 
(IRS)
0.3665 
(IRS)
1          
(CRS)
0.9261 
(IRS)
0.9287 
(IRS)
1          
(CRS)
1          
(CRS) 0.6800
Mexico
0.9922 
(IRS)
0.9639 
(CRS)
0.9936 
(DRS)
0.9571 
(CRS)
0.997       
(IRS)
0.9799 
(IRS)
0.9909 
(IRS)
0.9652 
(IRS)
0.9708 
(IRS)
0.9169 
(IRS)
0.9352 
(IRS)
0.9401 
(IRS)
0.9939 
(IRS) 0.9690
New Zeland
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1              
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
 1        
(CRS)
1            
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS) 1
Nigeria
0.4500    
(IRS)
0.8003 
(IRS)
0.7488 
(IRS)
0.7511 
(IRS)
0.7797 
(IRS)
0.9579 
(IRS)
0.9933 
(DRS)
0.9081 
(IRS)
0.9237 
(IRS)
0.8576 
(IRS)
0.9084 
(IRS)
0.9978 
(IRS)
0.9947 
(CRS) 0.8516
South Africa
0.9487 
(IRS)
0.9955 
(IRS)
0.9907 
(IRS)
0.9901 
(IRS)
0.9300 
(IRS)
0.9516 
(IRS)
0.9624 
(IRS)
0.8902 
(IRS)
0.9043 
(IRS)
0.9182 
(IRS)
0.9867 
(IRS)
0.9995 
(DRS)
1         
(CRS) 0.9591
South Korea
1         
(CRS)
0.9251 
(DRS)
0.9716 
(DRS)
0.8857 
(CRS)
0.9049 
(DRS)
0.99     
(DRS)
0.953       
(DRS)
1          
(IRS)
0.9966 
(IRS)
0.9874 
(CRS)
0.8951 
(DRS)
0.7982 
(DRS)
0.7541 
(DRS) 0.9278
Turkey
0.9934 
(IRS)
0.9722 
(CRS)
0.9957 
(IRS)
1         
(CRS)
0.958       
(IRS)
1          
(CRS)
0.993      
(IRS)
0.9747 
(IRS)
0.9962 
(IRS)
0.9667 
(IRS)
0.9614 
(IRS)
0.9626 
(IRS)
1         
(CRS) 0.9826
United Kingdom
0.6007 
(DRS)
0.6666 
(DRS)
0.6954 
(DRS)
0.7789 
(DRS)
0.7402 
(DRS)
0.778       
(DRS)
0.8358 
(DRS)
1         
(CRS)
0.9997 
(IRS)
0.8626 
(DRS)
0.8519 
(DRS)
0.6999 
(DRS)
0.7453 
(DRS) 0.7888
United States
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1         
(CRS) 1        (CRS)
1         
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1          
(CRS)
1         
(CRS) 1
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APPENDIX 2E: MALMQUIST PRODUCTIVITY INDEX (MPI) OF TFPG AND ITS COMPONENTS 
 
 
2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 Average
Australia TC 1.0673 1.0534 1.0485 1.0057 1 1.0108 1.0199 1.0112 0.973 1 1 0.9683 1.0132
SEC 0.8885 0.9437 0.9367 0.9747 0.9862 0.9728 0.9722 0.9717 1.028 1 1 0.9625 0.9698
PEC 0.9159 1.0755 1.1154 1.0542 1 1 0.9613 0.92223 1.1278 1 1 1 1.0144
TFPG 0.8686 1.0691 1.0955 1.0334 0.9862 0.9833 0.9532 0.9063 1.1281 1 1 0.932 0.9963
Belgium TC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
SEC 1.017 1.0115 1.0308 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0049
PEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
TFPG 1.017 1.0115 1.0308 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0049
Brazil TC 1.0484 1.0608 1.032 1.0509 1 1.0346 0.9484 1.0186 0.9905 1.0221 0.9276 0.9854 1.0099
SEC 0.9932 1.0457 1.0157 1.0451 0.9941 1.0006 0.954 1.1181 0.998 1.0049 1.0008 1.0024 1.0144
PEC 0.9038 1.1165 1.0177 1.0071 0.8877 1.0983 0.7076 1.3183 0.8912 0.7757 1.0831 1.2151 1.0018
TFPG 0.9411 1.2386 1.0668 1.106 0.8825 1.137 0.6401 1.5015 0.881 0.7967 1.0055 1.2002 1.0331
Canada TC 1.14 1.0874 1.0089 0.9518 0.9194 0.9951 0.9526 0.9969 1.0345 1.045 0.9834 0.9409 1.0047
SEC 1.0002 1 1.0004 1.0014 0.9957 0.998 1.0032 1.0048 1.0082 1.0028 0.9997 0.997 1.0010
PEC 1.0204 1.1526 0.9685 1.0694 1.004 0.9897 1.0346 0.9293 0.9948 0.9468 0.9935 1.0399 1.0120
TFPG 1.1634 1.2533 0.9775 1.0193 0.9191 0.9829 0.9888 0.9308 1.0376 0.9922 0.9767 0.9755 1.0181
Chile TC 1.1741 0.9022 0.909 0.8524 0.8931 0.929 0.9235 0.9242 0.9441 1.0802 1.119 0.7139 0.9471
SEC 1.0952 1.0029 1.0438 1.4051 1.0296 1.0323 1.0493 1.0139 1.0871 1.0435 0.8257 1.1928 1.0684
PEC 0.9603 1.2288 1.1079 1.0842 0.9003 0.9768 0.9383 1.4067 0.788 0.8092 1.1535 1.1764 1.0442
TFPG 1.2348 1.1119 1.0512 1.2986 0.8279 0.9368 0.9093 1.3181 0.8088 0.9122 1.0658 1.0018 1.0398
China TC 1.3375 1.3322 1.0606 0.9591 0.8706 0.9313 0.9885 1.1382 1.065 1.0196 0.941 0.9854 1.0524
SEC 1.001 0.9958 0.9738 0.9887 0.9587 0.9144 0.9528 0.9794 0.9669 0.9959 0.9947 0.985 0.9756
PEC 1.033 0.7375 0.9861 1.1331 1.2302 1.1899 0.9732 1.0586 1.1623 0.9509 0.86 0.9029 1.0181
TFPG 1.3831 0.9784 1.0184 1.0744 1.0267 1.0133 0.9165 1.18 1.1968 0.9656 0.8049 0.8763 1.0362
Germany TC 1.0535 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0045
SEC 1.26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0217
PEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
TFPG 1.3274 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0273
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2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 Average
India TC 1.1143 1.1597 1.1083 0.9313 0.8908 0.8799 0.9413 1.1695 0.975 0.9766 0.9907 0.9917 1.0108
SEC 0.9964 0.9744 1.0101 1.0307 1.0097 1.0141 0.996 0.9947 1.0038 0.9926 1.043 0.9772 1.0036
PEC 0.5049 1.8687 0.6174 1.0081 1.1207 1.2743 0.8442 1.0661 0.4687 4.44 1.1755 0.5849 1.2478
TFPG 0.5605 2.1116 0.6912 0.9677 1.008 1.1371 0.7915 1.2402 0.4587 4.3039 1.2147 0.5668 1.2543
Indonesia TC 1.1725 1.1438 1.2061 0.6973 0.9548 0.8735 0.909 1.2168 0.8851 1.0161 1.0228 1.0093 1.0089
SEC 1.0562 0.9407 1.0394 1.0086 1.0027 1.0115 1.0053 1.0031 0.9986 1.0089 1.0034 0.9972 1.0063
PEC 0.9915 1.231 1.2873 1.00042 1.0413 0.6421 1.2167 0.7655 2.0827 0.9234 0.8148 1.4116 1.1174
TFPG 1.2279 1.3245 1.6137 0.7062 0.9968 0.5673 1.1118 0.9344 1.8408 0.9466 0.8363 1.4207 1.1273
Japan TC 1.0213 1.0526 1.0219 1.0282 0.9938 1.0063 0.9988 1.0823 1.0331 1 1 1 1.0199
SEC 0.9886 1.0031 0.9964 1.0201 0.9886 1.0164 1.0085 0.9683 1.0134 1 1 1 1.0003
PEC 0.9746 1.0088 1.0159 1.0012 0.9377 1.0466 0.9055 0.9982 1.1273 1 1 1 1.0013
TFPG 0.984 1.0652 1.0343 1.0502 0.9213 1.0704 0.9122 1.0461 1.1803 1 1 1 1.0220
Kenya TC 1 1 1 0.9927 0.9648 0.8077 0.974 0.8967 1 1 1 1 0.9697
SEC 1.6339 0.9013 0.5233 0.7359 0.9221 1.577 0.907 2.8671 0.9175 1.1277 1.0588 1 1.1810
PEC 1 1 1 1 0.7401 0.9276 0.9468 1.5384 1 1 1 1 1.0127
TFPG 1.6339 0.9013 0.5233 0.7306 0.6584 1.1816 0.8364 3.9548 0.9175 1.1277 1.0588 1 1.2104
Mexico TC 1.0922 1.1877 1.0716 1.0281 0.9246 0.9105 0.9728 1.0579 0.9879 0.9864 0.9665 0.9739 1.0133
SEC 0.9811 1.0064 0.959 1.0229 1.0065 0.999 0.9761 1.0336 0.9531 1.0085 1.003 1.0462 0.9996
PEC 1.1484 0.8977 0.8624 1.0537 1.1983 1.3592 1 1 0.6041 1.202 0.8399 1.5016 1.0556
TFPG 1.2305 1.0731 0.8862 1.1081 1.1151 1.2363 0.9495 1.0934 0.5688 1.1958 0.8141 1.5299 1.0667
New Zealand TC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
SEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
PEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
TFPG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
Nigeria TC 0.9852 0.863 0.8499 0.9412 0.8802 0.9848 0.9236 1.1316 0.8734 1.0067 1.1061 1.0807 0.9689
SEC 1.6948 1.0368 1.1342 1.0398 1.2813 1.0544 0.9445 1.0123 1.0124 1.0585 1.031 1.0048 1.1087
PEC 0.9002 0.9539 0.7467 0.5766 1.0175 1.1555 1.3496 0.8571 0.8081 1.931 0.6723 1.1834 1.0127
TFPG 1.5031 0.8535 0.7198 0.5643 1.1476 1.1999 1.1773 0.9819 0.7146 2.0576 0.7666 1.2851 1.0809
South Africa TC 1.1327 1.057 1.0102 0.8536 0.913 0.9303 0.9071 1.0787 0.8807 1.0264 1.0121 0.9203 0.9768
SEC 1.0521 1.0043 1.0002 0.9652 1.018 0.9977 0.9392 0.9749 1.0515 1.074 1.0015 1.0256 1.0087
PEC 0.7682 1.2066 0.8732 1.5267 1.011 0.7357 1.1015 0.7697 1.3969 1.2161 1.0527 1.122 1.0650
TFPG 0.9154 1.2809 0.8823 1.2578 0.9397 0.6828 0.9384 0.8095 1.2936 1.3406 1.0671 1.0591 1.0389
South Korea TC 1 1.014 1.0109 1.0473 1 1 0.9901 1.0507 1.0069 1.0178 1.0029 0.9626 1.0086
SEC 1.0209 1.0682 0.9934 1.049 1.0136 0.9988 1.0116 0.9979 0.9966 0.8897 0.8522 0.9428 0.9862
PEC 1 1 0.9875 1.0126 1 1 0.9252 0.9625 1.0356 1.0055 0.9706 1.0872 0.9989
TFPG 1.0209 1.0832 0.9917 1.1124 1.0136 0.9988 0.9266 1.0092 1.0393 0.9105 0.8296 0.9867 0.9935
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2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 Average
Turkey TC 1.0812 1.1566 1.0117 0.9763 0.9275 0.9741 0.9542 1.1286 0.9205 0.9957 0.9901 0.9869 1.0086
SEC 0.9903 1.0143 1.0046 0.9673 1.0439 0.9821 0.9879 0.9949 1.0019 0.9965 0.9945 1.0312 1.0008
PEC 0.7178 1.1277 1.9742 0.8568 1.1671 0.9883 0.7067 1.0178 1.1724 1.0805 1.0815 1.0267 1.0765
TFPG 0.7685 1.3228 2.0064 0.8092 1.1301 0.9455 0.6662 1.1428 1.0813 1.0721 1.0648 1.0449 1.0879
United Kingdom TC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0264 0.9704 1 1 1 0.9997
SEC 1.222 1.1172 1.1495 0.977 1.038 1.1217 1.1766 1.0347 0.9157 0.9816 0.788 1.0042 1.0439
PEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9417 1.0619 1 1 1 1.0003
TFPG 1.222 1.1172 1.1495 0.977 1.038 1.1217 1.1766 1 0.9437 0.9816 0.788 1.0042 1.0433
United States TC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
SEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
PEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
TFPG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000
HICs TC 1.0456 1.0110 0.9999 0.9885 0.9806 0.9941 0.9885 1.0092 0.9962 1.0143 1.0105 0.9586 0.9998
SEC 1.0492 1.0147 1.0151 1.0427 1.0052 1.0140 1.0221 0.9991 1.0049 0.9918 0.9466 1.0099 1.0096
PEC 0.9871 1.0466 1.0195 1.0222 0.9842 1.0013 0.9765 1.0161 1.0135 0.9762 1.0118 1.0304 1.0071
TFPG 1.0838 1.0711 1.0331 1.0491 0.9706 1.0094 0.9867 1.0211 1.0138 0.9797 0.9660 0.9900 1.0145
MICs TC 1.1071 1.1068 1.0389 0.9367 0.9251 0.9252 0.9465 1.0930 0.9531 1.0055 0.9952 0.9926 1.0022
SEC 1.1554 0.9911 0.9623 0.9782 1.0263 1.0612 0.9625 1.2198 0.9893 1.0297 1.0145 1.0077 1.0332
PEC 0.8853 1.1266 1.0406 1.0181 1.0460 1.0412 0.9829 1.0435 1.0652 1.5022 0.9533 1.1054 1.0675
TFPG 1.1293 1.2316 1.0453 0.9249 0.9894 1.0112 0.8920 1.4265 0.9948 1.5341 0.9592 1.1092 1.1040
OECD TC 1.0525 1.0378 1.0069 0.9908 0.9715 0.9855 0.9843 1.0232 0.9892 1.0104 1.0052 0.9622 1.0016
SEC 1.0387 1.0139 1.0096 1.0348 1.0085 1.0101 1.0155 1.0017 1.0003 0.9936 0.9553 1.0147 1.0080
PEC 0.9781 1.0409 1.0860 1.0110 1.0173 1.0301 0.9560 1.0149 0.9927 1.0037 1.0033 1.0693 1.0169
TFPG 1.0698 1.0923 1.1019 1.0340 0.9959 1.0230 0.9569 1.0372 0.9823 1.0054 0.9616 1.0396 1.0250
All Countries TC 1.0747 1.0563 1.0184 0.9640 0.9543 0.9615 0.9686 1.0489 0.9758 1.0101 1.0033 0.9747 1.0009
SEC 1.0995 1.0035 0.9901 1.0122 1.0152 1.0364 0.9939 1.1037 0.9975 1.0097 0.9788 1.0089 1.0208
PEC 0.9389 1.0845 1.0295 1.0202 1.0135 1.0202 0.9795 1.0291 1.0380 1.2253 0.9841 1.0659 1.0357
TFPG 1.1054 1.1472 1.0389 0.9903 0.9795 1.0102 0.9418 1.2131 1.0048 1.2423 0.9628 1.0465 1.0569
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APPENDIX 2F: DEA SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULT
CRS Technical Efficiency VRS Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency
Original 
DEA 
Model Model 1 Model 2
Original 
DEA 
Model Model 1 Model 2
Original 
DEA 
Model Model 1 Model 2
Australia 0.9038 0.9180 0.7095 0.9462 0.9462 0.8987 0.9532 0.9532 0.9410
Belgium 1.0000 0.9332 0.9763 1.0000 0.9861 1.0000 1.0000 0.9455 0.9763
Brazil 0.8159 0.6005 0.8141 0.8630 0.6072 0.8630 0.9472 0.9878 0.9445
Canada 0.7960 0.7956 0.7708 0.8022 0.8021 0.8015 0.9924 0.9921 0.9624
Chile 0.5860 0.5737 0.4810 0.6654 0.6369 0.6557 0.8830 0.9033 0.7424
China 0.4785 0.4772 0.4785 0.5208 0.5207 0.5208 0.9202 0.9167 0.9202
Germany 0.9852 0.9852 0.9848 1.0000 1.0000 0.9851 0.9852 0.9852 0.9997
India 0.4650 0.4650 0.4643 0.4761 0.4761 0.4761 0.9755 0.9755 0.9746
Indonesia 0.5785 0.5684 0.5160 0.6103 0.6093 0.5856 0.9475 0.9357 0.8887
Japan 0.9450 0.9226 0.9450 0.9732 0.9259 0.9732 0.9712 0.9965 0.9712
Kenya 0.6544 0.6544 0.4287 0.9290 0.9290 0.9290 0.6800 0.6800 0.4504
Mexico 0.7370 0.7197 0.7316 0.7594 0.7280 0.7594 0.9690 0.9806 0.9622
New Zealand 1.0000 1.0000 0.7530 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7530
Nigeria 0.5062 0.5058 0.4695 0.6164 0.6175 0.6159 0.8516 0.8532 0.7912
South Africa 0.6653 0.6463 0.5441 0.6922 0.6840 0.6800 0.9591 0.9529 0.8158
South Korea 0.8945 0.7954 0.8815 0.9640 0.8384 0.9223 0.9278 0.9514 0.9562
Turkey 0.7972 0.7755 0.7479 0.8111 0.7863 0.8106 0.9826 0.9862 0.9252
United Kingdom 0.7844 0.7628 0.7714 0.9955 0.9955 0.7851 0.7888 0.7673 0.9823
United States 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
HICs 0.8895 0.8686 0.8273 0.9346 0.9131 0.9022 0.9502 0.9494 0.9284
MICs 0.6331 0.6014 0.5772 0.6976 0.6620 0.6934 0.9147 0.9187 0.8525
OECD 0.8691 0.8485 0.8127 0.9097 0.8871 0.8826 0.9544 0.9551 0.9310
All Countries 0.7464 0.7421 0.7088 0.8223 0.7942 0.8033 0.9334 0.9349 0.8925
Source(s): Developed for this research
Notes:
Original DEA Model: (Inputs: Capex, Subscriotions & Employment; Outputs: Revenues & Teledensity) 
Model 1 (Inputs: Capex, Subscriptions; Outputs: Revenues & Teledensity)
Model 2 (Inputs: Capex, Subscriptions & Employment; Output: Revenues)
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APPENDIX 3A: CORRELATION BETWEEN CRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND 
       EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
APPENDIX 3B: CORRELATION BETWEEN VRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND 
       EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
APPENDIX 3C: CORRELATION BETWEEN SCALE EFFICIENCY AND EXPLANATORY 
  VARIABLES 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
        LDev     0.5709   0.6365   0.0547   0.7072  -0.1819   0.2740  -0.0963   0.2774   1.0000
         CP1     0.3942   0.6782   0.3919  -0.0926  -0.3444   0.0808  -0.1700   1.0000
         HHI    -0.0436  -0.2697  -0.0729  -0.0807   0.1086  -0.0546   1.0000
     CRGDPPC     0.1827   0.1272   0.0057   0.2775  -0.0777   1.0000
    CapexRev    -0.3037  -0.2676  -0.2572  -0.0268   1.0000
      RevSub     0.5359   0.3393  -0.2019   1.0000
      SubEmp     0.3072   0.1665   1.0000
        NYRS     0.4181   1.0000
       CRSTE     1.0000
                                                                                               
                  CRSTE     NYRS   SubEmp   RevSub CapexRev  CRGDPPC      HHI      CP1     LDev
        LDev     0.5644   0.6365   0.0547   0.7072  -0.1819   0.2740  -0.0963   0.2774   1.0000
         CP1     0.2618   0.6782   0.3919  -0.0926  -0.3444   0.0808  -0.1700   1.0000
         HHI    -0.0026  -0.2697  -0.0729  -0.0807   0.1086  -0.0546   1.0000
     CRGDPPC     0.1904   0.1272   0.0057   0.2775  -0.0777   1.0000
    CapexRev    -0.0942  -0.2676  -0.2572  -0.0268   1.0000
      RevSub     0.5482   0.3393  -0.2019   1.0000
      SubEmp     0.2061   0.1665   1.0000
        NYRS     0.3584   1.0000
       VRSTE     1.0000
                                                                                               
                  VRSTE     NYRS   SubEmp   RevSub CapexRev  CRGDPPC      HHI      CP1     LDev
        LDev     0.1496   0.6365   0.0547   0.7072  -0.1819   0.2740  -0.0963   0.2774   1.0000
         CP1     0.3300   0.6782   0.3919  -0.0926  -0.3444   0.0808  -0.1700   1.0000
         HHI    -0.0962  -0.2697  -0.0729  -0.0807   0.1086  -0.0546   1.0000
     CRGDPPC     0.0357   0.1272   0.0057   0.2775  -0.0777   1.0000
    CapexRev    -0.4504  -0.2676  -0.2572  -0.0268   1.0000
      RevSub     0.1229   0.3393  -0.2019   1.0000
      SubEmp     0.2654   0.1665   1.0000
        NYRS     0.2173   1.0000
          SE     1.0000
                                                                                               
                     SE     NYRS   SubEmp   RevSub CapexRev  CRGDPPC      HHI      CP1     LDev
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APPENDIX 4A: CRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH 
     LAG IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            64 right-censored observations
           163     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                              
         rho     .5693427   .1158144                      .3434618    .7741054
                                                                              
    /sigma_e     .1122408   .0064576    17.38   0.000     .0995842    .1248974
    /sigma_u     .1290541   .0298499     4.32   0.000     .0705494    .1875588
                                                                              
       _cons     .0330402   .1266878     0.26   0.794    -.2152633    .2813436
              
         L1.     .3424586   .0648509     5.28   0.000     .2153532     .469564
       CRSTE  
              
        LDev    -.0165708    .080843    -0.20   0.838    -.1750202    .1418785
         CP1     .0043184   .0011576     3.73   0.000     .0020496    .0065871
         HHI     5.32e-06   .0000154     0.35   0.730    -.0000249    .0000355
     CRGDPPC    -4.20e-06   4.32e-06    -0.97   0.332    -.0000127    4.28e-06
    CapexRev    -.6447727   .0867787    -7.43   0.000    -.8148557   -.4746896
      RevSub     .0004675   .0000805     5.81   0.000     .0003097    .0006253
      SubEmp     .0001464   .0000611     2.39   0.017     .0000266    .0002662
        NYRS    -.0034515   .0048237    -0.72   0.474    -.0129057    .0060027
                                                                              
       CRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =  82.855863                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     231.30
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 4B: VRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH 
     LAG IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
            94 right-censored observations
           133     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                              
         rho     .7357174   .0947814                       .524822    .8845679
                                                                              
    /sigma_e      .118539   .0077323    15.33   0.000     .1033839    .1336941
    /sigma_u     .1977801   .0463298     4.27   0.000     .1069754    .2885849
                                                                              
       _cons     .2942719   .1584002     1.86   0.063    -.0161868    .6047307
              
         L1.     .4224953   .0788974     5.35   0.000     .2678593    .5771313
       VRSTE  
              
        LDev    -.0561853    .117415    -0.48   0.632    -.2863144    .1739438
         CP1      .002298   .0013752     1.67   0.095    -.0003973    .0049933
         HHI    -.0000319     .00002    -1.60   0.110    -.0000711    7.23e-06
     CRGDPPC    -2.63e-06   5.81e-06    -0.45   0.651     -.000014    8.75e-06
    CapexRev    -.6883603   .1183741    -5.82   0.000    -.9203692   -.4563513
      RevSub     .0006133   .0001299     4.72   0.000     .0003587     .000868
      SubEmp      .000256   .0000764     3.35   0.001     .0001062    .0004059
        NYRS    -.0035386   .0057314    -0.62   0.537    -.0147719    .0076947
                                                                              
       VRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =  42.848452                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     129.79
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 4C: SCALE EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH LAG 
     IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
            66 right-censored observations
           161     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                              
         rho      .543781   .1298097                      .2974856    .7738463
                                                                              
    /sigma_e     .0702295   .0040727    17.24   0.000     .0622472    .0782117
    /sigma_u     .0766734   .0195025     3.93   0.000     .0384492    .1148976
                                                                              
       _cons     .2809304   .1022913     2.75   0.006     .0804432    .4814176
              
         L1.     .4549557   .0612482     7.43   0.000     .3349115    .5749999
          SE  
              
        LDev     -.059335   .0490986    -1.21   0.227    -.1555665    .0368964
         CP1     .0025192   .0007068     3.56   0.000      .001134    .0039045
         HHI     .0000152   .0000105     1.45   0.147    -5.35e-06    .0000358
     CRGDPPC    -4.20e-06   2.68e-06    -1.57   0.117    -9.46e-06    1.06e-06
    CapexRev    -.3449806   .0565411    -6.10   0.000    -.4557991    -.234162
      RevSub     .0002241   .0000489     4.58   0.000     .0001283      .00032
      SubEmp    -.0000262   .0000374    -0.70   0.483    -.0000995    .0000471
        NYRS    -.0014035   .0030434    -0.46   0.645    -.0073684    .0045615
                                                                              
          SE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =  158.09394                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     202.00
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 5A: CRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT 
       WITH LAG AND INTERACTION TERM IN THE MODEL 
 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
. 
            64 right-censored observations
           163     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .6417773   .1088068                      .4176953    .8249048
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .0985863   .0057096    17.27   0.000     .0873956    .1097769
      /sigma_u     .1319569   .0302531     4.36   0.000     .0726619     .191252
                                                                                
         _cons    -.0104934   .1171072    -0.09   0.929    -.2400193    .2190325
SubEmpCapexRev    -.0020456   .0002988    -6.85   0.000    -.0026313   -.0014599
                
           L1.     .3162585   .0570319     5.55   0.000      .204478    .4280389
         CRSTE  
                
          LDev     .0421114   .0796501     0.53   0.597    -.1139999    .1982226
           CP1     .0048156   .0010486     4.59   0.000     .0027604    .0068708
           HHI     2.55e-06   .0000142     0.18   0.857    -.0000253    .0000304
       CRGDPPC    -2.82e-06   3.84e-06    -0.73   0.463    -.0000103    4.71e-06
      CapexRev    -.3335089   .0888795    -3.75   0.000    -.5077095   -.1593083
        RevSub     .0004103   .0000731     5.61   0.000      .000267    .0005536
        SubEmp     .0005075   .0000768     6.61   0.000     .0003571     .000658
          NYRS    -.0053068   .0044013    -1.21   0.228    -.0139331    .0033196
                                                                                
         CRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  103.76651                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)     =     315.61
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 5B: VRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT 
     WITH LAG AND INTERACTION TERM IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
            94 right-censored observations
           133     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho       .71611   .1004308                       .496189    .8753807
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .1030441   .0067612    15.24   0.000     .0897924    .1162957
      /sigma_u     .1636582   .0387772     4.22   0.000     .0876564    .2396601
                                                                                
         _cons     .2464699   .1358346     1.81   0.070     -.019761    .5127007
SubEmpCapexRev    -.0022208   .0003429    -6.48   0.000    -.0028929   -.0015486
                
           L1.     .3636691   .0687132     5.29   0.000     .2289937    .4983444
         VRSTE  
                
          LDev     .0790999   .1006045     0.79   0.432    -.1180812    .2762811
           CP1     .0026026   .0011866     2.19   0.028     .0002768    .0049283
           HHI    -.0000253   .0000171    -1.48   0.139    -.0000589    8.24e-06
       CRGDPPC     2.47e-07   4.97e-06     0.05   0.960    -9.50e-06    9.99e-06
      CapexRev    -.2009426   .1224567    -1.64   0.101    -.4409534    .0390682
        RevSub     .0003886   .0001114     3.49   0.000     .0001703    .0006069
        SubEmp     .0006203   .0000867     7.15   0.000     .0004503    .0007903
          NYRS    -.0045812   .0050053    -0.92   0.360    -.0143914     .005229
                                                                                
         VRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  60.841412                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)     =     211.98
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 5C: SCALE EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH LAG 
     AND INTERACTION TERM IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
            66 right-censored observations
           161     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .5437337   .1295632                      .2978695    .7734412
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .0700344   .0040637    17.23   0.000     .0620696    .0779991
      /sigma_u     .0764531   .0194245     3.94   0.000     .0383818    .1145244
                                                                                
         _cons     .2906783   .1029379     2.82   0.005     .0889237     .492433
SubEmpCapexRev     .0001412   .0002134     0.66   0.508     -.000277    .0005594
                
           L1.      .448893   .0617192     7.27   0.000     .3279256    .5698604
            SE  
                
          LDev    -.0628598   .0492276    -1.28   0.202    -.1593441    .0336245
           CP1     .0025024   .0007034     3.56   0.000     .0011238    .0038811
           HHI     .0000152   .0000105     1.45   0.147    -5.35e-06    .0000357
       CRGDPPC    -4.32e-06   2.68e-06    -1.61   0.107    -9.57e-06    9.34e-07
      CapexRev    -.3677132   .0660257    -5.57   0.000    -.4971212   -.2383052
        RevSub      .000229   .0000492     4.65   0.000     .0001325    .0003254
        SubEmp    -.0000507   .0000525    -0.97   0.335    -.0001536    .0000523
          NYRS    -.0013363   .0030392    -0.44   0.660    -.0072931    .0046205
                                                                                
            SE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =   158.3118                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)     =     203.84
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 6A: CRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION 
   RESULT WITH LAG, INTERACTION TERM AND    
   NYRSSQUARE IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
            64 right-censored observations
           163     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .6566709    .106632                      .4345175    .8343934
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .0980783   .0056857    17.25   0.000     .0869346    .1092219
      /sigma_u     .1356411   .0310405     4.37   0.000     .0748029    .1964794
                                                                                
         _cons     .0098625    .119023     0.08   0.934    -.2234183    .2431432
    NYRSSquare      .000341   .0002862     1.19   0.233    -.0002199     .000902
SubEmpCapexRev    -.0020293   .0002983    -6.80   0.000    -.0026141   -.0014446
                
           L1.     .3090722   .0570514     5.42   0.000     .1972534    .4208909
         CRSTE  
                
          LDev     .0659343   .0838183     0.79   0.431    -.0983466    .2302151
           CP1     .0055808   .0012348     4.52   0.000     .0031606    .0080009
           HHI     5.80e-06   .0000145     0.40   0.690    -.0000227    .0000343
       CRGDPPC    -2.28e-06   3.84e-06    -0.59   0.553    -9.81e-06    5.25e-06
      CapexRev    -.3428663   .0888016    -3.86   0.000    -.5169143   -.1688183
        RevSub     .0004054   .0000728     5.57   0.000     .0002628    .0005481
        SubEmp     .0005247   .0000786     6.67   0.000     .0003706    .0006788
          NYRS    -.0189713   .0123156    -1.54   0.123    -.0431094    .0051668
                                                                                
         CRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =   104.4785                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)     =     315.78
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 6B: VRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT 
WITH LAG, INTERACTION TERM AND NYRSSQUARE   
IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
. 
            94 right-censored observations
           133     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .7344866   .0954549                      .5222552    .8843592
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .1019426   .0066949    15.23   0.000     .0888208    .1150644
      /sigma_u     .1695526   .0397418     4.27   0.000       .09166    .2474452
                                                                                
         _cons     .2972088   .1401784     2.12   0.034     .0224641    .5719536
    NYRSSquare     .0005269   .0003469     1.52   0.129     -.000153    .0012069
SubEmpCapexRev    -.0022061   .0003405    -6.48   0.000    -.0028734   -.0015387
                
           L1.     .3538867   .0680293     5.20   0.000     .2205517    .4872217
         VRSTE  
                
          LDev     .1157164   .1059362     1.09   0.275    -.0919146    .3233475
           CP1     .0035564   .0013448     2.64   0.008     .0009207     .006192
           HHI    -.0000214   .0000171    -1.25   0.211     -.000055    .0000122
       CRGDPPC     1.28e-06   4.95e-06     0.26   0.797    -8.43e-06     .000011
      CapexRev    -.2219798   .1224464    -1.81   0.070    -.4619704    .0180107
        RevSub     .0003717   .0001106     3.36   0.001     .0001549    .0005885
        SubEmp     .0006544   .0000899     7.28   0.000     .0004783    .0008305
          NYRS     -.025113   .0144234    -1.74   0.082    -.0533823    .0031563
                                                                                
         VRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  62.005822                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)     =     214.61
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 6C: SCALE EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH LAG,  
INTERACTION TERM AND NYRSSQUARE IN THE  
MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
            66 right-censored observations
           161     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .5502484   .1282124                      .3054991    .7767393
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .0699582   .0040587    17.24   0.000     .0620033     .077913
      /sigma_u     .0773805   .0195034     3.97   0.000     .0391545    .1156065
                                                                                
         _cons       .29934   .1041947     2.87   0.004     .0951221     .503558
    NYRSSquare     .0001239    .000196     0.63   0.527    -.0002602    .0005081
SubEmpCapexRev     .0001505   .0002139     0.70   0.482    -.0002687    .0005697
                
           L1.     .4470585   .0617772     7.24   0.000     .3259774    .5681397
            SE  
                
          LDev    -.0556952   .0508537    -1.10   0.273    -.1553666    .0439762
           CP1     .0027614   .0008183     3.37   0.001     .0011576    .0043652
           HHI     .0000164   .0000107     1.53   0.125    -4.56e-06    .0000374
       CRGDPPC    -4.13e-06   2.69e-06    -1.53   0.125    -9.41e-06    1.15e-06
      CapexRev    -.3717877   .0662581    -5.61   0.000    -.5016511   -.2419243
        RevSub     .0002264   .0000493     4.60   0.000     .0001299     .000323
        SubEmp     -.000047   .0000528    -0.89   0.373    -.0001505    .0000564
          NYRS    -.0061724   .0082307    -0.75   0.453    -.0223043    .0099594
                                                                                
            SE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  158.51243                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)     =     204.06
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 7A: CRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT 
WITH LAG, INTERACTION TERM AND 
CRGDPPCSQUARE IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
            64 right-censored observations
           163     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .6400838   .1088816                      .4161383    .8235939
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .0984623   .0056973    17.28   0.000     .0872959    .1096288
      /sigma_u      .131307   .0300798     4.37   0.000     .0723516    .1902624
                                                                                
         _cons    -.0020998   .1171256    -0.02   0.986    -.2316617    .2274621
  CGDPPCSquare     1.08e-09   7.08e-10     1.52   0.127    -3.08e-10    2.47e-09
SubEmpCapexRev    -.0020389   .0002984    -6.83   0.000    -.0026238    -.001454
                
           L1.     .3187891   .0569981     5.59   0.000     .2070749    .4305032
         CRSTE  
                
          LDev      .043692    .079535     0.55   0.583    -.1121938    .1995778
           CP1     .0047529   .0010514     4.52   0.000     .0026923    .0068135
           HHI     3.07e-06   .0000142     0.22   0.829    -.0000247    .0000309
       CRGDPPC    -2.67e-06   4.19e-06    -0.64   0.525    -.0000109    5.55e-06
      CapexRev    -.3253615   .0888847    -3.66   0.000    -.4995723   -.1511506
        RevSub     .0003888   .0000743     5.24   0.000     .0002433    .0005344
        SubEmp     .0005069   .0000766     6.61   0.000     .0003567    .0006571
          NYRS     -.005694   .0044173    -1.29   0.197    -.0143519    .0029638
                                                                                
         CRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  105.12849                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)     =     316.70
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 7B: VRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT 
WITH LAG, INTERACTION TERM AND 
CRGDPPCSQUARE IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
            94 right-censored observations
           133     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .7224239    .099109                      .5042111    .8789107
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .1027305    .006749    15.22   0.000     .0895026    .1159583
      /sigma_u     .1657312   .0392449     4.22   0.000     .0888125    .2426498
                                                                                
         _cons     .2479382   .1361025     1.82   0.069    -.0188178    .5146943
  CGDPPCSquare    -5.32e-10   8.54e-10    -0.62   0.534    -2.21e-09    1.14e-09
SubEmpCapexRev    -.0022169   .0003426    -6.47   0.000    -.0028884   -.0015454
                
           L1.       .36269   .0684487     5.30   0.000     .2285331     .496847
         VRSTE  
                
          LDev     .0761445   .1014605     0.75   0.453    -.1227143    .2750034
           CP1     .0025788   .0011838     2.18   0.029     .0002586    .0048991
           HHI    -.0000262   .0000172    -1.52   0.128    -.0000599    7.56e-06
       CRGDPPC     6.16e-07   4.75e-06     0.13   0.897    -8.70e-06    9.93e-06
      CapexRev    -.2109476   .1238795    -1.70   0.089    -.4537469    .0318517
        RevSub     .0004013   .0001136     3.53   0.000     .0001787     .000624
        SubEmp     .0006213   .0000865     7.18   0.000     .0004516    .0007909
          NYRS    -.0042436   .0050208    -0.85   0.398    -.0140843    .0055971
                                                                                
         VRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  61.020404                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)     =     212.52
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 7C: SCALE EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH LAG, 
INTERACTION TERM AND CRGDPPCSQUARE IN THE 
MODEL 
 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
            66 right-censored observations
           161     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .5645095   .1252413                      .3223797     .784031
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .0691374   .0039977    17.29   0.000     .0613021    .0769727
      /sigma_u     .0787153   .0195325     4.03   0.000     .0404323    .1169983
                                                                                
         _cons     .2950203   .1027009     2.87   0.004     .0937302    .4963104
  CGDPPCSquare     1.23e-09   5.28e-10     2.33   0.020     1.98e-10    2.27e-09
SubEmpCapexRev     .0001485   .0002112     0.70   0.482    -.0002654    .0005624
                
           L1.     .4507833    .061102     7.38   0.000     .3310255    .5705411
            SE  
                
          LDev    -.0626615   .0499734    -1.25   0.210    -.1606075    .0352846
           CP1     .0024155   .0007028     3.44   0.001      .001038     .003793
           HHI     .0000165   .0000104     1.58   0.114    -3.94e-06    .0000369
       CRGDPPC    -4.04e-06   3.03e-06    -1.33   0.184    -9.98e-06    1.91e-06
      CapexRev    -.3585588   .0653125    -5.49   0.000    -.4865688   -.2305487
        RevSub     .0002069   .0000493     4.20   0.000     .0001103    .0003036
        SubEmp    -.0000522   .0000523    -1.00   0.318    -.0001546    .0000503
          NYRS    -.0014976   .0030289    -0.49   0.621    -.0074342    .0044389
                                                                                
            SE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  161.85376                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)     =     208.17
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 8A: CRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH 
LAG, INTERACTION TERM AND THE TWO QUADRATIC 
TERMS IN THE MODEL 
 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
            64 right-censored observations
           163     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .6611493   .1057631                      .4400389    .8369684
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .0977713   .0056601    17.27   0.000     .0866777    .1088649
      /sigma_u     .1365705   .0312204     4.37   0.000     .0753796    .1977615
                                                                                
         _cons     .0248728   .1195336     0.21   0.835    -.2094088    .2591544
  CGDPPCSquare     1.24e-09   7.29e-10     1.71   0.088    -1.85e-10    2.67e-09
    NYRSSquare     .0004312    .000291     1.48   0.138    -.0001391    .0010015
SubEmpCapexRev    -.0020183   .0002976    -6.78   0.000    -.0026016    -.001435
                
           L1.      .309999   .0569008     5.45   0.000     .1984754    .4215225
         CRSTE  
                
          LDev     .0744411   .0846246     0.88   0.379    -.0914201    .2403023
           CP1     .0057101   .0012409     4.60   0.000      .003278    .0081422
           HHI     7.24e-06   .0000145     0.50   0.618    -.0000212    .0000357
       CRGDPPC    -1.94e-06   4.24e-06    -0.46   0.648    -.0000103    6.37e-06
      CapexRev    -.3361071   .0886071    -3.79   0.000    -.5097738   -.1624404
        RevSub     .0003798   .0000739     5.14   0.000     .0002349    .0005247
        SubEmp     .0005289   .0000787     6.72   0.000     .0003746    .0006831
          NYRS    -.0230258   .0125492    -1.83   0.067    -.0476218    .0015701
                                                                                
         CRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  106.23249                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(12)     =     316.87
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 8B:   VRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH 
LAG, INTERACTION TERM AND THE TWO QUADRATIC 
TERMS IN THE MODEL 
 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
. 
            94 right-censored observations
           133     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .7380041   .0945738                      .5271026    .8861723
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .1017387   .0066877    15.21   0.000     .0886309    .1148464
      /sigma_u     .1707529   .0399666     4.27   0.000     .0924199     .249086
                                                                                
         _cons     .2966933    .140236     2.12   0.034     .0218359    .5715508
  CGDPPCSquare    -4.08e-10   8.60e-10    -0.48   0.635    -2.09e-09    1.28e-09
    NYRSSquare     .0005122   .0003481     1.47   0.141    -.0001701    .0011945
SubEmpCapexRev    -.0022043   .0003402    -6.48   0.000    -.0028711   -.0015375
                
           L1.      .353548   .0678519     5.21   0.000     .2205607    .4865353
         VRSTE  
                
          LDev     .1125849   .1065419     1.06   0.291    -.0962334    .3214031
           CP1     .0035107   .0013453     2.61   0.009     .0008741    .0061474
           HHI    -.0000221   .0000172    -1.28   0.199    -.0000559    .0000116
       CRGDPPC     1.54e-06   4.78e-06     0.32   0.747    -7.83e-06    .0000109
      CapexRev    -.2286808   .1233934    -1.85   0.064    -.4705275    .0131659
        RevSub     .0003813   .0001127     3.38   0.001     .0001604    .0006021
        SubEmp     .0006542   .0000897     7.29   0.000     .0004784      .00083
          NYRS    -.0242791    .014519    -1.67   0.094    -.0527358    .0041777
                                                                                
         VRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =   62.11179                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(12)     =     215.18
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 8C: SCALE EFFICIENCY REGRESSION RESULT WITH LAG, 
INTERACTION TERM AND THE TWO QUADRATIC TERMS 
IN THE MODEL 
 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
. 
            66 right-censored observations
           161     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
                                                                                
           rho     .5799563   .1225615                      .3399005    .7928352
                                                                                
      /sigma_e     .0689104    .003983    17.30   0.000     .0611039    .0767168
      /sigma_u      .080972   .0198425     4.08   0.000     .0420814    .1198626
                                                                                
         _cons     .3101194   .1042652     2.97   0.003     .1057633    .5144755
  CGDPPCSquare     1.33e-09   5.49e-10     2.43   0.015     2.58e-10    2.41e-09
    NYRSSquare     .0002205   .0001991     1.11   0.268    -.0001698    .0006108
SubEmpCapexRev     .0001647   .0002114     0.78   0.436    -.0002497    .0005791
                
           L1.      .447649   .0610876     7.33   0.000     .3279195    .5673786
            SE  
                
          LDev    -.0494956   .0522808    -0.95   0.344     -.151964    .0529729
           CP1      .002874   .0008232     3.49   0.000     .0012605    .0044875
           HHI     .0000189   .0000107     1.76   0.078    -2.15e-06      .00004
       CRGDPPC    -3.69e-06   3.08e-06    -1.20   0.231    -9.73e-06    2.35e-06
      CapexRev    -.3650778   .0653634    -5.59   0.000    -.4931878   -.2369678
        RevSub      .000201   .0000494     4.07   0.000     .0001042    .0002978
        SubEmp    -.0000454   .0000526    -0.86   0.388    -.0001484    .0000576
          NYRS    -.0101365    .008381    -1.21   0.226     -.026563    .0062899
                                                                                
            SE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood  =  162.47205                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(12)     =     208.64
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =         12
                                                              max =         12
                                                              avg =       11.9
                                                              min =         11
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs     =        227
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APPENDIX 9A: TOBIT MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS 
WITH CRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AS DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            69 right-censored observations at CRSTE >= 1
           178     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(3) = 71.28                  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
Instruments:   NYRS SubEmp HHI CP1 LDev RevEmp RGDPPC CapexSub Revenue
Instrumented:  RevSub CRGDPPC CapexRev
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2754942   .1107167    -2.49   0.013    -.4924949   -.0584935
        LDev    -.0355571   .0543355    -0.65   0.513    -.1420527    .0709384
         CP1     .0084233   .0013606     6.19   0.000     .0057565    .0110901
         HHI     9.03e-06   .0000103     0.88   0.382    -.0000112    .0000293
      SubEmp     .0002527   .0000446     5.67   0.000     .0001653      .00034
        NYRS    -.0130184   .0042432    -3.07   0.002    -.0213349   -.0047019
    CapexRev    -.1080831   .0477819    -2.26   0.024     -.201734   -.0144323
     CRGDPPC    -4.91e-06   .0000325    -0.15   0.880    -.0000687    .0000589
      RevSub     .0007581    .000109     6.96   0.000     .0005446    .0009717
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -3409.3753                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =     261.30
Tobit model with endogenous regressors          Number of obs     =        247
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APPENDIX 9B: TOBIT MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS 
WITH VRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AS DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           103 right-censored observations at VRSTE >= 1
           144     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(3) = 43.64                  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
Instruments:   NYRS SubEmp HHI CP1 LDev RevEmp RGDPPC CapexSub Revenue
Instrumented:  RevSub CRGDPPC CapexRev
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1629163   .1520362    -1.07   0.284    -.4609017     .135069
        LDev     -.001016   .0741195    -0.01   0.989    -.1462876    .1442557
         CP1     .0067035     .00179     3.75   0.000     .0031952    .0102118
         HHI     .0000167   .0000139     1.21   0.227    -.0000104    .0000439
      SubEmp     .0002401   .0000611     3.93   0.000     .0001205    .0003598
        NYRS    -.0103246    .005776    -1.79   0.074    -.0216454    .0009962
    CapexRev     .0686617   .0829721     0.83   0.408    -.0939606     .231284
     CRGDPPC     .0000384   .0000404     0.95   0.343    -.0000409    .0001176
      RevSub     .0007135   .0001424     5.01   0.000     .0004345    .0009926
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -3478.8031                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =     143.21
Tobit model with endogenous regressors          Number of obs     =        247
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APPENDIX 9C: TOBIT MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS 
WITH SCALE EFFICIENCY AS DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            71 right-censored observations at SE >= 1
           176     uncensored observations
             0  left-censored observations
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(3) = 40.31                  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
Instruments:   NYRS SubEmp HHI CP1 LDev RevEmp RGDPPC CapexSub Revenue
Instrumented:  RevSub CRGDPPC CapexRev
                                                                              
       _cons     .5634312   .0788902     7.14   0.000     .4088092    .7180533
        LDev    -.0699008   .0389335    -1.80   0.073     -.146209    .0064074
         CP1     .0042261   .0009565     4.42   0.000     .0023515    .0061008
         HHI    -3.35e-06   7.34e-06    -0.46   0.648    -.0000177     .000011
      SubEmp     .0000868   .0000321     2.71   0.007      .000024    .0001497
        NYRS    -.0062479   .0030071    -2.08   0.038    -.0121417   -.0003541
    CapexRev     -.163924   .0338005    -4.85   0.000    -.2301718   -.0976763
     CRGDPPC      -.00002   .0000201    -0.99   0.320    -.0000593    .0000194
      RevSub     .0003429   .0000729     4.70   0.000        .0002    .0004858
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -3355.1535                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =      86.72
Tobit model with endogenous regressors          Number of obs     =        247
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APPENDIX 10A:  RANDOM EFFECT INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
 REGRESSION WITH CRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY    
 AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
Instruments:    NYRS SubEmp HHI CP1 LDev RevEmp RGDPPC CapexSub Revenue
Instrumented:   RevSub CapexRev CRGDPPC
                                                                              
         rho    .19056119   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18292018
     sigma_u    .08875378
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1475039   .1332018    -1.11   0.268    -.4085746    .1135669
        LDev     .0064467   .0656968     0.10   0.922    -.1223167    .1352101
         CP1     .0070717   .0012296     5.75   0.000     .0046617    .0094816
         HHI     8.87e-06   .0000109     0.81   0.416    -.0000125    .0000303
      SubEmp     .0002044    .000047     4.35   0.000     .0001124    .0002965
        NYRS    -.0086165   .0035182    -2.45   0.014    -.0155121   -.0017209
     CRGDPPC     -.000017   .0000197    -0.86   0.388    -.0000556    .0000216
    CapexRev    -.0336274   .0362474    -0.93   0.354     -.104671    .0374163
      RevSub     .0005361   .0001308     4.10   0.000     .0002798    .0007924
                                                                              
       CRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =     152.77
     overall = 0.5758                                         max =         13
     between = 0.7378                                         avg =       12.9
     within  = 0.2809                                         min =         12
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
G2SLS random-effects IV regression              Number of obs     =        246
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APPENDIX 10B:  RANDOM EFFECT INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
REGRESSION WITH VRS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY  
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
Instruments:    NYRS SubEmp HHI CP1 LDev RevEmp RGDPPC CapexSub Revenue
Instrumented:   RevSub CapexRev CRGDPPC
                                                                              
         rho    .54715319   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .12083665
     sigma_u    .13282428
                                                                              
       _cons     .0939364   .2499697     0.38   0.707    -.3959952     .583868
        LDev     .0466874   .1328767     0.35   0.725    -.2137461    .3071209
         CP1     .0049143   .0017965     2.74   0.006     .0013932    .0084354
         HHI    -1.75e-06   .0000158    -0.11   0.912    -.0000326    .0000291
      SubEmp     .0002295   .0000598     3.84   0.000     .0001123    .0003467
        NYRS    -.0063821   .0038356    -1.66   0.096    -.0138997    .0011354
     CRGDPPC    -.0000209   .0000224    -0.93   0.350    -.0000649     .000023
    CapexRev     .1057722   .0451376     2.34   0.019     .0173042    .1942401
      RevSub     .0004548   .0002499     1.82   0.069     -.000035    .0009446
                                                                              
       VRSTE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =      69.83
     overall = 0.4288                                         max =         13
     between = 0.5678                                         avg =       12.9
     within  = 0.1491                                         min =         12
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
G2SLS random-effects IV regression              Number of obs     =        246
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APPENDIX 10C:  RANDOM EFFECT INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
  REGRESSION WITH SE AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 
Source(s): Author‟s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
Instruments:    NYRS SubEmp HHI CP1 LDev RevEmp RGDPPC CapexSub Revenue
Instrumented:   RevSub CapexRev CRGDPPC
                                                                              
         rho    .27388509   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .13096137
     sigma_u    .08043123
                                                                              
       _cons     .5401899   .1194057     4.52   0.000      .306159    .7742208
        LDev     -.115849   .0598925    -1.93   0.053     -.233236    .0015381
         CP1     .0040815   .0010162     4.02   0.000     .0020897    .0060733
         HHI     5.33e-06   8.95e-06     0.60   0.551    -.0000122    .0000229
      SubEmp     .0000224   .0000378     0.59   0.555    -.0000518    .0000965
        NYRS    -.0043409   .0026932    -1.61   0.107    -.0096194    .0009377
     CRGDPPC    -.0000225   .0000152    -1.48   0.138    -.0000523    7.24e-06
    CapexRev     -.141621   .0282284    -5.02   0.000    -.1969476   -.0862944
      RevSub     .0003252   .0001195     2.72   0.007      .000091    .0005595
                                                                              
          SE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =      61.51
     overall = 0.1836                                         max =         13
     between = 0.1500                                         avg =       12.9
     within  = 0.2161                                         min =         12
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         19
G2SLS random-effects IV regression              Number of obs     =        246
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APPENDIX 11: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Deregulation 
1. How would you describe the nature of the telecommunication industry in 
Nigeria? 
 Emerging industry  
 Mature industry 
 Declining industry 
 Other(s) (Please Specify) …………………………………………. 
 
2. How would you classify the pattern of change in the industry? 
 Very rapid  
 Rapid  
 Moderate  
 Slow  
 Very slow   
 
3. What are the functions performed by the regulatory agency 
a. ………………………………………………… 
b. ………………………………………………… 
c. ………………………………………………… 
d. ………………………………………………… 
e. ………………………………………………… 
 
4. What, if any are the type(s) of support your organization has received from 
regulatory agency? (Select all that apply) 
 Financial 
 Industry/Market analysis 
 Infrastructure development 
 Training and development 
 Provision/availability of Information  
 Contract/Dispute resolution  
 Other(s) please 
specify…………………………………………………… 
 
5. What would you say is/are the primary reasons for the deregulation of 
telecom industry (Select all that apply) 
 Promote Investment 
 Universal/Wider access to telephone services 
 Increase teledensity 
 Promote competition 
 Maintain reasonable rates 
 Service quality improvement 
 Address government deficit spending 
 Technological trend 
 Economic development 
 Sociocultural trend 
 Political trend 
 Legal & regulatory trend 
 Other (please specify) ………………………………… 
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6. On a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being the highest), how would you rate the impact 
of the following policies on the deregulation of the telecommunication 
industry? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Deregulatory policy      
Licensing policy      
Wage policy      
Trade policy      
Competition policy      
Macroeconomic policy      
Tax policy      
Other(s) (Please specify)      
 
7. On a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being the highest), how has government policies 
influenced the direction of the telecommunications industry? (Select all that 
apply) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Innovation      
Product pricing and delivery       
Increased partnership among operators      
Network access      
Increased competition      
Reduced costs      
Increased subscriptions       
Increased investment in infrastructures      
Other(s) (Please specify)      
 
8. Your perception of operating in a deregulated environment could best be 
described as:  
 Very successful 
 Successful 
 Neutral 
 Unsuccessful 
 Very unsuccessful 
 
9. What would you say were the difficulties experienced in the deregulated 
environment?  
a. …………………………………………………… 
b. …………………………………………………… 
c. …………………………………………………… 
d. …………………………………………………… 
e. ……………………………………………………  
 
Structure of the Industry 
10. Your view of the structure of the industry is? 
 Monopoly 
 Oligopoly 
 Monopolistic competition 
 Perfect competition 
 Other(s) please specify ………………………………… 
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11. Based on your knowledge of the industry, you would rate the following 
information about the industry as: 
 
 Low Moderate High 
Number of firms    
Growth rate of the industry    
Profitability growth    
Entry barriers    
Competition among firms    
Capital requirement    
Other(s) (Please Specify)    
 
Conduct of firms in the industry 
12. What are the entry barriers in the industry? 
a. ………………………………………. 
b. ………………………………………. 
c. ………………………………………. 
d. ………………………………………. 
e. ………………………………………. 
 
13. On a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being the highest), your perception of the level of 
impact of deregulated environment would be:  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Business focus      
Product Pricing      
Advertising & Promotion      
Distribution      
Research and innovation      
Product & service differentiation      
Cooperation with competition      
Legal strategies      
Investment in infrastructure      
Other(s) (Please specify)      
 
Performance 
14. How would you describe industry trends in the following areas? 
 
 Increase Decrease No change 
Number of service providers    
Number of product/service substitutes    
Prices charges customers for service 
provided (ARPS) 
   
Cost of producing services    
Access to network    
Investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure 
   
Level of market competition    
Quality of services provided    
Churn rate    
Other(s) (Please specify)    
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15(a) Would you say that the telecommunications industry has performed better 
under deregulation? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
(b) If YES, on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being the highest), indicate how you would rate 
the performance of the industry in the following areas 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Profitability      
Efficiency       
Technological advancement      
Productivity      
Product/service quality       
Return on investment (ROI)      
Market share      
Network accessibility      
Teledensity      
Customer service      
Investment in infrastructure      
New product/service development      
Increased competition      
Other(s) (Please specify)      
 
16. Your organization could best be described as using which of the following 
strategies? 
 Cost leadership strategy 
 Product differentiation strategy 
 Focus strategy 
 Other(s) (Please specify)………………………………… 
 
Background  
17. Which of the following best represents the number of years you have been 
with the firm? 
 1–5 years 
 6–10 years 
 11–15 years 
 16–20 years 
 Over 20 years 
 
18. Which of the following fits the description of your position/title? 
 Manager 
 Supervisor 
 Coordinator 
 Director 
 Chief Executive Office 
 Other 
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19. Which of the following best describes your educational attainment? 
 Less than high school 
 High school 
 National Diploma 
 HND/University Degree 
 Master/PhD 
 
20. Which of the following telecommunications service(s) does your organization 
currently provide to customers? (Select all that apply)  
 Wireless/mobile phone service (GSM) 
 CDMA 
 Fixed/Wireless service 
 Other (Please Specify)……………………. 
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APPENDIX 12: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
HREC Approval Number:       
TO: Participant 
Full Project Title: Deregulation in the Telecommunications Industry and its Impact: 
The Case of Nigeria 
Principal Researcher: Abayomi Oredegbe 
Other Researcher(s): None 
 I would like to invite you to take part in this research project. 
 
1. Procedures 
 
 Purpose and Objectives of the Research 
By studying the deregulation of the telecommunications industry and its impact, the research 
will examine how deregulation of the industry has influenced the competitiveness of firms in 
the industry. Specific questions that will be addressed include the driving forces behind 
deregulation and the impact of deregulatory policies on the performance of firms in the 
industry. The research will also seek to understand the level of competition in the industry 
and how the structure of the industry has evolved from monopoly. The research will lead to 
an understanding of the influence of environmental change on the competitive strategies of 
firms in the industry in areas relating to resource allocation and strategic behaviours. The 
quest for this understanding will lead to the exploration of trends and paradigm shift in the in 
the Nigerian telecommunications firms and the industry couple with recommendations on 
policy directions that could be used to enhance the competitiveness and long term 
sustainability of firms and industry as a whole.  
 
 Methodology 
Quantitative and qualitative data will be collected from firms in the industry using a survey 
questionnaire. Purposive sampling will be used to identify participants to complete the 
survey questionnaire. The survey questionnaire will take approximately 30 to 40 minutes to 
complete and respondents will be asked questions in areas such reasons for deregulation, 
the change in the structure of the industry, its impact on firms’ performance and strategic 
behaviours, and implications. The data will then be analyzed using descriptive statistics. 
 
 Monitoring of the Research 
To ensure compliance with ethics protocol, research participants will be asked to voluntarily 
indicate their willingness to participate in the study. Although there are no identifiable risks 
associated with this research, participants are not obligated to answer all of the questions in 
the survey questionnaire and interviews. Also, participants will have the choice of 
disengaging from the research at any stage of the research. Furthermore, research 
participants will be assured of data security as the data collected will be kept in a secure 
location that is accessible only to the researcher. Once the research is concluded, each 
research participants will be given access to the research output if they asked for it. 
 
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S o u t h e r n  Q u e e n s l a n d  
 
The University of Southern Queensland  
 
Participant Information Sheet  
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 Benefits to Participants 
The research will shed lights on the continuous shifts in the sector’s micro and macro 
environmental conditions without losing sight of the impact it has had and/or is having on 
firms in the industry and their relative competitiveness. The study will benefit participants in 
that it will elaborate on how deregulation has shaped the structure, conduct, and 
performance of firms in the industry. The practicality of this research rests on finding out if 
the competitive strategies employed by firms in the industry are working? If not, why? It is 
the view of this research that this information will position telecommunications firms on the 
path to sustainability in the long run. 
 
 Potential Risks 
There are no identifiable risks associated with this research  
 
2. Voluntary Participation 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary. If you do not wish to take part you are not obliged to. If 
you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are free to withdraw from the project 
at any stage. Please note that due to anonymity of research participants, it is unfortunate 
that there will be no opportunity for withdrawal of consent to participate in the study once the 
survey questionnaire is completed and returned to the researcher. However should you 
decided to withdraw during the interview, any information obtained from you at this stage will 
be destroyed.  
Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part and then withdraw, will 
not affect you personally nor will it affect your relationship with the researcher.  
The researcher encourages you to notify him should you decide not to participate in the 
research. 
Should you have any queries regarding the progress or conduct of this research, you can 
contact the principal researcher: 
 
Abayomi Oredegbe 
PhD Candidate, Faculty of Business, Education, Law and Arts 
University of Southern Queensland 
646 Hogan Avenue 
P.O. Box 2848, The Pas 
Manitoba, Canada 
R9A1M6 
Tel: 1-(204)-623-6585 
Email: aoredegbe@ucn.ca 
 
If you have any ethical concerns with how the research is being conducted or any queries 
about your rights as a participant please feel free to contact the University of Southern 
Queensland Ethics Officer on the following details. 
 
Ethics and Research Integrity Officer 
Office of Research and Higher Degrees 
University of Southern Queensland 
West Street, Toowoomba 4350 
Ph: +61 7 4631 2690 
Email: ethics@usq.edu.au 
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APPENDIX 13: CONSENT LETTER 
 
 
HREC Approval Number:       
TO: Participant 
Full Project Title: Deregulation in the Telecommunications Industry and its Impact: 
The Case of Nigeria 
Principal Researcher: Abayomi Oredegbe 
Student Researcher: Abayomi Oredegbe, PhD(c) 
Associate Researcher(s): None  
 I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and purpose of the research 
project has been explained to me. I understand and agree to take part. 
 
 I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it. 
 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage and that this will 
not affect my status now or in the future. 
 
 I confirm that I am over 18 years of age. Omit if participants are under age of 18. 
 
 I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, I will not 
be identified and my personal results will remain confidential. If other arrangements have 
been agreed in relation to identification of research participants this point will require 
amendment to accurately reflect those arrangements.  
 
 I understand that the tape will be transcribed and will only be accessible to the 
researcher only. Also, I understand that once the research is concluded the researcher 
will erase the tape's content  
 
(if tape is to be retained, insert details of how and where the tape will be stored, who will 
have access to it and what limits will be placed on that access) 
 
 I understand that I will be audio taped / videotaped / photographed during the study. Omit 
this point if not. 
 
Participants under the age of 18 normally require parental or guardian consent to be 
involved in research. The consent form should allow for those under the age of 18 to 
agree to their involvement and for a parent to give consent. Copy and paste another 
signature field if necessary. 
 
Name of participant………………………………………………………………....... 
 
Signed…………………………………………………….Date………………………. 
 
 
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S o u t h e r n  Q u e e n s l a n d  
 
The University of Southern Queensland  
 
Consent Form 
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If you have any ethical concerns with how the research is being conducted or any queries 
about your rights as a participant please feel free to contact the University of Southern 
Queensland Ethics Officer on the following details. 
 
Ethics and Research Integrity Officer 
Office of Research and Higher Degrees 
University of Southern Queensland 
West Street, Toowoomba 4350 
Ph: +61 7 4631 2690 
Email: ethics@usq.edu.au 
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APPENDIX 14: ETHICS APPROVAL  
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APPENDIX 15: CRTC LETTER OF DECLINE 
 
 
 
